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SUMMARY
The aim of the project was a comprehensive study of the Iranian o i l  
industry in  general, and the National Iranian O il Company in  particu lar, 
over the past seventy years.
Part I  of the d issertation  described the h is to r ica l background to 1951<> 
I t  dealt with the various concession agreements, the impact of o i l  revenues 
on the Iranian economy and the sta te  of the domestic d istribution  network©
Part II  was concerned with the a c t iv it ie s  of NIOC and the Iranian Gov­
ernment in  exercising a firmer control over the Iranian o i l  industry in  the 
period 1951- 7! • The concessionary and non-concessionary agreements were 
considered and an analysis was made of the p r o fita b ility  of each type of 
contract© The role of OPEC and i t s  influence on the Iranian o i l  industry 
was also examined© F inally , the e ffect of o i l  revenues on the domestic 
economy was investigated and contrasted with the period up to l951o
Part I I I  dealt with the domestic a c t iv it ie s  of NIOC in  the period 
1951-71© I t  reviewed the objectives of the Company and the manner of th e ir  
implementation© Thus, exploration, production, d istribution and transport 
were studied© The growth of Iranian demand was next considered and th is  
led  to the investigation of the apparent imbalance in  patterns of supply 
and demand, i t s  e ffe c ts , and the examination of possib le remedies© A lso, 
p rices, p ro fits  and costs of NIOC were analysed. I t  was shown that the 
governmentfs attitude towards prices was the single most important factor  
in  causing the imbalance between the supply and demand© Moreover, the 
price stab iliza tion  po licy  resulted in  cross-subsidization which detriment­
a lly  affected some regions©
F inally , i t  was shown that the Company* s a c t iv it ie s  could not be judged 
on a purely commercial basis and that the government*s intervention, direct 
and in d irect, has had a major e ffect on i t s  development©
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INTRODUCTION
The o i l  industry has fascinated economists, p o lit ic ia n s and lay-men^ 
a lik e , and since the turn of the century, an a ir  of mystery has surrounded 
the operations of the international petroleum corporations* In the o i l  
producing countries the role of o i l  has been crucial and has had the most 
profound so c ia l, p o l it ic a l  and economic effects© As an Iranian I have been 
interested in  the o i l  industry since childhood and therefore, when I  decid­
ed to  carry out a research project on th is  subject, i t  was only natural that 
I  should choose Iran. Personal reasons apart, there were other considerat­
ions which determined my choice: Iran i s  the. oldest Middle Eastern o i l
producer, the f i r s t  country to  nationalize i t s  o i l  industry, the originator  
of the national o i l  company concept in  the Middle East and not le a s t , the 
most economically advanced nation in  the region0
In the past decade or so , a great deal of attention has been devoted to  
the impact of national o i l  companies on the international petroleum indust­
ry© Among these, NIOC's, role .was that of a pioneer: i t  led  the way for
new types of non-concessionary partnership and service contracts which have 
now become commonplace; i t  developed a great deal of expertise and techn­
ic a l  know-how; i t  promoted the large expansion of domestic demand for  o i l  
products and managed to create a strong organizational and technical base, 
capable of coping, with the complex problems of the modern o i l  industry©
My f ir s t  task was to consider the impact of the o i l  sector on the devel­
opment of the indigenous economy in  the pre-nationalization as w ell as in  
the post-nationalization periods, Further I had to consider the sign ificance  
of the non-concessionary agreements compared to the conventional agreements, 
to see the extent by which the o i l  industry has contributed to  the spectac­
ular growth in  Iran in the 1960* s 0
oGiven the absence of literatu re  on the domestic petroleum markets of 
the o i l  producing countries of the Kiddle East, I was prompted to  attempt 
a detailed study of NIOC’s domestic a c t iv it ie s . By the la te  1960*s ,  NIOC’s 
domestic sa les had passed the fikOQ m illion  mark and i t s  net worth was over 
$700 m illion , figures comparable to those of some independemt o i l  companies 
in  the Y/est. Accordingly, I  decided to  place the main emphasis of the 
project on the domestic a c tiv it ie s  of NIOC, i t s  development in  the past two 
decades, i t s  achievements and i t s  failures*
As an economist, I  began by applying the methods of economic analysis 
to  the a c t iv it ie s  of NIOC to investigate whether i t  functions as a p r o fit-  
motivatedcompany. Thus, I  decided to examine the economics o f NIOC’s 
operation in  general. S p ec ifica lly , I  considered the following: the
economics of expansion of the domestic distribution and transport network; 
the basis on which p r ices, costs and profits are determined; and the econ­
omic ju stifica tion s for  entering into non-concessionary agreements, as w ell 
as attempting to  e;sport o i l  d irectly  to Eastern European and other countries. 
Furthermore, I  wished to  discover to what extent NIOC’s objectives have 
been achieved. F in ally , whether these objectives have been in  lin e  with 
the overall strategy of the government, and indeed, whether there has been 
any coherent energy po licy  in  Iran*
I t  soon became clear however, that NIOC was a strange mixture of giant 
business corporation and government department. The Company was independ­
ent insofar as the planning of supply and demand was concerned, but i t s  re­
lations with the foreign o i l  companies and i t s  domestic price p o licy  were 
in  practice dictated by the government. For instance, the M inistry of 
Economy and the Plan Organization, the two main ben efic iaries of o i l  reven­
ues, played key roles in  NIOC’s negotiations with the foreign o i l  companies* 
Also, NIOC’ s decisions to  build  refin er ies , storage tanks and p ip elines  
entailed of necessity , co-ordination with, .and involvement by the M inistry 
of Roads and Transport, and the Plan Organization. As to p r ice s , the 
government e ffe c tiv e ly  removed NIOC’s power to a lter  the prices of the 
four main products (87 percent of NIOC's domestic sa les in  1969)0
In view of the above, I decided to broaden my analysis to  considet 
so c ia l and p o lit ic a l ,  as well as economic factors which have undoubtably ,
uaffected the p o lic ie s  of the Company. I t  became obvious that a company 
such as NIOC could not be appraised on a purely business b a sis , since  
economic considerations have frequently given way to  p o lit ic a l  ones. Thus, 
a s tr ic t ly  economic approach seemed no longer appropriate, and in  the end 
I  decided to carry out a detailed study of NI0C*s a c t iv it ie s  so as to  ident­
i f y  not only the economic, but also the p o lit ic a l  and so c ia l pressures 
which determined i t s  a c t iv it ie s . Moreover, I  have attempted to id en tify  
the problems caused by these non-economic forces and to offer possib le rem­
edies for th e ir  solution©
*  *  ' . ♦  . ■ *  " *
An important obstacle to research in  developing countries i s  the laok 
of data. Iran i s  of course, no different in  th is  respect* The data r e la t­
ing to the finan cia l a c t iv it ie s  of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company was made 
available to me by B .P ., although i t s  scope was lim ited to  very b r ie f annual 
reports. The systematic and regular co llection  and co lla tion  of s t a t is t ic s  
in  Iran rea lly  started in  the mid-l950*So In some cases cross-checking of 
the data showed that i t  was unreliable; in  others the material was of a 
confidential nature and not therefore availab le. Thus i t  was unavoidable - 
that the research focussed on areas where information could be obtained.
In th is  way the a v a ila b ility  of the data has to a sign ifican t extent d ic t­
ated the development of th is  d issertation .
Published material such as books and journals, did not play an import­
ant role in  th is  project, except for the h is to r ica l section . Various art­
ic le s  published in  English and Persian did not cover a l l  the areas of the 
study and the sources were, in  some cases, conflictin g  and biased? I  
therefore decided to  go on a four month trip  to  Iran and to try  to c o llec t  
the necessary information from the original records in  order to avoid being 
entirely  dependent on secondary sources of information. This was considered 
essen tia l as the data could be interpreted d ifferen tly  by d ifferent re­
searchers. Unfortunately, the original records were not always in  a form
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that was immediately useful and the frequent instances of con flic tin g  inform­
ation had to be laboriously sorted out, often with a great deal of assistance  
from various experts*
The f ir s t  two months of my Iranian tour were spent at the NIOG Headquart­
ers, particu larly  in  the Distribution Department* I was able to  meet various 
senior o f f ic ia ls  who p atien tly  explained the technical, p o l it ic a l  and econ­
omic aspects of NIOC's operations* I spent a week at the Headquarters of 
the National Iranian Gas Company and a couple of days at the Tehran refinery© 
Another important v i s i t  was to the Central Bank of Iran, particu larly  i t s  
O il Department and Household Budget Survey Department* Several interviews 
at the Headquarters of the Consortium were also fru itfu l*  Apart from prov­
iding me with most of what I  needed, they offered to  arrange for me, a two- 
week tr ip  to southern Iran to see th e ir  operations -  an o ffer  I had to decl­
ine because of in su ffic ien t time* My la s t  two v is i t s  entailed  journeys to  
the Plan Organization's Energy Department and a meeting with the Deputy 
Prime M inister where I  received valuable guidance©
On my return to the U*K., I  paid several v is i t s  to  the B*P. Headquarters 
to see the Annual Reports of AIOC and to discuss the events during the 
period before the nationalization* I spent much time in  the lib ra r ies  of 
B.P„, S h ell, the In stitu te  of Petroleum and the In stitu te  of Development 
Studieso
In many cases I was obliged to  rely  on the experts* opinions instead of 
s ta t is t ic a l  facts* There were also frequent occasions when I had to  specul­
ate and use my own discretion in  se lectin g  and intexpreting co n flic tin g  in ­
formation • Thus the a v a ila b ility  and r e l ia b ili ty  of m aterial -  s ta t is t ic s ,!  
and other -  had an important bearing on the extent to  which I  achieved my 
objectives*
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PART I: Historical Developments to 1951
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CHAPTER ONE
The History of Persian Oil Concessions 1901-51
The purpose of th is  chapter i s  to  discuss the Persian o i l  concessions 
in  the f ir s t  half of the 20th. Century, to  explain the circumstances which 
led  to  th e ir  award and la ter  cancellation and the economic e ffe c ts  of these  
concessions on the course of Persian history©
The P o lit ic a l and Economic Background
Despite her glorious h istory, Persia has been a weak and under-developed 
nation in  the past two centuries© The growing power of the T zarist regime 
to  the north of the country led to  some wars between Persia and Russia 
which eventually destroyed the m ilitary power of Persia and paved the way 
for  ever increasing Russian influence in  the country. Russia*s relentless: 
search for an outlet to  the open sea was the main cause of Russia* s in terest  
in  Persia©
P o lit ic a l r ivalry between Russia and Britain however, started with a 
fear of the Russian advance towards India. This fear placed P ersia in  a 
prominent position  in  B r itish  strategic planning. I t  i s  to  be emphasized 
that during the 19th. Century, B ritish  in terest in  Persia was primarily 
stra teg ic , and commercial considerations occupied a secondary placeo B r it­
ish  policy  in  Persia in  the 19th. and 20th. Centuries can be considered frcm 
four points of view: the f i r s t  embraced the commercial and strateg ic  ±nt&
erests of the B ritish  as a maritime power in  the possession of India; the 
second, sharp rivalry  between B ritain  and Russia in  p o lit ic a l  and economic 
affa irs; co-operation with Russia for the maintenance of peace on Indian 
borders, and f in a lly , the partition  of Persia along the lin e  of the devel­
opment of the o i l  industry and the expansion of the B r itish  influence in
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p o lit ic a l  l i f e  of the country (1)
There was a time when the B ritish  statesmen were considering a po licy  
which sought to  strengthen Persia; they wanted Persia to stop the tid e  of 
Russian movement towards India, but la ter  the B r itish  aimed at weakening 
Persia* They followed a p o licy  of demanding equal p r iv ileges and concess­
ions in  the south to balance every Russian gain in  the north0 This policy  
stripped Persia of her sovereignty and culminated in  the Anglo-Russian 
Treaty of 1907, which e ffe c tiv e ly  partitioned Persia by dividing i t  in to  
two spheres of influence with a neutral zone in  between*. Both countries 
agreed to respect Persian sovereignty and independence* Neither party in  
fact did soo
The discovery of o i l  in  Persia was a turning point in  B r itish  p o licy  
towards Persia* For the f ir s t  time strategic considerations gave way to  
commercial interests* As we sh a ll see in  the course of th is  chapter, the 
B ritish  stripped the central government of i t s  powers by making separate' 
deals with the rebellious tribes*
In March 1 5 >  tbe second Anglo-Russian convention, referred to  as ”the 
Constantinople Agreement”, was signedo The agreement gave to  the B r itish , 
the o il-r ic h  neutral zone in  return for Constantinople and Eastern Turkeyo 
At the same time the Russians (with the approval of the B ritish ) were adva­
ncing th e ir  troops towards Tehran with the f in a l aim of a second and comp­
le te  partition  of Persia* Fortunately, the 19*17 October Revolution in  
Russia took place before the f in a l annexation was near completion and Lenin 
ordered a l l  the Russian troops to  evacuate Persia* Perhaps, had i t  not 
been for th is  single  event, Persian o i l  would have caused the country to  
become colonies of Russia and B ritain
Socia l. P o lit ic a l and Economic Conditions at the Turn of the Century
As in  many other A siatic  countries, the monarchs ruled Persia with an 
iron f is t*  Unlike the p o lit ic a l  development of many western countries, 
there was no p o lit ic a l ly  conscious middle class capable of curbing the 
power of the Shahs* The main so c ia l and economic groups were the peasants,
1* Fof detailed analysis see N.S* Fatemi "A Diplomatic History of Persia” 
(Whither Books, New York) 1952©
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the landords, the nomadic tr ib es , the relig ious hierarchy and the merchants. 
The population of the country in  1900 was just under 10 m illion  and the 
rural population constituted over 80 percent of the to ta l .  (2)
The peasants, although le g a lly  free  were for a l l  p ractica l purposes 
bound to  the land they cultivated . They liv ed  in  small v illa g e s , close to  
subsistence le v e l and the farms generally belonged to absentee landlords. 
They were victims of poverty, disease and ignorance© Just as the Shahs 
considered the country to  be th e ir  personal property, the landlords con­
sidered the peasants as th e ir  personal slaves. The landlords, who frequ­
ently measured th eir  wealth by the number of v illages they owned, generally  
lived  in  the larger c i t i e s ,  leaving the management of the v illa g es  to  th e ir  
stewards© The most influendial c la ss in  Persia, the landlords never devel­
oped a ’'class consciousness” strong enough to  curb the absolutism of the 
throne© The nomadic tr ib es , representing around one-quarter of the to ta l  
population, lived  in  the mountainous ranges along P ersia 's western and east­
ern borders© They were, from childhood, trained to become good horsemen 
and powerful fig h ters. Their figh ting  power on many occasions exceeded that 
of the central government© Their nomadic habits gave them a strong sense 
of independence and created an attitude of indifference towards the throneo
The relig iou s hierarchy was composed of two groups: mujtaheds and mul­
lahs© Mujtaheds, highly educated in  Moslem law; philosophical and relig iou s  
culture were accepted as part of the upper stratum of the Persian so c ie ty . 
The mullahs,who were, le s s  educated occupied a sim ilar p osition  amongst the 
masses© The income of these groups was provided by donations from the landt 
lords and prescribed by Moslem law, and as such the re lig iou s hierarchy was 
a great supporter of the landlords© Neither of the relig iou s groups had, 
therefore, any sympathy with the peasants, nor did they ever exercise any 
substantial restraint over the power of the Shahs0
The ’’bazar" or merchant c la ss represented the nearest approach to  a 
middle c lass comparable to  western bourgeoisie, but there were important 
differences© The bazar c lass contained none of the lib era l professions 
that played such a sign ifican t role in  transforming the soc ie ty  of Western 
Europe into the secular and democratic c iv iliz a t io n  of our tim es. Nor was 
there in  Persia, an aristocracy of su ffic ien t coherence, and with su ffic ien t
2© J . Bharier ”A Note on the Population of Iran 1900-1966” in  Papulation - ’ 
Studies Vol© XXII, No©2 July, 1968.
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t l y  w ell defined righ ts and duties to  be of any influence in  the a ffa ir s  
of the throne0 There were, of course, large numbers of ind iv iduals holding 
royal t i t l e s 0 Royal harems produced royal princes and th e ir  number grew 
as the> dynasty aged. According to  Haas, in  the reign of Nasser-din-Shah 
(1848-1895)» the descendants of h is  predecessor, Fath-Ali-Shah, could be 
counted by thousands® (3 ) Some of them held o f f ic ia l  p o sitio n s  of respon­
s ib i l i t y ,  most were lo a fers  and con stitu ted  a heavy drain on th e Shahs purse 
but exercised no restra in t on h is behaviour
Such were the economic and so c ia l conditions in  Persia. I t  i s  perhaps 
useful to discuss b r ie fly  the p o lit ic a l  structure of the country prior to  
the discovery of o i l  in  Persia©
The Shahs were absolute rulers; torture, imprisonment and murder were 
the order off the day. There was no coherent system of tax  co llec tio n , and 
in  many cases the peasants had not much to be taxed upon0 The landlords 
were too in flu en cia l for  the government to tax, particu larly  as most of 
them were related to the Royal Family in  one way or another. Taxes c o ll­
ected from the merchants, plus import duty on some goods provided the main 
source of the government’s income or the Shah’s privy purse. This;,, however 
was not su ffic ien t for the extravagent expenditure of the Shahs.
The Shahs supplemented th e ir  income by borrowing from the foreign  
powers, particu larly  from Russia and la ter  from B rita in . In 1900 the 
Russian'Banque des Prets de Perse” had advanced to the Shah, the sum of & 
£2©5 m illion  at f iv e  percent in terest, but the nations independence was 
bartered away over and above th is  f iv e  percent. The Shah had obtained the 
loan on the security  of the customs, other than those in  the Persian Gulf 
region, which had already been pledged ear lier . This new loan agreement 
stipulated that no further loans could be contracted with any foreign gov­
ernment without the consent of the Russian government. Through th is  ingen­
ious provision, the Russian M inister in  Tehran aquired supreme power over 
the executive of the country. A ll loans and concessions were to  be approv­
ed by the Russian M inister in  Tehran,. In  the words of the B r itish  M inister
"The Persian monarchy in  i t s e l f  was an odd, long mismanaged 
esta te , ready to be knocked down, along to  whatever foreign  
power bid highest or threatened most loudly i t s  defenceless 
and degenerate rulers." ( 4)
3o W.S. Haas: "Iran" (Columbia University Press, New York) 1948. P .99 
4« A.Ho Harding: "A Diplomat in  the Bast" London 1928. P. 28
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Another source of the Shah’s revenues was the sa le  of o f f ic ia l  appoint­
ments 0 Customarily, government p osts, from the highest to  the lowest, 
were bought and soldo Direct appointees of the Shah made direct monetary 
contributions to  the Shah’s purse. They in  turn sold posts to th eir  sub­
ordinates, thus a self-rein forcing vicious c irc le  of corruption was formed 
and a corrupt hierarchy of o f f ic ia ls  was b u ilt  up, where each o f f ic ia l  got 
from below, funds for those above, with enough to  spare for h is own person­
a l expenditure on such a scale as the system might allow® Lord Curzon 
characterized th is  ass
"An arithmetical progression of plunder from the sovereign 
to the subject, each unit on the descending scale remunerating 
him self from the unit next in  rank below him® The help less  
peasant being the ultimate victim®" (5)
Under such a system i t  i s  not sup r is in g  that income was frequently inadequ­
ate to meet the Shah’s and the government’s expenses®
During the la tte r  part of the 19th® Century, the Shahs looked more and 
more towards "concessions" as a means of supplementing th e ir  incomes and 
usually granted them with an irresponsible lack of foresight©
These were the circumstances which surrounded the atmosphere in  Ttfiich 
the D’Arcy concession was awarded© I t  goes without saying that given th is  
kind of p o lit ic a l  background no proper care could have been taken by the 
rulers in  formulating a concession which has overshadowed Persian h istory  
in  the 20tho Century©
5© G-.N. Curzon: "Persia and the Persian Question" (London: Longmans 1892)■■ 
c ited  in  G-.W. Stocking "Middle East Oil" London: The Penguin Press 19?I« P«7
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The D’Arcy Concession and the Origins of the B r itish  Involvement
'In  1892, a French geological magazine, "Annales des Mines11 published 
a report on th e  prospects of o i l  discovery in  Iran0 This report was based 
on the investigations of a French Government’s s c ie n t if ic  mission, which 
had been sent to Iran in  the early 1890’s* This report however, did not 
in terest potentia l investors before 1900o I t  was indeed, the D irector- 
General of the Persian Customs, Antoine Ketab ji-Khan, who f ir s t  t/ought the 
matter to  the attention of European finan ciers, amongst whom was the 
B ritish er , William Knox D’Arcyo
Apart from the favourable geological conditions in  the south and 
south-west of Iran, the so c io -p o lit ica l environment was of considerable 
importance in  persuading D’Arcy to enter negotiations with Persia* D’Arcy 
understood the fact th at, given the corrupt p o lit ic a l  system, and the im­
potence of the monarchy, there would be few dangers to h is potentia l invest­
ment* On the other hand, the B ritish  government looked upon D arcy’ s quest 
to obtain a concession as a mission w ell deserving of support* S ir  
Arthur Harding, the B r itish  M inister in  Tehran, was instructed to  do a l l  
he could in  securing an o i l  concession for D’Arcy* Harding obtained the 
agreement of the Grand V izier  (the Prime Minister) , but the major stumbling 
block was the Shah*s acceptance of the terms of the Russian bank -  that the 
Persian government could not award any concessions to  foreign powers with­
out the approval of the Russian government* The Grand V izier suggested 
that a le t te r  of application for the concession should be sent to  him, 
written in  the Persian language* He was aware that the Russian M inister 
could not read Persian, and that the Russian Oriental Secretary, who alone 
could read i t ,  was away on holiday* The Grand V izier  sent the le t te r  to 
the Russian legation in  Tehran, where i t  lay  for several days untranslated* 
Since no objections were raised by the Russians, the concession was granted 
to  D’Arcy*
Such was the background of d eceit, ignorance, threat and corruption 
which surrounded the award of the D’Arcy concession* Although there were • 
other concessions awarded before and a fter  the D’Arcy concession, the la t te r  
was the most sign ifican t, shaping the future of the Persian p o l i t ic a l  and 
economic development. (6)
6. For a l i s t  of other concessions see Appendix I* See also: S.H. Longrig* 
’’Oil in  the Middle East" (Ox?ord University Press 1968) continued* . . • • • • *
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History of the D’ Arcv Concession
The 1901 D’Arcy concession provided for a s ix ty  year exclusive priv­
ileg e  to: “search fo r . obtain, exp lo it, develop, render su itable for trade, 
cariy away and s e l l ;  natural gas, petroleum, asphalt and ozokerite” through­
out the whole of the empire, with the exception of the fiv e  northern prov-. 
inoes, (Azarbayejan, G illan, Mazanderan, Khoras&n and Asterbad) which were 
under the influence of Russia. The concession embraced an area of 500,000 
square miles -  an area larger than Prance, U.K. and Germany, put together©
I t  granted D’Arcy the exclusive right to  lay  p ipelines to  the Persian Gulf 
(7 ) , and made available a l l  land within the concession area, except the 
holy p laces, necessary for D arcy’s operations0 The concession exempted 
a l l  lands and a l l  materials imported for the maintenance and development of 
the concession, from a l l  taxes and imposts throughout the l i f e  of the con­
cession. A rtic le  14- of the concession bound the Persian government “ to  
take a l l  and any necessary measures to  secure the safety  and the carrying 
out of the object o f“ the concession, including the security  of both the 
physical assets and personnel of the company. But the same a r tic le  denied 
the company “the power under any pretext whatever, to  claim damages from 
the Persian government“0 The concessionaire could form one or several 
companies to  operate the concession, with a l l  such companies enjoying a l l  
rights and priv ileges granted to DfArcyo An Imperial Commission was to  be 
appointed and paid by D’Arcy to supervise the operations as might be deemed 
necessary,, D’Arcy agreed that a l l  workman, exclusive of managerial, super­
v is o r y  and technical employees were to be Persian nationals. At the end 
of the concession, D’Aroy was to  turn over to  the government, without 
charge, a l l  the assets of the company used by him© D’Arcy’s concession was 
signed in  1901 and a royal decree was issued in  1902 which c lea r ly  shows 
the ignorance of the monarch and h is Ministers in  investment procedures and 
fin an cia l matterso The tex t i s  as follow s:
“Persuant to  the concession granted to Mr© William Knox D’Arcy, 
as a resu lt of particu larly  friendly relations which unite the 
powerful Great Britain and Persia, i t  i s  accorded and guaranteed 
to  the Engineer William D'Arcy, and to  a l l  h is heirs and assigns
6© Bo Mostofi: “A Review of the History of Oil Development in  Iran” The 
B u lletin  of the In stitu te  of Petroleum of Iran Tehran November, 19^TT” 
PP. 104-112o
7« The exclusive right to lay p ipelines proved to  be D’Arcy’s strongest 
weapon against h is competitors©
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and friends, f u l l  powers and unlimited lib er ty  for  a period 
of s ix ty  years, to  probe pierce and d r i l l  at th eir  w il l)  the 
depths of Persian s o i l ,  in  consequence of which a l l  the sub­
s o i l  products wrought by him without exception w ill  remain the 
property'of D’Arcy® We declare a l l  the o f f ic ia ls  of th is  
blessed Kingdom, and a l l  our heirs and successors w il l  do th e ir  
best to  help and a ss is t  the honourable D’Arcy, who enjoys the 
favour of our splendid courto ( 8)
In return D’Arcy and h is companies were to  pay the Persian government, 
within a month of th e ir  formation, £ 20,000 in  cash and £ 20,000 in  stock of 
the companies, plus 16 percent of th e ir  net profits per annum, ("net profit"  
implied net integrated p ro fit of a l l  companies dealing with Persian o i l) .
In addition, a fixed  sum of 2,000 tomans (£1,800) per annum was to  be paid 
to  the government in  l ie u  of taxes. There were to  be two arbitrators in  
the case of any disputes, one appointed by each party, and an umpire se lec ­
ted  by the arbitrators whose decision was to  be fina lo  The most important 
economic issu e  which was embodied in  the concession was the linking of 
royalty payment to profits,. This, as we sh a ll see la te r , raised innumerable 
problems and d ifficu lties®  As far  as D’Arcy was concerned, th is  would 
provide him with a protection in  years of l i t t l e  or no profit* This method 
also seemed attractive to the Persian G-overnment in  th e ir  hope that the 
industry would be in  a state of continuous prosperity -  which in  fact did 
not turn out to be the case® Payments under th is  method were subject to  
fluctuations varying with those of the companies* p r o f its , a situ ation  which 
was contrary to the Persian government’s expectation of securing a more or 
le s s  steady stream of cash to  the Treasury® Prom the beginning the e fforts  
to  exploit Persia’s o i l  resources were s tr ic t ly  a commercial enterprise, 
but a commercial venture with important and far  reaching p o l i t ic a l  implic­
ations*
In 1903, the F irst Exploration Company (PEC) was formed with a cap ita l 
of £600,000 in  shares of £1®00 each® G-.B. Reynolds, a man of remarkable 
character, was put in  charge of the operations® The f i r s t  few w e lls , a l­
though containing o i l ,  were not large enough to  be commercially viable® 
Under the terms of the concession the c entral government in  Tehran was 
responsible for protecting the companies’ operations, but weak and corrupt 
as i t  w as,it lacked control of the Bakhtiari tribesmen who had immense
80 Royal Library, Tehran, quoted in  N®S® Fatemi "O il Diplomacy” (New York ' 
Whither Books) 1954 Pa8
powers in  the southern province of Khuzestan, where Reynolds was operating* 
To protect the operation from raids, D’Aroy formed the Bakhtiari O il Com- 
pany, with a capital of £400,000 in  £1*00 shares, and presented 3 percent 
of the shares to  the tr ib a l ch iefs0 D’Arcy also agreed to pay the tribes?? 
men £2,000 per annum for  safeguarding the d r illin g  equipment and supplies, 
and £1,000 per annum for safeguarding the pipelines*
D’Arcy’s FEC spent f iv e  years and nearly a quarter of a m illion  pounds 
ster lin g , before o i l  in  commercial quantities was struck in  southern Persia0 
During th is  period, D’Arcy’s funds were exhausted and h is e fforts to  ra ise  
cap ita l in  London met with fa ilu re . He therefore decided to  s e l l  to  for­
eign interests*  During the same period, John Fisher, who had dreamt of 
the substitution of o i l  for coal in  the ships since 1882, was appointed 
the F irst Lord of the Admiralty* His f ir s t  act was to appoint an o i l  
committee to  investigate  the p o s s ib ility  of switching the naval fu e l from 
coal to o ilo  In view of the p o s s ib ility  of D’Arcy se llin g  his concession  
to  foreign in te re sts , the Admiralty approached Lord Strathcona of the 
Burmah O il Company, who had an agreement with the Admiralty concerning the 
emergency fu e l o i l  for  the navy, with a suggestion that he form a syndicate 
with D’Arcy and provide funds for  the development of the Persian concession# 
Preytman, the Chairman of the o i l  committee, had th is  to  say in  Parliament:
”I t  i s  only due to them (Strathcona and Burmah O il), to  point 
out that th is  enterprise originated at the request of the Ad- 
* m iralty and from a purely commercial purpose® Lord Strathcona, 
whom I  saw personally — I think i t  was characteristic of him — 
only asked me one question* He asked: Is i t  in  the in terests  of 
the B ritish  Navy that th is  enterprise should go ahead and that 
I  should take part in  i t  ? I saidj "It i s w, and Lord Strathcona 
without any further question agreed to do what he had been asked*
(9 )
In th is  way the Concessions Syndicate Limited was formed in  1905, with 
D’Arcy as a director and with adequate cap ita l to continue operations in  
Iran* The exploration however, s t i l l  met with failure* Reynolds moved h is  
operations to  Masjid-i-Soleiman (then called  Masjid-i-Naftoon)* In th is  
place the w ell H*I* was d r illed  for 1,100 feet* There Reynolds received a 
telegram from the directors of the syndicate saying that funds were exhaus­
ted and the decision reached f in a lly  and irrevocably, was that he was to
9* Parliamentary Debates. House of Commons Vol* 63, Cols* 1189-119*1, 
June 19tho 1914o
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cease work, dismiss h is s ta f f ,  dismantle anything worth the cost of trans­
porting to  the coast for re-shipment, and come home® Reynolds thought of 
an idea to continue v/ork© On account of possib le errors in  the coding of 
such an important message he said i t  would not be safe to rely  on the t e le ­
gram© He decided to wait u n til o f f ic ia l  confirmation arrived© This with 
luck was expected to take a month© Meanwhile the d r illin g  went on© A 
fortnight la te r , on Hay 26th , 1908, M©I© having reached a depth of 1,110 
f e e t ,  struck o i l  in  large quantities© This was the extraordinary story  
of the Persian o i l  discovery©(lO)
In 1909 the Anglo-Persian O il Company (APOC) was established to  take 
over the Persian o i l  operations© The company's in i t ia l  cap ita l of £2  
m illion  was largely  held by the Burmah Oil Company© The transfer of the 
concession from D'Arcy to APOC has frequently been used as subject by 
imaginative story tellers©  The stor ies range from the attempted assasin- 
ation of D'Arcy in  Cairo by B r itish  secret agents, to the continuous press­
ure brought to bear on him by the B r itish  government to  transfer h is hold­
ings to APOCo One of the most widely quoted stor ies (a t lea st the one 
Persians lik e  to believe) i s  about the role of Sidney R e illy , the B r itish  
secret agent, in  obtaining the concession from D'Arcy® R e illy  was said to  
have disguised himself as a p r ie s t , and having persuaded D'Arcy that he 
should set up a charitable company to  convert Persians to  C h ristian ity ,
obtained the concession from him® An examination of the Annual Reports*■
of the APOC in  1909-1906 period, shows that the story i s  false© In fact  
D'Arcy never 'disappeared from the scene*©(11) He was a live  and w ell and on 
the Board of Directors of the company for seven years® He retired  at the 
end of 1916 because of i l l  health©
An important point, which i s  unfortunately missed out in  most of the 
available litera tu re  on the formation of APOC, i s  that when the company 
was formed in  1909 i t  did not take over the operation of the F irst Exploit­
ation Company and the Bakhtiari Oil Company© These two companies were 
maintained as subsid iaries, concerned with the producing a c t iv it ie s  of 
APOC© FEC was a fu lly  owned subsidiary ofl APOC and the Bakhtiari O il Com­
pany was owned by APOC to the extent of 97 percent (3 percent Bakhtiari 
Khans)o APOC's relationship with regard to  these companies was very much
10© B© Ilo sto fi, op©cit
11© For d eta ils  of the stor ies see: F©C. Henighen "Secfcet War" quoted in  
N©S© Fatemi, op®cit© P©13o
lik e  a holding company.
The Anglo-Persian O il Company continued i t s  operations with success 
in  the south of Iran, but to  esqpand i t s  a c tiv it ie s  more capita l was requ­
ired . The extra funds were eventually to come from the participation  of t  
the B ritish  government in  the venture,. I t  was mainly through the e fforts  
of Winston Churchill, who was appointed the F irst Lord of the Admiralty in  
1911, that the B r itish  government decided to buy a controlling in terest in  
the Anglo-Persian Oil Company in  19*14© The to ta l cap ita l of the company 
was raised from £2 m illion  to  £4*2 m illion , with the B r itish  government 
investing £ 2 .2  m illion  in  the company. The share of the government was 
then around 52©5 percent, Burmah O il Company 22.5 percent, and the public 
25 percento (12) There was a great deal of debate in  the House of Commons 
for  and against the B r itish  governments participation in  the venture, 
d eta ils  of which are w ell documented. (13) Churchill talked of the advant­
ages to  the Admiralty and Ore at B rita in , that the purchase would bring. I t  
would free the navy from exclusive reliance on a world market dominated by 
the “two gigantic corporations” Standard Oil and Royal Lutch-Shell. I t  
would help to secure supplies in  war and peace at reasonable p r ices. On 
June 17th. 1914> he had th is  to say in  the House of Commons:
'•Britain would obtain for  nearly f i f t y  years, o i l  potentia l­
i t i e s  of a petro-liferous area of about half a m illion  square 
m iles. An area larger than France and Germany put together.
. . 0 .. over the whole of th is  enormous region we would obtain 
‘the power to regulate developments according to naval and 
national in terests and to  conserve and safeguard the supplies 
of ex istin g  wells pending further development"0 (1A)
His speech shows that Churchill had taken l i t t l e  consideration of Persian 
in te re st. He la ter  argued that acquisition of control of the company would 
not create p o lit ic a l  d if f ic u lt ie s  in  the Persian attitude towards the 
bompanyo As i t  happened th is  government participation  in  APOC proved to be 
one of the greatest causes of disagreement with Persia. Hot a l l  the Memb­
ers of Parliament agreed with Churchill. Ramsey Macdonald f e l t  that the 
p o lit ic a l  significance of the purchase was larger than i t s  economic meaningo 
He feared that the reliance on lo ca l trib es would weaken the central govern­
ment in  Persia. He said:
"All commercial concessions, especia lly  with government monqy in
12oIbid Chapter 1
13. See Parliemontary Debates, House of Commons Vol.63 June, 1914 e tc .
14 Ibid. c o l. 1140 1143.
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them, have a very unhappy knack in  the course of tim e, of 
becoming te r r ito r ia l acquisitions* " ( 15)
A.W.H. Ponsonby was even more articu late in  h is b e lie f  that the venture 
threatened the independence of P ersia0 He 'said:
NYfe know that ever since the Anglo-Russian convention of 1907» 
we have been weakening the Government of Persia0 There can 
•«• o e • • o be no doubt that we are working towards a partition  
of Persia. (By purchasing shares in  APOC)11 (16)
The b i l l  waS passed, and despite the frank and forcefu l opposition, the 
government obtained 254 votes, against an opposition of 18 votes* As i t  
turned out Ponsonby and Macdonald were right in  th e ir  prediction. B ritain  
signed an agreement with Russia in  1915 which e ffec tiv e ly  divided Persia  
in to  two colonies* A lso, i t  i s  fa ir  to  say that most of the resentment and 
suspicion of Persians to  APOC, which culminated in  i t s  nationalization in  
1951, stemmed from the direct involvement of the B ritish  Government in  the 
Company*
A direct consequence of the B r itish  Governments involvement in  the 
a c tiv it ie s  of APOC, was the forty  year supply, contract signed between the 
B ritish  Admiralty and the company* The contract was for the sa le  of fu e l  
o i l  to  the navy at specia l discount prices* Although the prices were never 
o f f ic ia lly  d isclosed, there were agreed to  be special discounts from the 
market p r ices. The supply contract was one of the major issu es raised by 
the Persians in  the nationalization debates. According to Persians, the 
cost of o i l  to  the Admiralty during the forty  year l i f e  of APOC ranged 
from 30 to 40 cents per barrel, against the market prices fluctuating bet­
ween 90 cents to  $2*43 per barrel* (17) According to  Churchill th is  cont­
ract saved the B ritish  Government £40 m illion  between 1914 and 1923*
1o The original government investment of £2*2 m illion  in  ord­
inary shares, had by 1923 become one of f iv e  m illion  shares 
and the appreciation in  value of th is  at current prices was 
approximately £16 m illion
20 The government had received in  taxes and dividends and 
in terest £  6o5M
3© ^He supply contract had enabled the government departments to  
save on purchases, as compared with market prices £  7©5M
4* The sum saved by the competition of APOC from other companies 
and the saving on o i l  prices under the supply contract
£10 M
£  40 m illion  (18)
15© Ibid, Col* 1164- 
16* Ibid Col* 1175-1176 
17* 18. overleaf
24 :■
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Churchill had th is  to  say in  1923 about the benefits to  the B r itish  Govern­
ment of involvement in  APOC:
"And so i t  a l l  •vent through© Fortune rewarded the continuous and 
steadfast facing of these d if f ic u lt ie s  by the Board of Admiralty 
and brought us a prize from fairyland far beyond our brightest 
dr earn So "(•19)
He added that the to ta l  p ro fits  realized  from th is  investment were not only 
large enough to pay for  the cost of the fu e l to  the ships, but also for the 
addition of great f le e t s  of ships to  the B ritish  Navy, without costing the 
taxpayer a sin gle  penny0 (20) Persians claimed that the benefit to  the 
B ritish  Government in  the forty  year l i f e  of APOC was £300 m illion  and that 
the contract alone saved the B r itish  Government 13 percent more than the 
to ta l  amount paid to the Persian Government in  taxes and roya lties during 
the forty  years of operation of APOC in  Persia* (21) Although there i s  no 
evidence to  support the figures presented by the Persians, i t  goes to  show 
the fee lin g  of the people towards the participation of the B r itish  Govern­
ment in  the company* I t  i s  in teresting to  note that the payments to  the 
Persian Government in  the 1911-23 period were around £3o5 m illion  compared 
to the £40 m illion  figure quoted by Churchill* The £40 m illion  b enefit to  
the B r itish  Government shown by Churchill i s  also suspecto Let us remember 
that th is  was an attempt to g lo r ify  his own actions* 3ven excluding the 
appreciation of the value of the shares, the Churchill figure stands at £26 
m illion  benefit to the B r itish  Government in  the 1911-23 period, while the 
to ta l net p rofit of APOC (a fter  payments to Persia) was just under £11 mil­
lio n  in  the same period* Considering that the dividend payments were around 
15 percent on average, and that no dividends were paid out before t1916, we 
can see that there are inconsistencies in  Churchill’s figures*(22) The ben­
e f i t s  to  the B ritish  Government were not a l l  economic* B ritain  used APOC to  
expand i t s  p o lit ic a l  dominance of the country by bribery and force where 
necessary* Arthur C* Millspaugh, an American who served as an Administrator 
General of Finance in  Persia from 1922-1927 end 1943-1945 > had th is  to  say
17© M. Nemazee and S* Nakazian: "Iran Presents Her Case for  Nationalization" 
The O il Forum 1952*
18* Winston Churchill: "The World C risis 1911-1914" (London 1923) P©134
19© ibid* P*132
20* ibido P*140
21* Mo Nemazee op0c it
22* The UK taxes for 1911-32 wero £7©7 M. Even with the addition of the en­
t ir e  UK tax to the net p ro fit of APOC, s t i l l  the Churchill figure i s  exagg­
erated o (See Chapter 3)
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about APOC:
"While'the B ritish  Government undertook not to  in terfere in  the 
commercial management of the company7-, the la tte r  became to a l l  
intents and purposes an ana of the B r itish  Admiralty and of the 
B ritish  Strategic policy* (23)
By obtaining the exclusive right to  lay pipelines to the Persian Gulf, the 
B ritish  Government ensured that no foreign power could d r i l l  for  o i l  in  
Persia, since o i l  with no means of transport would be of no use to any 
company* The B r itish  M inister in  Tehran used his influence to  block Russian 
and American companies that obtained concessions in  Persia to operate in  
the country* ( 24) Thus B ritain  remained the dominant power in  Persia u n til
■195V
The Armitage Smith and the tlntepretive" Agreements
There were two points in  the D*Arcy concession which caused co n sid er  
able disagreement between APOC and the Persian Government* The revenue 
payments by the former, and the security obligations of the la t te r 0 The 
D*Arcy concession clearly  specified  that the Persian Government was to ob­
ta in  16 percent of the net p ro fits  of a l l  companies formed to  exploit 
Persian o il*  APOC questioned th is  right by arguing that since these sub­
sid iar ies were operating outside P ersia, they should not be l ia b le  to  pay 
royalties* Also the concession shows thaat the Persian Government was not 
lia b le  for any damage caused to  APOC a ssets , should the government f a i l  to  
protect the companies* properties (A rticle 14)o APOC disregarded th is  pro­
v ision  and frequently deducted the sum paid to lo ca l trib es as a bribe, 
from the royalties* In 1915* APOC only paid 13 percent of net p ro fits  to  
the government, saying that the other 3 percent was spent on repairing the 
damage caused by the raids from lo ca l tribes* I t  i s  in terestin g  to note 
that these v io lations of the agreement started mainly after  the B r itish  
Government became a shareholder in  the company, and also in  the same year 
as the Anglo-Russian Agreement of 19^5* for  the second p artition  of Persia, 
was signed -  w ith’the B ritish  troops in  the south and the Russian troops
23» A.C. Millspaugh "Americans in  Persia" Washington: Brooking In stitu te  
1940* P*162o NOTE; Arthur Millspaugh'was removed from h is p osition  at the 
insistance of AP0Co
24® For a b r illia n t analysis see: Fatemi op0c i t .  Chapter V III.
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advancing towards Tehran from the northo The Russian Revolution stopped 
the.Russian advance and th eir  sold iers were gradually withdrawn. Lenin 
announced that a l l  agreements with ’’Imperialists" were to  he nu ll and void 
and Persia was rid  of Russia for a while0 The withdrawal of Russian troops 
did not help the Persian Government. On the contrary, i t  enabled the 
B ritish  G-overnment and APOC to dominate Persia completely, though no formal 
colonization took place. In 1917* the B r itish  Government was subsidizing  
not only the Persian Administration, but also individual ru lers, such as 
the Shah (a t £120,000 per year) , the Prime M inister, Vossough-ed-Dowleh, 
the M inister of Foreign A ffa irs , and the Finance M inister. (25) Under 
these circumstances, APOC asked for  what i t  ca lled  "an interpretive agree­
ment”,  to  c la r ify  the controversial points of the original D’Arcy concess­
ion. In 1919 an agreement was signed to the e ffec t that the B r itish  Gov  ^
erament would lend advisors to the Persian Government, at the la tter*s sus­
pense, with ’’adequate” powers to resolve a l l  disputes. The treaty  was 
considered by a B ritish  O ffic ia l to  have ’’turned Persia in to  a private  
mandate for Great B r ita in .” (26) Later the Persian Government was pers­
uaded to appoint a B r itish  Treasury O ffic ia l, S ir  Sidney Armitage Smith, 
as P ersia's representative in  the negotiations. In December, 1920, the 
so-ca lled  ’’Interpretive Agreement" was signedo The agreement d iffered  ... 
extensively from the original D’Arcy concession to the detriment of the  
host country.* The agreement accepted the Persian contention that the prof­
it-sharing principle applied to  a l l  the companies formed by APOC, but 
provided for large deductions from the net p rofits of the subsidiary comp­
anies which were involved with refin ing, transportation and d istribution  
of Persian o i l  outside Persia. In practice, with the great f l e x ib i l i t y  in  
accounting procedure which an integrated company, such as APOC, enjoyed, 
the company was able to  a llocate the largest portion of i t s  p ro fits  to  
downstream a c tiv it ie s  and the balance to the producing end of the operat­
ions. In th is  way the Armitage Smith Agreement lim ited the profit-sharing  
of the Persian Government in  the concession, to  the producing a c t iv it ie s  
of the companies within Persia. The second modification in  the concession
25* Document on B ritish  Foreign Policy 1919-1939* Quoted in  Z. Uikdashi 
"A Financial Analysis of Middle Eastern Oil Concessions 1901-1965” (F.A. 
Preager, 19^6) P0I 6 . .
26© ibid© P.17o
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was that disputes regarding royalty payments were not to be referred, to  
arbitrators, but to  a chartered accountant, appointed by the President of . 
the In stitu te  of Chartered Accountants in  London®
In return for th is  agreement APOC dropped i t s  claim for  damages and 
paid the Persian Government £1 m illion  in  settlement of a l l  past claims®
This se ttle d  the issu e only temporarily®
Three months a fter  signing the Amitage Smith Agreement, a bloodless 
revolution took place in  Persia® Colonel Reza Khan marched at the head of 
a Cossack detachment to Tehran and occupied the capital® As M inister of 
Y/ar and la te r  as Prime M inister, he brought together a l l  the lo c a l rulers 
under one f la g , by persuasion or force, as appropriate® In 1925 the M ajlis 
(Parliament) deposed Ahmad Shah, the la s t  King of the Qajar Dynasty, and 
Reza Shah Pahlavi (the father of the present Shah) was placed on the throne® 
Reza Shah was a man of remarkable character® He was determined to put the 
country on the road to progress after  a hundred years of vreakness, corrup­
tion  and decay® His methods were often harsh but effective® Bribery and 
corruption were stamped out ru th lessly , taxes were reformed and universal 
conscription was introduced® A lso, educational in stitu tio n s were greatly  
expanded and a great deal of road and railway construction was undertaken® 
Shortly after Reza Shah came to power, he asked Lumely and Lumely, the 
London so lic ito r s , who had been occasionally a ssistin g  the Persian Govern­
ment in  leg a l matters, to examine the Armitage Smith Agreement® Lumely and 
Lumely expressed the opinion that the agreement constituted not an interp­
retation  of the concession agreement, but a modification of i t ,  and hence • 
required r a tif ica tio n  by the Persian Parliament to make i t  binding® They 
also expressed the. opinion that Armitage Smith had exceeded the powers con­
ferred on him by the Persian Government in  negotiating a settlement on such 
a broad b a sis , they wrote:
"as we understand the matter, i t  i s  a question en tire ly  for  the 
Imperial (Persian) Government whether they adopt the alleged  
Agreement or not ®®o®o (our investigations) point to the concl­
usion that the adoption of the Agreement would mean the Imperial 
Government giving up important rights and in terests  under the 
concession." (27)
27® Letter of July 27th» 1921® League of Nations O ffic ia l Journal, 
Vol® XIV i 933> quoted in  G.W. Stocking op®cit. P®26
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The Armitage Smith Agreement was never r a tif ied , nor was i t  properly re­
pudiated® Year after year the Persian Government challenged the basis on 
which the roya lties were being calculated, but no response was forthcoming 
from the B r itish  side® Peelings of frustration  were running high among the 
people and the Shaho The B r itish  p o litic ia n s did not fu lly  appreciate the 
sign ificance of the changes which were taking place in  Persia under the 
leadership of Reza Shah, and continued to ignore Persian demands©
While the fee lin gs were high in  Persia, the international fin an cia l 
c r is is  of the 1930*s took place* Y/hereas APOC paid the Persian Government 
£1©28 m illion  in  1930, payments declined to £0©306 m illion  in  1931© The 
decline in  the royalty payments reflected  the world economic depression and 
particu larly  the depressed condition of the o i l  industry© With a decline 
of 3o5 percent in  the Persian production, payments to  Persia declined by 
76 percent© During the same period the p ro fits  of APOC declined by around 
36 percento During the 1911-32 period, the Persian Government received a 
to ta l  of £12*8 m illion  in  ro y a ltie s , while the net p ro fits  of the company 
were £51 ©5 m illion  and the U.K. taxes were £7©7 m illion0(28)
The sharp decline in  roya lties while Reza Shah was carrying out large  
development projects was the la st straw for the Shaho He warned APOC of 
the p o ss ib ility  of the cancellation of the concession, but APOC and the  
B ritish  Government refused to recognise the Shah* s right to cancel the 
concession© On November 27th© 1932, the M inister of Finance delivered  
formal notice of cancellation of the concession to the resident director  
of APOC© The B ritish  M inister in  Tehran wrote some le tte r s  to  the Persian 
Government, the summary of which i s  given below:
1© The cancellation was an inadmis sable bfeach of terms ©*.©
20 The B r itish  Government took a most serious view of the conduct 
of the Persian Government and demanded the immediate withdrawal 
of the n o tifica tion  of cancellation©
3© The B ritish  Government would not hesitate i f  n ecessity  arose, 
to  take a l l  legitim ate measures to protect th eir  just and in ­
disputable interests© ( 29)
The arguments dragged on, and f in a lly  the B ritish  took the Persian Govern­
ment before the Council of The League of Nations, on December, 1932© (30)
28. See Chapter 3 * .....................     . . . . . .
29© These correspondence appear in  Appendixes 8-10 Annex 3 to United King­
dom Memorial. International Court of Justice Pleadings PP.237-239•
30© For deta ils see N©S. Fatemi op©cit or G.YT. Stocking op©cit© PP. 29-34o
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The arguements before the Council indicated the sharp differences between 
the two parties* They illuminated not only the immediate issu e , which 
precipitated the dispute, but also the basic grievances that the concession 
had created* Before the Council announced a decision, a compromise was 
reached. The calculation of royalties was to  be made on a completely new 
basis*
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The 1933 Concession and the Principle of Tonnage Royalty
I t  i s  s t i l l  a matter of personal opinion as to  “who was the winner of 
the contest® Even the experts cannot agree which side obtained the b est deal • 
or which side capitulated first.® Alan Ford argues that the 1933 Agreement 
was a victory for Persia® (3*0 While the Persian G-ovemment in  1951 argued 
that i t  was a setback for  Persia. (32) Dr. G-hassemzadeh, now a fin an cia l  
director of the National Iranian O il Company (NIOC) b elieves that the agree­
ment was a setback for Persia insofar as the government could have obtained 
better  terms® (33) Dr® Fatemi in s is t s  that the main motivation of the comp­
any, by paying low royalties in  1931, was to force the cancellation of the 
D*Arcy concession with a view to securing an extension in  the period of the 
leaseo (34) This contention i s  hardly tenable® A careful examination of 
the D*Arcy concession gives the answer® The D’Arcy concession and the 
Armitage Smith agreement rendered the Persian Governments revenues more 
sen sitive  to  a decline in  APOC *s income, to the extent that the government 
was to share (a t the rate of 16 percent) in  the p rofits  of some APOC a f f i l ­
ia te s , after certain fixed  deductions were made© Thus, during a depression 
year, such as 1931» Persia was l e f t  with a very small royalty mainly as a 
resu lt of the decline in  APOC*s net profits® However, i t i  i s  important to  
emphasize that the decline in  the roya lties was more than proportional to  the 
decline in  AP0C*s net profits* This was because the Persian Government*s 
share of net p rofits  at 16 percent was made under the Armitage Smith agree­
ment® To remedy th is' situation  the princip le o f tonnage royalty was in tro­
duced® This would lin k  the royalty payments to the volume of o i l  production 
with a b u ilt  in  protection device against change in  the value of s te r lin g .
APOC agreed to  pay the Persian Government the sum of four gold sh illin g s  per 
ton of Persian o i l  extracted, and in  l ie u  of taxes to pay 9 pence per ton 
(gold) for the f ir s t  s ix  m illion tons of o i l  produced in  any one year, for,
31 o A.W® Ford “The Anglo-Iranian Dispute of 1951-52“ Ph®D Thesis, Univer­
s ity  of California (Berkely)® Published by the University of C alifornia  
Press 1954o Chapter 20
32® For a view of the Iranian Government see Nemasee op®cit® PP083~86 
33® For the most comprehensive analysis of the 1933 Agreement, see H® 
Ghassemzadeh, “An A nalytical Comparison of 1933 and 1954 Agreements“ Ph®D 
Thesis, Tehran University® Published in  Tehran in  1968 (Persian language) 
34o N.S* Fatemi op*cit® P®159o
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the f i r s t  f if te e n  years, and 6 pence per ton for production of o i l  in  ex­
cess of s ix  m illion tons (a lso  for the f i r s t  f if te e n  years)o After the 
f i r s t  f if te e n  years and up to  th ir ty  yaers, those payments in  l ie u  of tax­
es were to he raised to one gold sh illin g  for the f i r s t  s ix  m illion  tons 
and nine gold pence for  the production in  excess of s ix  m illion  tons0 APOC 
also agreed to pay the Persian Government 20 percent of the distribution  
of i t s  earnings in  excess of £671,250© I t  guaranteed that the payments to  
Persia from these three sources: ro y a lties , taxes and a percentage of d is­
tributed earnings, would not be le s s  than £575,000 in  the f i r s t  f if te e n  
years and £10,050,000 in  the next f if te e n  years0 The area under explorat­
ion was to  be reduced by 80 percent to 100,000 square m iles, and the period  
of the concession was to  be s ix ty  years© Payments of roya lties and taxes 
for the second th ir ty  year period (a fter  19&3) were to be negotiable©
The company also agreed to  pay £1 m illion  to Persia in  May, 1933 in  s e t t le ­
ment of a l l  past claims© The revised agreement required APOC to develope 
the Naft-e-Shah o i l f ie ld  on the Iran-Iraq border, west of Kermanshah and to  
process i t s  output for  Iran*s domestic consumption© In addition, the comp­
anies agreed to make efforts to increase th eir  Persian s ta ff  and place some 
Persian nationals in  technical and commercial positions© The provision for  
arbitration was to be as in  the original D*Arcy concession, but the umpire 
was to be selected  by the President of the Permanent Court of International 
Ju stice , i f  the two parties could not agree on a mutual se lec tio n . The 
concession contained several new provisions to protect Persia1 s interests©  
I t  gave Persia the right to appoint a "Delegate of the Imperial Government" 
at a salary of £2,000 per annum, payable by the company, who should have 
access to a l l  information that the stockholders were e n title d  to 0 (35)
The concession also contained provisions designed to  ensure lower prices of 
petroleum products for domestic consumption© (36) F in ally , the company 
pledged i t s e l f  to non-interference in  Persia* s domestic life© In return 
the government exempted the company from a l l  taxes except those stipulated  
in  the concession, and agreed not to  annul or a lter  the concession "either 
by general or special leg is la tio n  in  the future, or by administrative meas­
ures, or any other act of the executive authorities©" In 1935, Reza Shah
35o For the text of the Agreement see: C© Hurewitz "Diplomacy in  Near and 
Middle East — A Documentary Record 1914-1956" (Princeton,' 1956)" FP©188- I 96® 
36© Persian customers were to  secure a ten percent f la t  discount on a l l  
products, while the government received a 25 percent discount© (See Chapter 
2) .
32
decided that the o f f ic ia l  name of the country should be changed from 
Persia to Iran (as i t  was called  by the nationals)© In compliance with 
th is  order, the company changed i t s  name to the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company 
(AlOC)©
In terms of p r o fita b ility  per ton of o i l  produced, the Persian Govern­
ment was s lig h t ly  better o ff during the period of the 1933 Agreement, as 
the following table shows:
Table 101
Per Ton Revenues of the Persian Government 
and AIQC P rofits for Selected Years (Pounds S terling)
Year
Persian Government 
Revenues per ton
AlOC Revenues (P ro fits)  
per ton
1913/14 O0O4. 0©10
1919/20 0©34 1o34
1925/26 0®23 0®9 6
1930 0®22 0© 64
1931 0.03 0o42
1933 0.26 0o37
1935 0.30 0®47
1940 0®47 0©33
1945 0.33 0®34
1946 0©37 0©30
1950 0®50 1 ©06
Source: Chapter 3
The above table clearly  shows the downward movement of o i l  payments 
towards the end of the D*Arcy concession and the improvement a fter  the 
1933 Agreement© I t  i s  in teresting  to note that in  most of the years of 
the D*Arcy concession, the net p ro fit per ton of AlOC rose or declined  
proportionately more than the Persian Governments receipts® At the same 
time, AlOC1 s tonnage p rofits  did not r is e  as fa s t  as those of the Persian 
Government u n til the end of World War I I 0
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Causes of Disputes
There were a number of major disputes between Iran and APOC in  the 
1909-1933 periodo These included the evasion of royalty payments, the 
exclusion of p ro fits  of subsidiaries operating outside Persia, from the 
share of the Iranian Governments net p r o fits , the sa le  of fu e l o i l  to  
the Admiralty at favourable prices and the accounting practices of the 
company in  a llocating costs and p ro fits  so as to minimize the share of 
the Iranian royalties© A ll these points have been discussed in  the tex t  
and need not be repeated©
Let us now consider the causes of con flic t in  the post-1933 period© 
There were a number of minor and major disputes between the Iranian Govern­
ment and AlOC in  the period under study0 These disputes can be b r ie fly  
summarized as follow s:
a) The fa ilu re  of the company to  increase i t s  Iranian employees to  the 
lev e ls  promised to the government©
b) AlOC*s d iversifica tion  p o licy  with regard to  i t s  sources of crude©
The company had made large investments in  Iraq and Kuwait in  the la te  
1920*3 and in  the 1930*s© I t  must be noted that these d iversifica tion  
p o lic ie s  were only made possible under a r e str ic tiv e  dividend policy© 
Indeed, a spokesman for the company could boast that:
’’The whole cap ita l investment during the years 1930 to 1952 
was financed by retained p ro fits  and without recourse to  
outside borrowing of any importance©” (37)
The Iranians considered th is  deliberate restr ic tiv e  dividend p o licy  of 
AlOC as a method of evading the ’’r igh tfu l share” of the Iranian royalt­
ies© The investment programme abroad was c learly  at the expense of the 
Iranian Government©
c) Apart from the dividend restr ic tio n  po licy  of the company, the U©K0 
Government did, on occasions, impose restr iction s on dividend payments 
of the companies as part of an anti-in flationary policy© In 195-7 for  
example, the B ritish  Labour Government lim ited the companies* dividend 
payments to  30 percent© This measure curtailed the current revenues of
37 « B.A.C, Sweet-Escott ’’Financing Problems of Integrated O il Companies” 
Fourth Arab Petroleum Congress (Beruit 19^3) P<>5-
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the Iranian G-overnment at a time when the p rofits of AlOC were high# In 
fa ct in  1946, AlOC p ro fits  were £ 906 m illion , the Iranian roya lties £7<>1 
m illion  and the B r itish  taxes £10<>2 million*) In 1947> the AlOC p ro fits  
nearly doubled to£18©5 m illion , while the Iranian roya lties were s t i l l  4 
£7<>1 m illion  and the B r itish  taxes rose to  £15o2 m illion , an increase of 
50 percent# (38)
d) Another source of disagreement was that B r itish  taxes were deducted
before the net p ro fits  of the company were declared** Thus, by changing
i t s  domestic tax p o licy , the B r itish  G-overnment was able to a ffect  
d irectly  the Iranian Share of the p r o fits . In 1950 for example, the 
B ritish  taxes amounted to £3*1 m illion  compared with royalty payments 
to Iran of £16 million. (39) In the words of S ir  Anthony Eden:
”The company was earning 150 percent or thereabouts, but s t i l l  
paying ( in  dividends) 30 percent# His Hajesty* s G-overnment was 
getting a good rake-off, not as a shareholder, but from taxat­
ion j income tax , profit tax, and th is  that and the other forms 
of tax; and although some of the Persians new that eventually  
they would get into reserve whenever the concession came to  an 
end, an amount equivalent to the extra which the ordinary share­
holders would have had, that was not much immediate comfortl,f
(v>)
Perhaps the most fundamental source of the Anglo-Persian misunderstand­
ing was not purely economic, as implied by the above discussion# There was
an important p o lit ic a l  factor involved in  the Anglo-Persian relation s con­
cerning the a c t iv it ie s  of the B r itish  G-overnment both in  supporting the act­
ions of the company in  Iran, and promoting i t s  own p o lit ic a l  influence in  
the country0 The unquestionable support of the B ritish  Government for  the 
company created the core of discontent, suspicion and fear towards AIOO in  
Iran. There was c learly  a change in  the attitude of the Iranians, starting  
with the reign of Reza Shah# A sense of national unity and pride was f e l t  
by the people a fter  a hundred years of rule by corrupt and degenerate rulerso 
People became more p o lit ic a lly  conscious, and resentfu l of foreign in terfer­
ence# Unfortunately i t  seems that the B ritish  Government did not take f u l l  
account o f the changes in  Iran, and pursued i t s  p o licy  of gunboat diplomacy# 
Perhaps i t  was th is  misunderstanding of the change in  p o lit ic a l  attitudes  
of the Iranians, which culminated in  the cancellation of the AlOC concession  
and led  to the a lliance of Iran with Germany in  the Second World War#
38# See Chapter 3*
39o Ibid#
40# House of Commons Debates (June 21st, 1951) Co«752 quoted in  Zo Mikdashi 
opocit# P.112#
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CHAPTER TWO
Development of the Iranian Oil Industry 
1901 -  1951
This chapter describes the Iranian o i l  industry in  the pre-nation­
a lisa tio n  period, and in  particular the development of the d istribution
network and cansumption0 Because the data is  often inadequate, the treat­
ment of some aspects of the industry has to be briefo
Production and Refining:
The f i r s t  o i l f ie ld  to be discovered in  Iran was the Masjid-e-Soleiman 
o i lf ie ld  in  I 9O80 Prom then onwards the company struck o i l  in  many par6s 
of the country, making Iran the largest Middle Eastern o i l  producer u n til  
1951« Table 201 shows the development of the o i lf ie ld s ,  and the rate of 
production in  th is  period.
Table 2d
Chronology of the Development of Iranian O ilfie ld s
O ilf ie ld  Date of Date of f ir s t  Production in  Rank as
Discovery (b) Commercial Ex- 1950 (000*s Producer
p lo ita tion  (b) b/d) (c) in  I 95O0
M as aid -e -S o l oiman 1908 1911 61 o0 3
Naft-e-Shah 1923 1936 n0a0 (©) n»>
Haft gel 1928 1928 193*0 2
Chachsaran 1928 1940 42o0 (d) 4
Naft-e-Sefid 1935 • 1945 . 25o0 5
Agha-Jari 1937 1945 323o0 1
Pazanan (a) 1937 1943 mm —
Lali 1938 1948 15*0 6
36
a) Pazanan 7;as not considered an o i lf ie ld  u n til i 9^0• I t  produced natural 
gas during the World War II  periodo
b) From Nahai and Kimble op.cit© P.31 and the S ta t is t ic a l  Yearbook of Iran
Tehran 197*1 ® Pol9V
c) From the Handbook of Iranian Oil Operating Companies 1963° Po12
d) Refers to production in  1954
e) n .a . -  the data relating to Naft-e-Shah o i lf ie ld  i s  not provided in  the 
Consortium reports because the o i l f ie ld  was taken over by NIOC in  195V
Agha-jari was the largest producer in  1950, followed by H aftgel. The to ta l  
production of Iranian o ilf ie ld s  in 1950 was 659*000 barrels per day.
The f ir s t  Iranian refinery to be b u ilt was at Abadan. A fter the d is­
covery of the Has jid-e-Soleiman o i lf ie ld ,  a pipeline with a capacity of 
2.9 miHicn barrels was la id  to  Abadan. The construction of the Abadan refin ­
ery started in  1908 and was completed in 1911 -  concurrently with the start  
of commercial production in  Has jid-e-Soleiman. As soon as other f ie ld s  were 
discovered they were connected to Abadan by various/p ipelines. In 1950 the 
Abadan refinery then the largest in  the world* reached i t s  peak capacity of 
500,000 barrels per day. <0
In the pre-World War II  period, o i l  exports were mostly in  the shape of 
o i l  products and the refinery process took place near the producing areaso 
Some European countries, notably France, Germany and I ta ly  had lo c a l refin ­
eries which provided much of th e ir  domestic requirements. Other European 
countries, and in  particular B rita in , had l i t t l e  refining capacity. A fter  
the war, the foreign exchange shortage made i t  d if f ic u lt  for  the la t te r  
group of countries to pay for the value added by refining the products ab­
road. The continued pressure of the consuming nations in  Western Europe 
and other countries, persuaded the international o i l  companies to  bu ild  
refin eries near the consumption centres.
The change in  international refining p o licy  of a l l  o i l  companies, and 
in  particular AI0C, diminished the international role of the Abadan r e f­
inery. Although Abadan i s  s t i l l  one of the largest refin eries in  the world
1© Since the 1951 nationalization the capacity of Abadan refinexy has drop­
ped substantially . In 1971 Abadan was producing just over 422,000 b/d .
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i t s  role in  sa tisfy in g  the domestic demand in  Iran has been greatly red­
uced. (2) The Kermanshah and Naft-e-Shah refin eries were b u ilt  in  1935 Dy 
AlOC, mainly to cater for the domestic demand. In 1950 th e ir  capacity was 
around *5>000 b /d .(3) The Mas jid-e-Soleiman topping plant was constructed 
in  1927 by AlOCo The topping plant produced fu e l o i l  for domestic use and 
export. The capacity of the topping plant was around 22,000 b/d in  1950©(4)
Marketing Organization and Distribution
After the expansion of the o i l  industry in  the la te  19th. Century, 
American companies such as Socony and B ritish  companies such as Burmah O il, 
which were already active in  the o i l  business in  the Middle and Far East, 
started se llin g  petroleum products in  Iran. The products were imported in  
metal drums through the ports in  the Persian Gulf and marketed under vari­
ous brand names, such as ’T iger Brand11, ”V istoria Brand” and ’’Elephant Brand. 
The Soviet o i l  agency ”Persaznaft” also imported kerosene in  metal drums, 
each holding a maximum of 80 l i t r e s  and marketed i t  in  northern Iran. The 
most popular o i l  product, namely kerosene, was in  th is  way getting to  the 
south and north of Iran and over time i t s  rate of consumption increased 
noticeably, i t s  use being no longer confined to  lig h tin g , but also to cook- 
ing.
Prior to 1930, there existed keen compettition between the Soviet agency 
and APOC for the sa le  of o i l  products in  the southern and central d is tr ic ts  
of Iran. APOC i s  said  to have resorted to  changing i t s  prices up to  three 
or four times a day and employing street vendors with pack-horese0 (5) In  
1928, under pressure from the Iranian Government, AP0G agreed to se t up a 
centralized distribution  department in  Tehran. (6) Later^ the terms of the 
1933 agreement gave the company monopolistic rights to supply the entire  
domestic requirement of the country -  rights which i t  did not fu l ly  exer­
c ise  u n til the la te  1930fs o
2© For d eta ils of the operations of the Abadan refinery and other refineries  
see Part H I ,  Chapters 8,10 and 110 
3 q ib id  
2f. ib id
5o The only information available on th is  competition i s  in  the Presidential 
Lecture of Mr0 A. Ettehadieh at the Iranian Petroleum Institute© V ol.I  
Tehran 1937o The t i t l e  of the lecture was: ’The Haulage of Petroleum Products 
in  Iran” ( in  Persian)
6. Unfortunately no d eta ils  of the D istribution Department's organizations 
for  the period before 1951 availab le. Dr© Ferrier, the B.P. continued®.
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Let us at th is  stage say something about prices* Although the bulk 
of imports were dominated by Russia for  most of the period, AlOC accounted 
for  the greater part of the remaining imports as well as a l l  lo ca l product­
ion* AlOC sold i t s  products at prices fixed  on the basis of those prevail­
ing in  the Roumanian port of Constanta. To these prices was added the 
customs duty payable by the company* I t  i s  very hard to  determine the 
actual prices revailing in  Iran over the period under study, because AlOC 
sold i t s  products through reta ilers se llin g  at various p rofit margins*
There were no government or company controls on prices and these prices  
depended on two major factors* The transport cost component of the prices 
and the p rofit margin required by the reta iler*
The Russians however, enjoyed p artia l exemption from customs duty pay­
ments u n til 1928, and although AlOC/Persaznaft competition did not have a 
purely commercial motivation behind i t ,  nevertheless, the p a r tia l exempt­
ion from customs provided an advantage in  terms of competition for the 
Russians. In 1928, Reza Shah cancelled th is  special priv ilege  granted to  
the Russians, to bring the competition onto a more equal footing .
In the 1933 agreement, AlOC undertook to  se U  i t s  products at a 10 per­
cent discount below the previous prices to  the public, and at a 25 percent 
dicount to  the government. These prices were s t i l l  competitive with the 
Russian p r ices. Under the same agreement, AlOC undertook to  develop the 
Naft-e-Shah o i lf ie ld  and build the Kermanshah refin eiy  near i t ,  so as to 
supply the bulk of the domestic requirement of the western and central 
regions of the country*
The AlOC was unable to supply the domestic requirements of the country 
from the Abadan refinery — not because the domestic demand was so large -  
but because there were few roads, and transport was both co stly  and d i f f i ­
cult* Indeed, AlOC was forced to  carry the products by r a i l  to  Iraq and 
import them again through Kermanshah where they were transported by trucks 
to  the central and northern d is tr ic ts  of Iran* To transport o i l  to the 
east and the south-east of Iran, AlOC had to transport the o i l  by seacraft 
to  Karachi in  Pakistan and then to  Zahedan and f in a lly , by d ifferent means,
6* Company historian informs me that the records were l e f t  in  Iran after  
the Iranian take-over and that the Iranians appear to have destroyed them 
in  the early 19 0^* So
7, A. Bttehadieh, op.cit<*
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to other centres of consumption. (7)
The transportation of o i l  products was particu larly  d iffi'uxlt in  Iran, 
not only because there were few roads, but also because of the very long 
distance between the centres of production and the centres of consumption*, 
Oil was produced and refined in  the underdeveloped regions in  the south, 
while the largest demand existed in  the more prosperous central and north­
ern regions. For instance, Tehran, the largest centre of consumption i s  
1,022 kilometres (6h0 miles) from Abadano Esfahan, another large centre, 
l i e s  600 kilometres (370 miles) from Abadano Other regions in  the north­
western and north-eastern parts of the country are over 1,000 m iles from 
Abadano
Transportation of Oil Products. 1928
Caspian 
s Sea
Meshed
Tehran
AfghanistanEsfahan
IRAQ Shiraz Pakistan
Zahedan
Gulf ‘ Gulf of Omman
Railways were few, in e ffic ie n t and slow, while p ipelines had been construct­
ed from the production points to  e:q>ort terminals© U n til the mid-1920*s 
the main mode of transporting the cans and drums was by pack mule or donkey. 
From the mid-l920*s, in  the reign of Reza Shah the Great, the government 
decided to modernize the transport network and concentrated on making motor 
transport widespread and efficient© But motor transport required roads,
7© A© Ettehadieh, o p .c it .
40
spare parts, roadside repair f a c i l i t i e s  and f i l l in g  sta tio n s. Non of these 
existed  in  Iran, therefore the government adopted an amitious road const­
ruction p o licy  in  the la te  1920* s® The existence of roads and motor tran­
sport meant that an increasing market for m otor-spirit developed, which in  
turn provided free enterprise with an incentive to  build  garages and serv­
ice  stations® In short, the a v a ila b ility  of supply led  to  more and more 
petrol-based activities®  (8)
The f ir s t  company to use motor transport was AlOC its e lf*  In order to  
supply i t s  bulk customers in  the south the company employed bef ore 1928, 
two trucks each f it te d  with an 1,800 l i t r e  tank® In that year i t  imported 
two British-made road tankers each having mounted on i t  a 3>600 l i t r e  tank 
for  service in  the south® In that same year "Persaznaft” tr ie d  out several 
road tankers for transporting petroleum products from the Caspian Sea to  
Tehran® The products carried in  these tankers were emptied into t in s  or 
other containers at th e ir  destination.
In the 1933-36 period, the construction of the Kermanshah refinery and 
the development of the Naft-e-Shah o i lf ie ld  greatly eased the demand situa­
tion  in  the western and central regions. By 1937 there were 153 road tank­
ers in  operation, of which 105 belonged to  AI0C and the rest to  the cont­
ractors® A large garage was b u ilt  in  Kermanshah near the refinery , for  the 
servicing and maintenance of company tankers. Iiater other garages were 
b u ilt  in  Mashad and Shiraz and many other centres for repair work®
Transport by means of road tankers between the centres continued to be 
the most important method, but in  the la te  19,20*s Reza Shah ordered the co­
nstruction of a railway l in e  between Ahwas and Andimehke, which was la te r  
extended to Tehran® The railway lin e  was completed in  1931* -Rail trans­
port at the rate of 0o35 r ia ls  per ton-kilometre was exactly ha lf the cost 
of transportation by road tankers® (10) Therefore, wherever railways were .
80 G-® Naamati, f,A Social and Economic Investigation of the E ffects of Petrol­
eum Products1 D istribution in  Iran1 Tehran 1967. P ? . 1 17 A ( in  Persian)
9® A® Bttehadieh, op®cit.
10® I t  i s  in teresting to compare the costs in  1931 with those in  1970® In 
1970 the cost was 1015 r ls  ./ton-kilom etre for railways and 1.80 r ls® /ton -k il 
ometre for NIOC-operated road tankers® In 1970 road tankers were 36/0 more 
costly  than the railways® (see  Chapter 9 )
b u ilt  they were used in  preference to road haulage, and in  1939 the number 
' of r a il  tankers in  service for  transporting o i l  products to ta lled  150.
These tankers were of German manufacture and each had a capacity of 45*000 
l i t r e s .  Abadan, the largest refinery in  the world, was v ir tu a lly  cut o ff  ' 
fran the rest of the country, while Ahwaz, the neighbouring c ity , was conn­
ected by railway to Tehran. There was a need, therefore, to  lin k  Abadan to  
Ahwazo In 1939* & 4  inch p ip elin e , with a capacity of 100,000 tons per 
year was la id  between these two c i t i e s 0 This p ipeline i s s t i l l  in  use for  
transporting aviation fu e l from Abadan to  Ahwaz©
With the outbreak of the Second World War and the a llian ce  of Iran with 
Germany, the B ritish  Government considered i t  e ssen tia l to  open another 
supply route to Russia. After a short war, Iran was occupied and Reza Shah 
was forced to abdicate. The occupation of Iran by the A llied  forces brought 
about an adverse impact on the domestic transport network. The additional 
road and r a i l  tr a ff ic  due to  the A llied  aid to Russia increased the fu e l  
consumption considerably, and although the A llied  forces used th e ir  own ... 
transport for  th e ir  requirements, a considerable strain  was imposed on the  
existing means0 There came about an acute shortage of spare parts and tyres 
and freight charges inevitably increased. These factors led  to  a shortage 
in  the means of transport needed for Iran's internal requirements. Moreover, 
the take-over of the trans-Iranian railway system by the A llied  forces im­
posed a further lim itation  on the transport of seme of the o i l  company prod­
u cts, and in  some cases AI0C had to re str ic t  the sa le  of petroleum products. 
Indeed, there i s  evidence that o i l  product d istribution in  many parts of the 
country was either reduced or brought to  a s ta n d s till . (11)
Iron ica lly , the occupation of Iran by the A llied  forces provided the 
necessary means for a breakthrough in  the o i l  transport system of Iran.
After the departure of the occupation forces, Iran regained not only her 
own r a il ,  road and pipeline systems, but also the A llied  transport f a c i l i t ­
ie s  which were either l e f t  or sold cheaply to  Iran0 In 1946 Iran had 746 . 
railway wagons (an increase of 500 percent in  6 years) and 300 road tankers 
(an increase of 100 percent in  6 years). Another important development in  
the o i l  transport was the expansion of the pipeline network. In 1944* an-
11. G. Naamati o p .c it . P .210
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other pipeline -with a s ix  inch diameter and a capacity of 200,000 tons 
was, la id  alongside the ex istin g  Tehran-Ahwaz pipeline®
Consumption and Imports
An in teresting  feature of the Iranian o i l  industry in  th is  period was 
that a large part of the requirements of the country was imported while 
at the same time, Iran was actually exporting crude and refined products© 
The data on the consumption and imports in  th is  period are hard to fin d , 
and what t h e s i s  must be viewed with caution. For instance, although the 
most comprehensive set of data available comes from the Customs and Excise 
Office in  Iran, I t  i s  quite possible that a large volume of o i l  products 
were not registered with the Customs Office® The other main sources of 
s t a t is t ic s ,  the Ministry of Finance and the Foreign Trade S ta t is t ic s  of 
Iran, d iffer  from those of the Customs and Excise Office© The Iranian 
Government during th is  period does not seem to  have shown any great in ter­
est in  compiling re lia b le  and accurate s t a t is t ic s ,  and th is  may w ell be the 
answer to some of the discrepancies© Even B.P. are not very sure with reg­
ard to these magnitutes and refer to their  own data as ’’u n o ffic ia l”. In 
general, the author i s  led  to believe that the Customs and Excise O fficefs 
data i s  more re liab le  than the others, and these have been used in  th is  
selection©
Table 2o2 refers to the 1912-27 periodo In th is  period only motor- 
sp ir it  and kerosene are considered, as the sa le  of other products was very 
small and unrecorded. The sale of kerosene was far more important than 
that of m otor-spirit in  the whole of th is  period© However, after 1923* 
with the greater improvement of road building and expansion of motor trans­
port the sa le  of m otor-spirit rose greatly0 In 1922*. the ratio  of kerosene 
sales to  m otor-spirit was 2:1, by 1927 th is  ratio  was just under 4:1©
APOC sa les in  Iran were substantially  below the recorded le v e ls  of im­
ports. In 1914 only 12 percent of the to ta l sa les were dom estically prod-
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Table 2 .2
Iranian Consumption of Motor Sp irit and Kerosene 
1912-27 (Cubic Metres.V
Motor Sp irit Kerosene Total APOC Total Total
Imports SalesAPOC Sales Imports APOC Sales Imports
1912 _ _ 44563 — 44563 44563
1913 . - - -  - 40041 - 40041 40041
1914 29 - 6812 50594 6841 50594 57435
1915 112 - 3988 41536 4100 41536 45636
1916 206 - 3305 42043 3511 42043 45554
1917 12 - 3363 52395 3375 52395 55770
1918 35 - 2537 21006 2572 21006 23578
1919 82 -  ■ 2828 (41522 ) 2910 (41522 ) 
[4766 ^
(44432 )
1920 411 187 3949 [4579 ] 
22524
4360 £ 9126 j
1921 422 400 4514 4936 22924 27860
1922 318 463 4343 26636 4661 27099 31760
1923 425 1116 4756 28849 5181 29965 35146
1924 820 1032 . 4780 33561 5600 34593 400193
1925 1984 2271 6190 34573 8174 36844 45018
1926 4303 6628 7905 36560 12208 43188 55396
1927 4682 8085 9713 38296 14395 46381 60776
Source: These figures are shown in J. Bharier, o p .c it . ^'l^O
They were obtained from the o ffice  of Dr. Perrier of B.P. The orig inal
data was in long tons and i s  converted to cubic metres by using tne conversi
rate of 1 long ton = 1.17 Cubic metres.
uced and over 88 percent were imported. In 1921, 82 percent was imported 
and in  1927 the le v e l of imports was 76 percent of to ta l sa le s . Table 2.3 
shows the a c t iv it ie s  of APOC u n til 1951* while Table 2.4- shows the source 
and magnitude of Iranian imports during th is periodo
The outstanding feature of Iran* s imports during th is  period was the 
importance of Soviet oil© In 1930 of the to ta l imported o il*  3k. percent 
came from Russia© Indeed, throughout most of the period u n til  1938, Russian 
o i l  accounted for  over 90 percent of the to ta l import So A lt hough the import 
of petroleum products was d rastica lly  reduced after 1938, Russian o i l  s t i l l  
constituted a large portion of the to ta l imports in  most years©
Table 2©5 brings together a l l  available data on production, exports, 
consumption and imports for  the whole of the 1912-51 period© I t  i s  evident 
that despite large production and exports, Iran was s t i l l ,  obliged to  import 
o i l  products© In 1922 to ta l consumption was just over 1 percent of to ta l  
exports: in  1932 and 1943* i t  was 0©7 and 5 percent respectively© The
corresponding ratio was 6o7 percent for  1951©
Two important points emerge from our analysis© F ir s t ly , imports const­
itu ted  a large portion of the Iranian consumption of o i l  products u n til 1934j 
after which AlOC*s domestic sa les gradually expanded, particu larly  due to 
the construction of the Kermanshah refinery© Secondly, Russian o i l  con stit­
uted a large portion of the to ta l import in  most years©
Although the rate of import of o i l  products into Iran may, at f i r s t  
s ig h t, appear inexplicable, one may fin d , in  fa c t , a rather simple explanat­
ion© The Iranian transport network was sm all, in e ff ic ie n t and co stly  to 
operate and the Iranian market was a small one0 Although u n til 1933 the 
Iranian prices corresponded to international p r ices, the high cost of d is t­
ribution and the small s ize  of the market did not make the sale of domestic 
products a fin a n cia lly  attractive proposition to AlOC© (12) AlOC, being a 
commercial en tity , was not prepared to spend vast sums on the expansion and 
modernization of the distribution and transport networks in  Iran© I t  was
12© Dr. Ferrier of B.P© informs me that no seperate fin an cia l statement was 
prepared by the company on the p r o fita b ility  of the domestic a c t iv it ie s  of 
AlOC in  Iran©
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concerned with keeping the Iranian Government content by gradually expand­
ing i t s  domestic a c tiv it ie s  in  the country. Indeed, one could say that the 
Russians were doing AlOC’s job by providing o i l  products to  northern and 
central d is tr ic ts  of Iran. However, towards the end of the 1930’s the 
Russian hold on Iran, both in  economic and p o lit ic a l  terms had weakened 
considerably, and AlOC gradually started to comply with i t s  obligations 
of the 1933 Agreement by catering for  the larger part of the domestic o i l  
consumption of the country*
Table 2 .3
AlOC, Sales through the Distribution Department 
1931-51 (OOP’s Cubic Metres)
Year Motor Sp irit Kerosene Gas Oil Fuel Oil Total
1931 16.7 10.4 — 9.1 36.2
1933 35.6 25.4 - 19.5 80.5
1935 57.1 39.8 4.2 26.1 127.2
1937 94.3 56.2 12.8 28.0 191.3
1939 . 91,0 78.6 21.0 89.3 v2?9.9
1941 95.4 83.9 24.7 107.6 311.7
1943 119.8 94.5 45.5 232,3 492.1
1945 98.2 122.8 39.4 277.2 537.6
1947 163.9 163.7 45.9 326.5 700.0
1949 215.3 238.9 67.7 421.5 943.4
1951 251.2 297.3 118.7 439.7 1106.9
Source:
Provided by NIOC from APOC .Records.
NOTE:
The above figures include APOC imported o il  products.
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Table 2 .4
Iranian Import of Oil Products 1927-51 (Metric Tons)
Year Soviet Union. U.S.A. Britain Other
(a)
Total
(a)
Total in  
Cubic Metres 
(000*s)
1927 41890 260 1260. — . 43430 50*3
1928 50840 316 2330 - 53486 62.0
1929 49590 350 1780 - 51720 60.0
1950 53430 215 3040 - 56685 65.7
1931 69260 82 1120 70762 82.0
1932 54840 48 1620 - 565O8 65.5
1933 27000 219 1020 - 28239 32.7
1934 49080 396 580 - 50056 58.0
1935 30860 570 1540 - 32970 38.2
1936 39960
CO0NA 1370 . - 41438 48.3
1937 40107 405 3959. 87 44558 ' 51.7 .
1938 14740 505 8047 100 23391 27.1
1939 - 309 709 227 1245 . 1.5
1940 1777 903 82 187 2949 3.4
1941 • 33 624 58 279 996 1.2
1942 2262 4249 178 12 6701 7.7
1943 30792 12315 36 1 43144 50.0
1944 17669 407 32 2 18110 21.0
1945 15154 4728 20 1116 21018 24.4
1946 53876 2094 877 202 57049 66.2
1947 31698 2396 93 493 34680 40.2
1948 9505 343 4442 394 14684 17.0
1949 1004 982 1284 1119 4389 5.1
1950 223 1152 3608 64 5047 . 5.8
1951 4859 935 634 6428 7.5
a) Includes Iraq., Hungary, India, Germany and other Countries* 
Source:
Iranian Customs and Excise O ffice, Annual Reports 1927-51•
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Table 2 .5
Production, Exports, Consumption and Imports 1912-51 
(OOP1s Metric Tons)
Year Production
(a)
Imports
.0 >)‘
Total
Consumption (b)
Exports
(a)
Imports as a 
fo of
Consumption
1912 82.0 38.4 38.1 37.0
1913 278.0 34.5 34.5 158.0 100
1914 382.0 43.7 49.6 134.0 88
1915 456.6 35.9 39.4 172.0 92
1916 654.4 36.3 39.3 390.0 92
1917 911.8 45.2 • 48.1 _ 623.0 94
1918 1124.1 . 18.1 20.3 828.0 90
1919 1407.5 35.8 38.3 936.0 95
1920 1771.5 n.a . n .a . 1398.0
1921 ' 2364.5 19.8 24.0 2307.0 79
1922 3006.5 23.4 27.4 2604.O 72
1923 3773.8 .25.9 30.3 3177.0 85
1924 4403.4 29.9 34.7 3577.0 86
1925 4629.2 . 31.8 38.9 4052.1 82
1926 4909.3 * 37.3 47.8 4518.5 77
1927 5443.7 40.0 52.5 4754.4’ 77
1928 4358.5 45.7 63.5 3781.9 72
1929 5544.0 45.1 66.9 5416.3 67
1930 6341.0 56.6 (c) 27.2 (d) 5737.5 -
1931 5842.7 70.7 32.3 5539.2 -
1932 6549.2 56.5 40.0 6006.3 -
1933 7200.4 28.2 68.8 6654.7 41
1934 7653.3 50.0 96.0 7062.5 52
1935 7607.8 32.9 108.0 6917.7 31
1936 8329.6 41.6 135.1 7244.5 31
1937 10329.8 44.5 162.3 9302.0 28
1938 10358.9 23.3 174.2 9090.0 13
1939 9731.5 1.2 238.0 8207.8 N egligible
1940 8752.7 2.9 278.8 8020.1 1
Continued
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T a b le  2 .5  continued
Year Production 
(a)
Imports
0 >)
Total
Consumption (b)
Exports
(a)
Imports as a % 
of C onsumpt ion
1941 67010 2 0.9 278o8 5239.7 N egligible
1542 9546.7 6.7 265.2 8030.2 2
1943 9861.5 43.1 313.6 8304.7 10
1944 13487®2 18.1 419.0 10440.0 4
1945 17109®7 21 o0 456.4 14177.2 5
1946 19497.4 57.0 4880O 17919.1 12
1947 20518*9 34.6 595.9 17725.1 6
1948 25270.1 14.6 697.8 22737.4 2
1949 27236.7 4 .3 801.5 24632.5 N egligible
1950 32259.6 5 .0 869.5 29274.1 N egligible
1951 16885*7 6.4 941.0 14032.3 N egligible
Notes: a) Production and export figures for the period 1912-1928 refer
to. the Iranian year, i 0e 0 1912 figures represent 21st* March 
1912 to 21sto March 1913* The 1928 production and export 
figures are for only 9 months* Data supplied by NIOCo
b) Imports and to ta l consumption for  the 1912-1929 period are taken 
from Jo Bharier, op.cito P©160* This data has come from the 
o ffice  of Dr0 Perrier, the B.P. historian in  London* I t  i s  
converted from long tons to metric tons using the conversion of
1 long ton = 1o01 metric tons0
c) Import figures come from Annual Reports of Iranian Customs and 
Excise Office for the 1930-1951 period. They are s lig h t ly  at' 
variance with the data of the Ministry of Finance quoted in  
Nahai and Kimble op.cit* P .71 *
d) Consumption figures quoted for  the 1930-51 period come from 
NIOC records. For the years 1930, 1931 and 1932, the import 
figures are larger than to ta l consumption. This represents 
either a mistake on the part of NIOC or indicates that imports 
were re-exported to neighbouring countries through Iran* These 
figures are at variance with those of the M inistry of Finance, 
quoted in  Bonekderpaw "Le Petrole Iranian" Lyon 1953  ^ P.175* 
which was cited  in  J . Bahrier, opec i t  P0161.
chajter three
The Impact of the Oil Industry on the Iranian Economy
1901 -  1951
This chapter proposes to  investigate the impact of the Iranian o i l  
industry on the general economic development of Iran "between 1901 and 
1951© I  w il l  begin by considering the general development theories of 
balanced and unbalanced growth and economic dualism© Then I  w i l l  examine 
the direct and indirect influences of the o i l  industry on the Iranian econ­
omy© I  propose to  show that a) general development theories have been ir r ­
elevant to the Iranian situation , and b) the o i l  industry* s impact has 
been minimal on the economic development of the country in  the period vender 
study©
Balanced versus Unbalanced G-rowth Theory
Development i s  a process of converting a trad ition a l soc iety  based on 
bulk production and export of a few primary products into a "modern soc iety ’o 
This involves what i s  generally known as "industrialization” © In th is  
sense, industria lization  required the internal transformation of the society  
and the economy© I t  required the investment of cap ita l for the estab lish ­
ment of industries; investment in  the necessary infra-structure; the dev­
elopment of a sk illed  and d iscip lined  labour force; the creation of an 
educational system; the integration of markets fo r  goods, cap ita l and lab­
our; radical changes in  the system of land tenure, and a more equitable 
re-d istribution  of income e tc . Most economists agree that th is  transform­
ation must be met from within, though external aid may speed up the process©
The development of the Western economic system has been in  the p ast, gen­
era lly  brought about by the so-ca lled  "growth centres"© Over time these
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growth centres expanded and created a close integration between the 
leading industries and the rest of the indigenous economy© To many devel­
opment economists, th is  gradual and slow process seemed to take too long a 
time* They have pointed out that during the 18th. and 19 th . centuries, 
the fin an cia l centre of the world was the free-trading, resource-scarce 
U.K., while at present the world*s finan cia l centre i s  the resource-rich, 
p rotection ist United S tates.
r  The basic dilemma of under-developed countries i s  the shortage of foreign  
exchange, essen tia l fo r  purchasing capita l goods from the developed world©
I f  protectionism in  the developed world, namely the U.S.A. and E.E.C., 
hampers the export of the few primary products on which the le s s  developed 
j nations are so dependent, then the process of development would be consider— 
! ably slowed down in these countries.
^  A large body of development economists believe that the present structure 
of the international trade system has a b u ilt - in  bias against the le s s  
developed world, resu lting  in  an ever increasing gap between the poor and 
the rich nations. (1) Not only have the protectionist p o lic ie s  of the 
Western World damaged the export prospects of the le s s  developed cpuntries, 
'but also the prices of manufactured goods have risen  while the prices of 
j>rimary products have either fa lle n  or fluctuated© (2)
^  Disappointment with the prospect of international trade and aid as an e ff -  
 ^ ective to o l of development in poor countries directed the attention  of some 
economists to  a heavier emphasis on the development of the indigenous 
economy. But could an economy with imperfect markets and l i t t l e  cap ita l 
develop quickly ? The answer, they thought, would be a centralized economy 
where a l l  the sectors could develop simultaneously. This was how the 
^balanced growth theory came into being.
1e See for example a) R. Prebisch: ’’Towards a New Trade P olicy  for  Develop­
ment11 Report by the Secretary General of UKCTAD I U.li. 19640 b) G. Myrdal: 
’’Development and Underdevelopment” 1956, in  G.LI. Meier ’’Leading Issue in  
Economic Development” (Second Edition, Oxford University Press 1970) HP.479 
-484©
5o For a comprehensive review of the export problems of le s s  developed 
countries see: F© Fesharaki ’’Strategies for  Export Promotion in  Less-Devel­
oped Countries” M.A. D issertation , Sussex University 1971 •
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v The thoery of balanced growth has several leading authors. Among them 
y one can name, Rosenstein-Rodan, Nurkse, Lewis and Scitovsky0 (3) In gener- 
\ a l ,  the theory of balanced growth requires the simultaneous expansion of 
I a l l  sectors of the economy under a centralized, decision-making u n it. I t  
I requires the government to make the d ifferent sectors, buyers and se lle r s  
j o f each other's goods. Each section  would create external economies which 
^ cou ld  be u t iliz e d  by the other sectors.
The case for balanced growth and government intervention rests on jrhe 
J  contention that the price system in  le s s  developed countries (LDC's) does 
not work, or i f  i t  dbes, i t  generally gives the wrong sign a ls. According 
to  the Hla Myint, the market mechanism may work w ell where:
a) The economy i s  su ff ic ie n tly  monetized and reasonably competitive, so 
that prices can be held as a fa ir  measure of demand-supply conditions.
b) Changes in  supply and demand relationships are only incremental, taking 
place at the margin.
c) Supply-demand e la s t ic it ie s  are such, that no major in d iv is ib il i ty  or 
bottleneck can block or undermine responses to  change in  price ratios*
\ d) Neither internal nor external economies are of an immense magnitude.
\
1 In LDC's where often a sizeable portion of the economy is  non-monetized,
) where large scale movement of factors i s  frequently necessary to break the 
\ vicious c irc le s  of poverty and productivity, where bottlenecks are enorm- 
| ous and when ex tern a lities are abundant, the price mechanism usually f a i l s  
( to stimulate growth. (4)
In the absence of an automatic mechanism, or " invisib le  hand” to stimul­
ate growth, the need for a deliberate so c ia l action i s  strongly f e l t .  In 
a pioneering a r t ic le , Rosenstein-Rodan argued that the government must 
provide the so c ia l overhead cap ita l, despite the high capital-output ra tio ,
3© See a) P.N. Rosenstein-Rodan "Notes on the Theory of Big Push" in  H. E llis  
(Ed) "Economic Development in  Latin America" (Macmillan & Co0 L td., 1 9 ^ )
b) R. Nurkse "Problems of Capital Formation in  Underdeveloped Countries" 
(Oxford University Press 1953) Chapter 1. c) Tib or Scitovsky "Two Concepts 
of External Economics" Journal of P o lit ic a l Economy, April 1954*PP.143-'I52*
d) Vf.A. Lewis "The Theory of Economic Growth" 1954 London PP.274-283o
4© Hla Myint "The Economic of Developing Countries" (E.A. Praeger, New York 
1964) Chapters 7 80
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in  order to provide private enterprise with su ffic ien t stim uli to proceed 
on i t s  own. (5)
The theory of balanced growth or "Big Push" as some economists prefer to  
c a ll  i t ,  gained a great deal of popularity among the LDC*s, particu larly  in  . 
the lig h t of economic development in  Soviet Russia. The e ffec t of th is  
school of thought can be traced in  the development plans of many LDC * s • In 
particular, the Second Plan of India. I t  must be emphasized that the balan­
ced growth theory was interpreted to  exclude agriculture from the growing 
sectors -  since i t  was generally accepted that investment in  industry, 
p articu larly  heavy ind ustries, was more productive insofar as the rate of 
GNP was concerned. (6)
The main challenge to  the balanced growth theory came from Professor
Lrschman of Harvard U niversity. (7) He c r itic ized  the balanced growth
ieory on the ground of im practicality. He argued that i t  i s  u n rea listic
d believe that an en tire ly  new, self-contained industrial society  can be
iperimposed on the stagnant and equally self-contained trad ition a l economy
"How can we explain that they set up so unsatisfactory a model? 
I  suspect the reason i s  that the very d if f ic u lty  of the task of 
development has led  them to an escapist solu tion . How many a 
Western traveller  to an under-developed country has been be­
wildered and dismayed by the ubiquitous poverty and in e ff ic ie n ­
cy* Hy the immensity of the task- and by the interlocking vicious 
c ir c le  I The temptation i s  strong then to leave a l l  th is  
backwardness alone and to  dream of an en tire ly  new type of 
economy." (8)
! the doctrine of balanced growth, then i t  should not be under-developed in
■ necks which oould hamper the simultaneous growth of a l l  sectors -  the most
5 c R.N. Rosenstein-Rodan "Problem of Industrialization  of Eastern and South- 
Eastern Europe" 1943* c ited  in  G-.M. Meier "Leading Issue in  Development 
Economics" (OUP 1970) FP.393-399.
6. For d eta ils  of "Feldman Model" see Maurice Dobb "Papers on Capitalism  
and Planning" (Rautledge, 19&7) Chapter 5®
7o Albert 0 . Hirschman "The Strategy of Economic Development" (Yale Univer­
s i ty  Press, Newhayen 1968)
8. ib id . P<>32«
(trad ition a l economy i s  taken to  mean an economy based on subsistence agri­
culture and sm all-scale handicraft). He went on to say:
^  The heart of Hirschman* s argument i s  that i f  a country i s  ready to  apply
the f ir s t  p lace. According to Hirschman there are a large number of b o tt le -
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f  important of a l l  being the lack of managerial a b ility  and capitalo As an 
j a lternative to the balanced growth theory, Hirschman offered h is "unbalanc- 
j ed growth theory”0‘ He argued that there must be a leading sector which w ill 
j eventually p u ll up the other sectors of the economy. This ’’pu lling up
\ process” would take place through the so-called  ’’backward and forward
\ - ' 
linkages”.
A ’’backward” linkage i s  a p ro fit opportunity created for a firm as a r es-  
J  u lt  of the expansion of demand for  various raw materials and intermediary 
j goods and services generated in  the leading sector, in  other words, the 
| flow of resources from the economy to the leading sector. A ’’forward” link—* 
age i s  a p ro fit opportunity created for other firms or ind ustries, to  
produce goods and services with the aid of the lower-cost inputs produced 
by the leading industry or sector -  that i s ,  the flow of resources from 
the leading sector to  the rest of the economy0
Unlike the balanced growth th eo r is ts , Hirschman aggued that for  an 
j- economy to be kept moving ahead, the task of development p o lic ie s  would be 
■'.to maintain tension, disproportions and disequalibria. The imbalances 
i would cause excess p ro fits  in  one sector which would lead to large in vest-  
j ments, a lso , large p rofits  would create stim uli and incentive fo r  business- 
’ men to  engage in  industrial ventures.
Unbalanced Growth and the Theory of Economic Dualism
Although only a re la tiv e ly  few countries have entered into a process of 
self-susta in ed  growth, most of the poor countries exhibit some elements of 
modernization in  one sector or in  parts of th e ir  economy. In many count­
r ie s  a modem money economy has developed alongside a trad ition al indig­
enous economy, resu lting in  what i s  termed as a”dual economy”. Economic 
dualism i s  a d irect consequence of the unbalanced growth strategy© Support­
ers of the unbalanced growth strategy maintain that over time the price  
system, with some government intervention, w ill  activate backward and for­
ward linkages, which eventually tend to  eliminate the gap between the 
modem and backward sectors. But as has been the case in  many LDCfs ,  where 
the leading sector (industry) has been a foreign orientated, primary-producjj
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I producer, these backward and forward linkages have fa ile d  to create s e lf ­
sustained economic growth* There maybe a variety of reasons why these 
linkages have not produced the desired effects* I f  the price signals are 
| weak, and i f  there i s  a complete lack of information, the stim uli which 
| Hirschman describes may not reach the entrepreneurs© There may a lso  be 
j structural bottlenecks, which hamper the transfer of stim uli across the 
sectors of the economy©
Many development economists have placed direct foreign investment in  th is  
non-stimulating category. Professor Singer of Sussex University has argued 
that such investments commonly constitute an enclave in  the LDC’s physically  
located therein, but economically aloof from them as a mere expansion of 
the overseas metropolis©.. ( 9) These foreign-owned industries tend to be 
extremely cap ita l-in ten sive , esp ecia lly  in  the case of mining and petrolemio
The theory of economic dualism has much to say about the labour force© A  
prominent w riter, S ir Arthur Lewis, (10) has se t up a two sector model in  
a dual economy composed of a “c a p ita lis t11 sector and a “subsistence” sector® 
The former i s  defined as that part of the economy which uses reproducible 
cap ita l, pays the c a p ita lis t  for  the use thereof and employs wage-labour 
for  profit-making purposes© C apita list production need not be restr ic ted  
to manufacturing, i t  extends to plantations and mines. The subsistence 
sector i s  that part of the economy which does not use reproducable cap ita l 
-  the indigenous self-employed sector© In th is  sector output per head i s  
much lower than i t  i s  in  th e ,ca p ita lis t  sector© There may be disguised  
unemployment ( in  the sense that workers are abundant and underemployed), 
in  many cases with marginal productivity of labour approaching zero©
A fundamental relationship between the two sectors i s  that when the 
c a p ita lis t  sector expands, i t  draws labour from the subsistence sector, 
assuming that the supply of labour i s  unlimited© Labour i s  “unlimited” in
9o H.W. Singer: “Distribution of G-ains between Borrowing and Investing  
Countries” In J© Levin* s “The Export Economies” (Harvard U niversity Press
i 960) PP.473-475°
10© Y/oA. Lewis “Economic Development with Unlimited Supplies of Labour" in  
“The Manchester School" May i 954-, PP.139-191° Also W.A. Lev/is “Unlimited 
Labour Further Note" ib id . January 1958© PP.1-32o
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the sense that when the c a p ita lis t  sector offers additional opportunities 
at the ex istin g  wage ra te , the number w illin g  to work at those rates w ill  
be greater than demand. A large component of the unlimited supply of 
labour is  assumed to be under-employed peasants. The movement of these 
peasants to a sector where th e ir  marginal productivity i s  above zero w il l  
obviously increase the GDP. (11) This large pool of unskilled labour en­
ables new industries to  be created and old industries in  the c a p ita lis t  
sector to expand without encountering any shortage of unskilled  lab our e 
The wages in  the c a p ita lis t  sector w ill  have to be higher than the average 
productivity of the land (Lewis observes that there i s  usually a gap of 30 
percent or more between c a p ita lis t  wages and subsistence earnings)o
In tracing the process of economic expansion, Lewis emphasizes that the 
key to the process i s  using the cap ita lists*  surplus. The driving force  
in  the system i s  generated by the re-investment of the cap ita lists*  surplus, 
in  creating new ca p ita l. As the c a p ita lis t  sector expands, labour with­
draws from the subsistence sector into wage-employmeht© The surplus becomes 
larger and the process continues progressively, absorbing surplus labour 
from the subsistence sector. In Lewis*s model, the share of p ro fits  in  the 
c a p ita lis t  sector i s  cru cia l to  the economic development© As the c a p ita lis t  
sector expands, and the wage-price ratio  remains constant, the share of pro­
f i t s  in  the National Income increases© And since the major source of 
savings i s  p r o fits , savings and cap ita l formation also increase as. a prop­
ortion of the National Income. Theoretically, the c a p ita lis t  sector can 
expand u n til the absorbtion of surplus labour i s  complete, and the supply 
function of labour then becomes le s s  than p erfectly  elastic© Capital accum­
ulation  has caught up with the excess supply of labour; beyond th is  point 
rea l wages no longer remain constant, but r ise  as cap ita l formation occurs 
-  th is  i s  where the LDC*s are supposed to be on the path to se lf-su sta in ed  
growth©
I t  wi l l  be useful at th is  point to  c ite  an interesting p iece of empirical 
research by Charles H ollin s, with respect to B oliv ia . (12) Rollins* study
11. One may envisage instances where large numbers of peasants who are not 
in  disguised unemployment, move in to  towns because of high wages, or the 
so-called'demonstration e ffe c t11
12© Charles E© R ollins "Mineral Development & Economic Growth" in  Socia l 
Research (Autumn 1956) PP. 253-280
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was concerned with the e ffects  of foreign investment in  extractive indust­
r ie s  under d u a listic  conditions in  B o liv ia0 R ollins divided these e ffe c ts  
into  two categories; direct influences and in d irect; or f i s c a l  influences© 
The f ir s t  includes ’’a l l  those influences that resu lt from the d irect contact 
of the mineral project with the sectors of the economy”; the second includes 
’’those elements that enable the sta te  to  contribute to  the growth process”.
Under direct influences, Rollins includes the expansion of markets and 
incomes resu lting from forward and backward linkages and the employment * 
of labour force. Under f is c a l  influences, are various governmental a c t iv it ­
ie s  that could be in it ia te d  as a resu lt of the payment of taxes, roya lties  
etc©, by the foreign investor to  the host government. These funds could be 
used to  improve market conditions or develop external economies d irectly  
(by providing roads and other f a c i l i t i e s ) ,  or a lternatively , by providing 
capita l for private enterprise through the industria l and agricultural 
banks. Rollins* conclusions were that the development of mineral resources 
in  d u a listic  economies is  not l ik e ly  to  lead to economic growth. He argued 
that foreign expenditures within the IBC’s are rather small in  rela tion  to  
the value of output; the prospects of an accrual of domestic cap ita l in  the 
private sector are rather s lig h t and that the proportion of the labour 
force employed i s  in sign ificant because these investments tend to  be highly  
capital-intensive©
YTith regard to fin an cia l influences, R ollins argued that the magnitude of 
payments to  the host government may not be very large0 With regard to the 
responses of the private sector to  the stim uli provided by the government, 
R ollins observes that private investors are l ik e ly  to  respond Only i f  the 
government is  capable of directing private expenditure into the desired  
channels© But such a direction , can, in  many instances, be contrary to the 
finan cia l in terests of the raw material producers -  at lea st in  the short- 
run. R ollins concludes that foreign investments in  extractive industries 
are not lik e ly  to lead to economic growth ’’because they do not become in t ­
egrated into the economy of the source country to  the extent required”® In 
short, Rollins* th esis  appears to be a denial of ap p licab ility  of Hirschmanh 
th esis  in  cases of the leading extractive industries.
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Mention must also be made of a th esis  developed by Messrs, Mabro and 
Katouzian® ( 13) They argue that governments f e e l  responsible towards 
th e ir  c itizen s because they are dependent on the c itizen s  for revenues in  
the form of taxes® (14) This creates a mastei/servant relationsh ip , where
I the master i s  dependent on his servant® In the case of the Middle Eastern
!
| o i l  producing countries, o i l  revenues have made the master to  a great ex t-
j ent, independent of the servant® The master (government), thus makes no
I
j effort to develop a sophisticated f i s c a l  system. The government tends to
j spend a great deal of money on infra-structural a c t iv it ie s , such as roads,
j dams, etc®, but these expenditures w ill  be iso la ted  from the whole economy
|
j  and thus w ill  not contribute to the creation of an ind ustria l base® In
{ * 
j short, the government expenditure w ill  not cause integration between the
j o i l  industry and the economy® They also argue that the government tends
l-
to  become the largest employer in  the economy, offering steady, w ell-paid  
jobs which w ill d istort the optimum allocation  of human resources® ( 15)
The conclusion of th eir  paper thus points towards the lack of integration  
 ^ between the o i l  industry and the economy®
13. Robert Mabro of Oxford University and A li Katouzian of Kent U niversity  
presented th is joint paper at the In stitu te  of Development Studies -  Sussex 
U niversity in  November 1971* t i t l e  i s  "The E ffect of O il Revenues on 
Economic Development11,
14® This i s  not true in  previous centuries as the taxes were obtained by 
force®
13® Indeed, Mr® Katouzian to ld  me that he believes that the reason for the 
coming of a large number of Iranian students abroad to  study for higher 
degrees, i s  their  expectation of large potentia l incomes in  Iran, since  
the government scale of pay i s  d irectly  related to the number of degrees 
they hold. Also Dr, Mabro, in  h is lecture at Sussex U niversity implied 
that one reason for the lack of democracy in  o i l  countries may w ell be the 
breakdown of the mastei/servant relationship -  that i s ,  the independence of 
the governments from lo ca l taxes® . ■ ' . ,
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Direct and Indirect Influences of the O il Industry on the Iranian 
Economy 1901 — 1951 '* •
Very l i t t l e  research has been undertaken "with regard to the impact of 
the o i l  industry on the economic expansion of LDC*s<> (16) Even the few 
pieces of research on the subject which are availab le, are those connected 
with the impact of the o i l  industry in  the post-war period*
Insofar as Iran i s  concerned, the lack of s t a t is t ic a l  data has hindered 
economists1 attempts to  analyze the e ffec t of the o i l  industry on the  
Iranian econpmy in  the 1901-1951 period. The only attempt at th is  type 
of research has been recently made by two Iranians, Messrs. Amuzegar and 
Fekrato (17) They borrowed R ollins * too ls  of analysis -  i 0e0 tracing the 
direct and indirect e ffec ts  of the o i l  industry on the Iranian economy*
In th is  chapter I sh a ll attempt to  extend their  analysis of these in flu ­
ences -  again by using Rollins* approach. Rollins* d irect and ind irect 
e ffec ts  can be translated in  terms of the Iranian economy to mean:
a) Direct influences through input and output complementaries 
with other industries in  the indigenous sector*;
b) F isca l .or indirect influences via  royalty payments to  the Iranian 
government.
A -  Direct Influences -  Backward and Forward Linkages
By the end of 1950, AI0C had a fixed  investment in  Iran o f around 
£90 m illion , (£28.7 m illion  net of depreciation) with a market value of 
around £200 m illion . (18) As already mentioned, AI0C did not resort to 
much external borrowing, most of i t s  investments were in tern ally  financed 
-  mainly by restr ictin g  dividend payments<> According to  the United Nation 
figures, around 80 percent of AI0C*s re-investment came from the company
16o The only substantial book on the subject i s  Re M iksell (Ed) “Foreign 
Investment in  the Petroleum and Mineral Industries** (John Hopkins-Balti— 
more, 1971~5 the book includes seventeen a r tic le s  and fourteen case studdes 
17. Jo Amuzegar and A li Fekrat “Iran: Economic Development Under Dualis- 
t i c  Conditions” (Chicago University Press -  Chicago 1971)
180 ibido
GU
p rofits rather than from fresh equity cap ita l. The company had discovered 
13 b il l io n  barrels of proved o i l  reserves, d rilled  433 w ells , la id  2177 & 
miles of p ip e lin e ,-b u ilt  three major ports and 2,500 kilometres of road, a 
few thousand houses and a number of schools and hosp ita ls. Yet the actual 
operations of the company were such as to substantially  iso la te  th is  large 
industry from the rest of the Iranian economy. ( 19)
Let us f i r s t  look at the backward linkages -  that i s  the flow of resources 
from the domestic economy to the o i l  industry. This flow could take the 
form of
a) Participation of Iranian nationals in  providing equity capitalo
b) Encouraging the establishment of lo ca l banking, insurance and other 
fin an cia l and professional serv ices.
c) Providing lo ca l materials for  use by the company and i t s  employees.
d) Encouraging domestic ancillary industries and professions to provide 
goods and services necessary for  the operation of the company and the 
welfare of i t s  employees.
e) Providing work at manual, technical and managerial le v e ls 0
Considering each of these linkages in  turn;
a) AI0C had decided from the beginning that the company should remain ex­
c lu sively  in  E ritish  hands. The company did not offer  any shares for sa le  
on the domestic market, although any Persian would have presumably been 
able to  buy them on the London Stock Exchange. In 1919* bhe Persian Foreign 
M inister so lic ite d  the B r itish  Foreign Secretary in  London for  the right to  
purchase a few shares out of a new issue of £7©5 m illion  to be made in  
1920. His request was turned down0 ( 20) The APOC management even went so 
far  as to  persuade the Bakhtiari C hiefs, who held shares to  the value of 
£15,540 in  FEC and over £11,000 in  the Bakhtiari Oil Company in  1911, to  
s e l l  a l l  th e ir s . By 1929, they had sold a l l  th e ir  equity ca p ita l, despite
19. United Nations “Economic Development in  the Middle East 1945-1954"
PP. 70-71©
20. "Documents on B ritish  Foreign Policy ‘1919-1959“ Edited by E.L. Woodward 
and R. Butler. F irst se r ie s , Vol: IV” (Fpreign O ffice, London 1952) P.1258
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the fact that the company was increasingly prosperous* (21)
b) . No encouragment whatsoever was given to the establishment of lo ca l  
fin an cia l institutions©
c & d) As far as lo ca l material production was concerned, AIOC offered  
l i t t l e  or no stimulus. Almost a l l  the requirements of the company were
imported from abroad, including food and drink© Abuse of customs p r iv il­
eges were also  reported. A rtic le  7 of the DAArcy concession en titled  the 
concessionaire to import free of duty, only those items "necessary" for  
the working of the concession. A private le t te r  of the B r itish  M inister 
in  Tehran revealed that the company attempted to import free  of duty, goods 
not necessary to the working of the concession. The B r itish  M inister said:
"You may remember that when I  talked with you about the 
APOC's customs p r iv ileg es, I  was rather in  favour, not on 
the grounds of ju stice , but purely on the grounds of exped­
iency, of supporting the company’s extremely wide in terpretat- .:
ion of A rtic le  VII of th e ir  concession© I t  i s  clear now I  
think, that the Russians, whose concession would, I  think, 
give them better  grounds than the APOC’s concession, do not 
claim on behalf of th e ir  companies, free entry for  clothes 
and provisions for the employees, so we should not have a leg  
to  stand on i f  we supported the APOC as regards these two 
categories. I  know hope, therefore, that you w il l  give us a 
d efin ite  ruling against the company on these two points©
I belive  that you w il l  find  Greenway (Managing Director of
APOC) or whomever you see , unreasonable© He at one time tallied
of submitting the point to  arbitration." (22)
However, no ruling was issued from London against the company, and a few 
years la ter  a l l  the o i l  companies in  the Middle East took up the same pos­
ition© Indeed, the Iranian allege that much of the company’s household
needs (e©g© food items) and part of i t s  induatrial supplies ( e .g .  cement) 
were lo c a lly  available or could have been produced com petitively in  Iran.(23)
As far as the employment opportunities were concerned, the company’s 
operations had only marginal e ffects  on the overall employment. With regft 
ard to  senior or managerial jobs, the opportunities were very small indeed©
21© EEC Financial Statements, 1911-1929. My great-grandfather, Hadj-Amino- 
Sheriah, a Freemason, was instrumental in  "buying back" the shares held by 
the Bakhtiari Chiefs in  the two subsidiaries©
22. League of Nations op.cito P.302 Feb©l933 cited  in  Z© Mikdashi qp©cit B39 
23o Nemazee, op.cito Po93®
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But the e ffec t was rather more sign ifican t on the unskilled labour force© 
According to  IHQ figu res, in  1949 le s s  than one percent of the Iranian 
work force was employed by the company (AIOC)o Only 9 percent of these 
employees were among slaried  s ta f f  -  that i s ,  senior employees© The rest  
were wage-earners or unskilled  workers© Among the salaried  employees, 
the number of"graded" (high-ranking) Iranians was about one th ird  of the 
B ritish  s ta f f  o On the other hand, the ratio  of "non-graded" employees " 
was fiv e  Iranians to  one foreigner, most of them Indians© There were no 
Iranians assigned to top managerial positions within the company© (24-)
The follow ing table shows the employment situation  in  Iran during th is  
periods
Table 5o1 Employment in  the Iranian Oil Industry
1939 -  1951
Year Iranians Non-Iranians Not Specified Total
1939 15060 2723 n©a© 17783
1940 13380 2273 n©a© 15653
1941 10980 2079 n.a© 13065
1942 11654 1803 n.a . 13457
1943 16389 2864 n©a© 19253
1944 16485 3380 n .a . 19865 .
1945 21781 4030 12143 37954
1946 24889 4520 12461 41870
1947 28221 4228 11065 43514
1948 29917 4306 12189 46412
1949 32011 4477 16410 52898
1950(a)31875 4500 n.a© n«a0
1951 50662 4271 12951 67884
Source: Nahai and Kimble "Petroleum Industry in  Iran" Bureaux of Mines© ' 
U.S. Department of In terior, 19&3o Po20©
Note: a) Figures for 1950 are taken from Nemazee o p .c it . b) 1939-1944- 
figures are small due .to incomplete information on contract labour 0 Contract 
labourers were presumably a l l  Iranian©
24-o International labour O ffice, "Labour Conditions in the Oil Industry in  
Iran" (G-eneva 1950) Chapters 2 and 3
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Turning now to the forward linkages -  that i s  the flow of resources 
from the industry to the economy, we can formulate the following l i s t :
a) Establishment of by-product industries, linked to o i l  production
j d) Through the domestic sale of o i l  products in  Iran©
\ .  . ■ ;; : ' :
Examining each of these cases in  turn, we can say:
a) AIOC took no steps to  estab lish , or help to  estab lish , by-product 
industries in  Iran* AIOC did not intend to  develop any ancillary  industries 
in  Iran on which i t  may have had to depend for supplies* Indeed, the Iran­
ians a llege that the company actually "obstructed the growth of industries
• which would compete for lo ca l labour and thereby raise wages©11 (25)
b) AIOC’s Annual Reports and Chairman*s Reports bear no evidence of the 
company* s intention to  get involved in  lo ca l non-oil ventures#
c) The fin an cia l statements of AIOC show that almost a l l  the company’s 
foreign exchange earnings, reserves and deposits were held in  foreign  
banks* This was not unusual considering that the company was registered  
in  London and operated in  many countries© This type of forward linkage 
had l i t t l e  or no e ffect on the development of domestic fin an cia l and credit 
institutions©
d) The only sign ifican t forward linkage was the consumption of o i l  prod­
ucts in  Iran during th is  period© There was no real effort on the part of 
AIOC to encourage the use of o i l  for home cooking, heating and other uses© 
Indeed, the o i l  products consumed by the Iranians did not a l l  come from 
AIOC© There were three major sources of supply: the AIOC’ s own sa les of
i t s  domestically refined products, AIOC’s imports from abroad , and
25* Nemazee, op,cit© P©93* The correctness of th is  a llegation  i s  doubtful* 
Because of the low lev e l of industrial a c tiv ity  in the country one may spe­
culate that there was a large number of unskilled  labour force available  
for employment a l l  over the country©
j  and refining©
j b) AIOC’s participation  in  lo c a l industries, either in  joint-venture
j with Iranians or with f u l l  company ownership.
I c) Keeping the company’s cash p rofits  or holdings in  Iranian banks#
I ■
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imports from Russia,, Table 3©2 shows the relationship between Iranian 
production, sa les and imports#
Table 3c2
Production. Consumption and Import of O il 
Products for Selected Years (000fs Metric Tons^
Year Production Imports Consumption Imports as a % of 
consumption©
1913 278.0 34«5 34® 5 100
1918 1124o1 18©1 20©3 90
1923 377308 25*9 30 ©3 85
1928 4358.5 45o7 63 «5 72
1933 7200.4 28© 2 68©8 41
1938 10358.9 23.3 174© 2 13
1943 9861.5 43 ®1 419o0 10
1948 25270.1 14.6 679*8 21
1951 16885.7 6 .4 941.0 0©07
Source: Chapter 2©
The above table shows that u n til the 1930*s ,  there was no important linkage] 
between the o i l  industry and the economy. In the la te  1930*3 and 1940* s j 
the imports f e l l  d rastica lly  and almost a l l  of the o i l  products were supp­
l ie d  by the domestic o i l  industry0 • .
U ntil 1936, the Soviet Union was the largest single exporter of o i l  
products to  Iran<> During the 1927-36 period, Soviet o i l  exports con sist­
ently provided over 90 percent of Iran1 s to ta l  o i l  imports© I t  i s  clear  
that despite i t s  large production of crude o i l ,  Iran was obliged to  import 
o i l  from abroad© In 1923 to ta l consumption was just under 1 percent of 
exports, in  1933 was just over 1 percent and in 1943 th is  ra tio  was 5 
percent© The corresponding ratio  for  1931 was 6©7 percento ( 26)
26© For d eta ils see Chapter 2*
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I t  i s  c lear that the direct impact of the o i l  industry on the Iranian 
economy was r e la tiv e ly  in s ig n ifica n t. Apart from employment and domestic 
sale  of o i l  products, one could in  fact claim that the impact was negligible© 
Contrary to  Lewis*s prediction, the flow of labour from the economy to  the 
ca p ita lis t  sector did not constitute a major portion of the labour force.
The cap ita l-in tensive nature of the o i l  industry lim ited the absorbtive 
capacity for labour in  the o i l  industry. (27)o The re-investment process 
also* took place by opening new sources of supply in  Iraq and Kuwait rather 
than Iran© The p rofits  which are so c r it ic a l  to Lewis’s theory were not 
kept in  Iran, but repatriated to England and allocated to dividends and 
reserves as the directors thought fit©  Rollins* predictions were closer to  
the Iranian situ ation , insofar as the forward and backward linkages had 
l i t t l e  e ffe c t  in  developing the domestic economy©
27. In fa c t , a fter  the 195^ contract, the employment of Iranians dropped 
sharply, despite the high rate of growth in the industry©
66
B -  Indirect Impact of the O il Industry on the Iranian Economy 1901-51
_The indirect, or f i s c a l ,  impact of the o i l  industry on the Iranian  
economy would be through the payment of royalties to  the Iranian Government, 
the uses to  ’which the revenues are put, and the importance of these revenues 
as a percentage of to ta l  government revenues and National Income# Since, 
royalty payments were d irectly  related to  the p rofits of AP0C/AI0C, i t  would 
be necessary to  discuss the fin an cia l performance of the company# In the 
follow ing, two particular areas w il l  be discussed:-
1) The fin an cia l performance of AIOC
2) The e ffect of the o i l  revenues on the Iranian economy#
1) The Financial Performance of AIOC (APOC)
Production of o i l  in  Iran was carried out not by APOC, but by i t s  two 
producing subsidiaries# The relationship between APOC and these two subs­
id iaries was very much lik e  that of a holding company# The two subsidiar­
ie s  were:
a) The F irst Exploration Company (FEC), or ig in a lly  established by D*Arcy in  
1903 with a cap ita l of £600,000# The issued share cap ita l of FEC was £5*18,
000 in  1911 and £54^,000 in  1913* After the take-over of APOC in  1909 the
company decided to  o ffer  some of FEC*s shares to the lo ca l tr ib a l ch iefs
of the Bakhtiari, so that the company* s properties would be safe from tr ib a l  
attackso In 1911, out of the £518,000 issued shares, 3*0 percent or £15>540 
were held by the Bakhtiaries0 FEC continued i t s  producing operations u n til  
the Iranian nationalization of 1951® (28)
b) The Bakhtiari O il Company (B0C) was formed in 1909, with a share cap ita l 
of £400,000. In 1911, the Bakhtiari chiefs held shares worth £ 1 1 ,670, or
3 percent of the issued ordinary shares of £3899000# ( 29) The Bakhtiari O il 
Company operated u n til the end of 1924, by which time the power of Reza Shah 
and the central government had eliminated the danger of Bakhtiari attacks 
on the company*s properties# The Anglo-Persian Oil Company owned a l l  the 
shares of the two subsidiaries except for those given to  the tr ib a l chiefs#
28# Letter of F# Macindoe, Secretary of APOC, to  Foreign O ffice, dated 8th# 
August, 1911. F .0. 371/1190 
29 o ibid#
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Table 3*3 shows the p ro fita b ility  of the two producing subsid iaries, and 
table 3*4 indicates the relationship between net p ro fits , U.K. taxes and 
the Iranian ro y a lties .
Table 3.3
Production and P ro fita b ility  of the Producing Subsidiaries
1911 -  1950
One P rofits (£000 fs) Rate of . Production P rofits o f
Year Return 
on. share
Capitalm
(M illion tons) BOC £ PEC 
in  sh illin g s  
per ton.
Bakhtiari Oil 
Co. (BOC)
P irst
Exploitation  
Co. (PEC)
1911-1912 > ' T ■J--*'' ' • ; . 0.04
1912-1913 0.08
1913-1914 0.27
1914-1915 40.3 62.7 10fo 0.38 .5 .4
1915-1916 70.2 59.7 12 0.45 5.8
1916-1917 70.0 66.4 12 0.65 4.2
1917-1918 90*0 82.6 15 0.91 3.8
1918-1919 101.7 91.1 17 1.12 3.5
1919-1920 180.6 150.8 29 1.40 4.8
1920-1921 203.2 181.8 31 1,77 3.8
1921-1922 257.8 257.1 41 2.36 4.0
1922-1923 242.3 233.9 38 3.00 3.2
1923-1924 291.9 229.2 42 3.77 2.8
1924-1925 558.5 45 4.40 2.6
1925-1926 672.5 54 4.63 3.0
1926-1927 746.1 60 4.90 5.1
1927-1928 783.6 63 5.44 3.0
1928 (9 Months) 736oO 59 4.35 3.4
1929 924.0 74 5.54 3.6
1930 909.0 73 6.03 3.0
1931 783.4 63 5.84 2.7
1932 807.4 65 6.55 2.5
1933 • 78608 63 7.20 2.2
Continued
T a b le  3 ©3 co n tin u ed
Year P rofits  
(PEC)- 
. (£000's)
Rate of Return 
( $
Production 
(m illion  tons)
P rofits in  
sh illin g s  per 
ton
■1934- 783.0 63 7o20 2<>2
1935 776.7 62 7 .6 0 2©0
1936 811.0 65 8*33 2o0
1937 942.5 76 10.33 1 .9
1938 925.1 74 10.35 1 .8
1939 571.6 2j.6 9.73 1 ©2
1940 447.7 36 8,75 1©6
1941 • , 375.0 30 6© 70 1.1
1942 712 .6 57 9.54 1 .5
1943 635.9 51 9.86 1 .3
1944 702 .0 56 13.48 1.1
1945 697.2 56 17 .10 0©8
1946 685.4 55 19.50 0©7
1947 681.4 • 55 20©51 0.7
1948 822.1 66 25.27 0 .6
1949 636.4 51 27.23 0©5
1950 ' 669.1 54 32.56 0 .4
Note: a) P rofits are pre-tax u n til  1929* thereafter they are net of U*K. 
taxeso
b) The issued cap ita l of Bakhtiari O il Company was £389,000 in  1911, 
but i t  was raised  to  £300,000 and £700,000 at the end of March of 
the years 1915* i 9^7 aad- 1920 respectively©
c) The issued ca p ita l of ESC was £518,000 in  1911 and £544,000 in  
November 1913o
Source: Bakhtiari O il Company lim ited , Public Records O ffice, London.No: 
l02if£o and F irst Exploration Company Limited, Companies* R egistration Office 
London, No: 77452©* Quoted in  Z© Mikdasbi o p .c it . PPo316~318l5,
Production figures supplied by NIOC* Rate of return i s  calculated by talcing 
the percentage of p ro fits  over issued share capitalo
*(There are some mistakes inM ikdashif s table which have been corrected©)
I t  i s  important to note that the concept of the rate of return on 
paid-up shar©.'capital i s  economically meaninglesst &s i t  does not always in­
take account of undistributed p ro fits . \ What'is much more .relevant, 
however, i s  the rate of return on capital* employed. We.can see that the
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profits in  sh illin g s  per ton seem to  have declined sharply in  1920- 21, 
coinciding with the Armitage-Smith Agreement. There may be two reasons for  
the p ro fits  per unit of production to  f a l l .  Either international prices  
f e l l  or the unit production costs in  Persia increased. In fact neither of 
the above happened. The fa llin g  p ro fita b ility  per ton i s  ind icative of in­
ternal a llocation  of co sts , prices and p rofits of the v e r tica lly  integrated  
Anglo-Persian O il Company. The company was alleged by the Persians, to  
have entered into a f ic t ic io u s  transaction with i t s  subsidiaries with a 
view to  reducing the p r o fita b ility  of the producing subsid iaries oh the / 
basis of which a large portion of the Persian roya lties was calculated , i f  
we believe that the real p ro fits  were higher than those shown in  the prev­
ious tab le , then the rate of return on the share cap ita l would be even larg­
er than those shown in  Table 3©3«
Table 3#4 illu s tr a te s  the overall picture of the company* s fin an cia l 
performance, and provides an insight into the relationships between APOC* 3 
net p r o fits , U.K. taxes, royalty payments and dividends of the ordinary 
shareholders.
The company p rofits rose from £27,000 in  1913-14 to a peak of £4©8 
m illion  in  1926-27, but f e l l  to  £2o4 m illion  in  the depression year of 193*1© 
Royalties to  the Persian G-overnment started from^a low of £10,000 in  1913-*! 4  
rose to  £1*4 m illion  in  1929 and f e l l  drastica lly  to £307,000 only in  193*1© 
The shareholders of the comp any were particu larly w ell remunerated during 
the 1933 Agreemento Dividend payments rose from a high of 5 percent in  the 
years of the Great Dq>ression, to 20 percent in  193^-38o Scrip bonuses (or  
stock dividends) of 50 percent were distributed in  193&© In the 1939* 4^0 
period dividends f e l l  to  5 percent, owing to a reduction in  o i l  exports a ft­
er the outbreak of war. Later they rose to  30 percent in  the years 1946-50o 
Had i t  not been for the B ritish  Government* s dividend lim ita tion  p o licy  in  
the la te  1940*s, AIOC would in  fa c t , have distributed larger sums. (30)
Despite the nationalization of o i l  by Iran in  1951 and the v irtu a l stand­
s t i l l  of Iranian o i l  production, dividends continued at the rate of 30 per­
cent for  1951 anl rose to 35 percent in  1952, to 42.5 percent in  1953 and t0  
15 percent plus 400 percent scrip bonus in 1954o The large fin a n c ia l reserves
30. Chairman*s Report at the 40th. Ordinary General Meeting of AIOC. 1949©
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accumulated by the company (which would have raised the Iranian share of 
profits-had i t  been declared as distributable p r o fit) , made i t  possible  
for the c.ompany to follow such a generous dividend policy . (31)
Table 3*4 also shows that within 20 years, the net p ro fits of AIOC rose 
from £2.4 m illion  in  1931 to £33*8 m illion  in  1950, a r ise  of over 14 
times. Payments to Iran rose 12 times during the same period.
Table 5.4
Net P rofits of APOC/AIOC. U.K. Taxes. Iranian 
R oyalties. Dividends to Ordinary Shareholders (1911-1951)
Year ' NetP rofits (a) 
(£000*s)
U.K. Taxes Iranian Ordinary share
(b) R oyalties(c) Dividends($)
(£0001s ) (£000*s) share at
1911-1912
1912-1913
1913-1914 27 10
1914-1915 64
1915-1916 86 •
1916-1917 344 6
1917-1918 780 325- 8
1918-1919 736 330 (1912-18) 10 •
1919-1920 1849 469 20
1920-1921 3264 585 (d) 20
1921-1922 3779 ‘ 593 20
1922-1923 3431 : 533 10
1923-1924 3517 411 10
1924-1925 4067 831 12.5
1925-1926 4379 1054 17.5
(with 5< 
scrip
1926-1927 4800 1400 12.5
1927-1928 4106 502 17.5
1928 (9 months) 3686 529 9.4
1929 4274 1437 20
1930 3785 1288 15
'  . Continued •  • • • • •
31• B.A.C. Sweet-Escott "Financing Problems of Integrated Oil Companies" 
Fourth Arab Petroleum Congress (Berruit Nov. 1963) P*4»
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Table 5»4 continued
Year Net P r o fits tr.K. Taxes Iranian
R oyalties
Dividends
1931 2413 307 (e) 5
1932 2380 7700 (1912 
-32)
4525 7*5
1933 2654 305 1812 7*5
1934 3183 512 2190 12.5
1935 3519 409 2221 15
1936 6123 911 2580 25 +50$  scr ip  
bonus,
1937 7455 1652 3545 25
1938 6109 1157 3307 20
1939 2986 1956 4271 5
1940 2842 2975 4000 5
1941 3292 2921 4000 7*5
1942 7790 4918 4000 20
1943 5639 7663 4000 20
1944 5677 10636 4464 20
1945 5792 10381 5624 20
1946 •9625 10279 7132 30
1947 18565 15266 7104 30
1948 24065 28310 9172 ( f ) 30
1949 18390 22480 13489 ( f ) 30
1950 33103 50707 16032 ( f ) 30
1951 24843 27374 8326 30
a) After taxes and royalties; consolidated accounts were not prepared before 
1958* Includes p rofits of AIOC subsidiaries not in  Iran,
b) Includes Company income tax and corporate p ro fit tax,
c) In 1940, AIOC paid an indemnity of £1,5 m illion  to the Iranian Government 
for 1939 and guaranteed a minimum of £4 m illion  for the 1940-44 period. 
This guarantee was a means of compensating AIOC’s in a b ility  to export 
su ffic ien t crude and products during the war years. Without th is  
guarantee the royalty payments would have been £2.7 m illion , £2.7 m illion , 
£2.0 m illion , £3*4 m illion  and £5*6 m illion  respectively in  1939-1943*
^  Excluding £1 m illion  paid in  1920, p artia lly  in  settlement of past claims.
.e) After the 1933 Agreement th is figure was revised to £1.339 m illion  and 
the difference was paid to Iran.
f)  Had the Supplemental Agreement of 1948 "been r a tif ied , these payments 
would have been £18.6 m illion , £22.9 m illion and £30 m illion  in 1948,
19499 and 1958 respectively . (Hie Supplemental Agreement was signed 
in  1949 to replace the Iranian demand for 50/50 profit sharing. The 
agreement was not r a tif ie d . See Chapter 4)
Source; Z. Mikdashi o p .c it  pp.45-46 and pp.109-110, and Nahari and 
Kimble, o p .c it  P17*
Turning now to the capital structure of the Company. The share 
capital of the company was increased during i t s  l i f e  in  the following  
manner:
a) Share capital was £2 m illion  1909-1914*
b) The investment of the B ritish  Government raised the share capital 
to £4 m illio n .1914-1917*
c) In 1917 the new issue raised the share capital to £5 m illion  (1917- 
1920).
d) In 1920 the share capital rose substantially  to £20 m illion  and 
remained unchanged u n til 1926 •
e) In 1926 an additional £4 m illion  of ordinary and preferance shares 
were issued, bringing the to ta l to £24 m illion . (1926-32)
f )  In 1932 the share capital increased to £26 M illion. (1932-38)
g) Prom 1938 u n til the Nationalization of AIOC, the share capital 
stood at £33 m illio n .(32)
I t  i s  in terestin g  to look at,» the rate of return of the Company on i t s  
share capital in  the period under study. Hie relevant data i s  shown in  
Table 3. 5.
Table 5.5
Rate of Return on Share Capital o f AIOC 
For Selected Years. (Percentages)
Years 1914-15 1919-20 1924-25 1929 1931 1933 1937 1939
Rate of return 0.07 37 20 18 10 10 28 9
Years
Rate of Return
1944
17
1948
73
1951
75
Source: Computed from data in table 3*4*
32. Annual Reports of AP0C/AI0C 1909-1951. '
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Table 3©5 shows the very high rate of return on the invested share cap ita l 
of AIOC* VJ'ith the exception of the 1 9 ^ 5  period, the depression years 
and the early war years, the rate of return had been more than reasonable*
I t  i s  in ter estin g  to  note that the rate reached i t s  peak towards the end of 
the l i f e  of the company, when dividends to  ordinary shareholders were 30 per­
cent per annum* One should however, guard against making generalized ded­
uctions from th is  sort of data. This data represents the a c t iv it ie s  of the  
company a l l  over the world and not only in  Iran, while at the same time one 
should note that the p r o fits  and a sse ts  of the company were not a ltogether  
consolidated* The same kind of care must be taken when evaluating the U*K* 
ta x e s , which were lev ied  on a l l  the a c t iv it ie s  o f  the company, rather than 
on i t s  producing a c t iv it ie s  in  Iran alone*
2) The Impact of Royalties on the Iranian Economy
Prom 1911 to 1919* royalties paid to Iran amounted to only about 
£335,000; from 1920 to 1950 -  about £10.5 m illion; from 1931 to 1940 -  
approximately £26.9 m illion was received by the Iranian Government; and 
from 1941 to 1951 a to ta l of about £82.0 m illion was received. Although 
the o i l  revenues increased sign ifican tly  in the period under study, they 
constituted only a small portion of the tota l government expenditure and 
National Income. The budgertary impact of o i l  was thus correspondingly 
small. The lack of reliab le  budget data on the way in which o i l  revenues 
were spent, makes i t  impossible to measure any precise impact of these roy­
a lt ie s  on the Iranian economy. Nevertheless, some broad and admittedly 
rough observations, based on the evidence which i s  available, can be made. 
During the 1901—51 period, the government had one single budget which 
included current expenditure as well as development expenditure. (33) 'I t  
i s  the d ivision  of o il  revenues between the current and development expend­
iture^ which can provide an indication of the role o f o i l  revenues on the 
development o f the Iranian economy. I t  i s ,  however, important to note that 
o il  revenues are, in  nature, d ifferent from other internal revenues. The 
former are foreign exchange eam5.ngs which can only be used to finance the 
import b i l l  and are thus not s tr ic t ly  comparable to the domestic income.
Up to 1927, almost a l l  the receipts from o il  were earmarked for current 
expenditure, but during the 1930*s development expenditure became more s ig ­
n ifican t, accounting for between 30 to 40 percent of the to ta l government 
expenditure. (34) During, and immediately a fter  the Second World War, devel­
opment expenditure was reduced to 18 . percent in 1942; 7 percent in  1945 and 
recovered to only 12 percent in 1947. Included in these expenditures were 
the purchase o f arms and munitions (not under "defence” expenditure), the 
construction of the trans-Iranian railway system, and the establishment of  
some government enterprises, (see Table 3*6). ‘
33. In the post-nationalization period a separate budget for development 
projects was created. This budget was mainly financed by o i l  revenues.
(See Chapter 7)
34. United Nations, Public Finance Information Papers: Iran ST/ECA/Ser.A/14.
(New York, 1951) P.21.
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Table 3*6
Contribution o f Oil Revenues to Total Government . 
Expenditure, (M illions o f R ials)
Components 1937 1942 1945 1947 1949
Development Expenditure 662 512 313 991 1638
Other Expenditure (a) 976 2251 4099 7130 9479
Total Expenditure 1638 2763 4412 8121 11117
Oil Revenues 206 347 512 677 901
Contribution of O il 
Revenues to Total 
Expenditure ($) 13 13 12 8 8
a) 'The other expenditures include: Defence, Administration, Health and 
Education, In terest, Public Undertakings and Debt Redemption,
Source: Calculated by the Author, from the United % tions Public Finance
Information Paper: Iran, P .25 and PP.31-33*
One way of establish ing the impact of o i l  revenues on the Iranian 
economy i s  to look at the re la tive  importance of these revenues in  the 
to ta l government income. As we can see from Table 3*7* at no time did 
royalty payments exceed 15 percent of those revenues. In 1950» the peak 
year before nationalization , o i l  royalties reportedly accounted for about 
12 percent of to ta l government revenue and 4 percent of National Income, 
Clearly, the major portion of the government's income came from non-oil 
sources; about two thirds of the to ta l came from taxes, including specia l 
excise taxes on sugar and tea* customs and other le v ie s . Despite the fact  
that o i l  royalties did not constitute a substantial part of the to ta l 
revenues,.they nevertheless provided a major portion of Iran's to ta l foreign  
exchange earnings. The royalty payments plus the purchase of loca l currency 
for domestic expenditures in Iran, by AIOC, accounted for 66 percent of 
Iran's $154 m illion  average annual foreign exchange eaming3 in  the 1947-50 
period. (35)
35* U.N. Economic Development in the Middle East 1945 -  1954 o p .c it  
PP. 70-71
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Table  5 .7
Total Iranian Government Revenue Estimates 
Major Components, 1957-49 (M illion R ials)
Component 1937 1942 1945 1946 1947 1948 1949
A. Revenue from 
ip.xes:
Taxes on Income 130 198 644 504 510 600 900
Inheritance tax - 2 15 7 7 9 10
Land tax 10 -  ■ 70 150 180 200
Taxes on 
Buildings 2 mm 6 30 60 50
Outlay taxes and 
assim ilated!
Excise taxes, mainly 
kerosine, gasoline 
an alcoholic  
beverages 1.80 175 360 309 320 445 550
Customs duties 442 307 457 1205 1312 1911 1679
Fiscal
monopolies(gross) 400 1150 1406 1489 14 66 1870 2000
Mi s c ellaneous 
taxes - 107 24 24 21 31 66
Total revenue 
f  ram-taxes j___
1164 1939 290 6 3614 3816 5106 .5455
B. Other 
Revenues: »
Oil payments 206 347 512 677 677 771 901
Ret p rofit of 
public
undertakings:
Post and
Tel e graph ( Gro ss ) 26 73 122 121 121 126 130
Government domains 42 150 125 125 131 179 189
Government 
Industries (net) 1 500 497 438 600
Investment income 50 125 51 79 79 126 128
Continued.• . • • •
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Table 5 .7  continued
Component 1937 1942 1945 1946 1947 1948 1949
B. Other Revenues 
(Continued)
■ •
Others and 
Administration 156 109- 196. 351 327 408 582
Non-tax Revenues 
Total: 480 805 1506 1850 1743 2048 2330
Total Government 
Revenues (A + B) 1644 2744 4412 5464 5559 7154 7785
Deduct for 
transfer to dev­
elopment budget
- - -  • - - 1065 -
General Budget 
receipts: 1644 2744 4412 5464 5559 6089 7785
Source: United Nations Public Finance Information Papers: Iran pp.31-33 
Cited in  J. Amus^er o p .c it P .25
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Summary and Conclusion
How relevant are the development theories to  the Iranian situation  in  
the 1901-1951 period ? The o i l  industry created an enclave in  the south 
of Iran0 Abadan changed i t s  shape completely -  i t  no more resembled an 
Iranian c ity ; i t s  resid en tia l areas looked more lik e  a part of the Europ­
ean continent. Living and working conditions of many Iranians employed by 
AI0C were much above those of the other workers and peasantse Clearly 
there was a du alistic  economy in  existence, but none of the predictions of 
^  Hirschman or Lewis came to  be true® There was l i t t l e  integration between 
I the domestic economy and the o i l  industry, no complementary industries 
\ were created to  supply the needs o f the o i l  industry because the domestic 
l_economy was too under-developed to provide such sophisticated machinery. 
j There was.no substantial re-investment of p ro fits  in  non-oil a c t iv it ie s ,
I p ro fits  were repatriated abroad or invested to develop new sources of crude\
o i l  in  other countries© The o i l  industry employed only a small portion 
of the Iranian labour force. Although th is  employment was mostly at the 
,,unskilled,, le v e l, high wages c and good working-conditions ensured that 
there would be no outflow of "trained" labour to  the rest of the economy© 
The o i l  industry did not use any lo ca l cap ita l and held i t s  cash in  reserve 
balances abroad, and thus did l i t t l e  to  encourage the expansion of the 
domestic fin an cia l in s titu tio n s. In general the backward and forward lin k ­
ages fa ile d  to  make any sign ifican t impact on the Iranian economy© The 
hi direct influences of the o i l  industry on the Iranian economy were a lso  in ­
significant© Oil revenues were small in  magnitude re la tiv e  to other 
sources of government finance, and the government did not have a w ell dev­
ised  machinery to u t i l iz e  these revenues for development expenditure©
Rollins* predictions came true in  the period under study, and the o i l  
industry contributed very l i t t l e  to  the general development of the Iranian 
economy© But can Rollins* predictions be generalized ? Rollins* argument 
was that structural bottlenecks block the linkages while the government i s  
unable to  u t i l iz e  the royalties -  which w ill not be large in  re la tion  to  
other sources of income and GHPo
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There i s  no doubt that a large in jection  of cap ita l into the economic system 
of an under-developed economy w ill not develop the economy over-night0 
Development i s  a gradual process* Roads, schools, h osp ita ls, dams and other 
in fra-structural construction has to  take place before th is  cap ita l inflow  
can be u tilized* A lso, non-economic factors, such as careful planning and 
wise leadership are necessary before these inflows can become e ffec tiv e  in  
the domestic economyo In other words, some pre-conditions are necessary -  
economic and otherwise -  before a country can be put on the path ta  growtho 
The various theories of economic development cannot be generalised* Each 
theory may be applicable to a particular economy (indeed, that i s  how many 
theories are b u ilt  up ) and w ill  only be applicable to  a certain phase of 
that economy1 s developmento
As we sh a ll see in  the course of future chapters, there are strong 
indications that after certain pre-conditions were met, the Iranian o i l  
industry had a profound effect on the Iranian economy in  the post-national­
iza tion  period*
ov
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CHAPTER FOUR
The Iranian Nationalization and The Consortium Agreement
In order to  understand the background in  T/hich the Iranian Consortium 
came in to  being , one has to  examine two major issu es: the n a tion a liza tion
of Iranian o i l  and the s itu a tio n  of the in ternation a l o i l  industry in  the 
early  1950*s ©
A-Nationalization of the Iranian Oil Industry© (D
The causes of co n flic t between the Iranian Government and the Anglo- 
Iranian Oil Company have been discussed in  d e ta il in  Chapter 1 , but i t  i s  
generally agreed that these disputes were not the major cause for the 
nationalization© The Second World War had increased the suffering and hard­
ship amongst the poverty stricken majority, who saw the occupation forces 
of the A llied  Armies perpetuating the p o lit ic a l  domination of the B r itish  
Government and AIOC over Iran© The need for o i l  for  the war had made a l l  
the major powers conscious of the necessity  of securing th e ir  sources of 
supply for the future© At the Tehran Conference of 1945? the A llied  Powers 
discussed th eir  mutual in terests in  Iran’s o i l  and while the governments 
were discussing th e ir  joint concerns, private companies were asserting  
th eir  individual interests© After the withdrawal of the American forces, 
the B r itish  l e f t  Iran, but the S ta lin  regime refused to  withdraw i t s  army
1© The treatment of the section on nationalization i s  b r ief because there 
i s  a wealth of litera tu re  on the subject particu larly on the 1951-1954 per­
iod© Some of the best known works on the subject are: a) N.S. Fatemi "Oil
Diplomacy” op .c it b) A© Ford “The Anglo-Iranian Dispute of 1951” op * c i t
c) M© Ghassemzadeh "A Comparative Analysis of 1955 and 1954 Agreements" op© 
c i t ,  d) LI© Fateh: "F ifty  Years of Iranian O il” Tehran ^in Persian)
e) Z0 Mikdashi "A Financial Analysis of L'iddle Eastern Oil 1900-65" op ©cit
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from the northern part of Iran* As the price for withdrawing i t s  troops, 
Russia extracted a 50 year o i l  concession from the Iranian Premier Ghavam- 
e-Saltane, who headed an Iranian delegation to  Moscow to  negotiate a se tt ­
lement* An Irano-Russian company was to  be formed to  explore and exploit 
the o i l  of the northern provinces* Russia was to  own 51 percent in terest  
in  the f i r s t  25 years and 50 percent in terest in  the second 25 yearso The 
p ro fits  were to  be divided in  proportion to  ownership* (2) The Russian 
forces withdrew and Ghavam never submitted the agreement to  the M ajlis 
(Parliament) for  ratification* Some believe he never intended to  do so*
The occupation of the country by foreign troops increased resentment 
against foreign influence. With B r itish , American and Russian in terests  so 
anxious to secure new sources of supply for  o i l  i t  was not sup r is in g  that 
Iran should re-examine the terms under which AI0C was exploiting her o il*  
Between 1944 &n<3. 1950, AIOC's p ro fits  had increased ten fold , while Iranian 
revenues rose only fourfold* The n a tion a listic  sentiments of the people, 
stirred  by the Soviet-backed Tudeh Party (the Iranian Communist Party) 
forced the government to introduce a b r ief but sign ificant b i l l  which be­
came law in  October 1947<> (3) The law proposed a ban on the award o f any 
o i l  concession by the government without prior approval by the Majlis* The 
M ajlis, therefore, declared the Russian concession null and void, and in st­
ructed the government to  investigate and re-negotiate the terms of the AI0C 
concession, declaring i t s  b e lie f  that Iran was being deprived of i t s  right­
fu l  share of the o i l  revenues*
At the same tim e, the principle of 50/50 profit sharing was accepted in  
Venezuela, and an agreement to  that e ffect was signed in  1947* In 194-8 
AI0C submitted the so-ca lled  "Supplemental Agreement” to  the Premier General 
Razmara* This agreement provided for an increase in  the royalty  from 4 to  
6 sh illin g s (gold) per ton, with a tax commutation increase of 9 pehce to  
one sh illing* Under the agreement the Iranian o i l  revenues would have in -
20 Incidently, i t  i s  worth noting that the Russians recognised the need 
for a f i f t y - f i f t y  p ro fit sharing agreement before the other o i l  companies*
3* For details see: M. Ghassemzadeh, op*cit P*23 and G* Kirk, "The Middle
East 1.94-5 -  1950" Survey of International A ffa irs. (London) 1954 P«88.
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creased in  th is  manner:
Table 4 01
Iran’ s Oil Income Under the Existing and New 
Agreements
Year
Iran's Actual 
O il Revenues
Oil Revenues under the 
Supplemental Agreement
1948 £  9.1 M (0.37) £18.6 M (0.75)
1949 13.411 ( 0 .50) 22.8 11 ( 0. 85)
1950 16.0 It ( 0. 50) 30.0 H ( 1. 00)
Note: Figures in  brackets represent Iran*s revenues in  pounds ster lin g  per 
ton of o i l  produced.
Source: Nahai and Kimble o p .c it . P.17
In the opinion of the company’s chairman, th is  agreement was the most 
advantageous granted to  any producing country in  the Middle East. The 
Supplemental Agreement would, he argued, give Iran the same b en efits  as a 
50/50 p ro fit sharing agreement. (4)
The Prime M inister was sa t is f ie d  with the agreement and submitted i t  
to the Majlis for  ra tif ica tio n . The Majlis ordered the Oil Committee, 
headed by Dr. Mo Mussadeq., to  investigate  the agreement and report back©
The committee’s report was unfavourable and the agreement was rejected*,
In 19A3, the Arabian-American Oil Company (ARAMCO) agreed to  sign a 50/50 
profit-sharing agreement .with the Saudi Arabian G-overnment. This new devel­
opment in ,a  neighbouring country led  to further h o s t il ity  towards Al0Co
To understand the kind of reasoning used by Dr0 Mussadeq. one can note 
his argument that the Pacific-Western Oil Corporation had signed an agree­
ment with the Saudi G-overnment in 1949* which provided for twice as much
4o In the 1955 -  19^0 period the 50/50 profit-sharing agreement provided 
for around £202 per ton for Iran0
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revenue compared to  the Supplemental Agreement offered to Iran. Dr. 
Mussadeq was w ell aware that Pacific-Western was a small independent o i l  
company with no o i l  production at the time. (5) AIOC claimed that early  
in  1951 they offered Razmara a proposal to negotiate for a 5C/50 p r o fit-  
sharing settlem ent, but the Premier wished i t  to  be kept a secret and in% 
deed, he never submitted i t  to  the Parliament. The company chairman had 
th is  to say about the offer:
"Despite the company*s endeavour to persuade the Prime M inister 
to  make known in  Iran both the company1 s offer to  re-open neg­
otiations for a 50/50 profit-sharing settlem ent, and i t s  action  
to  undertake to  make advances, General Razmara refused to  do so 
and maintained the c lo sest secrecy on these matters. " ( 6 )
Whether the offer of a 50/50 profit-sharing settlement was actually  
made to Razmara can never be factu ally  determined. On the one hand, i t  i s  
clear that Razmara was in  favour of a settlement with the company -  indeed 
he accepted the Supplemental Agreement subject to ra tif ica tio n  by the M ajlis 
in  1949, which indicated his wish to avoid a confrontation with the company. 
On the other hand, i t  i s  reasonable to expect that the company was prepared 
to negotiate such a deal with Iran, as in  that period many companies appr­
eciated the benefits of profit-sharing settlem ents. One can only speculate 
that i f  Razmara was offered such a deal his reasons for not submitting the 
proposals to  the M ajlis were that he knew that the proposal was not s a t is ­
factory enough to  be r a tif ie d  by i t ,  and he dared not risk  another, reject­
ion of his. proposals by Parliament. On February 19th. 1951> Dr. Mussadeq 
submitted a draft project for the nationalization of the o i l  industry and 
a l l  the AIOC properties in  Iran. Razmara declared h is opposition to  the 
nationalization project by saying that Iran could not, for  techn ical, econ­
omic and p o lit ic a l  reasons, nationalize her o i l  industry. Four days la ter  
he was assasinated. Dr Mussadeq assumed power on April 28th. 1951 > and on 
April 30th ., the M ajlis approved the Mussadeq proposal to  nationalize AI0C*s 
properties.
Mussadeq was an emotional man with l i t t l e  foresight. He was the hero 
of the people, but at the same time a ruthless dictator who would quash a l l
5 . U.N. Security Council O ffic ia l Records, 53r d, Meeting (Hew York) Oct. 
1951o PP. 19-20 quoted in  Mikdashi o p .c it . P. 154©
6. Chairman1 s statement at the Annual Meeting of the sharholders c ited  in  
AIOC Annual Report 1951 P.15*
85
opposition rdth l i t t l e  mercy* After the International Court of Justice in  
The Hague had rejected the B ritish  Government's request to intervene, by 
declaring that i t  Had no jurisd iction  over Iran, Mussadeq. asked for large  
dictatoria l powers from the M ajlis, which gave him a unanimous vote of con­
fidence, hut the Senate hesitated* Mussadeq persuaded the M ajlis to  vote 
the Senate out of office* He further dissolved the Supreme Court and asked 
for a new electora l law* His wish was granted by the M ajlis, but when the 
Majlis hesitated  to  extend h is d icta toria l powers to  rule by decree for  
another year, h is emotional speeches in cited  large and violent demonstrat­
ions against the M ajlis, u n til he got h is way0 When he challenged the 
authority of the Shah the majority of the M ajlis Deputies turned against 
him* In August 1953* he ordered a p leb isc ite  to dissolve the M ajlis and 
won 99 percent of the votes cast and counted** (7) Meanwhile the Shah l e f t  
the country and named General Zahedi, Prime Minister* Mussadeq did not re­
cognise the Shah's authority t-o dismiss him, and continued in  office*  
Although Mussadeq was s t i l l  very popular, the e ffec t of h is promises was 
wearing off« He had no success in  se llin g  Iran's o i l  to  America, Russia 
or other European countries* Economic c r is is ,  combined with a sense of 
purposeless struggle from w ith in ,, together with the external forces of 
Western in terest, brough about Mussadeq's downfall* (8) General Zahedi 
ousfaed Mussadeq in  a coup d'etat in  September, 1953» The Shah retruned, and 
with the help of American mediation, an agreement was reached with a conso­
rtium of international o i l  companies in  1954*o
Bo International Oil Industry after World War I I  ( 9 ^
The la te  1940*3 and early 1950* s proved to be a turning point for the 
international major o i l  companies* (10) Although these companies were s t i l l
7o B* Shwadran “The Middle East, O il and The Great Powers” New York 1959 
PP.136-140o
8* For an explanation of CIAfs a c t iv it ie s  see: D* Wize and To Ross: “The 
In v isib le  Government” New York, 1964.* FP« 110-114*
9o The treatment of th is  section w ill  be b r ief because of the wealth of 
litera tu re  on the subject* For a good analysis see E* Penrose '^ he Large 
International Firm in Developing Countries -  The International Petroleum 
Industry-” George Allen and Unvdn/London 19680 Chapters I I I ,  V and VI*
10* The term "major o i l  company” referes to Standard Oil of New Jersey, 
Standard O il of C alifornia, Gulf O il Corporation, Texaco, Mobil Oil Corp* 
Royal Dutct/Shell and B.P. The French state-owned company: Compagnie 
Francaise de Petroles (CFP) i s  sometimes referred to as a "major”*
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controlling a large portion of the international o i l  industry (11) ,  there 
were some unexpected erosions in  th eir  dominant position*
After the 11 as i s ” agreement of 1928, the majors kept in  close and reg­
ular contact with each other, arranging th e ir  international sa les and prod­
uction p o lic ie s  in  such a way as to maintain prices at agreed le v e ls . But^ 
towards the end of the 1940* s and the early 1950* s ,  there.were some new 
developments in  the international o i l  industry which shaped the o i l  indust­
ry in to  a different form in  the next; two decades® These developments can 
he summarized as follows:
a) The Venezuelan and Saudi Arabian Agreements of 1947 and 1949, with 
their 50/50 profit-sharing, were a most important step in  changing the 
company-government relationship® Although these agreements seemed to  have 
had an adverse e ffec t on the companies* p r o fits , they did in  fa ct turn out 
to be le s s  costly  for the companies® This was because the U.S and the U.K 
Governments agreed ( in  1951 and 1954 respectively) to allow the payments to  
the producing countries to be credited against the companies* domestic taacv. 
l i a b i l i t i e s .  Indeed, the o i l  industry went f u l l  c ir c le  insofar as the pay­
ments to  the producing countries were concerned® The payment system began 
on a profit-sharing basis u n til the early 1930*s , thereafter the principle  
of tonnage royalty was introduced, though some profit-sharing provisions 
were allowed for® The 50/50 profit-sharing agreements s ig n if ie s  a return 
to the D*Arcy princip le of roya lties being based on company p r o f its , a l­
though there were great differences in  these two types of profit-sharing  
arrangements, the most important being the increase from 16 to 50 percent 
of p ro fits as royalty payments® ■
b) Although the Iranian nationalization was not the f i r s t  of i t s  kind 
(Mexican Eagle was nationalized before the Second World Y/ar), i t  was cert­
ainly the most important. Iran was the largest-Middle Eastern o i l  producer 
and AIOC was a major international o i l  company, thus nationalization of 
AI0C?s properties created a turmoil in  the international o i l  industry®
The companies began to  rea lize  that th e ir  relationship with the host gover­
nments was undergoing an unprecedented change® Indeed, the Iranian nation-
11® In 1950 the majors owned over 70?o of the world* s refin ing capacity(out­
side the U.S.A. and Soviet b lo c ), two-thirds of privately-owned tanker 
f le e t s  as w ell as every important p ip elin e . (Quoted in  E® Penrose0 o p .c it  
P®61)
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; a lisa tio n  closed the ranks of the companies and the fear of further 
nationalisation was, perhaps, the most important motive for so lid arity  
of the U.S. companies with AIOC, in  refusing to  handle the nationalized  
Iranian oil*
c) After the Indian price war of I927*|three largest international o i l  
companies -  AIOC Sh ell and Jersey, met at Achnacarry and signed the 1928 
"as i s ” agreemento The agreement was to maintain parity  p r ices, to  avoid 
price warso The prices were based on a "single basing system"J because 
the United States was the largest exporter of o i l ,  the prices were based 
on the foOob prices of the Gulf of Mexico, plus the agreed fre igh t cost 
to the port of delivery* The so-called  "Gulf plus" pricing system had . 
some great advantages for the majors* F ir s t ly , there was a common yard­
stick  to which a l l  the companies could adhere and thus avoid competition 
in  various markets0*Secondly, the cost of crude was irrelevant to  the 
prevailing prices* The la tte r  was to  ensure that no company could s e l l  at 
lower prices when i t  discovered a low-cost source of crude* Thus the fa ct  
that the Persian crude costs were much lower than those in  the United * 
S tates, meant that AIOC was making particu larly  large p ro fits  and would 
not be able to lower i t s  prices in  competition with the other o i l  compan­
ies© The Second World War created some d if f ic u lt ie s  for the companies©
The B ritish  Navy stationed in  the Indian Ocean was unhappy about paying 
the Gulf of Mexico p r ices, plus the fre igh t charges, while i t  received i t s  
requirements from Iran* ' Under pressure from the consuming governments, 
the o i l  companies agreed to adopt a "dual base pricing system", with the 
Persian Gulf as the second basing point© The companies however, in s is te d  
that the Persian Gulf f©o©b* should equal those of the Gulf of Mexico, 
thus the only reduction in  price was the lower transport costs for  recip­
ien ts nearer to the Persian Gulf* After the War, the companies were per­
suaded to adopt lower prices for the Persian Gulf than those prevailing in  
the Gulf of Mexico© The fact that the United States was becoming a net 
importer, and the pressure brought upon the companies by the Economic 
Co-operation A dm inistation, were the main factors behind the companies1 
agreement to lower posted prices for the Persian Gulf basing pointo Natur­
a lly , th is brought about a big change in  the sales p o licy  of the majors, 
and the companies had to adjust th e ir  long-established p o lic ie s  accordingly<
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Further, the Persian Gulf* s lower prices created a danger of erosion in  the 
international prices because of the incentive to  engage in  price competit­
ion by the companies which, had access to low cost crudeo ( 12)
d) Perhaps the most important new development in the international o i l  
industry, was the entry of the “independents" or ’hewcomers" to  the in ts it­
uational o i l  scene0 These were small, non-integrated companies, which 
entered the o i l  industry in  the early 1950* s , being attracted to the lower 
cost sources of supply in  the Middle East0 Unlike the v e r tica lly  integrated  
majors, they we re not interested  in  the maintenance of stable prices and 
were prepared to s e l l  their  crude to independent refin eries at lower p r ices. 
Although, the amount of o i l  controlled by the independents was small in  r e l­
ation to the majors, nevertheless, they were looked on by the majors as a 
new force threatening th eir  unchallenged position,.
In the la te  1950* s , the long expected U.S. quota p o licy  came into oper­
ation* The purpose of the p o licy  was to protect the high cost U.S. o i l  
production. The Iranian nationalization and the Korean end Suez wars, pro­
vided a convenient front for the o i l  in terests in  the United States to bring 
up the issu e of the "Security of Supply". Under th is  pretext the o i l  com­
panies proceeded to s e l l  th eir  high-cost crude in  the protected U.S. market. 
At the same time, the U.S. independents, who had gone to search for low-cost 
areas in  the hope of bringing th e ir  o i l  back to the United States were 
faced with' the quota barrier. Moreover, the Soviet Union had started a new 
phase in  i t s  o i l  policy  in  Western Europe, by offering to s e l l  o i l  at lower 
p rices. Thus a large amount of independent and Soviet o i l  was dumped into  
the Western European markets. This eventually led to  the weakening of the 
international product prices and therefore the posted p r ices. (13) The 
posted prices had then become tax-reference prices under the 50/50 p ro fit  
sharing agreements used for  calculating the payments to  the producing gov­
ernments. The posted price of the Persian Gulf was / 2 o0b- per barrel in  
1957, i t  dropped to 086 per barrel in  February 1959> and- in  August i 960
120 For d eta ils of the history of the development of international o i l  . 
prices see: a) E. Penrose op .c it Chapter VI, b) C. Issawi and Yegame "The 
Economics of Middle Eastern O il" New York, Preager 19&2. c) LIo Froozan, 
"Petroleum Economics" Ph.D. thesis Tehran University 1963(ln Persian)
d) Wo Leeman "The Price of Middle Eastern! O il" Itacha, U.Y. Cornell Univer­
s ity  Press. 19^2.
13© For d eta ils  see Po Odell "O il  and World Powers" Penguin Press London, 
1970c
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was further reduced to $1.76 per barrel. (14) The in a b ility  of the o i l  
companies to  stop erosion of the posted prices was the cause of the creat­
ion 'o f the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in  19&0. 
(See Chapter 6)
Co The Participants of the Iranian Oil Consortium
i
A fter three years of p o l i t ic a l  and economic turmoil in  Iran, the way 
became clear for an agreement with a consortium of international majors©
Company Percentage Share N ationality
B.P. B ritish
Royal D utct/Shell 14 Anglo-Dutch
Standard O il of 
New Jersey 7 UoSo
Standard Oil of 
C a l i f  om ia 7 U.S.
Texaco 7 U.S.
Mobil 7 U.S>
G-ulf 7 U.S.
CFP 6 French
Iricon Group 5 U.S.
Total: 100$
The Iricon Group i s  a consortium of independent American o i l  companies
i t s  members are: American International O il Company, A tlantic R ichfield
Company, Charter O il Company, Continental Oil Company, and the Standard Oil
Company of 0hioo With regard to the Iricon Group, P.H. Frankel, an o i l
consultant, had th is to  say:
“For the additional members of the Iranian Consortium, th e ir  manor 
share proved to be an exceedingly profitable investment and the
14o\ “Shanshah  ^ of Iran on O il, Tehran Agreement, Background and Perspective 
Transorient Books Limited. London, 1,1 arch 1971o P.3
“prospectus which was drawn up by a large firm of Chartered Accountants 
shov/ed c learly , for  a l l  concerns, that even after the compensation to  
be payable to AIOC, any stake in  that venture was a license to  print 
money© " (15)
Heedless to say that the U.S. Justice Department gave an assurance to the 
f iv e  UoS. majors that th eir  joint participation in  the Iranian Consortium 
would not constitute an i l l e g a l  restraint of trade©
The Inter-relationship between the Consortium Participants
One of the original Iranian objections against the Angla-iranian Oil 
Company, was that Iran was not sa tis f ie d  with leaving her o i l  in  the hands 
of a single company© The placing of Iranian o i l  into the hands of several 
participants, sixteen in  to ta l, may seem on the surface to have solved the 
Iranian objection© But a closer look at the inter-relationship  between the 
Consortium participants reveals that the rea l change in  the overall control 
of Iranian o i l  by foreign o i l  companies was negligible® The seven majors, 
plus CPP, controlled 95 percent of the Iranian oil© The follow ing diagram 
w ill  help to show that so far  as Iran m s concerned, none of the particip­
ants could act independently from the others without jeopardizing i t s  own 
in terests elsewhere©
The Inter-relationship between the Major O il 
Companies in  19to *
r.Du unai 
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*From E© Penrose o p .c it . P .151
15® P.H. FrankelUlaitei: $ 6 il and Power P o lit ic s ’^  London, Faber and Faber 
1966) PP.95-96o . *
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The previous diagram shows the extent of the inter-relationship  between 
the major concession holders of the Middle East, I t  ^ives the impression 
that a monopoly was replaced bv an intem ational  cartel o f the major o i l  
companies in Iran, Since the nature of any arrangement between these 
companies would be.kept as secret as possible, much of the evidence for 
their  existence would have to rest on inference from the observed behaviour 
of the companies. The Federal Trade Commission in i t s  report "The Inter­
national Petroleum Cartel” made a comprehensive attempt to c o llec t the 
available evidence and, as the t i t l e  of their report im plies, concluded that 
the designation ’’ca rte l” was appropriate. I t  i 3 outside the scope of th is  
chapter to ar^me whether the existence of a cartel was necessary for the 
maintenance of price s ta b ilit :r and the prosperity of the intem ational o i l  
industry or not, but i t  seems incontestable that the rate of supply was sub­
ject to some sort o f jo in tly  controlled planning. Planning of supply was 
onlv possible because of the two inherent characteristics o f the major o il  
companies, one being: the jo in t control/ownership of crude o i l  resources, and 
the other, vertica l integration within the o i l  industry. In th is  wav, each 
in tem ational o i l  company was able to adjust i t s  output o f crude o i l  to i t s  
planned sa les o f crude and refined products with a high degree of e ffec tiv e ­
ness. Professor Penrose writes:
’’Moreover, i t  i s  not at a l l  clear that price movements played any 
role at a l l  in the suppl^ adjustments consequent on the virtual 
cessation of production in Iran during* the Abadan c r is is  from 1952-55 
and in subsequent re-absorbtion of the Iranian output a fter  the 
settlem ent’' ( 16)
Clearlv, without a co-ordinated system of production, the disappearance of 
the crude exports from the largest Middle Eastern o i l  producer would have 
had a great impact on the international petroleum prices, ( 17)
Although one may argue that the Consortium Agreement replaced one 
major o i l  company bv eight majors, and that Tran mav have been in  a weaker 
position compared to the past, i t  i s  fa ir  to sav that the broader nature 
of the participants helped to expand the Iranian o i l  industry at a 
faster  rate.
16. E. Penrose o p .c it . P. 152
17. Although there i s  no clear indication of the methods applied bv the 
majors to control their production in the Middle East, Professor Penrose has 
been able to c o llec t some u n offic ia l information which shows roughlv how the 
majors controlled the supplv in the Middle East. For d eta ils  see: E. Penrose 
o p .c it . PP.154-161.
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The 195V Consortium Agreement
Having won the struggle, AIOC and the. B ritish  Government could not be 
expected to grant more than they had previously offered. They agreed to  
recognise the princip le of nationalisation insofar as i t  did not a ffect  
their  normal rights and p r iv ileg es. In the words of Professor Stocking:
!,I t  (the Consortium Agreement) gave to the Iranians the shadow 
of what they sought, while retaining for the B r itish  the subst* 
ance of what they had.” (18)
The Consortium Agreement contains provisions recognising that the entire  
assets belong to Iran, but also c learly  lays down the right of the foreign  
o i l  companies to operate there. Indeed, i t  i s  a fa lla cy  to  argue that the 
Consortium Agreement was different from the agreements signed by the other 
majors with other o i l  producing countries o f the world. NIOC and the Iran­
ian Government refer to  the Consortium Agreement as an Magency contract in  
their  o f f ic ia l  publications, because they claim that the o i l  reserves and 
the assets belong to Iran and the Consortium is  only operating these assets  
for Iran. But the Consortium Agreement i s  in  substance another concession 
of the 50/50 profit-sharing type, signed by other Middle Eastern producers. 
The only difference between the other 50/50 type agreements and the Consort­
ium Agreement i s  concerning the ownership of the reserves and a sse ts . In 
the former case, the reserves and assets belonged to the concessionaire, 
which would return them to the host country a fter  the concession had ended, 
while in  the la tte r  case the o i l  reserves and assets belonged to Iran, but 
the concessionaire was allowed to operate them u n til the end of the concess­
ion periodo (19) In no case could the host country in terfere in  the running 
of the concession. Thus, b asica lly  there were no differences in  the two 
kinds c f concession.
D etails of the 195V Agreement: the area covered by the new agreement was
about the some as the one in  AIOC*s concession. I t  included 100,000 square 
m iles, extending from a point about the middle of Iran’s western borders in  
a south-easterly direction to the north of the Persian Gulf, an area approx­
imately 750 miles long and varying from 50 to 200 miles in  width. I t  embra­
ced a l l  the f ie ld s  AIOC had operated except the Kermanshah o i l f ie ld ,  which
18. G.W. Stocking op.cit* P.l57o   . .
17o The text of the orig inal agreement can be seen in  tfP la tts ’ Oilgram News 
Service11 New York, 5th0 October 195V> and the White Book continued.*©
was taken over together with the Kermanshah refinery by NIOC© The parties 
to the Consortium Agreement were Iran and NIOC (parties of the f ir s t  part) 
and a l l  the Consortium members (parties of the second part)* NIOC was the 
corporate instrument which-the government created to operate and own the 
o i l  industry under Mussadeq*s nationalization programme© Under the new 
agreement, NIOC became the owner of a l l  producing, refining and auxiliary  
in sta lla tio n s owned by AIOC before nationalization end of such other prop­
erties as the operating companies (created under the agreement) might sub­
sequently install©
Although NIOC became the owner of the physical properties used in  prod­
ucing and refin ing o i l ,  the agreement provides that two companies, ca lled  
"operating companies’* established under the laws of the Netherlands, and 
registered in  Iran, should operate the properties ”on behalf of Iran and 
NIOC” (A rtic le  4)o The operating companies were Iraanse Aardolie Exploratie 
en Product'ie Maatschappij (Iranian O il Exploration and Producing Company), 
and Iraanse Aardolie Raff inage Maatschappji (Iranian Oil Refining Company)© 
The operating companies have substantially  the same resp o n s ib ilit ie s  that 
AIOC previously had and they perform the same basic functions© Each comp­
any was given two Persian and f iv e  foreign directors, the two Persian dir­
ectors were nominated by NIOC© NIOC also has the right to subject a l l  acc­
ounts of the operating companies to independent audit by qualified  account­
ants of i t s  own choosing, aid to  inspect through i t s  experts a l l  technical 
a c tiv it ie s  of the operating companies© Ta fa c i l ita te  inspection, NIOC may 
request and the companies must furnish NIOC, with accurate copies of a l l  
topographical, geological, refinign d r illin g  and other relevent data0 (Art­
ic le  A, paragraphs G- and E) These provisions were expected to  give NIOC 
some powers  ^ to-exercise a kind of control in  the management of the compan­
ie s  that were to operate "on i t s  behalf” and give i t  access to  a great 
deal of technical and practical information that may contribute to a more 
e ff ic ie n t conduct of i t s  own operations, that have greatly expanded since  
the i 954- agreement©
19* continued.o - -
published by NIOC "History and Text of the Iranian O il Agreements” Tehran 
19660 ( in  Persian) «
94
The operating companies are not engaged in  se llin g  or buying o i l ,  they 
produce and refine i t  for NIOC* Each member of the Consortium has set up 
a trading company which individually and independently buys o i l  at the well­
head from NIOC at the "stated prices"0 The Iranian Oil Exploration Company
then delivers o i l  for the account of the t id in g  companies to the crude o i l  
loading ports 0r to  Abadan refinery* At the loading port the trading 
companies s e l l  their  o i l  for export, usually, but not always, to an a f f i l ­
iate* The Iranian Refining Company processes the o i l  that i s  delivered to  
the Abadan refinery and delivers the products for sa le  to  the trading com­
panies* The trading companies pay the costs which the producing and refin­
ing companies incur in  their operations and in addition pay them a fee  of 
one sh illin g  per cubic metre of o i l  that they receive, either for  export 
or for  refining* The trading companies not only meet the cost of producing 
and refin ing the o i l ,  but earn the p rofits by buying and se llin g  ito  The 
Consortium members have also foimed two companies in  London, one, Iranian 
O il Participants Limited, to hold the shares in the two operating companies 
and the other, Iranian Oil Services Limited, for  the provision of supply 
and personnel for th eir  operations* Under the new agreement, NIOC was to
take over the *hon-basic operations” which included health, housing and
education* (20) The agreement was to  run for 25 years with the provision  
of three, f iv e  yearly renewals at the Consortium’ s option*
The Profit D ivision Method
; Payments to the Iranian G-overnment take the form of royalty payments 
and 50^50 net p ro fit division* Royalty was fixed  at 12*5 percent of to ta l  
production* Only Iran and Iraq obtained provisions from the majors that 
th is  12*5 percent could be payable either in  kind or in  cash at posted  
prices* Other Middle Eastern o i l  producing nations were bound to  s e l l  th is  
12*5 percent for cash0 The 50/50 profit-sharing device as operated in  Iran 
and other producing nations, means that the net profits of the producing 
stage should be divided equally between the Consortium and NIOC* The princ­
ip le  is  as outlined on the following page*
20* NIOC did not, in  fact take over the "non-basic operations" u n til 1959 ' ' 
and then with finan cia l contributions from the Consortium* As of 19^2,
NIOC managed the operations i t s  e lf  0
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Per Barrel Payments to the Iranian G-ovemment
I
1. Posted price of a barrel o f o i l ■ a x ' 1.80
2. luinus cost of production b 0.20
3o Net p ro fits a-b 1.60
4-. 50 percent income tax a-b
2
0.80
5o Royalties at 12.5 percent of 
posted prices
12.5 a 
100
0.225
6+ Iran's share out of taxes a-b -  12.5 a 
2 100
0.575
7c Total Iranian take a-b
2.
0.80
8. Consortium's take a-b
2
0.80
I t  can be seen that the above calculation i s  a rather absurd long-hand 
method to  avoid paying the r o y a lties . Hr. Rouhani, the Iranian represent­
ative of OEBC commented?
"Either the Consortium members are paying income tax  at the 
rate prescribed by law, but no royalty, or they are e ffe c tiv e ly  
paying royalty, but their  income tax amounted to  4-1 percent of 
income not f i f t y  percent." (21)
Presumably what LIr0 Rouhani meant, was that i f  the companies paid a 12.5 
percent royalty, then the tax. receipts of Iran would have been $0.575o 
In th is  situ ation , the net p ro fit of the company would have been:
posted price -  cost of production -  royalty, i . e .  $1,,80 -  (0 .20  + 0. 225) . 
thus net p ro fits  would have been /1.375o As a percentage of to ta l net 
p r o fits , the Iranian tax receipts would have amounted to 4-1 o8 percento (22)
Terms of B .P.*s Compensation '
The Consortium Agreement obligated Iran to pay £25 m illion  to  B.P. as 
compensation for the nationalization of i t s  a sse ts0 This figure represent­
ed the difference between what the company claimed were i t s  lo sse s  from
21. F. Rouhani: Explanatory Hemorandum on OPEC's Resolutions. 4-th. Confer- . 
ence, &eneva0 April-June 19&2.
220 For detailed  analysis see Chapter 6 on Iran and OPEC"
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July, 1951 u n til the 1954 Agreement, said the additional sums due to Iran 
under the 1949 Agreement© (23) Iran was to  pay th is £25 m illion  in  ten , 
yearly instalments*
In return for the 60 percent B.P, gave up to  the other companies, i t  
was to  receive an immediate sum of £32©4 m illion  and 10 cents per barrel 
on a l l  e ^ o r ts  u n til a sum equivalent to  £510 m illion  had been reached©
The terms were duly carried out during the ensuing years© I t  was stated  
that AIOC had been fu l ly  indemnified by the Iranian G-ovemment and the 
other members of the Consortium, in accordance with the claims i t  orig­
in a lly  submitted, and had emerged from the nationalization cri.sis in  Iran 
with reasonably l i t t l e  loss© I t  was also  stated that Al00*s producing 
subsid iaries in  Iran received about £16 for each £1 share for the surrender 
of th e ir  rights in  Iran© (24)
A G-eneral Appraisal of the Iranian Nationalization and the Consortium 
Agreement© ..........
The Supplemental Agreement of 1949 offered to Iran the terms of a 
contract which would, in  the opinion of some experts, y ie ld  the same in­
come to the Iranian G-ovemment as would a 50/50 profit-sharing agreement© 
( 25) Dr0 Mussadeq as head of the Parliamentary Commission on o i l ,  recom­
mended the rejection  of th is  agreement by Parliament© I t  .was also stated  
by AIOC that a 50/50 offer was made to  Iran, which never became publico 
Mussadeq.* s insistence that Iran should share 50 percent of the net integ*  
rated p rofits of AIOC and not 50 percent of the net p ro fits  at the prod­
uction stage was a demand doomed to  failure© I t  brought about three years 
of economic and p o lit ic a l  c r is is  for Iran -  ending with an agreement no 
more favourable than those already offered to Iran, or those accepted by 
other Middle Eastern countries© This emotional and hurried decision ent-
23© The Supplemental Agreement was not r a tif ied  by the Iranian Parliament 
24* The O il Forum (Sept 1954) Po307
25© See: S© Longrigg and Z© Mikdashi, op«cit. Chapters 5 and 16
respectively©
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a iled  for  Iran the lo ss  of three years of o i l  income, lo ss  of Iranian lead  
• in  production, expansion of production in other countries which wore potent­
i a l  competitors, and a sense of p o lit ic a l  demoralization and defeat for  the 
Iranian people* One of the principal architects of the Consortium Agree­
ment, Dr* A ll Amina*-".then M inister of Finance, to ld  the M ajlis:
"The solution that I  "bring to you i s  perhaps not the ideal 
solution ...•<> hut we do not yet have the means to compete in  
the intem ational markets because we do not possess a'marketing 
organization o.**** i f  anyone i s  capable of doing b etter , l e t  
him take our place*" ( 26)
There i s  l i t t l e  doubt that i f  Iran had not nationalized her o i l  she 
would have received exactly the same type of concession agreement from AIOC, 
as indeed a l l  the other producing nations did* I t  i s  important to emphasize 
that the 50/50 profit-sharing agreements were not d isliked  by the majors, 
f i r s t ly ,  they would receive tax credits against their  home country taxes, 
and secondly, these agreements were not quite 50/50 as we have seen, the 
companies evaded royalty payments by counting the 12*5 percent royalty as 
.both cost and as revenue* (27)
The Consortium Agreement did not bring any extra, benefits for Iran, 
at lea st in  the short-run* I t  brought Iran essen tia lly  the same type of . 
contract as Iran would have obtained anyway* Insofar as the Iranian ob jec t-  
ions against a single  monopoly (AIOC) was concerned, the monopolistic struc­
ture did ndt rea lly  change* Indeed, Iran was in  a weaker position  facing  
eight majors, rather than facing a single major o i l  company* As with'the* 
nationalization princip le accepted by the Consortium, th is did not change 
the picture at a ll*  The assets belonged to  NIOC, but were exploited as any 
other concession by the Consortium* As far as the provisions of the agree­
ment, with regard to NIOC’s control of the Consortium operations were con­
cerned (such as having NIOC representatives on the board of directors of the 
producing and refining companies and NIOC’s right of inspection of records), 
one can say that th is  was the shadow of control, but not .the substance*
26* Records of Oil Debates -  Iranian Parliament 195A«
27* A very good discussion on the reasons for the 50/50 princip le can be 
seen in  Z* Mikdashi, op*cit Chapter 5©
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Decisions on how much o i l  the companies would produce, to whom and at what 
price they would s e l l  and how fa st they would develop Iranfs resources, 
were l e f t  to the trading companies* In commercial decisions v ita l  to  the 
prosperity and economic welfare, Iran had no voice* To say th is  i s  not to  
say that either the Iranian o i l  industry, or the world industry, of which 
i t  was a part, would "be more prosperous i f  Iran had the so le  responsibility  
to develop the industry according to i t s  own discretion and wisdom* I t  i s  
merely to  emphasize the gap between what Iran wanted and what i t  got*
Although the Iranian nationalization brought no immediate extra benefits  
for Iran, i t  proved to  be of great help to the Iranian o i l  industry in  the 
long-run* V7hether th is  would make up for  the material lo sse s , the p o lit ic ­
a l turmoil and the individual suffering that accompanied the nationalizat­
ion may never be established* A lesson Iran learned was how dependent her 
economy was on o i l  -  the mist alee was never repeated again* Perhaps the most 
sign ifican t consequence of the nationalization was the creation of NIOC©
NIOC was the f i r s t  national o i l  company in  a major o i l  producing country©
I ts  immediate task of talcing over the domestic d istribution of the o i l  
products in  Iran, as we sh a ll see in  the future chapters, contributed great­
ly  to  the material well-being of the country and i t s  economic development 
by providing cheap energy and expanding i t s  distribution network* As a 
young company, i t  observed the operations of the Consortium and gradually 
obtained a great deal of experience and know-how© The b irth  of NIOC gave 
r is e  to  the creation of jo int venture and agency contracts, which, as we 
sh a ll see in  Chapter 5> changed the structure of the relationships between 
the o i l  companies and the host governments*
CHAPTER FIVE
The Development of Non-Concessionary Oil Contracts 1951-1971
c
Introduction: The Rifcht of Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources*
The Consortium Agreement, which e ffec tiv e ly  defeated the aims of the 
1951 nationalization , caused much controversy among the nations of the 
Third World about th eir  right to take-over and. free ly  exploit theia?. - 
natural resources. This started o ff a large number of resolutions and 
counter-resolutions in  the United Nations General Assembly, the Human Rights 
Commission and various other committees* Indeed, the f i r s t  U.N. resolution  
was proposed in  1952, the year after Dr* Mussadeq* s nationalization attempt 
and amid the various leg a l arguments in  the International Court of ju stic e  
in  The Hague. I t  i s  not the purpose of th is  chapter to  go into depth about 
various leg a l points of the resolutions, as they are w ell documented* d )  
The developing nations of the world were united in  proposing a resolution  
which enhanced the sovereign rights of a nation to nationalize i t s  resources 
while the in d ustria lly  developed countries of the world, in  particular U.S*, 
U.K., Netherlands, Prance, with strong backing from New Zealand and South 
A frica, continously rejected the resolutions* Indeed, the United States 
and the United Kingdom had asked for the resolutions to exclude any refer­
ence to  the "right of s e lf  determination" in  the Human Rights Covenants.
The arguments dragged on for  a decade, a nd during th is  period the attitudes 
of the developed nations had softened in  the face of the ^ united opposition
. .  —  m m ■ »  -  ■ ■ : mrm . .  — .  . .  - ■  "■ , I . . .  . . .  n n . . . .  . . . . .  , ■ . mm
1* For a detailed analysis see: a)'LI* Uughraby: "Permanent Sovereignty
Over Oil Resources" The Middle East Research and Publishing Centre, Beruit 
Lebanon 1966* b) II.A. Liovahed: "Our Oil and I ts  Legal Aspects" Tehran ( in  
Persian) c) M. Gangi: "Public International Law" Vo* I Tehran, 1968 ( in  
Persian).
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of the Third World* The U.S. and the U.K* stated that they were prepared 
to accept the principle of the sovereign rights of a nation over i t s  nat­
ural resources, but they in s is ted  that any particular reference to  "natioz*- 
a liza tion ’* should be omitted, as th is  would hamper international co-operat­
ion* They further in sisted  that there should be clear reference to compen- • 
sation* Indeed they asked for a resolution to include **adequate, prompt, 
and e ffective  compensation*M This was c learly  not acceptable to the devel­
oping nations* In fa c t , the U.S.S.R. and the Eastern European countries 
in s isted  that there should be no compensation clause at a l l  in  the resolut­
ion* Indeed, the Russian representative commented that compensation, in  
h is opinion, could not be paid 11 in  accordance with international law*’ since 
international law contained no provisions for the compulsory payment of 
compensation. "How” he added ”could one require from an economically weak 
country, compulsory-payment of compensation, vihen i t  often had very heavy 
debts, which from lack of resources, i t  could not meet ?M (2) I t  was furth­
er argued that when national laws allowed compulsory purchase without com­
pensation of the properties of the nationals of a country, how could that 
country pay compensation to  a foreign company in  accordance with internat­
ional laws O
After ten years of bargaining, a compromise was reached in  1962, which 
was generally accepted, but iro n ica lly , the Societ bloc nations were among 
the abstainers. The main points of the resolution of 14tho December, 1962 
were:
1) Recognition of the princip le of permanent sovereignty over natural - 
resources, (A rtic le  1)©
2) Nationalization or expropriation should be based on national in terest  
and security* (A rticle  4)©
3) Compensation payable to the nationalized companies should trbe approp­
r ia te ” (A rtic le  4)©
4) Only a fter  a.n the national jurisd iction  of a country which has taken . 
such measures (nationalization) i s  exhausted, w il l  the controversy, 
upon the agreement of the sovereign sta te  and other parties concerned,
2o U.N* General Assembly, 17th* Session (2nd. Committee) Provisional Summary 
Records of 834th meeting, November 12th, 19^2* P<>6 c ited  in  II* Mughraby: 
op*cit« P*23 •
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be referred to  arbitration and international adjudication (A rticle  k) o
In 1966 a further resolution  was passed by the General Assembly to the 
e ffec t that "the exploitation of the natural resources of each country sh a ll 
always be conducted in accordance with i t s  national laws and regulationso" 
The resolution further added that i t  ’’recognises the right of a l l  countries ' 
and in  particular, developing countries, to  secure and increase th e ir  share 
in  the administration of enterprises which are fu lly  or p a r tia lly  operated 
by foreign cap ita l and to have a greater share in  the advantages and profits 
derived therefrom on an equitable b a sis , with due regard to the development 
needs and objectives of the people concerned and the mutually accepted 
contractual practices, and c a lls  upon such countries from which such ca p ita l 
originates to refrain from any action which would hinder the exercise of 
that r i^ rt” (A rtic le  5)«
Although i t  was clear that the passage of such resolutions constituted  
a great step forward in  ascertaining the sovereign rights of the host 
s ta te s , the resolutions f e l l  short of clearing a large number of ambig­
uities© For instance, what would be an "appropriate” compensation, what 
are the yardsticks for measuring th is  "appropriateness" ? What would be 
the lim it for  payment of the compensation ? Presumably the resolutions le ft  
the time lim it to be determined by the power struggle between the foreign  
company and the recipient state© And most important of a l l ,  in  what currency 
should the compensation be paid ? Hard currency transfers are banned by 
national laws of many developing countries© One may even be tempted to 
assume that the importance of a l l  these resolutions i s  purely academic, 
since there are no set precedents for  punishment in  the cases where the 
parties ignore the resolutions© After a l l ,  the days of "gun-boat diplomacy" 
are over and the U.N. has no gun-boats anyway0 But i t  i s  important to real­
ize  that the passage of these resolutions a decade ago, s ig n ified  a great 
victory for the developing nations of the world, although the sign ificance  
of these resolutions has diminished greatly today©
In the case of the o i l  producing countries, the lesson learnt by the 
Iranian nationalization proved to be precious. Indeed, they set about e s t­
ablishing th e ir  sovereign r i$ it s  from the mid-l950fs onwards. There were
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to  be two ways of controlling th e ir  o i l  resources: from within, through 
awarding non-concessionary partnership and. service contracts, and. from 
without through the medium of OPEC, by co llec tiv e  bargaining with the major 
concessionaires. The technique of control from within by the award of non- 
concessionary contracts i s  the subject of th is  chapter0 Control through 
OPEC w ill  be discussed in  Chapter 60
The Significance of the Iranian Petroleum Act of 1957 ,
This aet was one of the f ir s t  w ell thought of and comprehensive petrol­
eum laws of any o i l  producing country© I t  reflected  the tendency of exerc­
isin g  the sovereign rights of Iran over her o i l  resources, not by hasty 
actions, but by a gradual process of d iversifying the sources of crude 
production* A rtic le  I of the act proclaimed that exploration and product­
ion in  areas not reserved for  the Consortium as w ell as refining^/.transport 
and sales of o i l  throughout Iran and abroad, be developed as rapidly as 
possib le , NIOC was to  be the instrument for  accomplishing these objectives. 
Although the basic character of NIOC was to  remain unchanged under the act, 
i t s  functions were broadened somewhat and at the same time made more spec­
i f i c .  A rtic le  5 of the act authorized NIOC to divide the country, including 
the continental sh e lf , but excluding the Consortium* s Agreement Area, into  
d is tr ic ts , each containing not more than 80,000 square kilometres for the  
purpose of “research, exploration and extraction”© At i t s  d iscretion , NIOC 
was empowered to  in v ite  other companies to enter into joint agreements for  
i t s  exploitation* Indeed, the most novel feature of the act was the nature 
of these joint-'venture agreements* (3) A leading NIOC o f f ic ia l  had th is  
to say about the Petroleum Act:
** I t  i s  the most progressive leg is la tio n  in  any Middle East 
country, one that has set a precedent for other o i l  laws in  many 
parts of the world,” (4)
3© In lega l terms these agreements are called  "joint structures”©
A© 1.1© Modir: "The Petroleum Act and the Petroleum D is tr ic ts”, Iran News 
L etter, Number 73 > August 19&A* Tehran, Iran©
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The joint-venture or partnership agreement may be formed between NIOC and 
any company or group of companies® NIOC i s  to hold not le s s  than 30 per­
cent of any joint-venture; the law also authorizes NIOC to make non-partner­
ship agreements, covering small areas, an authority which i t  has never 
exercised,. A rtic le  7 of the act lim its the holding of any joint-venture 
in  any one d is tr ic t  to a maximum of 16,000 square kilometres, provides that 
the joint-venture begins d r illin g  for o i l  within four years from the date 
of the agreement, lim its the agreement to  25 years vdth provisions for re­
newals in  three terms of f iv e  years each and requires the return to NIOC, 
within ten years, of half of the to ta l area included in  the orig inal agree­
ment® To make i t  unnecessary for  NIOC to risk i t s  lim ited cap ita l in  
searching for o i l ,  the act provides that NIOC partners pay an annual ren tal, 
a proportion of which i s  to be prepaid in  a lump sum (to  be recovered as a 
part of operating costs once o i l  has been found in  commercial quantities)®  
A lternatively , the act provides that the partner pay a l l  the exploration 
co sts , which i t  would recover i f  and when o i l  was discovered in  commercial 
quantities® I f  the joint-venture finds no o i l  the foreign partner alone 
bears the cost of exploration and development® A fter the discovery of o i l  
in  commercial quantities, NIOC supplies i t s  own share of the development 
costs and shares in  the p ro fits  of the operation® One half of the o i l  
belongs to the partner, for which the partner w ill pay 50 percent income 
tax . The partner may be required to market the one-half share of the NIOC 
crude® This would give the NIOC and the Iranian G-overnment 75 percent of 
to ta l profitso Indeed, these agreements are known as 75-25 agreements#
Further, A rticle  2 of the act empowers NIOC to  conclude ’’any agreement 
which i t  deems appropriate ®e®®® not inconsistent with the laws of the 
country” -  th is  would p ractica lly  enable NIOC to enter in to  any kind of new 
contract which may seem appropriate to the company® Indeed, i t  was as a 
resu lt of A rtic le  2 of the act that NIOC entered into service contracts 
in  1966®
Signet K attei’ s Influence on the Conclusion of Joint-Venture Contracts
Enrico H attei, president of the state-owned Ita lian  o i l  company ENI, 
had a profound e ffect on the creation of the joint-venture agreements® (5)
5® The a c t iv it ie s  of Hattei and his influence on the international o i l  ind­
ustry i s  best documented in  a) Dow Votuw "The Six Le~^ed Dog H attei and ENI 
-  A Study in  Power" Univesity California Press 19"£4® continued®®V.®®®>• *•
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Indeed, i t  may be argued that the Iranian Petroleum Act was shaped in  such 
a way as to  lega lize  the joint-venture between NIOC and AG-IP ( a subsidiary 
of ENI) and i t  i s  therefore appropriate to discuss Mattei and ENIo
Mattei was a complex character and an innovator,, He was”& man of many • 
parts* he had in him the makings of a ’oondoliaere* and of a p ira te , of an 
unscrupulous go-getter and of a rev iv a list preacher” (6) ”Neverthless, a 
dedicated man whose mission was to  secure for  I ta ly , a place in  the front 
rank of industrial nations, and also to figh t the b a ttle  of the l i t t l e  man 
against the bosses” ( 7) After the Second Yforld War, Mattei realized  that 
the attempt to discover o i l  in  I ta ly  had failed* He continued the long-staa- 
ding arrangement with ENI* s main supplier, the Anglo-Iranian O il Company, 
but i t  was inevitab le that H attei should go abroad to search for  oil*  He 
knew that ”there was plenty of low-cost crude o i l  available, which was 
t ig h tly  held by a few companies and that i t  was sold at a price which was 
several times i t s  real cost, the resulting large p rofit margin being shared 
equally by the producer government, and the o i l  companies.” (8) He could 
see no reason why I ta ly  should be excluded from th is  profitable venture, 
but h is attempts to join the e l i t e  of international o i l  were fru itle ss*
The Iranian nationalization provided a golden opportunity for  Mattei to 
persuade the major o i l  companies to allow him some share of th e ir  vast fo rt­
unes* Instead of going to  Mussadeq*s rescue, he remained to ta l ly  loya l to  
the majors, in  the hope of a reward in  the form of a percentage in terest  
in  the Iranian o i l  when the dispute was se ttled . ”Even when th e  Ita lia n  
G-overnment aquired * stolen  oil* from Dr. Mussadeq, through a somewhat 
obscure firm by the name of Supor, H attei would have nothing to do with 
them, thinking that such an attitude had earned him gratitude which would 
be adequately expressed on a su itable occasion * . .o . .* .” ( 9) The refusa l - 
of the major o i l  companies to include ENI in  the Iranian Consortium was.a 
great blow to Hattei* s loya lty  0 The refusal was made on the grounds that
5o Charles R„ Deschert: ”Ente^Nazionale Idrocarburi: A P ro file  of a State
Corporation” Leiden, B r il l  19^3o cY P*H. Frankel:"f a t  t e i : O il and Power
P o lit ic s” Faber and Faber 19660
6* P.H. Frankel op0cito  P*25
7. ib id  P*47
8* ib id  P*93
9* ib id  P*95
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independent o i l  companies could not be included in  a major concession*
But when, upon the insisten ce  of the State Department, the majors agreed 
to include a consortium of nine independent U.S. companies (the Iricon  
Group) with a f iv e  percent in terest in  the Iranian Consortium, Mattei* s 
attitude became terr ib ly  hostile* He started a campaign for revenge against 
the "seven s is te r s”, the aftermath cf which is  s t i l l  v is ib le  in  the terms 
of the non-concessionary contracts* He created an image of sympathy for  
the underdog -  so lid arity  between El'll and the exploited nations of the 
Middle East* He had th is  to say to the o i l  producing countries of the 
Middle Easts
"The people of Islam are wary of being exploited by foreignerso The 
big o i l  companies must offer  them more for  their  o i l  than they are 
getting* I not only intend to give them a more generous share of the 
p r o fits , but to  make them my partners in  the business of finding and 
exploiting petroleum resources," (10)
Mattei* s appeal to the producer nations of the Middle East paid offo 
The Iranian Petroleum Act f i t t e d  w ell into Mattei* s ideas. I t  i s  in terest­
ing to note that the act was r a tif ie d  on 31st* July 1957 i*1 Iran, and the 
NIOC-EOT joint-venture agreement was signed a few weeks la ter  in  August 
1957* Mattei seemed.to have been misunderstood as being a sincere and 
businesslike person* In fact he was neither* I t  was not through so lid ­
arity  with the underdog that he in itia ted  the joint-ventures, but rather 
through a ’sense of revenge against those who would not admit him into their  
se lec t circle* But whatever h is motives, he in it ia te d  a remarkable change 
in  the power structure of the international o i l  system -  a change which 
proved to be b en efic ia l to the producers* Yfith regard to  h is economic 
ra tion a lity , Frankel has written: ~
**••••••• these various tendencies (h is  attitude towards o i l
producer nations and his quest for low-cost o il)  were to some 
extent contradictory, or at lea st incompatible, and Mattei spent 
the rest of h is l i f e  in the endeavour to carry on simultaneously, 
a number of p o lic ie s , which, whenever they were confronted with 
each other, were bound to prove altogether troublesome* « ( 11)
10* Quoted in  Robert Engler: "The P o lit ic s  of O il. A Study in  Private Power 
and Democratic Direction" Macmillan oc Co* New York 1971 P*198 
11 e PoH. Frankel, op*cit0 Po9A-
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Mro Frankel was at some stage employed as an Advisor to the company, and
had th is to  say about Mattei:
"There was one period, however, roughly in  l95£/59> when Mattei 
asked me to help him estab lish  a team and a po licy  su itable for  
dealing with international problems in  consumer countrieso I  
tr ied  to do -that for a while u n til my conception began to diverge 
from the course he had se t  for h is Central European approach; real­
iz in g  the incom patibility of h is plans with my assessment of h i3 
opportunities, I  asked to be relieved of any role in  th is  matter* 
He must have been quite happy to be r id  of a Jeremiah who was bad
for  the morale of h is people: once he had made up his mind about
something, he was not interested any longer in  learning what-'the- 
truth was -  he was afraid i t  might confuse him®" ( 12)
The above quotations are not given to re flec t the lack of economic 
ra tion a lity  in  proposing joint-venture agreements, but rather to show 
that there were overriding p o lit ic a l  and "personal" considerations on the 
part of Mattei in  in it ia t in g  joint-venture agreements®
The NIOC-AG-IP Joint-Venture
Iran was the f i r s t  major o i l  producing nation to sign a joint-venture 
agreement® (13) In Iran only the foreign company and NIOC are signatories 
to  the agreement and the government, as such, i s  not a party® NIOC enters 
into these agreements under the authorization of the Petroleum Act of 1957® 
In accordance with A rtic le  2 of th is  act, the agreement must be confirmed 
. by the Council of Ministers and approved by the leg is la tu re . The Iranian 
parliament approved the NIOC-AG-IP agreement on August 2Ath® 1957? and the 
agreement became enforceable thereofo The agreement provides that within 
60 days, NIOC and AG-IP sh all establish  a corporation "to undertake for  their  
mutual in terest, operations for the exploitation and production of crude 
petroleum." (A rticle  l)«  The corporation, 'the Iranian-Italian Petroleum 
Company, known as SIRIP, i s  an Iranian corporation, in  which AG-IP and NIOC 
each have an equal interest® NIOC was to  appoint the chairman and AG-IP, 
the vice-chairman of the company® There were to be equal members of the 
board of directors appointed by each partner® Although AG-IP supplies
12® ibid® P®121
13« Although Iran was the f ir s t  major o i l  producer accepting a joint-venture  
contract she was not the f ir s t  country to do so. The f i r s t  country to sign  
such an agreement was Eqypt and the joint-venture company was ca lled  "Com- 
pagnie Orientale des Petroles I^Egypta-Cope" the date of the agreement was 
Feb. 1937 -  s ix  months before the Iranian agreement®
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SIRIP*s technical personnel, SIRIP i s  required to lim it foreign personnel 
to  such positions as i t  cannot f i H  with qualified Iranian personnel, and 
i s  obliged to  co-operate with NIOC and AG-IP to establish  a programme for  
the training of the Iranian personnel to replace, within "reasonable lim its"  
the foreign personnel as soon as possible® (A rticle  33)
SIRIP has exclusive exploration and production rights over 5*600 square 
kilometres in  the northern part of the Persian Gulf, lying over the cont-
v
inental sh e lf , over 1,130 square kilometres located on the eastern slopes 
of the Zagros mountains, and over 6,800 square kilometres extending along 
the Gulf of Omman©
In itia lly , the whole expense of exploration f a l l s  on AGIP, which agrees 
to spend at lea st $22 m illion  searching for o i l ,  $6 m illion  within the 
f i r s t  four years and $16 m illion  within the next eight years® (A rtic le  19) 
.If and when AGIP completes a commercial o i l  w ell (which the agreement care­
fu l ly  defines in  A rtic le  8 ), NIOC, i s  obliged to pay AGIP for i t s  exploratory 
expenditure "within the shortest possible time" at an annual rate of not 
le ss  than 10 cents per barrel of o i l  produced® (A rtic le  11) After i t  has 
opened one commercial o i l f ie ld ,  AGIP i s  obliged to explore for others u n til  
i t  has spent the entire $22 million® At i t s  discretion AGIP can suspend 
exploration operations at the end of four years or any year thereafter, but 
in  doing So i s  obliged to  pay NIOC one half of any unexpended balance of 
the $  22 million* (A rticle  19)
Once a commercial w ell has been completed, each of the partners 
provides half the cap ita l for exploiting it® SIRIP, as an independent 
business corporation, must f ir s t  offer to s e l l  i t s  crude equally to  NIOC 
and AGIP, and i f  their  offers are satisfactory , each partner takes t i t l e  
to  the crude o i l  to dispose of i t  as i t  sees fit® I f  the offer of either  
partner i s  not sa tisfactory , SIRIP must s e l l  the crude to other buyers, 
but not for le s s  than i t s  owners have offered to pay for it® (A rtic le  12)
SIRIP i s  required to post prices at which i t  w ill  s e l l  i t s  o i l  generally 
to  a l l  buyers® The posted prices "shall conform with current prices pre­
vailing  in  the region of the Persian Gulf" (a r t ic le  13)o SIRIP may o ffer
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to  s e l l  at discounts from i t s  posted prices i f  approved by the committee of 
two of i t s  d irectors, one appointed by each partner® SIRIP pays no royalt­
ie s  to  NIOC or the'Iranian Government, but i t  pays half o f i t s  net p ro fits  
to the government as taxes (A rtic le  17) o Because NIOC gets half of the 
remaining p r o fits , the to ta l take of the government is  75 percent of the 
net profits® The NI0C*-AGIP venture indicates the basic characteristics of 
a joint-venture agreement, which, with some modification, has been followed 
in  many other countries© I t  i s  a feature of th is  and other partnership 
agreements that the finan cia l burden of exploring for o i l  i s  placed on the 
foreign partner, which also furnishes technical knowledge and managerial 
s k i l l s  © As the venture becomes a going concern, having passed through the 
stage of o i l  exploration to o i l  production, i t s  operations are taken over 
by a jo in tly  owned company (SIRIP) operating for  the benefit of i t s  owners© 
Should any disputes a r ise , the agreement^provides for a method of s e tt lin g  
them designed to protect the in terests of both parties (A rtic les 43* 44 ancL 
45)* A rtic le  39 of the agreement constitutes a declaration of good fa ith :
’’The contracting parties agree to  carry out the terms of the 
procedure • •©© in  good fa ith  and to  observe both the sp ir it  and 
the le t t e r  of the said terms and procedures© No general or specia l 
measures, le g is la t iv e  or administrative, or any other act of th is  
kind emanating from the Iranian Government, central or lo ca l, can 
annul th is  agreement, amend or change i t s  provisions, or hold up 
the necessary and e ffective  execution of these stip u la tion s”
The NIOC-AGIP joint-venture dea lt a blow to  the tr a d it io n a l system of  
doncessionary agreement© The trade p ress, u su a lly  r e f le c tin g  the views of 
the majors, suggested that the lib e r a l terms to  which AGIP had subscribed  
r e f le c te d  th e ir  inexperience, terms to  ?&ich more.-Sophisticated o i l  comp­
anies would not have agreed to .  The trade press was proved wronge NIOC 
opened D is tr ic t  One to  exploration in  November 1957 -  two months a fte r  the 
AGIP agreement© Between the preliminary announcement and the o f f i c ia l  open­
ing of the d is t r ic t s ,  f i f t y  seven sp'/en companies from nine countries, 
applied fo r  11 questionnaires”, a preliminary requirement of NIOC -  from pro­
spective bidders© Twenty-two companies completed the questionnaire© NIOC 
pronounced 11 companies, 100 percent competent to  engage in  exploration and 
10 others as having competence ranging from 10 to  75 percent0 A fter  the', 
formal opening of the d is t r ic t s ,  six teen  of the companies paid NIOC $2,700
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each, for  a "documentation" on the d istr ict#  This was in  accordance with 
A rtic le  9o^3 -of the act, which provided for  NIOC to prepare a booklet cont­
aining necessary specifications such as geographical and geological situ a t­
ion, plus any other relevant informations, Fourteen companies eventually
submitted bidso ( 14) .
The successful bidder was Pan American International, a subsidiary of ' 
the Standard Oil Company of Indiana0 The agreement was signed in  June 1958* 
(15) Although the terms are broadly sim ilar to those of AG-IP, the d eta ils  
are different in  some important aspects# The main differences can be 
summarized'as follows:
a) The NIOC-Pan Am agreement ca lled  for the creation of a j ointly-owned 
company ca lled  Iran Pan American O il Company? IPAC# YTnile SIRIP was an 
independent commercial enterprise, IPAC was to remain e ssen tia lly  a non­
p ro fit maidng company, acting as an agent for Pan Am and NIOC, jo in tly  
controlled by them and producing o i l  for their  account©
b) There was to be a cash bonus of $25 m illion , payable by Pan Am to NIOC 
and recoverable in  ten annual installm ents after production began (A rtic le
wheras AGIP did not have to pay any cash bonus for i t s  contract©
c) The obligatory expenditure of Pan Am for i t s  exploration was nearly ./ 
four times higher than AG-IP* s© Pan Am had to spend $82 m illion  compared 
to AGIP* s $22 m illion over 12 years©
The in i t ia l  exploration costs and the government tax  provisions: iare 
id en tica l in  both contracts# Sim ilarly, the foreign partner may be requ­
ired  to market part or a l l  of the NIOC share on i t s  behalf©
■Eater J oint-Ventures
The IPAC venture proved to be a great success, while SIRIP had a modest 
commercial success# Both the ventures started producing commercial quant­
i t i e s  of o i l  in  1961 # By i 9^5 IPAC was producing 2©7 m illion  cubic metres
1A© No Modir, op0c i t .  P#6 ‘
15® Another joint-venture agreement was signed with Sapphire Petroleum- Ltd, 
a Canadian corporation in  June 1953# This proved to be a commercial fa ilu re  
and was cancelled by mutual agreement#
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of crude -  twice as much as the SIRIP venture* (16) In April 1963, .NIOC 
announced that i t  would declare additional offshoie areas open for bidding,, 
There was at th is  stage a very important problem: lack of information about 
the structure of the areas offered for bidding. When NIOC opened Iran’s 
D istr ic t One for  bidding in  1957, i t  could only offer  scanty geological and 
stratigraphic data for much of the area* (.17) As a resu lt the fourteen 
companies that either individually or as a group, submitted b ids, applied 
for  v ir tu a lly  id en tica l acreage located near the mainland adjacent to areas 
where exploration operations had revealed favourable geological features 
and where production had been successfu lly  conducted© For th is 16000 square 
kilometres lay  d irectly  opposite to the Neutral Zone of Saudi Arabia and 
Kuwait* (18) After the award of the Pan Am Agreement, the greater part of  
D istr ic t One remained uncommited* I t  was clear to NIOC1 s management that 
there would be no bidding for unknown areas. Y/hen NIOC opened D istr ic t  One 
again for  bidding, i t  h it  upon a novel plan for  obtaining technical inform­
ation, necessary for in te llig en t bidding at no cost to i t s e l f 0 * The idea 
was to  in v ite  a l l  those interested in  the area to jo in tly  finance a compreh­
ensive marine seismic survey© Only those companies which had contributed  
to  financing the survey would obtain the information, but none was guarant­
eed that i t s  bid would be accepted. Despite the fact that the companies 
were only buying an opportunity to b id , they showed great interest*  On 
August 10th 1963, at a press conference in  Tehran, NIOC’s director of o i l  
operations announced the names of the companies which had registered  to  par­
tic ip a te  and vdiose requests NIOC had approved. These included eight indiv­
idual companies, three groups of American companies, together representing  
th irteen individual companies, and one group each of French and German 
companies, each representing f iv e  individual companies© NIOC contracted 
with the Western Geophysical Company to make the seismic survey over an area 
of 48,000 square kilometres (an area four times as large as nearby Kuwait, 
which rested on the world’s largest known o i l  reserves). I t  was the most 
extensive survey of i t s  kind ever undertaken, at a to ta l cost of approximat- 
1y ^3«5 million© ( 19)
16© For d eta ils  see Chapter 8© _ t '
17* This refers to the questionnaire previously mentioned*
18. H* Uodir, op.cito P.6
19. For deta ils see a) P* Nina & F© Najmabadi: “A New Approach to F ull U t il­
ization  of Iran’s Offshore Prospects in  The Persian Gulf" Iran News Letter 
No: 85, August 19^5• PP©1-9» b) A.M. Mirfakhraii: ”A Case Study: NIOC’S 
Handling of a Maiine Seismic Survey*' ib id . No: 83 June 19&5, PP. 1-5 c) Y* 
Paran & J.G. Chricton "Highlights of Exploration in  Iran 195&-6511 ib id . No: 
96, July 1966, PP.13-1 A.
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The survey, was completed in  the la te  winter of 19&4, and the resu lts  
were promising© Petroleum In telligence Weekly, stated in  i t s  March 16th^
1964 issu e that "the world* s "biggest o i l f ie ld  may l i e  waiting to be tapped 
under 175 fe e t  of Persian G-ulf waters110 This pred iction 'later  proved 
wrong, was su ffic ien t to make the bidding attractive to a l l  the participants© 
On September 1st* 19&4, a l l  the participants were invited  to b id  and in  
November 1964, NIOC submitted the names of the bidders© Of those who had 
participated in  the Seismic survey, only Standard Oil of New Jersey and
the Continental Oil Company didinot participate in  the bidding©
The maximum acreage to  be granted by NIOC depended upon the type of 
participation agreement: .8,000 square kilometres when NIOC had a f i f t y  
percent participation , 4*500 square kilometres when NIOC had le s s  than 
f i f t y  percent participation and 2,500 square kilometres with no NIOC part-
v 1
icipation  at all© Agreements with s ix  groups of companies were signed in
1965 (see Table 5*1)o I t  i s  in teresting to note that Shell had aquired an 
area on i t s  own in  partnership with NIOC© This i s  particu larly  important 
as i t  r e flec ts  the change of heart by the majors and an attempt on th eir  
side not to be le f t  behind in  th is  modern type of contract© Indeed, CPP 
and Socony Mobil were not successful in  their  bids and th e ir  applications 
were rejected© The successful bidders were a heterogeneous lot© They in ­
cluded one major o i l  company, three government groups (I ta lia n , Prench and 
Indian) anxious to find  a dependable source of supply, and a number of 
aggressive American independents, the operations of which had hitherto been 
confined to the United States, but which were interested in  obtaining lo r^* 
cost crude supplies that might enable them to penetrate the international 
market© The successful bidders agreed to  pay cash bonuses aggregating 
$190 m illion and to spend more thgn $164 m illion over a 12 year period (see  
Table 5»1)« Each partner formed a jo in tly  owned company with NIOC on the 
lin es of IPAC© As stipulated in  the Petroleum Act, a l l  partners are resp­
onsible for  the in i t ia l  exploration expenditure; costs are shared equally 
once o i l  has been discovered in commercial quantities© The p rofit d iv ision  
in  a l l  cases i s  75-25, as in  the earlier  ventures* An additional arrange­
ment Y/as made to guarantee Iran some revenue in  cases were marketing would 
be d if f ic u lt  or delayed© The partner* s taxes would have to  equal 12©5 per­
cent at le a s t , of the va}.ue of production at posted prices when a commercial 
o i l f ie ld  was discovered© There i s  also a relinquishment clause, 25 percent 
after  f iv e  year3 and 50 percent after ten years, of the to ta l allocated area 
would have to be returned to NIOC© A ll the agreements provide for the work
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to start within 6 months of signing the contract and that exploration should 
continue with reasonable speed* The duration of a l l  contracts i s  to be 25 
years, subject to  optional renewals of three, five-yearly  periods*
The 1971 O il Agreements- '
On 27th. July, 197*1 NIOC signed three more jo in t-strm ture agreements 
with foreign o i l  companies* These were the f i r s t  set of contracts signed  
after 1965* During th is  period NIOC gained a great deal of experience with 
regard to the partnership agreements and was determined to tip  the balance 
of these agreements even more in  favour of Iran© The agreements were as 
follows;: ^
1 -  NIOC and the Japanese group: The joint company was named Iran Nippon
Petroleum Company (UJ2PC0), and the allocated area was 8,000 square 
kilometres of onshore land in  Lurestan* The Japanese group consisted  
of: T eijin  Limited, North Sumatra O il Development Co-operative Company ' 
Limited, Mitsui & Company Limited and Mitsubishi Shojikaisha*
2 -  NIOC and Amerada Hess Corporation, a U.S. independent o i l  company* The
joint-venture was named Bushehr Petroleum Company (BUSHCO)* The a lloc ­
ated area was 3,7^5 square kilometres of Block I  Bushehr offshore lando
3— NIOC and Mobil O il Corporation* This was the second time one of the 
seven majors obtained a non-concessionary contract and indeed the f i r s t  
time a major UoS. company was involved in  joint-venture agreements in  
Iran. The joint-venture company was named: Hormuz Petroleum Company 
(HOFECO)o The area allocated was 3,500 square kilometres of Block II  
offshore Hormuz Strait* (20)
Departures from 19&5 Joint-Venture Agreements.
These three new agreements were particu larly important as they con stit­
uted important differences from the previous types of partnership agree­
ments* The main points may be summarized as detailed overleaf:
20* for d eta ils  see Table 5o1
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a) Royalty payments or stated payments: a l l  the new agreements provide 
for the stated payment to the f ir s t  party (NIOG) of 12.5 to 16 percent 
of the posted prices applicable to the second party* s share o f crude 
exportso This provision was absent from the previous joint-venture 
agreements© ( 21)
b) F irst party’s share of crude offtakes: the second party i s  bound and 
obliged to  take any quantity of crude made available by the f ir s t  party 
of i t s  share of crude offtake* This provision was voluntary in  the 
previous joint-venture agreements©
c) Period of the agreements: the new agreements provide for  only s ix  
years of exploration and twenty years of exploitation* In the previous 
agreements these periods esrere twelve and twenty years respectively.
d) Cash bonuses on commercial discovery: the new agreements provide for  
the payment of bonuses to be related  to the cumulative amount of crude 
production in  the assigned area0 Thus payment of production bonuses 
by the second party in  the new agreements has been ensured. In the 
previous agreements, the payment of production bonuses was based on 
reaching a given fixed  daily crude production and in practice such 
lev e ls  have never been reached so fa r .
e) The board of directors and managing director: in  the previous agreements 
the right of e lection  of the managing director had been vested in  the  
second party© The new agreements provide for an alternation of th is  
r i$ it  every f iv e  years©
f )  Arbitration: each of the two parties appoint an arbitrator and the 
two sh a ll appoint a third arbitrator. I f  there i s  any dispute the 
Governor of the Central Bank of Iran, or the Supreme Court of Iran, 
sh a ll appoint a third arbitrator. In the previous agreements, the fina]
21. Note that the Consortium’s royalty payments ranged from 7<>5 percent
of posted prices in  1966 to 12.5 percent in  1971 • From 1971 onwards the
rate of 12.5 percent w ill  not change. For d eta ils see Chapter six©
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arbitrator i s  chosen by someone of high standing in  a foreign country* ( 22) 
This power was transferred to  the Iranian sid e0
g) Applicable law of the agreement: the new agreements sh all be govern­
ed by and interpreted according to  the laws of Irane This i s  in  lin e  
with the U.N. General Assembly1 s resolution of 1966 and would not seek 
reference to international law0
h) Loan repayments: under a l l  agreements NIOG would receive a loan to  pay
for  i t s  share of the development costs* The old agreements had provj
ided for various short repayment periods and did not stip u la te  any
particular range for  the chargeable in terest rate0 According to the 
new agreements, a fixed  time of ten years has been sp ecified  for the 
repayment of loans, beginning from the date of commencement of commerc­
i a l  production* The in terest rate under no circumstances would exceed 
7 percent.
i )  Renewal of the agreements: the new agreements provide fo r  two addition­
a l periods of f iv e  years, each renewable by negotiation and revision
of the existing terms of the agreements, in  the lig h t of the then pre­
vailing  circumstances* The old agreements provided three additional 
periods of five  years each, only the third period being negotiable for  
revision*
0) The port dues: for the f i r s t  time the new agreements e x p lic it ly  prov­
ide for the port dues payable to the government of Iran by each tanker 
ca llin g  at the Iranian ports*
k) NIOC prerogatives: an a r tic le  specifying the prerogative of NIOC has 
been included in  the new agreements, by which NIOC as the government’ s 
representative, w ill  control and supervise the o i l  operations* Such 
controls w il l  include the methods, means and f a c i l i t i e s  for  the crude 
and product measurements, audit of books and accounts of the joint 
company, and o i l  and gas conservation*
220 In the Pan Am-NIOC agreement, the President of the Swiss Federal Trib­
unal would appoint a third arbitrator* In the AGIP-NICC agreement th is  
power rests with the Chief Justice of the Geneva Cantonal Tribunal*
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1) Internal consumption: the nev* agreements c learly  specify that i f  and
.when NIOC requires, a certain negotiable portion of the to ta l product­
ion should be allocated to NIOC for internal consumption©
m) Joint use of o i l  in sta lla tio n s: to ensure avoidance of unnecessary
investment and to  expedite the implementation of the provision of 
these new agreements, i f  surplus capacity in  p ip eline, loading and 
other f a c i l i t i e s  and ancillary services ex is t in  the in sta lla tio n  of 
any o i l  company operating in  Iran, each company , before embarking on 
i t s  own developments and in sta lla tio n s, must examine the p o s s ib ility  
of u tiliz in g  and sharing such available fa c ilit ie s©
n) Discounts on the posted prices';, i t  has been c learly  sp ecified  in  the 
new agreements that the income on the to ta l crude exports -  that i s  to  
say -  the shares of both f ir s t  and second parties, y o . 1 1  be calculated  
on the basis of posted prices© Where necessary discounts are applic­
able only on the sa le of the f i r s t  party’ s (NIOC) share of the crude 
to  "the second party© In the old agreement only the share of the second 
party was calculated on the basis of posted p rices, vdiile NIOC’ s share 
was sold at market prices®
o) Natural gas: i t  has been clearly  stated in  the new agreements that
in  the event that the second party does not n otify  the joint company 
of i t s  intention to u t i l iz e  the associated natural gas within s ix  
months, a l l  the available associated gas sh all be put at the disposal 
of NIOC and no charge whatsoever sh a ll be made therefore©
A ll the other provisions in  the new agreements are sim ilar to the 1965 
partnership agreements©
Clearly the 197  ^ agreements constitute an important structural change 
in  the joint-venture contracts© The two p r in c ip a l issu es which were the 
chief drawbacks of these types of agreement were catered for  in  the I97I 
agreements© These Trere: the payment of royalty and the sa le  of NIOC’ s 
share of crude at posted prices© These two changes have tipped the balance 
of profit-sharing greatly in  favour of Iran0
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On the "whole, only four of the eleven partnership agreements have been 
operational in  Iran0 They are: SIRIP, IPAC, IAPCO, and IMINCO. SIRIP, 
the f i r s t  joint-venture, has been the lea st successful venture and indeed 
the smallest producer of o i l  in  Iran© IPAC has done rather b etter  occupy­
ing the second position  among the non-concessionary contractors. The most 
spectacular suocess was achieved by LAFCO, with the discovery of commercial 
o i l  in  1968, lAPC0*s production has been increased nearly tenfold  in  the 
span of three yearso BUNCO has also been reasonably successful© Commerc­
ia l ly  viable o i l  was discovered in  1969 within two years BUNCO* s 
production rose by around A© 5 tim es.( 23) There i s  however, some fee lin g  
of disappointment with regard to the joint-ventures© Four of the s ix  com­
panies (including Shell) which were awarded contracts in  1963 have not yet 
been successfu l in  strik ing o i l  in  commercial quantities©
The Service Contracts~ ~ ~ " 1 ; \
This type of contract i s  b asica lly  different from the joint-venture 
agreements* Although the Petroleum Act of 1957 did not sp e c if ic a lly  prov­
ide for service contracts, i t  authorized NIOC to award any type of contract 
i t  sees f i t  except those which are not in  accordance with the laws of the 
country- (A rticle  2)* The basic principle of the service contracts i s  that 
the foreign operator has no ownership rights in  Iran at a l l .  I t  i s  simply 
a contractor working for NIOC and i t  i s  remunerated for i t s  services by 
crude oil© NIOC*s Chairman and Managing Director, Dr© Egbal, at a press 
conference on 27th0 July, 1966, characterized th is contract as ’’revolution- 
ary” and predicted that i t  would open a new chapter in  the h istory  of the 
Iranian o i l  industry© The contract i s  designed both to ’’increase ben efits  
accruing to Iran and to  develop the economic t ie s  already ex istin g  between 
the two countries (France and Iran)©” The Iranian side were very boastfu l 
about the new contract© Once again Iran was the innovator of a new type 
of contract and a new concept© This was said to re flec t the maturity and 
experience of NIOC in  i t s  f if te e n  years of activity© Like the NIOC-AG-IP 
joint venture, the new agreement was between two state-owned companies,
NIOC and the French Entreprise de Recherches et d’A ctiv ites P etro liers , 
(ERAP)o Indeed, these^ types of agreement were thereafter often referred
23* For d eta ils see Chapter 8
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to as ”ERAP type agreements11 o The ERAP group created a subsidiary company 
named SOFIRAN, registered in  Iran, to take over the a c t iv it ie s  and respons­
i b i l i t i e s  of ERAP©-
Under the agreement, ERAP provides Iran with ’’cap ita l, technical comp­
etence and management s k il ls  in  an effort to expand the production and ex­
port of Iranian crude o i l ” (Preamble) „ ERAP obliges i t s e l f  to  lend NIOC 
the money to cover the cost of conducting geological and seismic surveys 
over a vast onshore area of 200,000 square kilom etres, and a smaller o ff­
shore area of 20,000 square kilometres* At the end of the year, on the 
basis of the knowledge which the survey y ie ld s , S0FIRAN Td.ll join with 
NIOC in  se lectin g  20,000 square kilometres of the land area, and 10,000 
of the, offshore area, for  more intensive exploration*. As exploration prog­
resses both onshore and offshore areas w ill  be further reduced u n til  at the 
end of s ix  years, the land area for  exploitation w ill  only include 5,000 
squsre kilometres (A rtic le  16) and at the end of seven years the offshore 
area w ill  include only 3,333 square kilometres (A rticle  12j-)©
The contractor i s  not only obliged to  lend NIOC, without in te re st , funds 
to cover the exploration costs, but, i f  o i l  i s  discovered, to  extend in ter­
est-bearing loans to cover the cost of operations u n til ’’the cash flow  
accruing to NIOC as a resu lt of the operation ©•©•© sh a ll be su ffic ien t to  
enable NIOC to provide the financing of appraisals and development operations”1 
(A rticle  5) • I f  SOFIRAN discovers no o i l ,  ERAP w ill  not recover i t s  explor­
ation loan*.
Another important aspect of th is  contract i s  the development of the 
concept of ’’national reserves©*1 I f  and when o i l  i s  discovered in  commercial 
quantities, NIOC i s  en titled  to set aside 50 percent of the ’’discovered 
recoverable reserves” as national reserves© This sh all be determined by 
’’mutual agreement” separately for discovered f ie ld  on offshore or onshore 
areas (A rtic le  21)© The other 50 percent of recoverable reserves sh a ll be 
brought into immediate exploitation© The contractor w ill  conduct product­
ion operations under a programme worked out in  agreement with NIOC© A l- 
thou^i S0FIRAN, as th e ’’general contractor” manages the production enter­
p r ise , i t  does so only in close co-operation with NIOC and with the Iranian 
personnel, i f  competent Iranians are available© The ownership of a l l
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production equipment, in s ta lla tio n  and discovered o i l  i s  en tire ly  NIOC*s0 
If* SOFIRAN f a i ls  to  comply with, the exploration obligations within the 
time period sp ecified  in  the contract, NIOC can terminate the agreement 
without any obligation to  SOFIRAN (A rtic le  13, sections 9 and 10). On 
the other hand, i f  SOFIRAN has complied with i t s  obligations and concludes 
that the conditions in  the area selected  preclude a reasonable chance of 
discovering o i l  in  commercial quantities, at the end of three years in  o ff­
shore exploration and at the end of four years in  i t s  onshore exploration, 
i t  can discontinue operations. I f  i t  does so, i t  pays NIOC one half of any 
unexpended balance set aside for exploration and the contract terminates 
(A rtic le  13, section 8 )0
Like the joint-venture agreements, th is  contract provides for  the min­
imum exploration of $9 m illion  and $1A m illion for onshore and offshore 
areas resp ectively  (see  Table 5®2)o The duration of the contract i s  25 
years from commercial production of o i l  (24) and during the whole of th is  
period, NIOC is  obliged to s e l l  ERAP a quantity of the discovered o i l  at 
cost plus 2 percent. The quantity of o i l  which i s  to be to ERAP depends 
on the distance of the f ie ld  from seaboard. I f  the o i l f ie ld  i s  located  
at a distance of 500 kilometres or over from the shore, SOFIRAN*s share 
w ill  be 45 percent and i f  the distance i s  100 kilometres or le s s ,  th is  share 
w ill be reduced to 35 percent, (th is  variation seems to r e f le c t  transport 
d ifferen tia ls) (A rtic le  29, section l ) 0 I t  i s  however, important to  
emphasize that th is  35-45 percent of crude which NIOC i s  obliged to s e l l  
to ERAP i s  calculated on the basis of the 50 percent of o i l  which can be 
brought in to  exploitation -  that i s  to say that SOFIRAN* s share would be 
35-45 percent of one half of the f ie ld ,  the othdr half being se t aside as 
national reserves. This means that in  e ffect only 17o5 percent to 22.5 
percent of the to ta l o i l  discovered in  the f ie ld s  i s  to be sold  to ERAP.
ERAP w ill  be obliged to pay 50 percent tax on i t s  p ro fits  derived from s e l l ­
ing th is  o i l ,  but the se llin g  price i s  to be calculated on the basis of re­
alized  prices and not posted prices (A rticle  30, section l)o  from the rev­
enues thus realized.by NIOC, i t  w il l  repay ERAP for the exploration expenses 
at the rate of one-fifth  of the to ta l expenses annually, or 10 U.S. cents
24o Commercial production was defined to be over 100,000 cu0metres per annum*
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per barrel of crude bought, whichever i s  greater (A rticle  27, section  l)o  
After production has been established NIOC w ill begin to repay, with in te2>  
e s t , the development loans that ERAP has supplied** I t  w il l  repay them in  
f iv e  years either in  cash or from the proceeds of the sa le  of the crude* 
According to A rtic le  28, section ’’each annuity sh a ll comprise the repay-- 
ment of loans and in terest •*>•• computed at the rate of discount of Banque 
de France, plus 2*5 percento” NIOC can, however, choose to pay in  oilo  
In th is  case, ERAP acting as NIOCVs broker, w ill  s e l l  a maximum quantity 
of one m illion  tons of crude o i l  each year for the f i r s t  f iv e  years and 
w ill  retain  the proceeds calculated on the basis of "realized prices minus - 
a brokerage commission of 2 percent• ” I f  th is  does not y ie ld  adequate sums* 
NIOC w ill  make good the deficiency in  cash© In addition to  se llin g  NIOC*s 
o i l  to recover i t s  developmental loans ERAP agrees to export to  world mark­
ets for  NIOC, three m illion  tons of crude each year during the f i r s t  f iv e -  
year period,'and four m illion  tons yearly during the second f iv e  year pe3>* 
iod© For th is  o i l  i t  w ill  pay NIOC realized p rices:miiius 2 percent broker­
age commission®
A very important clause sign ifying the p o lit ic a l  importance of th is  con­
tract was included in  A rtic le  31: ERAP w ill  only s e l l  o i l  on behalf of
NIOC i f  the Iranian G-overnment guarantees to use the proceeds to buy French 
equipment, products, or services as mutually agreed on by the two govern­
ments©
The basic structure of the service contracts are discussed above and 
the new contracts awarded la ter  in  Iran had the same basic principles© The 
second service contract was awarded to  the Continental O il ’Company in  April 
1969 and the th ird  service contract was awarded in  June 1969 to  & European 
consortium© This European consortium i s  particu larly  in teresting  as i t  
consists mainly of state-owned o i l  companies of Western Europe0 The part­
icipants are ERAP, AG-IP, Iiispanoil (Spanish State-Oil-Company), Petrofina  
(Belgium) and the Austrian Osterreichische llineralolwerke (O.M#W.)o The 
service contracts were the la te s t  in  the moves of the producing countries 
to tighten th eir  control over th eir  natural resources© Unlike the Consort­
ium Agreement, where NIOC had no say in  the production and management of 
the Company, joint-ventures and service contracts polarized the decision
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making process greatly in  the hands of NIOC management©
’The service contracts have however, turned out to he a fa ilu re  so fa r , 
with regard to the discovery of o i l  in  commercail quantities*, SOFIRAN has 
found no o i l ,  nor have the others* This i s  of course not to say that the 
contracts have not heen progressive, hut unless o i l  i s  found we cannot 
rea lly  say much about the success or fa ilu re  of th is  type of contract® 
Indeed, i t  i s  quite possible that the ERAP contract w ill  soon he cancelled  
in  Iran, as the provisions of the agreement provide that unless a commercial 
discovery i s  made within eight years in  onshore areas and nine years in  
offshore areas, NIOC may cancel the agreement, although for p o lit ic a l  and . 
prestige reasons i t  may not wish to do so© NIOC certain ly  does not wish to  
show i t s  novel concept of contract as being a fa ilu re , and would probably 
allow SOFIRAN to continue i t s  search for oilo  But w ill  ERAP wish to  contin­
ue a fter  th e 'lo ss  of so much cap ita l in  exploration ? This i s  a question 
not en tire ly  answerable by economic considerations© Only time w il l  show 
what w ill  happen to  the ERAP contracto
A Comparison of Concessionary and Non-Concessionary Oil Contracts
The d eta ils  of the concessionary Consortium Agreement were discussed  
in  Chapter 4, and the main points of the non-concessionary joint-venture  
and service contracts were explained in  th is  chapter*. Let us now’ attempt 
to make a comparative evaluation of these various o i l  agreements* This 
comparison is  particu larly important as there are endless vague statements 
made by the governments on their profitability©  The format of the analysis 
w ill  be s ta t ic , and no cash flows are used in  the discussion*. Since serv­
ice  contracts have not yet provided any actual revenue for  the Iranian 
G-overnment th eir  p r o fita b ility  w ill  only be commented on as a point of 
academic in terest, and indeed, l i t t l e  emphasis w ill be placed on th e ir  
p r o fita b ility  calculation in  th is  chapter© On the other hand, we are in  
a position  to make both a theoretical and an actual comparison between the 
joint-venture and the consortium agreements©
One important point which has to  be brought out at the outset, i s  that
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th is  analysis w ill  have to be confined to a comparison of economically 
quantifiable factors, therefore p o lit ic a l ,  lega l and economically non- 
quantifiable factors w ill  have to be excluded from the analytical framework*
The most important d iffereces between a joint-venture agreement and a 
concessionary agreement are that:
a) The concessionary agreements include an element of royalty at the rate  
of 12*5 percent of the prevailing posted prices, which were fu l ly  expensed 
by 1971 (25)e The majority of joint-venture contracts do not have a royalty  
clause, although the recent 197*1 agreements provided for such royalty pay­
ments*
b) In the concessionary agreements, a l l  the o i l  i s  sold at posted p r ices, 
but in  the joint-ventures, NIOC1 s share i s  paid for e ith er  at market prices 
or at half-way prices* Again, in  the 1971 joint-venture agreements, prov­
ision s were made for NI0C*s share to  be sold at posted p r ices, but with an 
”appropriate discount"* The d istin ction  between posted prices and market 
prices i s  important as the posted prices bear no relation  to  actual rea liz ­
ed market p rices, the difference being 30 -  50 cents per barrel in  the la te  
1960*s*
I t  i s  a popular fa lla c y  to claim that the concessionary agreements prov­
ide for a 50/50 (recently 55/45) p rofit division* While the joint venture 
agreements provide a 75/25 p rofit division* The governments of producing 
nations often compare their  75 percent p rofit take from the partnership 
agreements to the 50 percent income tax received from the concessionaire to  
show that the concessionary agreements are le s s  profitable than the jo in t-  
venture agreements* This i s  used to serve a p o lit ic a l  purpose, by. ju stify ­
ing the award of joint-venture contracts and for showing that the govern­
ments have been successful in  extracting a larger portion of the p ro fits  
from the new partnership agreements* The basis of th is  fa lla c y  i s  that the 
two kinds of ’’p r o fits” are not comparable as each i s  calculated on a d iffer ­
ent basis*
25o The issu e  of ’’royalty expensing” w ill  be discussed in  Chapter six*
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A Typical Concessionary Agreement (The Consortium)
£
2.25
Posted price for a barrel o f Iranian crude in  1971 
(on average).
Less: agreed cost of production (including opportunity 
cost of capital)
Less: royalty at 12.5 percent of posted p rices, 
fu l ly  expensed in  1971
ite profits
0*20
0.28
1©77
Government take: 55 percent income tax
Plus roya lty
Totals
0*97
0o28
T 75f
Consortium* s take: realized  market price
Less: cost of production 
Less: payments to Iran
Total:
p rofit s p lit  i s  thus 22/78 in  favour of Iran0
1.80
0.20
1*25
0.35
A Typical Joint-Venture Agreement
Realized export price of a barrel 
of crude
Less: cost of production 
Royalty
Cost of cap ita l 
Income tax at 55 percent 
Net profits for  Iran
Government* s take: Revenue from own share
Revenue from partner (taxes)
Revenue from 2 barrels of o i l  
Average from one barrel
Foreign partner* s take: market price of a 
barrel of o i l
Less: cost o f production
Less: .average payments to Iran for one barrel cf 
o i l
Net p ro fit fo f  the partner:
Iran* s own Iran* s reoeipte
share
1.80
0*20
0.10
wm
/1 .5 0
1.50
1*03
~ 2 3 3
1*265
1*80
0*20
1*26
0*34
from the 
partner
2*25
0*20
1*03
£1.03
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The p rofit s p lit  in  a typ ica l .ioint-venture agreement i s  thus. 21/79 in  
favour of Iran®
Notes: a) Although'the cost of production of the partnership agreements i s  
generally accepted to he around 40 cents per barrel, the cost figures  
are l e f t  at 20 cents to make them comparable to  each othero
b) Realized market prices are used in  th is  analysis instead of half­
way prices® Half-way prices are calculated as follow s:
posted prices -  cost of production . ., , , —r,   „ _ government tax
posted prices + cost of production + government tax _ halfway prices
2 .
In the case of Iran, the half-way price would be /1®74 for partnership 
agreements (some partnership agreements specify half-way p rices, while 
others refer to realized  market prices)®
Once we bring the two types of agreement on an equal footing , we w ill  
see that the "true p rofit division" in  both causes i s  sim ilar and there i s  
no reason to believe that one i s  better  than the other, at lea st in  theory®
The previous calculation i s  based on a theoretica l comparison of the 
p r o fita b ility  of the two types of agreement® Let us consider what happened 
in  practise:
T.a-ble 5 ,3-
Per Barrel Disposable Revenue Received by Iran 1968-71 
(Cents per Barrel)
Producer 1968 1969 1970 1971
Consortium 80 85 83 123
SIRIP 22 22 22 25
IPAC 40 33 28 51
IAPC0 18 29 52 89
BUNCO* 24 31 39
*BIINC0 started production in  19&9*
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Table 5.?
Notes: a) A ll the figures are based on net production figures.
b) 1971 figures r e fle c t  the price increase of the 1971 Tehran 
Agreement*
c) Conversion factors used are fA = 76 r ia ls  1 cubic metre = 6*3 
barrels*
Source: Calculated from the figures provided in  the Annual Reports of
NIOC 1968 -  1971 o .
A comparison of the theoretica l and the actual benefits to Iran under these 
two types of agreement leads to the following observations:
a) The Consortiums per barrel disposable revenue in  actual fa c t , i s  very 
close to what we might expect from our theoretical calculation* 7
b) The partnership agreements provide a much smaller revenue per barrel Y 
than that assumed in  our theoretical calculation* Indeed, SIRIP1 s per 
barrel disposable income i s  le s s  than one-fifth  of the theoretica l amount 
expected*
c) The impact of the Tehran Agreement of February 15th* 1971, which raised  
the posted price by 30-35 cents in  the Middle East, has been le s s  substant* 
i a l  on the partnership agreements than on the Consortium Agreement. The 50 
percent increase in  the Consortium^ cents per barrel revenue i s  only match­
ed by IAPC0, in  the 1970-71 period*
d) I t  i s  important to rea lize  that the reason for the partnership payments 
fa llin g  behind the Consortium i s  only p a r tia lly  related to the fact that 
the governments share of the partnership agreement o i l  i s  so ld  at rea lized  
prices and not posted prices* Since the r ise  in  posted prices has an up-- 
ward e ffect on market price; although th is  upward e ffect does not neccessar- 
i l y  have to be proportional to the r ise  in  posted prices* The main reasons 
for the bad performance of the joint-ventures have been: the small econom­
ie s  of sca le , offshore production and generally higher production co sts , 
and most important of a l l ,  the exemption from the royalty payments, which 
are linked to the increase JLn posted prices*
A ll in  a l l  there i s  l i t t l e  doubt that the Consortium is  the best buyer 
of Iranian o i l  in  terms of disposable income* However, one may argue that 
the purely economic benefits may not be the best measurement for  the per-
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formance of an industry, and p o lit ic a l  considerations must enter into it*
Or that the partnership agreements may have economic e ffec ts  which are un- 
quantifiable© This argument may w ell have i t s  own merits, hut th is  would 
c lear ly  necessitate present value calculations of cash flows by using an 
"appropriate” socio-politico-econom ic discount rateo Obviously, arbitary 
•’discount ra tes” w ill  have to be assigned to these cash flow s, involving 
value judgements, and one can come to surprisingly different values by 
using various discount rates* However, th is  approach i s  not p ractica l and 
economists should direct th e ir  attention to the actual situation  and draw 
their conclusions from the facts in  their  possession,, There i s  no doubt 
that non-quant if ia b le  economic and p o lit ic a l  forces are' in  operation in  
cases of partnership agreementso Typically they includes
a) A compromise between national aspirations and the desire to  u t i l iz e  the 
natural resources of a developing country©
b) Exercising a tigh ter  control over the natural resources©
c) Better integration of the foreign industry with the domestic economy©
d) Training of Iranians for  management positions©
e) Supplying risk  cap ita l and foreign exchange©
f )  Supplying technical know-how© (26)
In the case of the Iranian o i l  industry, i t  can be argued that except 
for a) and b) a l l  the other benefits of the partnership agreements already 
accrue to  Iran from the Consortium© Indeed, the linkages of the Consortium 
to the domestic economy are much stronger than the partnership ventures and 
many more Iranian personnel are trained and employed by the Consortium 
compared to the foreign partners©
P ro fita b ility  in  the ERAP-Type Contracts©
The evaluation’ of the p r o fita b ility  of service contracts has been a 
very controversial subject since the ERAP contract was signed in  1966© 
Various arguments and counter-arguments have been used by economists end 
government o f f ic ia ls  to  show the d iv ision  of p ro fits in  th is  type of cont& 
ract© As one might expect, d ifferent people have used various assumptions
26© Ho Mughraby op.cit© PP©55-59
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in  th e ir  analysis to su it th e ir  own endso Although i t  i s  not the purpose 
of th is  chapter to go in to  details^ i t  i s  in teresting  to look b r ie fly  at 
the various methods of calculation®
Dr® Mo Egbal, the Managing Director of NIOC, claimed soon a fter  signing  
the contract, that the Iranian share of p ro fits would amount to 87-91 peiv  
cent of the to ta l profits® His argument was based on a s ta t ic  analysis, 
which can be summarized as follow s:-
As sumptions:
Realized market prices = 15<#
Cost of production e tc . s
Net profit: realized  prices ** cost of production
s 150 -  40 = 11 Cjl
Income tax: 110 -j
2 ' ■ /
Total cost to  ERAP: cost of production + tax + 2$ of cost of production
: 40 + 55 + 0®8 = 95« ^
ERAP’s p rofit from one barrel of o i l  = 150 -  95 o8 =
■ > ' '
Case I: when the contractor i s  en titled  to the purchase of 35 percent of
crude discovered, th is  means that out of 100 barrels of o i l  discovered, 50 
barrels go to the national reserves® Prom the remaining 50 barrels, 32o5 
barrels go to  Iran and 1?«5 barrels go to the contractor®
NIOC’ s share of profit: (50 + 32. 5) 110 = 9075.0
Contractor's share of profit: 17.5 x 54.2 = 948.5
10023.5
Percentage share of HX0C: = = 91 percent.
Percentage share of the contractor = 948®5 x 100 = 9 percent®
10023o5
Case II: when the contractor purchases 45 percent of the o i l  discovered
(excluding the national reserve)® This would mean that the contractor
would teke 22®5 barrels, while IH0C would take 50 + 27o5 = 77«5 barrels®
Iran’ s to ta l profit: (50 + 27©5) 110 = 8525 cents
Contractors to ta l profit: 22.5 x 54o2 = 1219.5 cents
Total: 9744*5 cents®
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Case I I  continued
Iran’s percentage share of to ta l p ro fits  8525 x 100
9744,3“  = 87*5^
Contractor’s percentage share of to ta l  p rofits 1219®5 x 100
974W? . = O 0/9
This s ta tic  approach came under severe critic ism  by Dr0 To Stauffer, a 
leading o i l  economist from Harvard® In a paper delivered to  the Sixth  
Arab Petroleum Congress in  19&7* he produced cash flows showing that the 
Iranian share of to ta l p ro fits  would be 45 percent, and concluded that the 
ERAP-type contract was le s s  b en efic ia l to  NIOC than the Consortium Agree­
ment® (27)
The main points of critic ism  of Dr® Stauffer were that:
a) There i s  no reason to believe that the "national reserve” ioe® 50 percent 
of the to ta l o i l  discovered w ill  be developed and marketed in  the same way 
as the other h a lf ® This was im plicit in  Dr0 Egbals calculations®
b) There must be an element of opportunity cost of cap ita l in  the region 
of 15 percent of invested cap ita l introduced into the calculation®
c) In the early years, NIOC w ill  have to pay back the loans, which may be 
higher than the revenues received® NIOC may even have to  borrow to pay 
back ERAP loans o
d) The realized  market price of $ 1 o50 assumed by NIOC i s  unrealistic® I t  
would be closer to $1 ®30 -  $1®40®
According to Dr® Stauffer, i f  the o i l  reserves discovered diminish at the 
rate of 50 .percent per year, then the NIOC revenues from a barrel of crude 
from the ERAP-type agreement would be equal to 88 cents, which would nearly 
equal the Consortium’s paymento In h is calcu lations, Dr® Stauffer ignored 
the national reserve development of the %reement0 Dr0 Stauffer* s paper was 
c r it ic is e d  by some economists (28) and in 1968 he was in v ited  to  come
27o T® Stauffer "The ERAP-Agreement: A Study in Marginal Taxation Pricing” * 
Paper presented to  the Sixth Arab Petroleum Congress, Baghdad, Liarch 19&7© 
28o a) K® Sharir "The P ro fita b ility  in  ERAP Agreement” Kiddle East Economic 
Survey Kay 5th 19^7* Dr0 Sharir used the same techniques as Dr® Stauffer but 
using different assumptions he concluded Iran’s share to be around 65^ of 
to ta l p r o fits , b) M® Eroozan "Oil Agreements P ro fita b ility  Comparisons" Iran 
Oil Journal 19^9 c) Po Mina"Changes in  the Principle of Oil Contracts" Iran 
Oil Nev/s No®53 19^6 ( in  Persian) d) M, Eroozan "ERAP-type versus 50-50 Agree­
ments" in Tahqiqah Egtesadi The Cjuarterly Journal of Economic Research 
Tehran University Vo!® IV No’s® 15, 16® Nov,19^9 —
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To Tehran to  talee part in  a debate about his paper* The participants in  
the debate were Dr© Mina, an alternate director of NIOC, Dr* Froozan, a 
high-ranking NIOC economist and Mr. Erfani, a former Governor of the Central 
Bank of Iran© Later the author wrote a review of the arguments in  the de­
bate© ( 29) Although the debate was stim ulating, no new points emerged qnd 
the differences remained to be as wide as before0 Dr0 Stauffer was c r it ic ­
ized for ignoring the discounts on posted price awarded by OPEC nations to  
the concessionaires, when making h is calculations© Dr© Stauffer claimed that 
as these discounts were temporary and would be eliminated, they should not 
be taken in to  account* Indeed, the analytical differences between the part­
icipants were very small indeed, but the differences in  using various assump­
tions by d ifferent people was the rea l cause of the disagreement©
In view of the fa ilu re  of ERAP to discover any o i l  in  commercial quantit­
ie s ,  a l l  these arguments are largely academic and bear no rela tion  to  the 
actual situation© One may even argue that the idea of comparing percentages 
of p ro fit d ivision  of one contract with another maybe f u t i l e .  I t  i s  net 
the percentage points which are of importance to Iran, but the absolute value 
of income derived from a barrel of oil© I f  Iran’s share of the to ta l  p ro fit  
in  a contract i s  only 10 percent, but the actual income per barrel received  
from that contract exceeds the amount received from other contracts then 
surely the fonner should be preferred to the la tte r 0
In the case of the ERAP contract, a l l  the forecasts are mere guesses, and
no one i s  in  a position  to  judge the merits of the ERAP contract for  at
lea st 5-10 years, after the dis every of o i l  in  commercial quantities by the
company© I t  i s  only with the benefit of hindsight that one can say with 
certainty i f  the ERAP contract has been more profitable or le s s  profitable  
than the other contracts©
29© a) T© Stauffer “The Comparative Evaluation of Oil Contracts" ibid© Vol© 
VII Summer & Autumn 1970 b) E© Erfani: "A Comparative Analysis of O il Agre« 
ments" ibid© c) Mo Froozan "ERAP-type Versus 50-50 Agreements: A Further 
Comment" ibid© d) P© Mina "A Comment on Dr© Stauffer’s Paper" ibid© e) F© 
Fesharaki "Some Thoughts on STomparative Evaluation of O il Contracts" ibid© 
Vol© IX Winter & Spring 1972o
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Conclusion; A Marhinal Evaluation of the Non-Concessionary Oil Contracts
The la s t  tw© decades have “witnessed the emergence of a new f©rae in  the 
international petroleum industry. The independent o i l  companies were 
attracted to the Middle East leeause of the large differences "between the 
cost of crude and the se llin g  price of products. These independents were 
b asica lly  divided into tw© groups; the sta te  o i l  companies of Western 
European nations and the independent American and la ter  European and Japan­
ese companies. The state, o i l  companies entered into direct negotiations 
because th e ir  domestic o i l  industry was dominated by the international 
majors; they could see no reason why they themselves should not enter th eir  
own markets or export the low-cost Middle Eastern o i l  to  other markets©
The independents were also concerned with the security of supply. They 
believed that in  the case of an o i l  shortage, the majors would show th e ir  
loya lty  to  the countries of origin, rather than to other consumers. The 
independent, private o i l  companies were in i t ia l ly  attracted to the Middle 
East and North Africa by the prospect of exporting their  o i l  back to America, 
Later, when the American import quota p o licy  stopped th e ir  exports to  
America, they were forced to  s e l l  to the European markets*.
In general, a l l  the independents, whether state-owned or private, real­
ized that the only way they could take a share of the cake was to weaken 
the dominant position  of the international majors and to  gain a foothold in  
the producing countries. In order to  achieve th e ir  objectives they were 
obliged to concede advantageous terms to these countries. The trend started  
with ENI*s award of a partnership contract’ to Egypt and la te r  Iran -  a 
contract which would cost the host nation nothing in  terms of cap ita l in­
vestment u n til  commercially viable oil;was discovered. Early in  the a
with the weakening of the dominant p osition  of the majors and the format­
ion of 0K3C, offers of sim ilar joint-ventures poured into Iran and other - 
producing countries. The French sta te  o i l  company, although often ranked 
as a major o i l  company, was quick to  seek partnership and service contracts 
with Iran as an independent through i t s  subsid iaries. The trend was becom­
ing clear. The producing countries were intent on exercising th e ir  sover­
eignty over o i l  resources and the position  of the majors was weakening.
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The independents knew that i f  they began and maintained good relations 
with the host governments, they would be assured of supplies in  the 
long-run*
After the in i t ia l  surge of the American independents, the European 
independents, such as the Belgian "Petrofina”, the Austrian OMV, the 
European ’consortium and various German groups, were offered partnership 
and service agreements in  Iran* The European independents came mostly 
from the countries with l i t t l e  or no direct access to  o i l  supplies® They 
were concerned both with profits and assurance of long-term supplies of 
crude o i l .  In th e ir  attempt to obtain non-concessionary o i l  contracts they 
were strongly supported by their own governments, whose in terests  coincided 
with those of their o i l  companies. Moreover, insofar as these contracts 
did help to achieve the aims of the producing nations, a p o l i t ic a l  advantage 
was secured for the European governments whose independents had agreed to 
such contracts*
Any evaluation of o i l  contracts must take into account the prevailing  
government policy  of the producing country. The Iranian Government has an 
im plicit p o licy  of maximizing short-term revenues. The o i l  revenues are 
channelled in  increasing amounts to the development budgets of the country. 
The government i s  investing heavily to build a strong economic ■ infra~struc­
ture and to encourage industrialization as rapidly as p ossib le . For th is  
the government needs large amounts of o i l  revenues. In the 19o0*s there 
was an excess capacity in  the world crude production and i t  was clear that 
the Consortium could not increase i t s  offtake from Iran greatly  without., 
reducing the rate of cfftalee from other OPEC countries. The reduction in  
the rate of growth of production in  the other producing countries would 
have been greatly resisted  by those countries, and i t  could have had undes­
irable consequences for the concessionaires (see Chapter 6)0
Iran was faced with a situation  where she could not expect spectacular 
increases in  the consortium revenues and therefore looked for other means 
to increase i t s  much needed o i l  revenues. I t  awarded non-concessionary 
contracts which did not liv e  up to i t s  expectations and e ffe c t iv e ly  brought 
in  smaller revenues compared to those received from the Consortium, in  terms
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of cents per barrel. I t  i s  nevertheless, important to rea lize  that within  
the framework of the government’ s p o licy , i©e© the short-term maximization 
of o i l  revenues, the award of any contract, no matter how small i t s  benefits  
may be, i s  permissible©. Indeed, i t  may w ell be argued that even i f  the 
non-concessionary contracts provide for revenues of even ten cents per bar­
r e l ,  they should be acceptable, since Iran would not incur cash payment to  
the partners and contractors© In th is  context the award of non-concession­
ary contracts seems t©s have been fu lly  justifiab le*
Jl tS (i
chapter six
IRAN and OESC
In discussing the question of permanent sovereignty over o i l  resources 
in  the  previous chapter* two ways of a tta in in g n th is  objective were mention­
ed: con tro l from w ithin -  through the award of non-concessionary agreements 
which was the subject of Chapter 5? and con tro l from w ithout, by c o lle c t­
ive bargaining through OPEC (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries) 
to  tigh ten  the producing countries* con tro l over the concessionary agree- 
ments -  th is  co n stitu tes  the  content of th is  chapter*
I t  i s  important a t the outset to  poin t out th a t i t  i s  not the  purpose of 
th is  chapter to  describe a l l  the a c t iv i t ie s ,  functions and successes of 
OPECo Rather, i t  i s  to  deal so le ly  with se lec ted  issues which have an im­
portan t bearing on the Iran ian  o i l  industry* (1) The se lec ted  issues w ill  
include: p r ic e s , ro y a lty  expensing, p ro ra tion  and the Tehran and T rip o li 
Agreements of 197*1 <>
The Issue of Crude Oil P rices
■ i«i i nn - im  m  i i n ~ini rninir inrrwn nw om i i i nrnm m n r nni n n n m ii a r witmtfl
Although OPEC i s  considered in  the  broad leg a l framework of re -e s ta b lish ­
ing the sovereignty of the  producing nations over th e i r  oil. resources, i t  
was in f a c t  created only to  a rre s t the  f a l l in g  trend  of th e  o i l  prices*
The h is to ry  of the movement of o i l  p rices i s  w ell documented (2) and w ill
1c A host of m ateria l on OPEC’s a c t iv i t ie s  i s  availab le , amogst them one c: 
name a) OPEC’s Publications and Resolutions including "OPEC Selected Docum- 
ents" b) Po Rouhani 11A H istory  of OPEC" Praeger Special S tudies in  In te r ­
national Economics and Development, Hew York 1971© c) G-.7/0 Stocking c p .c i t  
1 9 7 1 , d) H« Mughraby op0c i t 0 1 9 6 6  e) Ho Hovahed o p .c it 1 9 7 0 o 
2« For a good discussion see a) YAA, Leeraan”The Price of Hi dole East O il” 
New York, Cornell U niversity  Press 19&2* b) H*J« Frail: "Crude Oil P r i c es  
in  th e Middle East: A Study in  O ligoo lis tic  Price Behaviour" Hew York Prae­
ger 1 §7)6 c c) C. Issav i and H0 Yegane "The Economics of Hi dale E astern  Oil ” 
New York, Praeger, 1962) d) Eo Penrose op.cito
not be discussed in  d e ta il  here., B rie fly , up to  the end of the Second ’world 
War, there  was v ir tu a lly  no competitive market ( in  the economic sense) fo r  
crude oil* The major o i l  companies, who had been operating under the 
’’Achnacarry Agreement” (As I s  Agreement) of 1923, and under other unpublish­
ed 11 gentlemen*s agreements" were able to  share the markets in  such a way as 
to  balance the  supply and demand of crude o i l  and thus to  maintain s tab le  
priceso However, the  1950*s were marked by new developments in  the in te r ­
national o i l  industry* (3) These new developments eroded the con tro l of 
majors over in te rn a tio n a l p rices  and weakened the p rice  s ta b i l i ty  of crude 
o i l  and o i l  products* The fac to rs  behind these developments were; the 
large surplus of crude supplies from the  Middle E ast, the emergence of the 
aggresive independents, the a v a ila b ili ty  of Russian o i l  in  the European 
markets and the import quota po licy  of the  United States* The independent 
non-in tegrated  companies, which were awarded concessions in  the  producing 
countries were eager to  bring  back th e i r  lovf-cost crude to  the U*S* markets*. 
The im position of the  quota po licy  in  America e ffe c tiv e ly  banned the entry  
of th is  crude in to  the U.S. m arkets. The independents were obliged to  
"dump" th e i r  crude on the European market and to  s e l l  to  independent re f in ­
e rie s  at large discounts, thus fu r th e r  weakening the  p rice  s tru c tu re  of 
crude oilo
In so fa r as the producing countries were concerned, the  importance of 
crude p rices  s ta r te d  with the 50-50 p ro f i t  sharing agreements* P r io r  to  
th is ,  under’tonnage royalty* agreements, the revenues of these  countries 
depended on quantity  ra th e r  than p r ic e . But the 50-50 agreement provided 
fo r  the  d irec t dependence of the  producing countries* revenues on posted 
p r ic e s , and any decline in  posted p rice  would c le a r ly  reduce the p e r-b a rre l 
revenues of these countries*
Let us now see what happened to  the Iran ian  crude p rices: th e  posted
p rice  of Persian Gulf o i l  in  June 1957 was $2*04 .per barre lo  In  February 
1959 the p rice  propped to $1*86 per b a rre l  and in  August i 960  i t  was re ­
duced again to  $1 *78 per barre l*  This represented a f a l l  of 26 cents per 
barre lo  This was the posted p rice  fo r  o i l  exported from Mah-Shahr, as the  , 
Khark Island  f a c i l i t i e s  had not yet been b u ilto  (if.) Y/hen they were compl­
eted there  was an increase of 1 cent per b a rre l  because of the  sh o rte r d is -
3* See the discussion in  Chapters 4 and 5®
4o Shahanshah of Iran  on Oil "Tehran Agreement:Background & Prospectives" 
Trans o rien t Books Limited March 197^* P<>3
tance and lower loading and tran spo rt costs* Apart from the fac to rs  c ite d  
above contributing  to  the  decline of crude o i l  p rices from the lli&dl© East, 
thefe  was an element of d e lib e ra te  action on the p a rt of the  o i l  companies 
to  depress the Persian Gulf p rices in  comparison with the p reva iling  pricef 
in  the  Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean. .Since New York'was chosen to  be t l  
"equalization  point" fo r  these th ree  major exporting areas, the  p rice  of 
Persian  Gulf crude was kept low enough to  be competitive with the other 
crude p rices  a t New York, a f te r  the f re ig h t cost and import duty was added 
to  i t .  (5) The Saudi Arabian O il M in ister, Sheikh Abdullah T arik i, argued 
th a t the p rices of Middle Eastern crude posted by the  m ajor o i l  companies 
during the  decade 1949~5 9 j had been too low in  re la tio n  to the p rices of 
crude o i l  in  the Y/'estefn Hemisphere, and to  the p rices  of products in  the 
European markets, he concluded th a t th is  s itu a tio n  had re su lte d  in  excess­
ive p ro f i ts  fo r  the companies and th e i r  a f f i l i a t e s ,  while i t  had deprived 
the  Middle Eastern producing countries of a considerable p a rt of th e i r  
r ig h tfu l  share of the  p r o f i ts ,  which he estim ated a t $4,743 m illion* (6) 
Indeed, the  p rices of Texan o i l  (Gulf of Mexico) and Venezuela, ( th e  Cai'ili 
ean) were nearly  70  percent end 40 percent respec tive ly , higher than the 
Persian  Gulf p rices of s im ila r API' gravity* ( 7 )
The p rice  reduction of August i 960  provided the turning pointe The 
producing nations, an tic ipa ting  fu rth e r  reduction of posted p r ic e s , were 
forced in to  making a stand against the  fa l l in g  prices* The o rig in a l arch­
i te c ts  of the OPEC v/ere Dr0 Juan Perez Alfonso, the Venezuelan M in ister of 
Mines, and Hydrocarbons and Sheikh .Abdullah T a rik i, the  Saudi Arabian O il 
M in ister and in  September 1960 , ‘kh.e Organization of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC) was formed* The o rig in a l p a rtic ip a n ts  were; I ra n ? Ira q , 
Kuv/ait, Saudi Arabia and Venezuela,* (8) The p rin c ip le  aim of the  Organis­
a tion  a t the ou tset was to ; a) s t a b i l i s e .the posted p r ic e s , b) re s to re  the
5.0 F* Rouhani op*c:lt0 Chapter 12 
6* ibid* P*191 
7e ib id . Pel 90
8 0  The OPEC membership i s  now eleven, the  new members are; Qatar (19t>1) 
Libya and Indonesia (19^2), Abu Dhabi (1967) ,  A lgeria (19&9) N igeria
( 1971) .
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pre~1960 posted p rices  a f te r  the declining trend  was arrested* The f i r s t  
objective was a tta ined ; th a t i s  to  say th a t the  posted p rices  of crude o i l  
were s ta b iliz e d  fo r  a decade, but the organization was unable to  re s to re  
the  pre-I^^O p rices during the 196q5s© The f i r s t  two years of OHSC*s l i f e  
passed without any firm  reso lu tions or decisions with regard to  o i l  prices* 
The f i r s t  constructive and comprehensive reso lu tion  was-adopted in  June 
l962e This was Resolution no* 32 of the Fourth OPRC Conference® This re s ­
olu tion  brought out the  basic  seeds of d iscontent among the producing nat­
ions© I t  pointed out the dependence of the  producing countries on th e ir  
o i l  revenues and th a t the  crude o i l  p rices were the determining fa c to r  in  
the welfare of th e i r  countries© I t  fu rth e r pointed out th a t:
Ma f a l l  in  crude o i l  p rices Impairs the purchasing power of 
member countries in  respect to  manufactured goods which are 
fundamental to  the  economy of developing nations and the  p rices 
of which have been s te ad ily  r is in g , w hilst those of crude o i l  
have been fa ll in g * " (A rtic le  4 )
The reso lu tio n  asked fo r  fu rth e r  negotiations with the  major companies 
fo r  ra is in g  the crude o i l  prices© •
The success of th is  and o ther reso lu tions was confined to  s ta b iliz in g  
the  posted p rices and apart from the modest success of reducing/elim inating 
various discounts and marketing allowances, no r e a l  change was made, in  
the  s tru c tu re  of posted prices©
The s ta b il iz a tio n  of posted p rices did not however, s ta b il iz e  the  market 
prices© The rea lized  p rices declined and the  gap between the  posted p rices 
and re a lise d  p rices widened. Although th is  bore no d irec t e ffe c t on the  
producing coun tries1 revenues, i t  tipped the  p ro f i t  sharing balance in  fav­
our of the producing countries©
The Issue of Royalty Expensing
The concept of ro y a lty  or ”s ta te d  payments” was introduced in to  a l l  oil 
agreements since the f i r s t  discovery of oil© This concept was used i n i t ­
i a l l y  in  the  United S ta te s , where o i l  was owned by p riv a te  3.andlords© The
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companies operating the o i lf ie ld s  were, to  pay the land-owner a sum of one- 
e igh th , to  one-fourth (12©5 to  25 percent) of th e  o il  produced as compen­
sa tio n  fo r  the  depletion of o i l  reserves *> This royalty  was separate from 
the p ere outage share of p ro f i ts  pa id  to  the owner of th e  land or the  income 
tax  payable to  the U.S, Government®
In the 1933 Iran ian  Agreement, the roya lty  was fixed  at four sh illin g s  
per ton ( with a clause allowing fo r  v a ria tio n  of gold p r ic e s ) , while the  
p ro f i t  sharing p rin c ip le  was maintained a t 20 percent fo r  the Iran ian  side 
In  th is  agreement, the  roya lty  payments constitu ted  a much la rg e r share of 
the to ta l  payments than the p ro f i t  sharing clause© However, in  the  1954- 
Consortium Agreement, and in  a l l  other 50-50 agreements, a ro y a lty  clause 
of much le s s  importance than p ro f i t  sharing was introduced© The ro y a lty  
was to  be a t the ra te  of 1 2©5 percent of the production of crude o i l  or i t ;  
cash equivalent at posted prices©
The disagreement between the OPEC countries and the concessionaires stem 
med from the  fa c t th a t the  negotiators of the producing countr5.es had them 
selvescnot understood the  p rin c ip le  of leg a l separation of the ro y a lty  
and income ta x  payments© Professor Stocking w rites:
,!YJhen I  asked Rouhani in  1963 5 why he had not held out fo r  
the  expensing of ro y a ltie s  in  the  Iran ian  negotiations with 
the  o i l  companies, following I ra n 1s n a tio n a liza tio n  of the  
industry  a decade e a r l ie r ,  he said  th a t a t the  time n e ith e r 
he, nor h is fellow  nego tia to rs , were aware of the  customary
p rac tices  in  tre a tin g  o i l  ro y a lt ie s 0 Houhani has learned a
lo t  about the in te rn a tio n a l o i l  industry  in  the in tervening  
y e a rs .” ( 9)
In  the o rig ina l 50-50 agreements i t  was c le a rly  s ta te d  th a t ro y a lty  pay­
ments were to  form a p a rt of the  income tax  payable to  the  producing 
countries -  i ce© the ro y a ltie s  were accepted as a c re d it against the 50 
percent tax  received by the producing coun tries0 Only in  cases where the 
production leve ls  or sa les were low, the ro y a lty  payment of 1 2 05 percent •
was to  co n stitu te  a f lo o r  to  the  minimum rece ip ts  of the  producing govern­
ments.
In  1 9 6 2 , 3)re Fuad Rouhani, a b r i l l i a n t  Iran ian  economist, was appointed 
Chairman and Secretary General of OPEC. His ta sk  was to  nego tia te  on be-
9© GoWc Stocking op.cito Footnote P.3^4
h a lf  of a l l  the OPEC coun tries , the  expensing of ro y a ltie s  ~ th a t  i s  to  say 
the  separation of royalty  payments from the ta x  payments_,collectively with 
a l l  the major concessionaires* (10)
The f i r s t  reac tion  of the  companies was to  refuse  to  recognise OPEC as a 
co llec tiv e  bargaining agency0 Although in  many cases the  companies them­
selves, had used th e i r  own c o llec tiv e  poy/er in  negotiations vdth ind iv idual 
coun tries, they were re lu c ta n t to  recognise and accord a s im ila r jo in t in t ­
e re s t to  the countries with which they  dealt* So strong and obvious was 
th e i r  opposition to  the jo in t action  of the  host coun tries, th a t ’’The Times 
commented e d ito r ia l ly  in  August 1963 th a t :
,}This( opposition) could be represented as yet another instance 
of the  ( o i l  companies’) attempts to  slow-down the  whole processs 
• of negotiation  and to  behave in  an ou t-o f-date , im p e ria lis tic  • 
?'Tay0 To some extent the industry  would have only i t s e l f  to  
blame i f  th is  happened* Some of i t s  more prominent members have 
not h e s ita ted  to  t r e a t  OPEG as an in ev itab ly  h o s ti le  body -  i f  
indeed they are prepared to  recognise i t s  existence a t a lio  Yet 
the Governments have a pe rfec t r ig h t to  se t up a body to  look 
a f te r  th e ir  common in te re s ts .  Moreover, these  in te re s ts  are to  
a large extent shared with the  companies,, A ll  male© money out oi 
o i l 0 I f  the producing Governments sometimes fo rg e t th i s ,  the 
industry  should show 5.ts g rea ter wisdom by being le ss  haughty 
about OPEC." (11)
\ \
S im ila rly ,’’The Economist wrote:
’'The o i l  companies have always been extremely anxious to  avoid 
nego tia ting  d irec t vdth OPSG as an e n tity  in  itse lf* , because 
they have not wanted to  magnify the  importance of what they  lik« 
to  th ink  of as simply a forum fo r  discussion and an advisory in ­
formation bureau fo r  o i l  governments©’’ (12)
The companies however, d id  not agree to  negotiate  c o lle c tiv e ly  and each 
of the  companies negotiated separa te ly  w ith ind iv idual OPSG members© The 
e ffe c ts  of expensing of ro y a ltie s  of the producing countries are as follows
10© Venezuela had already asked fo r  and received an expensing of ro v a ltie : 
and was thus not involved in  the negotiations© Her ra te  of ro y a lty  was 
1 6 ,6 7  percent© Later Indonesia signed a form of contract -  s tru c tu ra lly  
d iffe ren t from those of OPEG, which did not involve ro y a lty  payments a t all 
11 o The Times August 3rd0 19§3 
l2oIhe Economist August 10th© 1963
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Case BCase A
Without the expensing of ro y a ltie s  With the expensing; of ro y a ltie s
Posted p rice  of a b a rre l  of
t
Posted p rice  of a b a r re l  of
/>
o i l  in  1970 1 ©80 o i l 1 o80
Less: production cost 0 o20 Less: .production cost 0o20
Net. p ro f i ts 1 o 60 Less ro y a lty  a t 12* 5/6 0*225
Share of the  government 0©80 Net p ro f i ts 1o375
Share of the  company 0«80 Share of the government
Royalties at 12®5% o f (5 0  percent tax) 0*6875
posted p rices 0*225 T o ta l government take 0*9125
Share of the government 
through taxes
0c575 Share of the  government from 
taxes as a percentage of
Share of the  government from 
ta,xes as a percentage of 
p ro f i ts : 41 © 8 yo
p ro f i ts : 50^
In Case A we have a s itu a tio n  with no expensing of ro y a lt ie s «, Although 
the  t o t a l  share of the government i s  h a lf  the to ta l  p r o f i t s ,  th is  does not 
mean th a t there  i s  an equal p ro f i t  sharing arrangement* The companies* 
payment of 80 cents to  the governments inc3.uded 57 ©5 cents fo r  income ta x  
and 22*5 cents fo r  royalties*  This in  e ffec t meant th a t excluding ro y a lt- . 
ie s ,  the share of the governments* taxes out of the to ta l  ne t p ro f i ts  would 
be as follows:
Companies* net p ro f i t :  
G-overnments * share :
posted, p rices -  production cost -  ro y a ltie s  
fA  c.80 -  ^0*20 - $ 0*225 = $1 *375
x  1 0 0  = A1c&Jo1©375
What in  fa c t th is  type of ca lcu la tion  implied, was th a t  e ith e r  th e  compan­
ies were paying no ro y a ltie s  a t a l l ,  or th a t 'th e y  paid  the ro y a lty  co rrec t­
ly  but they were not paying the 50 percent income tax  on net p ro f i t  as s tip  
u la ted  in  the agreements©
Under Case B, the producing countries demanded th a t ro y a lty  be pa id  sep* 
a ra te ly  to  the  producing coun tries, but since i t  i s  a c o st, i t  may be ded­
ucted in  reaching a net p ro f i t  figure© I f  ro y a ltie s  were fu l ly  expensed, 
the  to ta l  take of the  producing countries would r i s e  by over 11 cents per
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b a rre l .  I t  must however, be emphasized th a t the  agreements made no prov is- 
. ions fo r  the  expensing of ro y a ltie s  and le g a lly  the concessionaires were 
not obliged to  pay anything more0 But the  question of le g a li ty ,  on such an 
important m atter involving so many coun tries, cannot always be in te rp re ted  
l i t e r a l l y ,  e spec ia lly  when one finds th a t many of these con tracts were awar­
ded under duress, or the  host country was ignorant of the  situation®
The most comprehensive and in telligent-argum ent fo r  the  expensing of 
ro y a ltie s  can be seen in  the 19^2 OPEC Resolution, and p a r t ic u la r ly  the  Ex­
p lanatory  Memorandum following the Resolution® (13) A rtic le  I  of th e  
Resolution asked fo r  companies to  confoxm to  the recognized p r in c ip le  of th  
separation of ro y a lty  and ta x  payments, and compensate the  producing count­
r ie s  fo r  “the  in s tr in s ic  value of such petroleum, a ltogether apart from 
th e i r  obligations fa l l in g  under the  heading of. income ta x ©’1 The Resolution 
recommended th a t the  countries en ter in to  negotiations with the concession­
a ire s  “ vdth a view to  working out a formula whersunder ro y a lty  payments 
sh a ll be fixed  a t a uniform ra te  and sh a ll  not be tre a te d  as a c re d it again 
s t  income tax  liab ility ©  “
In  the  follow ing, some p a rts  of th e  Explanatory Memorandum w ill  be
quoted to  show 0FEC*s reasoning behind the Resolution:
“There i s  a fundamental d is tin c tio n  in  raison  df e tre  between 
royalty  and income tax: the  ra tio n a le  underlying each can be
s ta te d  b riefly^  ro y a lty  i s  payable by the lessee  to  the  owner 
of th e  deposit on production, quite independently of whether or 
not any p ro f i ts  re su lt  therefrom® I t  may variously  be regarded n 
as re n t ,  as compensation fo r using up a wasting a sse t p laced a t 
the lessee* s d isposal, or as payment fo r  the  in tr in s ic  value 
of the  raw m ateria l produced income tax , on the other hand,
is  an equally d is tin c t item of l i a b i l i t y  to  the government of a
country, in  respect to  the net p ro f i ts  earned; i t  depends en tire ly
on the  re a liz a tio n  of p ro f i ts  and has nothing to do with the  pay­
ment of the  ro y a lty  kind® “ *
I t  fu rth e r added:
“As s ta te d  above, the confusion between roya3.ty and income ta x  
need not occur. In  v ir tu a lly  a l l  major o i l  producing countries 
outside the Middle E ast, i t  has not occurred® For in stance , in  
the  United S ta tes while the  ra le  of ro y a lty  in  the  case of
13c OPEC Resolution 17 June 19^2, and Explanatory Memorandum® See also: 
J{0H2C and the P rinc ip le  of N egotiations’* Paper presented a t the  F if th  Arab 
Petroleum Congress by CP3C s ta f f .  March 16-23, 19&5©
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p riv a te  owners i s  generally  a f l a t  1 2©5 percen t, the ra te  applied 
by the government tends to  vary on a s lid in g  scale between 12©5 
percent to  25 percen t, depending on the volume of production©
'Where the deposits belong to the Federal and S ta te  Governments, 
ro y a lty  and income tax  are applied as completely separate items© 
For the  purpose of income tax , ro y a lty  payments are  tre a te d  as an 
operating co st, th a t i s  to say, they are deducted from the gross 
income in  the same way as any other operating co s t, end income tax  
i s  paid on the  net earnings© Sim ilarly , in  Venezuela ro y a lty  a t  
the  ra te  of 16  2 / 3  percent i s  tre a te d  as an operating cost©"
The Memorandum went on to  say:
"A fu r th e r  i l lu s t r a t io n  of the d is tin c tio n  between ro y a lty  and in ­
come tax  is  furnished by the U,S© Government1 s treatm ent of royalt; 
payments made by U„S© companies overseas© These companies are per­
m itted  to  c re d it against th e i r  income tax  l i a b i l i t i e s ,  any income 
ta x  paid  by them to  governments of the countries in  which they op­
e ra te , but i t  appears th a t the ro y a ltie s  paid  to  these governments 
may not be c red ited  against American income ta x , and may. only ente: 
' in to  the ca lcu lations as normal operating costs©"
The Explanatory Memorandum goes on to  say th a t since, in  the  case of new 
agreements between Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, and a Japanese trad ing  company, 
a royalty  of 20 percent i s  included, and since the  ra te  of ro y a lty  in  U.S* 
and Canada varies between 12©5 and 25 percen t, depending on the  volume of 
production " i t  would appear th a t a minimum ra te  of 20 percent would be a 
ju s t and equitable ra te  of royalty  in  th a t region (the  Middle East)©"
Indeed, the 0PG0 Memorandum did not ask only fo r  the f u l l  expensing of 
ro y a ltie s , but also fo r  an increase -in the ra te  of ro y a lty  payments from- 
12©5 to  20 percent© I t  must have been c le a r  to  OPEC a u th o ritie s  th a t  th is  
was too much to  ask from the  o i l  companies, but i t  seems th a t they were 
d e lib e ra te ly  aiming high so th a t  a mutually acceptable compromise could be 
reached©
The companies* reaction  to  0PEC*& demands ?/as i n i t i a l l y  one of t o t a l  
re je c tio n , by arguing th a t the contents of th e  o rig in a l agreements should 
be respected© Later however, they rea liz ed  th a t  the  OPEC Governments were 
standing firm  on th is  y .ssue and agreed to  the  p rin c ip le  of expensing of 
royaltieso  For them there  was no question of ac tu a lly  ra is in g  the ro y a lty  
ra te  to  20 percent, and in  fa c t most of OPEC * s members abandoned th is  deman< 
a t a la te r  stage and seemed to  have been s a t is f ie d  with the 12©5 percent.
ro y a lty  ra te  s tip u la te d  in  the agreements® The companies however, asked 
fo r  a 12o5 percent discount from posted p rices as a p rice  fo r  th e i r  recog­
n itio n  of..the ro y a lty  principle® They fu rth e r  asked OPEG to drop i t s  dem­
ands fo r  the re s to ra tio n  of pre-19&0 posted prices® This meant in  e ffec t 
th a t  the OPSG members would be no b e tte r  off than before* p lus the  fa c t  
th a t they would loose th e i r  r ig h t to  press fo r  the  re s to ra tio n  of p re -1960  
prices® This was to ta l ly  re jec ted  by OFECo L ater the companies agreed to  
pay the roya lty  ra te  i f  the p ro f i ts  were calcu lated  on the b as is  of re a l iz ­
ed p rices and not posted prices* and i f  the member countries dropped th e i r  
claim fo r  pre-19&0 prices® This o ffe r was no b e tte r  than the previous offe 
and would in  e ffec t n eu tra lize  the e ffec t of roya lty  expensing®
The arguments end counter-arguments between OPSG and the cpncessionaires 
on th is  issue  were numerous and we do not propose to  go in to  them in  d e ta il  
here® The most in te re s tin g  and important argument used by the  companies * 
was th a t of try in g  to  prove th a t the  treatm ent of roya lty  payments in  the 
United S ta tes was not comparable to  the treatm ent of these  payments in  the 
Middle East® They argued th a t  although ro y a ltie s  were expensed in  the  
United S ta te s , the  companies there  benefited  from a depletion allowance of 
27o5 percen t, while even on expensing of ro y a ltie s  a t the  ra te  of 20 pereen 
the per b a rre l revenue of the  OPBG countries would be appreciably le ss  than 
the  ex isting  lev e l. To these arguments OFEC re p lied  th a t  the United S ta tes 
con stitu ted  a spec ia l case* and there  were p a r tic u la r  circumstances Yrhich 
led  to  the award of 27«5 percent depletion  allowance® In  the  U .S ., the 
energy po licy  of the  adm inistration demanded th a t exploration fo r  petroleum 
should be encouraged with a view to  improving* or a t le a s t  m aintaining, the 
r a t io  of the reserves of o i l  in  the ground to  the annual production* th is  
r a t io  being as loir as 12 to  1 ® The s itu a tio n  in  the  f id d le  Bast was e n tir ­
ely  d if fe re n t, the  r a t io  of proven reserves to  current production being 100 
to  1® Besides, the  depletion allowance was concieved of as a means of p ro­
viding the necessary finance to  search fo r new f ie ld s  to replace those ex­
hausted® But in  the  Middle Eastern countries* the requirements of c a p ita l 
fo r  fu tu re  exploration work are so in fe r io r  to  the amounts forbhcoming from 
the American depletion allowance th a t i t  is  impossible to  ju s t i fy  such an 
allowance® Bor example, in  the case of Iran , 1961 -  the  year proceeding 
the negotiations* the depletion allowance of 27®5 percent would have meant 
an allowance of £200 miHion® But evidently  the appropriation of such a sm
1 M
to  exploration operations in  one year, aimed a t finding new f ie ld s  fo r  the 
fu tu re  would have been absurd, and i t  would have been even more absurd to  
expect Iran  to  grant suoh ta x  exemption to  the  companies to  enable them to  
finance th e i r  exploration a c t iv i t ie s  in  other regions of the  world, in  
p u rsu it of th e ir  po licy  of diversification®  OPSG added th a t Venezuela did 
not grant a depletion allowance to  i t s  concessionaires ( in  sp ite  of the far 
th a t i t s  reserves s itu a tio n  was not as favourable as th a t of the Middle Eas 
and nevertheless, the  ro y a ltie s  were expensed® (12}-) F in a lly , the companies 
argued th a t because of d ifferences between posted p rices  and rea lized  price 
the separate payment of ro y a ltie s  and taxes on the basis of posted p rices 
would se riously  a ffec t th e i r  a b i l i ty  to  finance th e ir  operations in  the 
countries concerned® OPSG did  not agree vdth th e i r  conclusions and poihtec 
out th a t they  would s t i l l  be l e f t  vdth large  profits®
The Settlement
»Uil 'I i illinium* wumi yiiUMi ml » iii«»ni»« l ' ■munil
Unlike the un ited  stand of the concessionaires, the OPEC members were 
divided between the m ilita n t and the  moderate groupso Ira n , Saudi. A rabia, 
Kuwait and Qatar, agreed in  p rin c ip le  to  accept an o ffe r made by the 
concessionaires in  19&4o Later Kuwait withdrew but the other four countr­
ie s  signed the  agreement, vdth Iran  being the forerunner because she was 
convinced, th a t th is  was the maximum th a t the companies were prepared to  
offer® (15) The settlem ent perm itted the companies to  discount the  posted 
p rices by 8®5 percent in  I 9&f> 7*5 percent in  19&5 and 6®5 percent in  1966  
in  calcu la ting  th e ir  income ta x  ob liga tions, while the f u l l  ro y a lty  ra te  
was to  be paid  by the companies® This meant th a t in  I 966  the  governments 
would receive 5 cents a b a rre l  more than they  would have received under th  
p re-196V arrangement® This was ju s t under h a lf  of the 11 cents increase i  
OPEC's demands were fu l ly  met® The settlem ent provided fo r  consu lta tion  2
12}.® F® Rouhani op*cit® P®227
15c. Because of the difference in  opinion the negotiations were re fe rre d  tc 
ind iv idual countries* Kuwait signed an agreement in  19&7* re tro -a c tiv e  tC 
1 $Gh~} other countries made th e i r  own arrangements®
1 9 6 6 * between the  government and the  companies on possib le  reductions in  
the  fu tu re  ra te  of discount* Any agreement reached was to  be governed by 
“the competitive market and economic s itu a tio n  ««•««<> expected a t the time 
of such consu lta tion” to .p re v a il  during fu tu re  years0 (16)
• A fter examining the s itu a tio n  of the in te rn a tio n a l o i l  industry  a t i t s  
eleventh conference held in  Vienna in  A p ril 19665 OPSG recommended th a t 
"each member country concerned takes steps towards the complete e lim inatio  
of the discount allowance granted to  the o il  companies" ( 1 7 ) In  accordanc 
with th is  recommendation5 Iran* Saudi Arabia, and Qatar, and the  S ecretary  
General of OFfG s ta r te d  negotiations with the major o i l  companies0 . Negot­
ia tio n s  were concerned not only with the elim ination of the 6*5 percent t a  
allowance, but also with the c lo se ly  re la te d  problem of g rav ity  d if fe re n t!  
allowances b u i l t  in to  the o rig in a l ro y a lty  expensing se ttlem en t. In 'Janu ­
ary I 9 6 8 , agreement was f in a l ly  reached with the  companies. Under the agr 
ement, the percentage discounts were to  be phased out in  fou r years, decl­
in ing  to  5o5 percent in  1 9 6 8 , percent in  1 9 6 9 * 3*5 percent in  1 9 7 0 * 2 
per-cent in  1971 end cease e n tire ly  in  1972, The g rav ity  allowance,was to  
be elim inated by 1975© Libya was not a p a rty  to  th is  agreement, but p lan ­
ned to en ter separate nego tiations on th is  is su e 0
16o fo r  d e ta ils  of the agreement see F, Rouhani 6 p ,c i tc PP ,230-233
17*. OPEC REsolution XIo71-
The Question-of Oil P roration  -n  .I,,, ■ —« ...  ■    I.
We have already seen th a t i n i t i a l l y  the decline in  posted p r ic e s , due■ 
to the excess supply of crude o il  was the m otivation behind the creation  
of OPEC* This n a tu ra lly  brings tip the question th a t i f  excess supply of o il 
i s  responsible fo r the decline in  p rice s , then the obvious answer would 
be to  p rorate  or r e s t r i c t  o i l  production to such a lev e l as to s ta b il iz e  
or even ra ise  crude p rice s .
The problem, however, i s  not as simple as i t  may look a t  f i r s t ;  and involves 
many complicated issu es. The issue of royalty  expensing brought out the 
f i r s t  disagreement between the OPEC members, but a t  le a s t  the Persian Gulf 
s ta te s ,  with the exception of Iraq , presented a un ited  fro n t against the 
major o i l  companies. The question of o i l  p roration  and the following con­
f l i c t  of in te re s ts  among the producers, even s p l i t  the Persian Gulf s ta te s .  
I t  produced disagreement, suspicion and th rea ts  among the producing n a tio n s , 
with fa r  reaching consequences th rea ten ing  the very existance of OPEC. I t  
brought out the inherent con tradiction  in  an organization created to  serve 
nations of co n flic tin g  in te re s ts .  Oil p roration  was doomed to fa ilu re  
from the beginning, and i t  was fo rtunate  th a t i t  was o il  p ro ra tion  and not 
OPEC i t s e l f ,  which disappeared from the scene.
The f i r s t  and most p e rs is ta n t advocate of o i l  p ro ration  was h r. Perez 
Alfonzo of Venezuela. The cost of production of a b a rre l of o i l  in  
Venezuela i s  51 cents, compared to the Middle Easts average of 15 cents per 
b a rre l (18), while a t  the same time Venezuelan reserves were believed to be 
su b s ta n tia lly  below the Middle Eastern lev e ls . I t  was c le a r  to Venezuela 
th a t excess production was the cause of the weakening s tru c tu re  of in te r ­
national o i l  p rices and th a t the increasing  production v/oula b en efit the 
Middle -^ast a t  the expense of Venezuela. Indeed in  i 960 , the year OPEC was 
formed, Venezuela’s production increased by a mere three percent over 1959* 
Y/hile to ta l  Middle East production increased by fourteen percen t. Confronted 
with the declin ing  importance of Venezuela as an o i l  producer, concerned 
with i t s  lo ss of na tional revenue through p rice  cu ts , the Venezuelan 
Government authorized the M inister of Mines and Hydrocarbons, Hr. Alfonzo,
18. C. Tugendhat ?>Qil the Bivgest Easiness” London 1968 . p. 189 
(The corresponding production costs ares U.S.A. 15 $ ; U.S.S.Pi. 80$ 
and Indonesia 82$)
a man w ell informed about the American' o i l  p ro ra tion  programme, to  persuade 
the  OPEC members to  accept a comprehensive system of o il  proration©
Among the Middle E ast producers, Sheikh Abdullah T a rik i, the Saudi 
Arabian O il Minister*, was the  o f f ic ia l  most en thusia tic  about production 
control© Other members agreed to  i t  in  p rin c ip le  and i t  was brought out 
a t the  f i r s t  OPEC conference© The delegates of the member coun tries, while 
declaring th e i r  in ten tio n  of s ta b iliz in g  p r ic e s , re fe rred  to  the re'gulatior 
of production as one of the means of achieving th e i r  objective; and a t the 
second conference, during which the elaboration of an equitable p rice  f i x ­
a tion  was envisaged, i t  was resolved th a t a study of p ro ra tion  systems 
should be undertaken© The arguments fo r  p ro ration  were e n tire ly  based on 
i t s  impact on prices© An important point which came out of the  discussion 
was th a t  i t  was not excess production which weakened the p rice  s tru c tu re  -  
as the  lev e l of supply approximately corresponded to  the le v e l of demand, 
but the knowledge of excess availab ility  of supply was th e  r e a l  cause behinc 
the weakening of the prices© Accordingly, to  influence p rices  i t  would be 
su ff ic ie n t fo r  OPEC members to  make i t  known to  the companies th a t  the ave 
a ila b le  excess supply would not be u t i l iz e d  a t the  vd.ll of the companies© 
In  sh o rt, th e  countries th a t favoured the adoption of a p ro ra tion  po licy  
maintained th a t i f  i t  were possib le to  apply the  quota p rin c ip le  e ffe c tiv ­
e ly  within the  United S ta te s , i t  should be equally possib le  to  apply th is  
p rin c ip le  on an in te rn a tio n a l scale©
The arguments against p ro ration  were strong© Proration  would severely  
s tra in  the country-.corapany relationships©  I t  would be i l l e g a l  and the 
producer would be accused of c reating  a c a r te l  and in te rfe r in g  w ith the fire? 
operation of market forces© P roration  may lead  to  fu rth e r  in tensive  re -  
sea,roll in to  a lte rn a tiv e  sources of energy, which would in  th e  long-run, 
damage the revenues of producing nations© (19) I t  was also  argued th a t 
non~OPEC nations, which were rap id ly  expanding production could take advan­
tage of the vacuum and upset the production con tro l programme© Even a,n 
OPEC member could be tempted to  break with the  organization and independent 
3.y come to  an arrangement with the companies© The most important argument
19* Although the second argument may look absurd now-, i t  does not mean th a t 
i t  was unapplicable in  the early  1 9 6 0 !s©
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against p ro ra tion  was the p ra c t ic a l i ty  of i t ;  on what b a s is  should the 
Quotas be a llo ca ted  ? Several c r i t e r i a  have been proposed of which the  
p rin c ip le  ones are: th e  volume of proven reserves, the ra te  of current
production and the  prospect of i t s  annual growth, the size  of investm ent, 
the costs of operation, the  size  of non-oil exports in  p roportion  to  o i l  . 
exports, the proportion of o i l  revenues to  non-o il revenues, the size  of 
the  population end the  degree of economic development ~ the la s t  two argu­
ments forming the b asis  of the Iran ian  demands©
In  1$61, OPEC commissioned the American consultants; A rthur Do L it t le  
Inc©, (20) to  maize a comprehensive study of p rices  and p ro fits ,, end output 
in  the  in te rn a tio n a l o i l  industry  and to  form ulate recommendations fo r  an 
output con tro l programme© The study, was not published but i t  was widely known 
th a t Arthur D* L i t t l e ’ s analysis recognised serious obstacles to  in te rn a t­
io n a l p ro ra tio n  as a means of increasing revenues of o il-ex p o rtin g  countr­
ies© Professor Stocking w rites; !!the influence th a t the A rthur D© L i t t le  
study exerted on OPEC’s po licy  i s  a m atter of con jectu re, but OPEC’s in a c t­
ion i s  a m atter of f a c t t! (21) The L i t t le  analysis seemed to  have dampened' 
OPEC’s enthusiasm fo r  o i l  proration# Venezuela however, was standing firm  
on the issue  and is  even reputed to have th reatened  to  res ign  i f  OPEC did 
nothing about the  production controls, frequent OPEC conferences and 
reso lu tions did nothing constructive  about proration© (22) The f i r s t  p o s i t ­
ive step was taken a t  OPEC’ s Eighth Conference, held in  Geneva in  A pril 19&5 
where the ”0PEC Economic Commission” was form ally estab lish ed  and given the  
ta sk  of form ulating a production programme formula0 Meanwhile the  Commiss­
ion had worked out a production con tro l quota supposedly based qn a “ra tio n ­
a l” increase in  production in  th e  OPEC area, geared to  an estim ated increase 
in  the world demand© These " tra n s is to ry  measures*1 were-'adopted in  the 
Ninth Conference (1X©61) in  T rip o li in  Ju ly  .19©® But- i t  was not u n t i l  
August 2J)rdc 1‘965-* th a t the  o f f ic ia l  p ub lica tion  of the  A p ril  and Ju ly  
conferences were released© The re fu sa l of OPEC to  p u b lish /th e  proceedings 
of the E ighth and Ninth conferences, end the general lack of action  by OPEC
20© A rthur D0 L i t t le  In c . were th e re a f te r  employed by OPEC to  carry  out r e ­
search on important OPEC proposals© This firm  is  cu rre n tly  involved in  the  
tra in in g  of OPEC nationals fo r  petroleum management©
21© G.YA Stocking op0c i t 0 P0382
22© See Kesolutions II©13, VII«50, Vlil©55.
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. drew severe c ritic ism  from the Arab Press* One' journal wrote:
“The colossus in  Geneva is  now sick and possib ly  on i t s  death- 
bed« Differences among i t  members are now sapping i t s  streng th  
and reducing i t  to  a skeleton* Such d ifferences axe no longer- 
papered over, but f re e ly  admitted by the Organization^ spokes­
man* *■ ( 23)
And i t  propagandized in  a manner typical, of those who custom arily explain  
Middle Bast troubles in  terms of Western Imperialism; the  a r t ic le  concluded:
“Planning of supply i s  the  only e ffec tiv e  answer to  the companies* 
c a rte liz e d  l i f t in g  arrangement* I f  we f a i l  to  take i t  away from 
the companies through planned production* the dangerous offtake 
weapon by which they can p lay  one country against another* we can 
never succeed in  negotiating  a -ra tio n a l p rice  s tru c tu re  or in  
solving any basic o i l  problem*
The recent OPSG fiasco  is  explicable only in 'te rm s of the  m ajorsf 
in te rfe rence  through whispering in  some Middle Bast or North 
African ears th a t backtracking would be rewarded by increased off­
take* Future generations w ill curse our p o lit ic ia n s  fo r  fa i lu re  
to  c lip  the power of the companies to  decide our fate* ( 24)
The proceedings of the Resolution IX*61 was nothing spectacular*, the  only 
in te re s tin g  point which came out of i t  was the ac tu a l quotas a llocated  to  
the producing coun tries , these were:
Country A llowable  Increas ( 00Qfs b /d )i Percent on Previous
Year
■Iran 304 17*5
I ra q  125 10*0
Kuwait - 157 6 s.O
Saudi Arabia 254 12*0
Qatar 67 32*0
Libya 210 20*0 ' -
Indonesia 48  10o0
Venezuela 115 3o3
Average? 160 13*8
Resolution DU61 sp e c if ic a lly  mentioned th a t  these quotas were to  be varied 
from year to yegr. The weakness of the reso lu tion  was th a t there  was no
25* “Review of Arab P e troleum and Sconoriicf I ra q 0 May 19^5* 
24* ibid*
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planned course of action i f  e ith e r  the companies or the  producing countries 
f a i le d  to  abide by the quota system© The quotas were simply proposed to  .act 
as a guide to  in te rn a tio n a l o i l  proration© The main d issen ters  of qu an tiitj 
restxriction  were Ira n , Saudi Arabia and Libya© Iran  was unhappy with any 
kind of p ro ra tion  because she wanted to  secure her former p o s itio n  as the 
la rg e s t Middle Eastern o i l  producer and because she needed ever increasing  
o i l  revenues fo r  her development p lans0 Saudi Arabia could not agree to  a 
permanent p ro ra tion  because she did not want to  loose her lead  in  the MIddl( 
E ast5 and Libya, because her production was low and she v/anted to  e:xpand 
rapidly© Dr© Reza F a llah , ah HOG D irec to r, said in  an in terview  th a t  the 
creation  of an a r t i f i c i a l  shortage of crude would merely speed the expansio] 
of o ther sources of supply, encourage the use of a lte rn a tiv e  fu e ls , and in  
a l l  p ro b a b ility  f a i l  to  s ta b il is e  prices© Oil p ro ra tio n , he sa id  0 i s  
d e fin ite ly  out0 (25)© Saudi Arabian O il M in ister Sheikh Yamani sa id  in  
February 196 6 , th a t h is country r a t i f ie d  the proposed output scheduled on 
two conditions: 11 th a t (the) Saudi Arabian commitment be fo r  only the f i r s t  
s ix  months of the  p ro ra tion  period , and th a t approval fo r  the  second s ix  
months would depend on Saudi Arabia receiving an increase in  allowable 
production©0 ( 26) The Libyan O il M inister Kebasi said: 0s o 'f a r  as Libya i s  
concerned, th e re  is  no production l im it, none imposed and we never accepted 
one ©c © © © © Libya plans to  go ahead to  develop^ production u n t i l  i t  reaches 
m aturity©0 ( 2?)
The quota po licy  was a f a i lu r e 0 By January 1966 i t  was c le a r th a t the  
f i r s t  yearf s production figu res fo r  Saudi Arabia and Libya exceeded those 
of the  allowables while the  ra te  of offtake in  a l l  other coun tries , includ­
ing Ira n , was below the proposed output schedule© I t  i s  in te re s tin g  to  
note th a t two of the most important objectives of the o i l  p ro ra tion  progr« 
amme: the  denial of power to  the companies to  penalise  a p a r t ic u la r  country 
and the acceptance of output schedules as maximum allowable by the  member 
countries had failed© Indeed, Kuwait and Ira q , which were both engaged in  
controversies with th e i r  concessionaires, had th e ir  production ra te  cut be­
low the OPEC1 s allowables, presumably as a ,pun itive  device by the companies 
-  and OPEC could no t, or would no t, do anything about i t .  A lso, what began
25c Petroleum In te llig e n ce Weekly, May 17th« 1966  P?©6-7
26• Middle East Economic Survey February 11th, 1966 Supplement.
27* 'p*l«VA August 30th© 1965 P«o
p rim arily  as aprograame to  curb the  ra te  of increase  in  output, became 
one to  ensure th a t each coun tries1 output would a t le a s t  reach the lev e l 
s tip u la ted  in  OPEC schedules*,
A . ‘ ^ .I ra n is  Case fo r  Increase Production
N100*'s quest fo r  increased production and i t s  p lea  fo r  exceptional 
treatm ent brought about the f i r s t  signs of d is in teg ra tio n  in  0P3C© NIOC 
seemed to  be departing from the OEBO p a th , pu tting  the in te re s ts  of Iran  • 
ahead of the jo in t OPEC interests©  ■ - . . .
Iran* s demands were based on the  argument th a t the  ra te  of production of 
crude should correspond to  the "developmental needs" of the  country and 
population ra th e r  than any other criterion©  HI00 s ta te d  th a t in  19^7 the 
production ta rg e t ra te  was 12  percent above the previous yearns le v e l, f a l l ­
ing short by 5o5 percent of the  OPEC quota of 17*5 percent© On March 1st© 
1968, Prime M inister Hoveida, in  a speech to  the Iran ian  Parliam ent, declar­
ed h is  in ten tio n  of gearing o i l  output to  Iran*s needs as envisaged in  i t s  
development programme, he said:
"The o i l  income figures contained in  the.13V7 (i«e© 1 9 6 8 ) budget r e f le c t  
n e ith e r Iran*s true  needs nor her demands© They merely represen t the 
bare minimum required by Iran  during the fiv e -y ear period of the Fourth 
Development Plan (21st© March 1968  to  21st© March 1973) ° wre cannot stanc 
by id ly  while .our ovm o i l  resources are kept unexploited underground 
and not u t i l iz e d  fo r  the  country*s development©" (28)
Two weeks l a t e r ,  in  an address at the inaugeration of the  Soviet-aided 
s te e l  p ro jec t a t Esfahan, the Shah put i t  even more b lu n tly :
"what we must recognize i s  th a t ©'©©©© decisions cannot be taken uni­
laterally©  wej as the owner of th is  o i l  and as the  Master of th is  land , 
must have a say in  the production of th is  w ealth, because the needs of 
the  country are clear© I t  i s  c le a r to  which purpose the  country*s rev­
enues are being spent© Ho firm , no company, no organization can t e l l  us 
merely because i t  has an agreement vdth us: *We w ill  produce' and export 
so much of your na tu ra l wealth, but you cannot touch the  r e s t  as we do 
not wish to  explo it it©^ Y/hat th is  means i s  th a t they  want to  deprive 
Iran  of th is  wealth which r ig h tfu l ly  belongs to  us©" ( 29)
28* Middle  East  Economic Survey, March 8th© 1968  
29© ibid© March 22nd© 1 968© '
This time NIOC followed a d iffe ren t kind of strategy*. I t  presented to  
the Consortium a l i s t  of Iran*s development expenditures, over 63 percent 
of which came from expected. oil.revenues® NIOC asked the  Consortium to  
increase the  offtake to  such le v e ls  as to  provide NIOC with the specified  
sum of revenues required  fo r  the Development Planc The Consortium f e l t  
unable to  comply with NIOC r s deman dc I t  pointed out th a t in  keeping with 
the growth ra te  fo r  demand of 6 or 7 percen t, the Middle East average coul 
not exceed these le v e ls 0 NI0Cfs demand required a growth ra te  of over 20 
pex'cent, which was not acceptable to  the Consortium® In  an endeavour to . 
m obilise and soften Western public opinion in  support of Iran* s demand fo r  
an increase in  o i l  output su ff ic ie n t to  supply the  required  development f  
funds, the Shah sponsored a brochure by David Missen, which presented the 
Iran ian  po in ts of view© (30) The Iran ian  case was based on the  following 
points?
a) Population: Iran  has the la rg e s t population among the producing nation*
of the  Middle East* Indeed, I ra n ss population i s  more than double the 
t o t a l  population of other producing countries in  the Middle S a s t0 
Consequently the ra te  of o i l  revenue^per cap ita  i s  lowest in  Iran© 
Population and revenue fig u re s .a re  given in  Table 6©1:
Table
Population and Income in  R elation to  O il in  Middle Eastern 
Producing Countri.es
Countiy Population (000fs) Production (m illions Oil Income
$  of tons) 1967^68 per Head(£5s)
1967
I r a n .  28,000 141 9*5
I ra q  8,400 74  15<>0
Saudi Arabia 6,000 1p2 50*0
Kuwait 490 , 133 319cO
Qatar 160 16 243o0
Abu Dhabi 16 24 2187c0
Source: Do Mis sen op0c i t 0 P©6
* Population fig u res  based on to ta l  population of Middle E astern producing 
countries of 122 million® Figures are fo r  1967/880
30t Do Missen “Iran i O il a t the Service of a Nat io n ” London Transorient 
Books Ltd®, I 969
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NIOC argued th a t the low o i l  income per head would j u s t i f y  a la rg e r  product­
ion fo r  Iran  in  order to  ra is e  the  standard of liv ing  of th e  nation©
• b) Kate of U tiliz a tio n  of O il Revenues: NIOC claimed th a t Iran  had the
highest r s te  6f  u t i l iz a t io n  of o i l  revenues fo r  economic development© Over 
75 percent of the o i l  revenues went to  the.P lan  O rganization, the  supreme 
planning body of Iran? and the  r e s t  to  supplement the  government budget*. 
Over h a lf  the goods imported every year are c a p ita l goods fo r  development 
projects© Some 12 percent of these imports come from B rita in  and the re s t  
from other in d u s tr ia lly  developed countries of the West© I t  would be in  
the  long-run in te re s t  of the consuming nations to  provide Iran  with a la rg ­
er o i l  revenue, as th is  would provide a large  market fo r  th e i r  exported 
goods© Unlike some of i t s  neighbours, Iran  has su ff ic ie n t p ro jec ts  e ith e r  
so c ia lly  necessary or economically highly a tt ra c t iv e , or bo th , to  absorb • 
the e n tire  sum of c a p ita l which the country’ s o i l  industry  i s  l ik e ly  to  
produce© Hissen w rites:
"Iran  has not and would not wish to  accumulate su b s tan tia l sums of in ­
vested surplus funds, which would have to  be banked in  one or o ther of 
the main in te rn a tio n a l c a p ita l markets© The existence of huge surplus 
o i l  revenues banked in  B rita in , has in c id en ta lly  become a source of 
great p o te n tia l in s ta b i l i ty  to  the B r itish  balance of payments position© 
At any time in  the past four years i t  lay  w ithin the  power of the admin­
is t r a t io n  of Kuwait, fo r  example, to  p re c ip ita te  a devaluation of the 
pound simply by tran s fe rr in g  the <£700 m illion  worth of surplus s te r l in g  
banked in  London, in to  some other currency© At no time in  the past four 
years have reserves of th is  one " s ta te le t"  vdth bare ly  h a lf  a m illion  
people, amounted to. le s s  than f i f t y  percent of the  availab le  fo reign  
exchange reserves of the Bank of England©"
He went on to  w rite:
"A po licy  of fu rth e r  a llo ca tio n  of production increases to  countries 
which cannot possib ly  absorb the proceeds of even th e i r  present lev e l 
of earnings, i s  both w astefu l of scarce funds, le s s  productive of r e a l  
increases in  a sse ts , less humanitarian in  i t s  p r in c ip le s , le s s  success­
f u l  in  promoting human happiness ©©©©©«©•©«• (31)
The statements made by Mr© Missen are c le a r ly  one-sided, but presumably 
they re fle c ted  the o f f ic ia l  Iran ian  view and i t  would not be su rp ris in g  i f
TipT n r  r r©i ii iiKi r  n i ~ irrr r  i minr—m nr— it  in n n r — - —r r i ft— J~'i
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the  other producers in  the region did not take k indly  to  these  statements*
c) Security  of Supply: NIOC o f f ic ia ls  were quick to  point out th a t Irant »!!■■«—utaifcC—gMfc'iv.'A* rfn'i* ii aniiiini>»r»wa> hhmwu/vj »« *•
had been the most stab le  country in  the  region* Under the leadership of 
the Shah, p o l i t ic a l  s t a b i l i ty  and economic success have been achieved.
In  the  A rab -Israe li co n flic t of 19 6 7s Iran  was the only producer in  the  
troubled  region to  allow-not only the continuation of o fftak e5 but even 
increase the ra te  of production to  o ffse t the loss of o i l  from other Arab 
producers. Iren  remained p o l i t ic a l ly  n eu tra l in  the  co n flic t and was more 
than pleased with accomodating the Western consumers. In  19&7, the prod­
uction ta rg e t fo r  Iran  was 12 percent above the previous year, but the 
A rab -Israe li War, which did not break out u n t i l  June, ra ised  production 
by 21 percent* A fter the war, the ra te  of .growth of Iran ian  production 
dropped to  9 percent in  196 8 . Nor th is  Iran  blamed the lack of fo resigh t 
by the Consortium and warned th a t  another clash between Arabs and I s r a e l is  
would be unavoidable and Iran  would then be once again the saviour of the 
Western consumers.
Another important message was brought home to  the Western governments: 
a strong and prosperous Iren , with p a r tic u la r ly  close id ea lo g ica l and po l­
i t i c a l  t ie s  with Western nations could p lay  a leading ro le  in  making the 
Persian G-ulf a safe waterway fo r  the o i l  tankers -  Iran  would also  help to  
slow-down the Soviet influence in  the  G-ulf. Indeed, the departure of the  
B r itish  forces from the Gulf did not create a p o l i t ic a l ly  d isasterous 
ttvacuumno The U,S.A. and the U.K. appeared to  have delegated to  Iran  thei: 
task  of the Gulf P o lice .
I t  was against th is  background, th a t on agreement with the  Consortium wai 
reached on May 1 2 th ., 19^9© The Consortium’s planned ta rg e t ra te  fo r  19^9/ 
1970 had f a l le n  £100 m illion  short of the  Iran ian  demand. The May agree­
ment was a compromise. The Consortium would meet the f u l l  NIOC' demand, bu' 
the £100 m illion  gap would not be e n tire ly  f i l l e d  by increased production. 
This was provided in  p a rt by an, increase in  production of l ig h te r ,  h igher- 
p rice  crude and in  p a rt by short-term  advances against fu tu re  revenues*(3 2 ,
The settlem ent was to  be fo r  one year only (iHOC had submitted the Fourth 
Plan requirements fo r  1969- 7 0 , 1970-7'* and 1971-72.) . There was no actual 
gearing of production to development needs as Iran  had demanded, th is  was 
l e f t  fo r fu tu re  consideration.
The Consortium settlem ent brought a sharp reaction  from the other o i l  
producers in  the Middle F a s t. Kuwait’s Crown Prince and Prime M in ister, 
Sheikh Ja b ir  al-Ahmed al-Sebah, warned the o i l  companies th a t  “an increase 
in  their-p roduction  in. o ther areas a t the expense of . . . .  o i l  production" 
in  h is country, "vdll make i t  necessary to  reconsider th e i r  concessionary 
agreements." (33) And I ra q 's  M in ister of Oil and M inerals, Dr. Rashid A1 
R ifa i , in  a statement to  the I ra q i News Agency-on May 17tho 19^9j declared 
"we sh a ll not*-tolerate an increase in  the production of any country at the 
expense of Arab o il  output in  the region as a whole, or a t the expense of 
I ra q i  o i l  in  p a r t ic u la r ."  (34) Saudi-Arabia’s Oil M inister Sheikh Yaiaani 
had made h is country’ s in te re s ts  c lea r a year before " i f  we see th a t the 
o i l  companies have allowed o ther governments to  in te r fe re  with the  fre e  
play (o f economic forces) v is -a -v is  Saudi of f t  alee le v e ls , we w ill  a t once 
move to  safeguard our interests© " (35)
I t  was c lea r to both Iran  and the  Consortium th a t  a re p e tit io n  of such 
a move, so openly, would cause a great deal of troub le  fo r  the companies, 
and OPEC©- In  the event the Iran ian  production rose by over 18 percent in  
1970 and 20 percent in  197  ^» "but since these increased offtakes seemed to  
be in  lin e  with increased Saudi Arabian and Kuwaiti o fftak es , and since the; 
were thought to  be of the  f re e  choice of the  Consortium, th e re  was 210 major 
trouble with the other OPEC members©
The Snd of the Oil P roration  Proposals
The o i l  p ro ra tion  proposals were never o f f ic ia l ly  abandoned, but they' 
were qu ie tly  dropped by the OPEC©- The reso lu tions of the  eleventh confer­
ence of OPEO, held in  Vienna in  A p ril 1 9 6 6 , made no d irec t mention cf the
33® H3ES -  May 23rd* 1969 
34« i*den
35. KBES -  A pril 5th© 19^8,
o i l  p ro ra tion  and th e re a f te r  no reference was made to  i t  at OPEC conference
Why was the o i l  p ro ra tion  programme not successful ? We know th a t  the 
in s ta b i l i ty  of commodity exports had led  producers of co ffee , sugar, t i n  
etc©, to  en ter in to  producers c a r te ls  of ’In te rn a tio n a l Commodity Agree­
ments 11 • Some of these c a r te ls  proved to  be successfu l, while others fa ile d  
to  achieve th e i r  objectives© O il however, i s  not s t r i c t l y  comparable to  
other raw m aterials* Because of the  lack of su b s titu te s  fo r  i t  and because 
of the  r is in g  demand fo r  products during the 19^0 ’s ,  the creation  of an o il  
p rom t ion programme seems to  have been th e o re tic a lly  fe a s ib le . But the 
p ro ra tion  programme was ill-conce ived  from the beginning® I t  was based on 
the American p ro ration  programme without talcing in to  consideration  th a t 
the Middle East s i tu a tio n  was not su itab le  fo r  proration* In  th e  United 
S ta te s , because of the  problem of jo in t-re se rv o irs  and the subsequent wast 
age of gas and loss of pressure necessary fo r  the l i f t i n g  of crude, the * 
government had provided s ta tu to ry  regu lations fo r  c rea tin g  a quota system 
amongst the producers. The Federal Government was able to  supervise and 
enforce proration  by leg a l means. (3 6) In  the Middle B ast, there  was no 
problem of jo in t-re se rv o il 's , no wastage of gas and no lo ss of pressure 
through over-production© . And more im portant, no s ta tu to ry  means of enforc­
ing the  proration© The producing countries were independent s ta te s ,  each 
try in g  to  gain fo r  th e i r  country the maximum b en efit from th e i r  n a tu ra l 
resources© The inherent c o n flic t between the producers was based on th e ii  
d if fe re n t so c ia l systems and p o l i t ic a l  and economic objectives© Ira n P the 
only non-Arab s ta te  among the Middle Eastern producing countries was press- 
i nSfcr hieher production and la rg e r  revenues to  c a te r  fo r  i t s  development 
expenditure, while some of the other stakes, with few o u tle ts  fo r  th e i r  
vast income could a ffo rd  to  reduce th e i r  offtake in -a n tic ip a tio n  of h igher 
prices© The re s u l t  was complete f a i lu re ,  not only fo r  the o i l  p ro ra tio n  
idea  but fo r  OPSG itse lf©  I t  s p l i t  the rank of producing nations because 
i t  was the issue  th a t Indicated  the c o n flic tin g  in te re s ts  of the  members 
most© The abandonment of the  p ro ration  programme pleased a l l  the  p a r t ie s  
producers, (except Venezuela) and the  comapnies©
360 For a good discussion see: J© Hartshorn o p .c it .  and S© Schurr, "The U. i  
O il Co.nserv a tio n" Resources fo r  Future In c .,  U.S.A. 19 6 8©
The 1971 Increases in  Posted Prices^1... 1 «.    r ... . r ! ^  . *|| 11 ii , -m- m > i » m r n  mrnim irrrw
The 1971 Tehran and T ripo li Agreements, which brought about the f i r s t  
increase in  the posted p rices fo r  ten  years, had a twofold sign ificance, 
f i r s t l y  they ind icated  a s h if t  in  the  balance of power in  the country/ 
company re la tio n sh ip  of the o i l  producing regions, and secondly, they 
united  the  ranks of OPEC members which had been s p l i t  by the o i l  p ro ration  
programme* The creation  of OPEC in  i 960 was a d irec t consequence of the 
f a l l in g  trend  of posted p rices; i t  put a stop to  th is  declin ing trend  and. 
s ta b ilis e d  p rices fo r  a decade*
In  1970, the demand fo r  petroleum throughout the world reg is te red  an 
unusually f a s t  growth* While the growth in  the demand fo r  petroleum prod­
ucts was 6 to 7 percent a year in  the  la s t  h a lf of the  1 9 6 0*3 , in  the  f i r s t  
s ix  months of 1970 i t  was 9®4 percent above the  corresponding period in  
I 9690 The unusually cold w inter fu rth e r  contributed to a r is e  in  demand* 
Tap lin e  ( 37) carrying 500,000 b a rre ls  per day, was blown by P a les tin ian  
g u e rr illa s  in  May 1970 and the Syrian Government refused to have i t  repaid 
edo Tanker fre ig h t ra te s  Increased anj-the closizre of the  Suez Canal made 
Western Europe more dependent on the low-sulphur Libyan oil* The new revo]
u tionary  government of Libya, which had toppled King Id r is  in  1969s- decidec
th a t i t  was in  the public in te re s t  to  enforce a voluntary cut-back of prod­
uction  so as to  avoid over exp lo ita tion  and consequent exhaustion of o i l  
resources* The Libyan announcement came four days a f te r  the Tap l in e  was 
put out of action* Since Libya supplied around one-quarter of the ’Western 
European supplies, the  cut-back in  production threatened an energy c r i s i s  
in  Western Europe* For the f i r s t  time in  h is to ry , the  in te rn a tio n a l o i l  
industry  was witnessing a sudden transform ation of the  buyers.* market in to  
a se llers*  market, with energy supplies showing signs of becoming scarce* 
The energy squeeze in  the  United S ta tes was described by John Emerson, 
energy economist of the Chase Manhattan Bank, as:
,!The tig h te s t  energy squeeze i t  ( th e  United S ta tes) ever exper­
i e n c e d * . with a decline in  the trend  of new discoveries and 
the dwindling U.S. petroleum reserves, imports must n ecessa rily  
r i s e * t h e  energy c r i s i s ,  fo r  i t  i s  not so H y a n  o i l  c r i s i s ,
37® Tapline c a rries  Saudi Arabian o i l  to  IIediteranean Ports,
155
stems from two fa c to rs : one i s  the lack -  or s h o r t f a l l  of n a tu ra l 
gas, su ff ic ie n t to  fu e l industry  and commercial e s ta b lish m e n ts»«, 
< •«. o. the  second hurdle i s  the cu rren t demand for* iov/ sulphur* 
conte:rt fu e l o il"  (33) •
The United S ta tes was becoming more dependent on the import of Middle 
Eastern, or Libyan o i l ,  while the an ti-p o lu tio n  lobby was urging th e  use of 
low sulphur content o i l  « the  same kind of o i l  which was to  be found in  
la rg e  q u an titie s  in  Libya0 Libya* s p o sitio n  was strengthened by the  fa c t 
th a t  because of the  closure of the  Suez Canal, and the inadequacy of the 
long-hc.ul tanker tra n sp o rt, th ere  was no p o s s ib i l i ty  of tempting another 
producer to  o ffse t the gap created  by the Libyan cut-back* The f i r s t  
company to  be ordered to  cut-back on i t s  production was the O ccidental 
Petroleum Company o -Here Libya showed ta c t i c a l  su b tle ty  by p u ttin g  pressure 
on a company which was in  a r e la t iv e ly  weak position?, O ccidental Petroleum: 
an 1-meric an independent had no other source of foreign crude except Lib'jaandthe'k'' 
company was thus p a r t ic u la r ly  vulnerable to  any production cut-baclc measur­
es* L ater the r e s t r ic t io n  orders were extended to  four e ther companies, 
vtith the r e s u lt  th a t by mid-September 1970, production had been reduced by 
nearly  800,000 b a rre ls  per day* Libya made i t  c le a r  to  the  companies th a t 
an increase  of a t le a s t  A0 cents per b a rre l  would be the  p rice  fo r  l i f t i n g  
the  production re s tr ic tio n s*  Libya* s action  le d  to  an increase  of 30 cents 
per b a r re l  by O ccidental, 13* P« and others in  September* The p ric e s  of a l l  
Arab crude passing to  M editerranean p o rts  was also ra ise d  simultaneously* 
Libya*s ac tion  created  an opportunity fo r  the  Persian  G-ulf producers,'which 
accounted fo r  nearly  30 percent of t o t a l  world production* I t  was agreed 
th a t  the  Persian  G-ulf s ta te s , or the moderates, should make a separate  s e t t ­
lement from those of the so -ca lled  m ilita n ts , or the M editerranean producer 
namely Libya and Algeria* The Persian G-ulf S ta tes  nego tia tion  was taken 
over personally  by the  Shah with the  approval of the other Gulf s ta tes*
On December 9th* 1970, 0P3C*s twenty f i r s t  conference opened in  Caracas* 
This conference passed the im portant R esolution XXI©1 20, the most coF.prehen- 
sive  as well as e ffec tiv e  measure so f a r  taJcen by the orgainzation  fo r  a t t ­
a in ing  i t s  fundamental objectives of p rice  restoration®  Tho re so lu tio n
38* Magazine of Wall S tre e t September 2oth0 1970, quoted in  3?® Rouhani op* 
c ite  P*5o
declared th a t member countries should take steps to  a t ta in  the  following 
objectives:
1 o  ^To es tab lish  55 percent as the  minimum ra te  of tax a tio n  on net income 
of the  o i l  companies operating in  member countries;
2e To elim inate ex is tin g  d is p a r i t ie s  in  posted or tax -reference  p rices  of 
the crude oil; in  the member countries, on the basis of the highest 
posted p rice  applicable in  member countries -  talcing in to  consideration 
d ifferences in  g rav ity  and geographical loca tion  and any appropriate 
escala tion  in  the  fu tu re  years; . . .
3o To e s tab lish  a uniform, general increase in  the  posted or ta x -re f  erence 
p rices  in  a l l  member countries to  r e f le c t  the general improvement in  
the conditions of the  in te rn a tio n a l petroleum market; • .
ho To adopt a new system fo r  the adjustment of g rav ity  d if f e r e n t ia l  of 
posted or ta x -re f  erence p rices on the basis of 0 o15  cents per b a rre l  
fo r  0.1° API fo r  crude o i l  of 40© 0° API and below, and 0©20 cents per . 
b a rre l  per 0 d °  API fo r  crude o i l  of 40©1° API and above;
5 * To elim inate completely the  allowance granted to  o i l  companies, as from 
January I 9 7 I (these  allowances include discounts from posted p rice  fo r  
marketing etc*)*,
Resolution XXI©120, expressly provided th a t countries with s im ila r geograph­
ic a l  locations* namely the Persian Gulf states*  may separa te ly  nego tia te  a 
deal with the-companies© A committee of experts from the Gulf s ta te s  was 
to  repo rt back to OPEC w ithin 31 'days (12th© January i 97^) any re s u lts  of 
the progress made w ithin the negotiations© T hereafter w ith in  f i f te e n  days 
an extraordinary meeting of the  organisation was to  be convened to  evaluate 
the re s u lts  of the  negotiations* I f  the re s u lts  were found u n sa tis fac to ry , 
the organization would se t out procedures and aim a t enforc5.ng u n ila te ra l ly ,  
the organization1s objectives through concerted and simultaneaous action©
In  Resolution 122 of the same conference, OPEC noted th a t any nego tia tion  
must take in to  account the d e te rio ra tin g  e ffec t of in f la tio n  in  in d u s tr ia l­
ized  countries, on the purchasing power of member co u n tries1 o i l  revenues 
and resolved th a t posted p rices should be adjusted to  r e f le c t  in f la tio n a ry  
charges© The reso lu tion  pointed out th a t the r e a l  value of the d o lla r  had
fa l le n  by 27 percent since 1 whi l e the p rices of manuf actured a r t ic le s  
imported from Western countries had r ise n  by 35 percent since 1950<»
The reac tion  of the companies v^ as th a t of i n i t i a l  shock and d is b e lie f , 
To f ig h t 0P3C they closed th e i r  ranks and. continued to  r e s i s t  the-unpreced­
ented demands of OPEC© In  th e ir  actions they were strongly  backed by theii 
parent governments end by the governments of other major consuming nations, 
Indeed, the 13. S* 'Government joined with the Governments of Great B r ita in , 
France, West Germany, The Netherlands, I ta ly ,  Sweden, and Japan in  a unitec 
diplomatic fro n t to  back the companies© The U.S. Attorney Gei o ra l, with 
the approval of President Nixon, decided to  waive-'the a n t i - t r u s t  laws- of 
the U .S ., to-allow  the .major o i l  companies to  combine against OPEC. The o: 
companiespsked fo r  negotiations and a "global pact" 'with aid  the members ci 
OPEC © T heir in sis ten ce  on co llec tiv e  bargaining was a f a r  cry from th e ir  
a tt i tu d e  in  1962 , when they ca teg o rica lly  refused to  comply w ith OPEC5 s 
decision to  conduct negotiations with them c o llec tiv e ly  in  the name of a l l  
members© The companies’ argument was th a t regional nego tiations would meai 
th a t the more m ilitan t members, namely I r a  a, Libya and A lgeria  would obtaii 
b e tte r  terms# This would lead to  "leap-frogging" and the  process could go
ton in d e fin ite ly  under the th re a t of cu tting  off the supplies© Negotiations 
began on i 2th* -January .1971 $ (the  i n i t i a l  OPEC deadline) and ended 011 
January 2 'lst, when the companies agreed to drop th e i r  in s is ten c e  on a 
"global pact" and instead  agreed to  a "regional pact" i f  th e  OPEC assured 
them th a t there  .would be no ’leap-frogging” -  th a t i s  to say, th a t no rsg io 2 
would ask fo r  any add itional concessions because the  companies y ielded  more 
in  other regions. A f in a l  deadline of 3rd© February i 97  ^ was se t by OPEC© 
But no re s u lts  were a tta in ed  in  the negotiations# The companies had sa id  
th a t  the producing countries* specific  demands were too d ra s tic  and the 
deadline was too stringent© An extraordinary  meeting of OPEC was convened 
on 3rd© February, and a fou rth  and f in a l  ultimatum v/as issued  in  Resolutioi
XXII©131:
"Each member country exporting o i l  from Gulf term inals sh a ll  
introduce on Fenruary 15th#, the necessary le g a l and (or) 
le g is la tiv e  measures fo r  the implementation of the  objective'! 
embodied in  Resolution XXI©120«”
In  the  evont of a fa i lu re  to  reach nego tiation  by February Ipth© the 
member coun tries, including the other regions "sh a ll take appropriate meas»
u res , including the t o t a l  embargo on shipments of crude o i l  and petroleum 
products by such company”o The biggest fe a r  of the companies was c o lle c tiv  
l e g i s la t io n  Since the  le g is la tio n  could not be undone, not only would 
they have to comply with i t ,  but th is  would also se t a precedent" in  the 
country/company re la tionsh ip* ' On February 1 2tho the  companies agreed to 
comply fu l ly  with a l l  OPEC * s demands*
OPEC’s Case fo r  an Increase in  Posted P rices
OPSC*s case fo r  an increase in  posted p rices was presented by the 
Shah, who led  the negotiations on behalf of the  s ix  Persian Gulf s ta te s c(3S 
The four ch ief poin ts can be summarised as fo llo w s:-
a) The widening of the poverty gap between the r ic h  and the poor nations 
would requix’e a concession in  terms of in te rn a tio n a l trade  by the  developed 
nations to the under-developed coun tries , as se t out in  various UNCTAD 
(United Nations Conference on Trade and Development) resolutions* Y/hat the 
developing countries -  in  th is  case the OPSC members -  needed most was not 
a id  but trade*. By tra d e , these countries implied a so rt of diguised a id  
through trade: in  e ffe c t, by ra is in g  the p rices  of th e i r  exposes re la tiv e  
to  imports they would improve th e i r  terms of trade* (40) This was basic  all 
a humanitarian appeal, much repeated in  the  U,N* c irc le s  p a r t ic u la r ly  
since I 96O0
b) The consumer governments’ tax  po licy  was another pcfcentially esplosive 
argument * The large le v e l of taxes lev ied  by the consumer governments on 
o i l  products compared to  the  income tax  received by the producing govern­
ments, i s  an issue  which has been brought up 021 many occasions* In  1 9 ^7 , 
the  ty p ic a l breakdown of m o to r-sp irit in  Western Europe was as follows:(ip*,
Production costs 2o J/O
Refining 3c3^
Transportation
D istrib u tio n  and Marketing 2 6 oOyo
O il Company net p ro f i ts 6*3/i>
O il Producer’s share 7*9;*
Consumer Government’s taxes * 47o5;«
.1 :
W a «i «sw *11*1
1C0o0/J
3 9 * Shahanshah of iran  on Oil op.cit*  Also press conference Jan*21th* 1971 
40* fo r  a discussion on aid versus trade  see F, Fesharaki LI,A. D isse rta tio n
ODoCit,
41 * R« Sanghavi !llran : Destiny of O il” p .11 Trans o rien t Books London 1971
JL Vf kJ
( in  the United Kingdom the lev e l o f taxes i s  on average over 60 percent)
The '0P3C government.fs were asking fo r an equal share of the taxes compared 
to those o f the consumer governments, But th e i r  demand ra is e s  complex 
problems. The consumer governments are  e n ti t le d  to  ra is e  th e i r  taxes to  
anv lev e l thev wish. This i s  an in te rn a l f i s c a l  measure ?/hich should be of 
no concern to foreign governments. The companies a re , of course, qu ite  
powerless in  in fluencing  the domestic tax  po licy  of consumer governments. 
Also, the taxes lev ied  on products by the consumer governments are not 
comparable to the OPEC taxes. The former involves no foreign  exchange 
component, while the l a t t e r  i s  a foreign  exchange payment a ffe c tin g  the 
balance o f  payments of the consuming country. C learly the OPEC countries 
should have d irec ted  th e i r  a ttack  towards the consumer governments and not 
the companies. OPEC members strongly  objected to the statem ents made in  the 
Western press th a t they were responsible fo r  the h irh  p rices  o f petroleum 
products. They argued th a t i f  the consumer governments f e l t  th a t the p e tro l­
eum product p rices  were too high they should reduce th e i r  own taxes.
c) The r is e  in  the p rice  o f manufactured goods, coupled with the s ta n d s t i l l  
in  the crude p rice s , meant th a t .the re a l purchasing power of the producer 
governments declined d ra s t ic a lly . The Shah declared th a t in  the 1960-70 
period the cost of l iv in g  went up by 3 9 .7  percent in  the U.K. and 24*9 
percent in  the. United S ta te s , while the purchasing power o f the U.S. d o lla r  
declined by 2-7 percent. (4 2 )
d) The increase  in  the p rice  of petroleum products during the 1960-70 
s ta n d s t i l l  o f posted p rices  was not passed on to  the producer governments.
In  the U.K. fo r  example, the p rice  o f m o to r-sp irit was ra ised  by one pence, 
per gallon on 3rd. November, 1970 and by a fu r th e r  1.5 pence per gallon  on 
31st. December, 1970. This meant an increase o f 87.5 cents per b a rre l which 
may be compared to 83 cents per b a rre l th a t Iran  received from the Consortium 
in  1970. Between August and December 1970, the p rice  o f o i l  products rose in  
the o ther Western European countries* as follows:
In nine Western European countries, excluding I ta lv  -  86jt per b a rre l .
In  ten  Western European countries including  I ta ly  -  74^ per b a rre l .
In  the United S ta tes the o i l  companies ra ised  the price  o f crude o i l  by
25)25 per b a rre l in  1970, while in  Japan the p rices  rose bv 22f, per b a rre l  in
October 1970, and 12^ ! per barre l on the 1 st, January 1 9 7 1 .( 4 5 )  __________
42. The Shah’s press conference, o p .o it . 
4 3 * ib id .
The OPEC arguments were based on th e i r  b e lie f  th a t the p rice  increases 
re f le c te d  e ith e r  an increase in  taxes of the cons inner governments or the 
companies' in ten tio n  to radse th e ir  p ro fits*  However, i t  i s  quite possible 
th a t those p rice  increases re f le c te d  higher labour and equipment c o sts , 
though i t  i s  hard to  a sce rta in  the extent to which the increase in  the 
p rice  of petroleum products re fle c ted  the increase in  costs*
The companies' case res ted  on th ree  arguments: f i r s t l y ,  the  contents
cf the  concession terms must be respected according to  in te rn a tio n a l lav/, 
secondly, they were not responsible fo r  e ith e r  the tax  p o licy  of the  con­
sumer government or fo r  the r is e  in  the p rice  of .manufactured goods, and
f in a l ly ,  the p rice  increase had re f le c te d  the increase in  th e i r  operating 
expenses* The companies fea red 'leap -frogg ing” by the  various OPEC groups, 
but the Shah assured them th a t the Persian Gulf s ta le s  would not ask fo r  
b e tte r  terms i f  more favourable terms were granted to  the m ilita n t fac tions 
of OPEC (Libya, A lgeria etc*)* Further, the Shah assured the  companies 
secu rity  of supply fo r  the next f iv e  years and promised th a t the  government 
would not ask fo r  a rev is ion  in  the s tru c tu re  of the posted p rice  u n t i l
1 975* As i t  turned out th is  pledge proved to  be short-lived*
Terms of the Settlement
The terms of th e  settlem ent complied closev with the OPEC demands as
se t out in  R esolu tion 's 120 and 1 220 The ra te  of income ta x  was increased
by 5 percent to  55 percent; the posted p rices of the  Persiaii Gulf region
•were ra ise d  by a uniform 35 cents per b a r re l ,  which included 2 cents per
b a rre l  in  settlem ent of fre ig h t d isp a r it ie s ;  each of the companies would
make a 2o5 percent upward adjustment to  posted p rices  fo r  in f la tio n  on June
1st* 1971* and on the f i r s t  of January 1973 through 1975o In  add ition , the
companies agreed, to  increase the  crude posted p rices  by 5 cents per b a rre l
on June 1 s t. 1971> th e re a f te r  an increase of 5 cents per b a rre l  was to  be
added annually on the f i r s t  of January 1973/>through 1975« to  r e f le c t  increa
ing demand fo r crude o i l  during the agreement* From the e ffec tiv e  date
of the agreement crude o i l  was to be posted in  the Persian  Gulf under a
0 onew system, of g rav ity  d iffe ren tia ls*  For crude o i l  between 40 and 30 API
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grav ity , each present posted p rice  was to  be increased.by. 0©5/ per b a rre l  
fo r  each f u l l  degree. A ll the discounts and allowances were to  be elim in­
ated©
The Shah, and not OPEC i t s e l f ,  had pressed fo r  a system of lin k in g  the 
crude p rices to  an index of in te rn a tio n a l comodity prices© This was in  fac  
recommended by the U©N. fo r  countries exporting primary commodities© This 
objective however, was not achieved© the 2o5 percent upward adjustment 
fo r  in f la tio n  was c le a r ly  not enough to  s ta b iliz e  the  purchasing power of 
crude oil© But in  view of the su b s ta n tia l and continuous increases in  the  
posted p r ic e s , th is  point was not pressed©
In  re tu rn  fo r  th e i r  agreement, the concessionaires were assured of s ta  
b i l i t y  in  the flow of crude o i l  fo r  f iv e  years© No more f in a n c ia l  demands 
were to  be made by the Persian Gulf s ta te s ,  and no th re a t of embargo was to  
be ra ised  by the producing s ta te s 0
At the same time, Libya and A lgeria declared th a t the  outcome of th e ' 
Tehran Agreement did not even meet Libya1 s minimum requirements© An agree­
ment was eventually  signed on A pril 2nd© 1971 o The terms of the  T rip o li
Agreement were su b s ta n tia lly  above those of the  Tehran Agreement© Although 
th is  chapter does not in tend to  sp e c if ic a lly  deal with the T rip lo i Agreeznen* 
we might mention e, few of the terms achieved by Libya:
a) An increase in  posted p rices of around 90 cents per* barrel©
b) An increase of 7$ in  posted p rices (compared to  5$  in  the  Persian  
G-ulf) to r e f le c t  the world demand fo r  oil©
c) An add itional surcharge of per b a rre l  on top of the 55 percent
income tax©
d) Compulsary re-investm ent of the companies* net p r o f i t  in  Libya 
fo r  fu rth er exploration during the fiv e -y ea r period© (Ail*) ■
The impact of the Tehran Agreement wa.s very small indeed on the o i l  
product prices© An increase in  the posted p rice  by 35 cents per b a r re l  
meant th a t the  governments wore receiv ing  19 cents per b a r re l  more than they
wjn i>»nr»i J~ni©i»Kir iiMi i <i r i i n  m n  i mu « r i  hi T—i t t t  t  i—-— irr T’*-~T •-r~"lm i r  ■* in  -  t  i m run ■ tin m» ■■■#«© m m i n n »  amwn w i m  ilm iii»< i»»  .m>>+ wnii*i ■ «i» ».© »i© n m  niMirnrrrrmru—  n f  m n »  *  ■UnrTnrfirn*-
43© Por d e ta ils  of the Tehran and T rip o li Agreements see: a.) O il Trade Pres; 
Petroleum Press Service, Petroleum Times and the Petroleum In te llig en ce  
Yfeekly, p a rtic u la rly  see P e tro l Press Service, January March, A p ril, June & 
December, 1971c b) P© Rouhani opec i t  c^TJ^ OPEG Resolutions XXXI©131 & 132©
did. before© This 19 cents re f le c te d  the 55 percent income ta x  received 
by OPEC members© In  e ffe c t the  increase would have ra ised  the product 
p rices  by 0©5^  per im perial gallon , i©e0 an increase of h a lf  an old pence 
per gallon in  the U.K© Table 6 ©2 shows the change in  the p rices  of crude 
o i l  in  the Persian Gulf u n t i l  1975* taking into consideration the  e ffe c t 
of the various poin ts of the agreement, while Table 6©3 compares the  Tehra 
with the T rip lo i Agreement®
•Table 6. 2
E ffect of the Tehran Agreement on The Persian Gulf P rices
- (Cents per Barrel)
API Gravity 
Ds^x*00s*
Price Producing Countries 
Revenues..
- Previous June 1st Jan 1st Jan 1st Jan 1st As June 1st Increase
1971 1973 1974 1975 1971 over
previous
27 147 205.9 216.1 226.5 237.1 1 1 3 .8 42.8
31 159 218.7 22 9 .2 239.9 250.9 121.6 45.0
34 180 228.5 239.2 2 5 0 . 1 , 261.4 127.5 4 0 .0
41 195 240.7 25 1 .7 262.9 274.4 134.8 36.7
Source: F, Rouhani op.cit«  P .18
Table 6.3
Comparison of the E ffects o.f Tehran and T r i p o l i  Agreements
(Cents per Barrel)
Pates Q atari(Persian Gulf) Libyan 40 Difference J u s ti f ie d Remain-
40 degree crude degree crude in  p rices d ifference/ \ d i f f e r ­(a) ences (b)
P rio r to
September 1970 193 . 223 - 30 35 -  5
September 1970 193 253 60 35 25
January 1971 193: 255 62 35 27 .
February 1971 228 255 27 35 -  8
March 1971 228 345 117 35 82
a) Includes Freight saving and premium fo r low surplus o i l .
b) This i s  achieved by tough and m ilita n t bargaining.
Source ; ib id . P .25
Summary and Conclusion
OPEC was created i n i t i a l l y  as an instrument fo r the s ta b il iz a tio n  
of crude o il  p rices , very much in  lin e  with an in te rn a tio n a l commodity 
agreement fo r exporters of raw m ateria ls of the Third World,
Because of the very nature of o il  the OPEC members were placed in  a strong 
s itu a tio n  from the beginning, unlike sugar or coffee which the Western 
economies could possibly do without, o i l  was e sse n tia l fo r the running 
of the 'in d u s tria l economies of the West.
The f i r s t  few years o f OPECfs l i f e  proved to be in e ffe c tiv e , but 
the issue  of royalty  expensing provided a "cause" fo r u n if ic a tio n  among the 
o i l  producers. The OPEC members won the agreement of the c ompanies on the 
issue  of royalty  expensing, but had to concede th e ir  claim fo r the re s to r­
a tio n  of pre-1960 Posted p rice s .
There was, however, an inherent c o n flic t of in te re s t  among the 
members. Some m ilita n t Arab S tates wanted to use th e ir  o i l  against the 
Western World in  revenge fo r th e ir  support of Israel*  The OPEC members, were 
a heterogeneous lo t ,  they d iffe red  in  p o l i t ic a l  ideology, s iz e , population, 
and the degree of economic development, Some members were able to  go 
without the o i l  revenues fo r some time, while others were extremely 
dependent on o i l  revenues fo r the running of th e ir  economies.
The issue of o il  p roration  brought th is  co n flic t in to  the open, Iran  was 
asking fo r higher production and revenues to pay fo r i t s  development plans, 
while Venezuela, argued fo r a unanimous reduction in  production ra te s .
The A rab -Israe li War of 19^7 and the subsequent stoppage of o i l  flow from 
the Arab S tates to the West J  did not stop Iran  from stepping up her 
production to  o ffse t the reduced supply. The o il p ro ra tio n  programme 
was u n o ff ic ia lly  abandoned by OPEC, but p z t  the ranks of the OPEC remained 
s p l i t .
The 1971» Tehran and T rip lo i Agreements were s ig n if ic a n t in  two resp ec ts . 
They closed the ranks of OPEC once again, while r e v ita l iz in g  the issue  of 
re s to ra tio n  of pre-19o0 p rice s . An issue which lay  a t  the heart of the 
creation  of OPEC,
The Tehran Agreement was‘a great success. I f  provided fo r  a large  
i n i t i a l  increase in Posted p rices , with provisions fo r  fu tu re  increases.
I t  included an allowance fo r  in f la tio n  and the increased demand fo r  o i l  
products® I t  ra ised  the income tax  to  33 percent and s e t t le d  the dispute 
on g rav ity  d i f f e r e n t ia ls „
Moreover*;, t h e  T ehran  and T r i p o l i  A g reem en ts  p r o v id e d  f o r  a  s i g n i f i c a n t  
s h i f t  o f  p ow er from  t h e  consum er t o  th e  producer®  The i n t e r n a t i o n a l  o i l  
m arket c e a s e d  t o  h e  a  b u y ers*  m arket end h ad  b een  tr a n s fo r m e d  i n t o  a  s e l l ­
e r s ’ market® H ow ever, t h e  in h e r e n t  c o n f l i c t  o f  i n t e r e s t  among t h e  OPEC 
members rem a in s and i t  w i l l  no d oub t r e a p p ea r  i n  an y  f u t u r e  c o n f r o n t a t io n  
v d th  t h e  com panies®  B u t i f  OPEC i s  t o  s u c c e e d  i t  w i l l  h ave t o  make a r r a n g ­
em ents s o  t h a t  t h e  o r g a n is a t io n  n e g o t i a t e s  w ith  t h e  'c o m p a n ie s , t h e  b ro a d  
and g e n e r a l  i s s u e s ,  l e a v i n g  t h e  d e t a i l s  t o  b e  w orked o u t b y  i n d i v i d u a l  
memberso
The b a r g a in in g  p ow er o f  t h e  OPEC members i s  t o t a l l y  d ep en d en t on t h e i r  . 
j o i n t  a ctio n ®  T h ere  i s  no dom inant member i n  t h i s  s o - c a l l e d  ’’c o l l u s i v e  
o l i g o p o l y ’* e x c e p t  p o s s i b l y  'Sau d i A r a b ia ,  t h e r e f o r e  demand, i s  r e l a t i v e l y  
e l a s t i c  f o r  a n y  in d i v i d u a l  c o u n tr y  0 T hat i s  t o .  s a y ,  i f  o n e ' i n d i v id u a l  
c o u n tr y  in c r e a s e d  i t s - p r i c e s  u n i l a t e r a l l y ,  o r  c u t  b a ck  i t s  p r o d u c t io n ,  t h i s  
l o s s  c o u ld  b e  s u p p l ie d  from  o th e r  sou rces®  The to ta d . m arket demand h ow ever  
i s  r e l a t i v e l y  i n e l a s t i c  around  th e  g o in g  l e v e l  o f  p r i c e s  ( t h a t  i s :  p r i c e  
in c r e a s e s  t e n d  t o  h a v e  a  l e s s  th a n  p r o p o r t io n a te  e f f e c t  on dem and, so  t h a t  
r e v e n u e s  w i l l  in c r e a s e  w ith  p r ic e s ) ®  I n  t h i s  k in d  o f  m arket s i t u a t i o n  th e  
b e n e f i t s  t o  t h e  p r o d u c e r s  from  group a c t io n ,  i s  c o n s id e r a b le ®  I f  t h e y  
s t i c k  t o g e t h e r  t h e y  can  ta k e  a d v a n ta g e  o f  th e  i n e l a s t i c  m arket demand c u rv e  
f o r  cru d e o i l  b y  r a i s i n g  p r i c e s  and th u s  reven ues®  F u r th e r m o r e , c o l l u s i o n  
i s  r e l a t i v e l y  e a s y  a s  t h e r e  a r e  o n ly  e le v e n  eixporters®  I n d e e d ,  i t  i s  n o t  
e v e n  n e c e s s a r y  f o r  t h e s e  c o u n t r ie s  t o  j o in  i n  a  group a c t i o n ,  p r o v id in g  
t h e  members a g r e e  t h a t  l o s s  from  one so u r c e  w ou ld  n o t  b e  p e r m it t e d  t o  b e  
made up from  o th e r  sou rces®
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CH&.PTBR SBVEH 
The Role of O il in  the Bconoiaio Development of Iran
m L - ^ .A 9 1 l
The purpose of th is  chapter i s  to  extend the analysis of chapter 3 
in  in v estig a tin g  the impact of o i l  on the economic development of Iran , 
to  the period 195^-71 <> ^he e sse n tia l to o ls  of analysis and the approach 
w ill  he sim ila r to  those of chapter 3<>
This chapter v&ll f i r s t  consider the f i s c a l  o r in d ire c t influences 
of the o i l  revenues through the "ordinary and "development" budgets„ Liite] 
the impact of the d irec t influences of the  o i l  industry  through forward 
and backward linkages vn.ll be discussed0
Ac The f i s c a l  Influences of the O il Revenues
The f i s c a l  influence of the o i l  revenues has a twofold e ffe c t on the 
Iran ian  economyo F ir s t ly ,  the o i l  revenues provide a source of income fo r  
the  government to  supplement i t s  own budgetary incomeo Secondly, the  o i l  
revenues are channelled through th e  Plan Organization (th e  Supreme Plauninj 
A uthority  of Iran) to  various development p ro je c ts»
I t  i s  necessary a,t the  outset to  define the  term " o i l  revenues" o Most 
of the contemporary economic and o f f ic ia l  pub lications do not include a l l '  
the components of o i l  income* (1) Also, the  d e fin itio n s  of o i l  revenue's - 
may vary from one government department to  another * III 00 i t s e l f  has con­
stru c ted  a tab le  which considers o i l  revenues received from various o i l  
companies, plus other items such as: NT.00 p ro f i t  tax , dividends, taxes
10 For instance see: a) J 0 Bharier opcCit* b) P ub lication  of the Economist 
In te llig en ce  Unit on Iran  and the Middle Bast O il, c) M* Sadri "Impact of
011 on Iran ian  Economy" Tehran 197"* e tc 0
Table 7.1
I r a n ia n  G overnm ent *s  Incom e from The O il I n d u s tr y
1969-1971 M illions of R ials (ITIOC C lassifica tio n )
D etails 1969 1970 1971
1. Income tax  paid by the Consortium 
Members’ Trading Companies 52201 60238 109869
2. Iran ian  Oil Operating Companies’ 
Income tax 1033 1190 1529 •
3 . "Stated Payments" a f te r  deduction of 
2$ General Reserve 16704 19278 29691
4 . Total Receipts from the Consortium 69938 80706 141089
5 . Income tax  re su ltin g  from the SIRIP 
Agreement 160 191 396
6 .Income tax re su ltin g  from the IPAC 
Agreement (Share of the 2nd. Party) 290 183 710
7 .Income tax  re su ltin g  from the IPAC 
Agreement (Share of NIOC) 636 541 1054
8. Income tax  re su ltin g  from the LAPCO 
Agreement (Share of the 2nd, Party) 342 1225 2203
9 . Income tax re su ltin g  from the LAPCO 
Agreement (Share of NIOC) 633 829 1127
10. Income tax re su ltin g  from the IMINCO 
Agreement (Share of the 2nd. Party) 44 180 258
11, Income tax re su ltin g  from the IMINCO 
Agreement (Share of NIOC) 59 288 456
12. NIOC P ro fit Tax .1077 1439 1948
13* NIOC Dividends 1000 1344 1523
14. Central Government & Municipal taxes 
on o il  fo r domestic consumption. 8749 9719 10823
15.Employees Income tax 834 861 1095
16.Contractors Income tax 954 910 805
17. Bonus a f te r  deducting 2fo General Reserve 75 75 75
18. Total payments in  m illions of R ials 84791 98491 163562
19. Total payments in  m illion  of U.S. 0 1116 1296 2152
20. Total payments in  m illions of Pounds 
S te rlin g . 4 6 6 . 541 899
Notes: a) 2yo General Reserve i s  held by NIOC.
b) SIRIP's Taxes are calcu lated  on the share of both p a r t ie s .  No
Division between the shares of the 1st. end 2nd. Party  i s
provided. _ , . ,Continued.« . . . . . . . . . . .
Table 7*1 continued.
Notes:
c) Contractors*and employees’ income tax i s  collected, by NIOC on 
behalf of the M inistry of Pinance.
d) The ra te  of exchange has been, assumed to  be 1 U.S. $ = 76 R ia ls , 
and 1 £ = 182 R ials.
e) The sharp r is e  in  1971 figures r e f le c t  the increase in  Posted p rices 
in  the Tehran Agreement.
Source:
NIOC Annual Reports. 1969-71•
l i t
on petroleum products and employeefs income t a x .  Table 7.1 provides a 
guide to 'th e  c la s s if ic a tio n  used by NIOC. The Plan Organization and \ 
the Central Bank of Iran  do not consider the in d ire c t b en e fits  of the ( 
o i l  industry  to the government, but instead  include sa les to  Eastern \j
Europe and Afghanistan. Indeed, th is  is  the reason why o i l  revenues as f 
shorn by NIOC w ill not always be equal to those of o ther government -dep­
artments.. Although one may consider th a t NIOC’s c la s s if ic a tio n  i s  the \
most appropriate, because i t  gives a more comprehensive p ic tu re  of the
o i l  revenues, the researcher i s  obliged to follow the Central Bank1s 
c la s s if ic a tio n , since a l l  the data about the sources and uses of the o il  ' 
revenues o rig ina te  from the l a t t e r  source.
«s
l e t  us now have a b r ie f  look a t the NIOC c la s s if ic a tio n  in  the
1969-1971 period, i f  only to  get an idea of the order of magnitude of
various components. Table 7.1 shows us th a t in  a l l  the three years, the 
la rg e s t component of the government o i l  income has been the taxes on the 
sa le  of o il  products in  the domestic market. These ind iv idual taxes 
constitu ted  between 6.5 to 10 percent of the to ta l  rece ip ts  from the 
petroleum secto r in  th is  period. NIOC’s domestic a c t iv i t ie s  (item s 12 *- 
16 inclusive) in  1971 provided for nearly  10 percent of the to ta l  o i l  
re c e ip ts , NIOC’s p ro f i t  tax and dividends were la rg e r than most of the 
tax payments accruing from the partnership  agreements. In  o ther words, 
NIOC’s domestic sa le  of o i l  products has, on i t s  own, been a major fa c to r  
in  supplying revenues fo r  the development expenditures of the country.
An important yardstick  fo r measuring the importance of o i l  
revenues to the Iran ian  economy, i s  the re la tiv e  share of th is  income in  
the to ta l  foreign exchange rece ip ts  of Iran . Table 7*2 provides such data 
fo r the 1957-1971 period. The rece ip ts  from the petroleum sec to r are com­
posed of the payments by the Consortium, partnership  agreements, bonuses 
and the purchase of r i a l s  by foreign o i l  companies. (2)
The receip ts  from the petroleum secto r have provided fo r 
between 50 to 80 percent of the to ta l  foreign exchange re c e ip ts  of Iran .
2, I t  may be of in te re s t  to consider the composition of the Consortium 
payments. They include income tax  by operating and trad ing  companies, 
purchase of r i a l s  by the Consortium, and the ro y a ltie s  or s ta te d  payments. 
For a breakdown of these payments in  the 1967-71 period see Appendix 
Table A-7.1.
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| But there are ind ications th a t despite the growing o i l  revenues, the 
| dependence of the country on th is  single source of foreign- exchange has 
/ heen declin ing. This may he in te rp re ted  as an ind ication  of the economic
V health  of the country. „In the la te  1960’s, the o i l  secto r accounted fo r 
f  over 50 percent of the to ta l  rece ip ts , with the Consortium representing
nearly  90 percent of the rece ip ts  from the petroleum sec to r. The second 
I la rg est source of foreign exchange has heen the inflow of long term and 
short term c a p ita l coming from p riv a te  investo rs , in te rn a tio n a l agencies 
I such as IMF' and IBRD, and loans from the foreign governments. The th ird  
| la rg est item is  the export of non-oil goods and serv ices, providing around
V  20 percent of the to ta l  rece ip ts  of the country. The. share of these non­
o i l  exports has heen re la tiv e ly  steady.since 1960; goods always had a 
la rg e r share than serv ices.
The sources of the government’ s o i l  revenues and th e ir  ro le  in  
the to ta l  foreign exchange earnings of Iran  having'heen estab lished , we 
can consider the way in  which these o i l  revenues were spent and th e ir  
impact on the Iranian  economy. The Iranian  budget can he broadly divided 
in to  two sub-divisionss
1, The "ordinary" or current account budget, which in d ica te s  the
government disbursements fo r  the running of the country. The
• ' ordinary budget embodies the so ca lled  "special budget" which
caters  fo r  the expenditures of the nationalized  in d u s tr ie s .
2, The "development" or c ap ita l budget,'which shows the public 
investment in  development p ro jec ts , through the Plan Organization 
in  various development plans.
The development budget i s  the.most important fac to r in  stim ulating  the 
economic development of the country and the ra t io  of these two budgets - 
over the to ta l  o i l  revenues ind ica tes the trend of the government s tra te g  
Table 7*3 ind ica tes the change in  the a tt i tu d e  of the government, with 
regard to the developmental expenditure . In  1963* a t the s t a r t  of the 
Third Development Plan, the" Plan Organization received 58 percent of the 
o i l  revenues, while th is  share has been more than 75 percent, on average, 
since 1965,
The ordinary budget has l i t t l e  bearing on d irec t investment by the 
government on 'the development p ro jec ts , but I t  may be in te re s tin g  to  looi
17i)
Table 7 .5
Division of the Oil Revenues Between The 
Treasury General and The
11
Year ^evenues Share of Treasury General Share of the Plan.
B illion  R ials B illions R ials of Total Organisation
B ill .R ls . /» of Total
1965 27.7 11.4 .41.2$' 16.5 58.^
1964 56.4 14.1 58.7 22.5 61.5
1965 50.0 (a) 12.4 24.8 57.6 75.2
1966 47.4 15.5 ' 28.1 54.1 71.9
1967 54.0 14.5 26.8 59.5 75.2
1968 61.8 15.0 (c) 24.5 46.8 (d) 75.7
1969 70.0 (b) 14.7 21.0 55.4 79.0
1970 85.8 17.6 21.0 66 e 2 79.0
1971 150.5 (a) 54.0 22.6 116.5 77.4
a) Includes o i l  bonus es of 10.5 Rls. b ill io n , and 5.5 Rls. b i l l io n  :
1965 and 1971.
h) Excludes R ls ,6,5 b il l io n  advance payment by the Consortium.
c) Includes Rls. 2 b i l l io n  tra n s fe r  from the Plan Organization o i l
. revenues fo r the implementation of the new c iv i l  code.
d) Excludes Rls. 2 b i l l io n  mentioned in  c),
Source;, The Central Bank of Iran , -Annual Reports and Balance Sheets 
1968 -  1971.
b r ie f ly  a t the composition of the ordinary budget as se t  out in  Table 7*4 
.for the 1968-1971 period.' (5) The o i l  revenues of the Treasury General 
represented 17 to  25 percent of the to ta l  budget revenues, while account­
ing fo r 16 to 20 percent of the budget disbursements. The share of the 
o i l  revenues in  the ordinary budget rece ip ts  was much la rg e r  in  the early 
1960’s . In  1964? nearly  51 percent of the to ta l  rece ip ts  of the Treasury 
General was provided through o i l .  In recent years the increasing  degree 
of soph istica tion  of the f i s c a l  too ls has made i t  e a s ie r  fo r  the govern­
ment to obtain i t s  revenues from non-oil a c t iv i t ie s .  In d ire c t taxes
5. Por more d e ta ils  of the ordinary budget see Annual Reports of The 
Central Bank of Iran .
1Y6
T ab le  7o4
Revenue, Expenditure & D efic it of the T: 
(B illio n  R ials)
•1968 1969 1970 1971 Growth 
ra te  1971
^Average 
grovrth 168/7
Ao Receipts 78©3 860 3 101o7 132o7 30o5 19*2
D irect Taxes 17©3 2101 26o3^ . 3 0 o0 1 3 o2 19o7
In d irec t Taxes3 33d 28o6 44.8 32*7 17.6 14©3
Customs Revenues(21 06) (2 3 d ) ( 26 . 9) ( 29d ) 8.2 10o4
Other (13©5) ( 15*5) ( 1 7 .9 ) ( 23© 6) 31.8 20o 5
Revenues from Monopolies 
& Government 
A ff i l ia te s  22o3 22d 26.3 43 ©2 71.9 2606
O il (1 5 .0)1 (14*7) (17.6) (34.0) 93.2 31 o4
Other (7 ©3) (7*4) (8 .7) (11 o2) 28.7 15 ©3
Revenue from Public 
Sector Services* 2«6 2o8 3.3 3©7 12.1 12o3
Miscellaneous , 
Revenues 0o8 1 ©7 0.8 1o1 37.5 11o2
Recurrent Development 
P ro jects 10o1 11 o4 13.4 15©2 13.4 14©8
T otal Revenues and 
Transfers 88 o 4 97©7 115.1 147*9 28.5 18o7
Bo Current Payments 
(Recurrent Development 
Expenditures) 92©7 107o4 1260 2 165 ©7 31.3 21 «4
Co D efic it 4e3 9®7 11d
■ .................. .. mra.TgQnmn-ieai
1 7 e8 60.4 6O06
D efic it Financing: 
U tiliz a tio n  of Banking 
System C redit ~0o4 
(Net)
-0 e1 2o3 0o3 -88.0
Sale of Treasury B il ls  
and Bends (Net) 4o5 7o0 7©0 1603 132.9 53o6
Advances by the  Oil 
Consortium 0 1o3 0o3 1 d 266.7
Other 0o2 1 ©3 1 ©3 0o1 -92 .3
1o Includes Rls* 2 b i l l io n  tra n s fe r  from Plan Organization o i l  revenues fox  
implementation of new C iv il Service Code0
c Average growth ra te s  are re -c a lc u la ted  by the author and d i f f e r  from the 
in  the o rig in a l ta b le 0
Source: Annual Report and Balance Sheety C entral Bank of I ra n  1971© Pd15«
1 ( (
provided the la rg e s t portion  of the Treasury General’s rece ip ts , 
followed by d irec t taxes (except fo r 197l). In general the o i l  revenue: 
have provided the th ird  la rg e s t source of revenues of the Treasury 
General in  recent years.
The Role of Oil in  the Deve
The development expenditures made through the Plan Organization 
have been the most e ffec tiv e  instruments in  developing the Iranian  
economy. I t  i s ,  therefo re , e ssen tia l to  look a t the various Development 
Plans, and evaluate th e ir  impact on the Iran ian  economy. The f i r s t  three 
Development Plans w ill be looked a t b r ie f ly , while the Fourth Development 
Plan w ill  be examined in  more d e ta il .  The Fourth Plan i s  p a rtic u la rly  
important, not only because i t  was the most ambitious, but also because 
i t  was the most successful.
The F ir s t  Seven Tear Plan 1949-55
Systematic development planning s ta r te d  in  Iran a f te r  the Second 
World War. In 1949 a skeleton plan with a proposed to ta l  expenditure of 
Rls, 2 b i l l io n  ($656 M illion) was prepared by the U.S. consultants? 
Morrison Knudson, In February 1949, the M ajlis (Parliament) passed a 
’’Plan Organization Act” estab lish ing  the Plan Organisation fo r  the task 
of implementing the f i r s t  Seven Year Plan. Table 7 .5  shows the sources 
and uses of funds in  the f i r s t  Plan. One can c lea rly  see the importance 
of o i l  revenues in  the development budgets They accounted fo r  97 percent 
of the to ta l  and were the la rg e s t sing le  item in  the estim ated budget.
The damaging e ffe c t of the Iranian  n a tio n a lisa tio n  i s  traceab le  in  i t s  
impact on the f i r s t  Plan. Rot only did the o i l  revenues stop flowing, 
but also the p o l i t ic a l  d i f f ic u l t ie s  between Iran  and B rita in  caused the 
World Bank to stop i t s  proposed loan to the Iran ian  government. At the 
same time, the domestic p o l i t ic a l  in s ta b i l i ty ,  created by the actions of 
Kussadeq, discouraged the p riva te  en terp rises from investment in  the 
proposed Plan. In  short, the f i r s t  Plan was crippled  and no s ig n if ic a n t 
progress was made. A fter the resumption of o i l  operations in  1954, a 
number of ’’Impact P ro jec ts” were implemented in  the l a s t  remaining year 
of the f i r s t  Plan. (4)
4. G.B. Baldwin ”Planning and Develom ent in  I r an” Baltimore: John 
Hopkins Press 1967> Chapters 2 and 3*
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Table 7 .5
Estimates of Sources and Uses of Funds fo r 
The F ir s t  Seven T ear Plan 1949— 1956 (B illion  of R ials)
Sources Amount Percentages Uses Amount Percentages
Oil revenues 7.80 37.1$ A griculture 5.25 25.C$
Liquidation of
government asse ts 1.00 4.2$ Roads, railw ays,
ports and
a irp o rts  5.00 -23.2$
P a rtic ip a tio n  of Industry and
p riv a te 'o rg an iz - mines 3.00 14*3$
ations 1.00 4.8$ •
Rank loan 4.50 21.4$ ' Oil industry  1.00 4.2$
IBRD loan 6.70 31 *S$ Communications 0.75 5.
Social p ro jec ts  6.00 28 .SA
Total: 21.00 10C$ Total: 21.00 10C$
Source: Plan Organization "Report on The Second Seven Year Plan11
Tehran 1964. (in  Persian) „
Note: Late in  1952, funds were ra ised .to  Rls.- 26 b i l l io n .
The Plan Organization proposed to take 40 percent of the to ta l  o i l  
revenues, equivalent to Rls. 7 .8  b il l io n  ($243 m illion) in  the f i r s t  
Plan period. In  fac t the to ta l  o i l  revenues turned out to be no more 
than Rls. 6.8 b il l io n  ($212 m illion ). Thus in  theory the 40 percent 
share of the Plan Organization would have had amounted to R ls. 2.7 
b ill io n , ind ica ting  a reduction of the development funds derived from
o i l ,  by around two th ird s . In p rac tice  however, not even th is  amount 
was made availab le  to  the Plan Organization, and most of the funds were 
used by the general (ordinary) budget.
Although the Plan Organization could not achieve i t s  goals, the United 
S tates Technical Assistance Program, under point IV and the Kutual 
Security Legislation, aided the Iran ian  government in  many development 
programmes, p a rtic u la rly  in  ag ricu ltu re  and communications. (5)
The to ta l  actual investment' outlay by the Plan Organization in  the f i r s t
5. Por a good analysis see: J .  Amuzgar "Technical A ssistance in  Theory
and P ractice: The Case o f  Iran " New York, P. A. Praeger 1966.
I '/ HJL so
Plan period, amounted to Rls. 4 b il l io n , or. about 20 percen t-o f the 
o rig in a lly  planned expenditure. Transportation and communication 
accounted fo r  le s s  than 40 percent of the ac tual investment outlays, 
followed by industry/m ines and ag ricu ltu re . (6)
6. M inistry of Economy "In d u s tr ia l Guide to Iran " Tehran, 1968 P .58
18U
The Second Seven Year Plan 1955-62
The Second Seven Year Plan, due to s ta r t  in  September 1955? ca lled  
fo r a to ta l  outlay of Rls. 87.2 b ill io n  ($1162.6 m illio n ). Approximately 
a quarter of these funds were.to be used for completing the unfinished 
p ro jec ts of the f i r s t  Plan, and the balance fo r  the implementation of 
the new p ro jec ts . I n i t i a l ly  80 percent of the o i l  revenues were to be 
se t aside fo r the developmental budget each year. However, the reduct­
ion of foreign assistance  and the increasing lev e l of government invol­
vement in  the economy, forced the reduction of the share of the Plan
Organization, f i r s t  to  60 percent and la te r  to 55 percent and le s s . The
to ta l  rece ip ts  of the government from o il  revenues were Rls. 127.5 
b i l l io n  ($1700 m illion ), the Plan O rganization 's share of the o i l  revenue 
was Rls. 60.9 b i l l io n  ($812 m illion) or nearly  48 percent of the to ta l  
o i l  revenues. The o i l  revenue a llocated  to the Plan Organization accoun­
ted  fo r nearly  70 percent of the planned expenditure and 75 percent of 
the actual expenditure of the Plan Organization. Table 7*6 shows the 
planned and actual expenditure of the Second Plan.
Table 7.6
Planned and Actual Expenditure of the Second Plan 
(B illions of R ials)
1 Planned $  of Total Actual
•A gricu ltu re/irriga tion  
Transport/Communication 
In dus t  r i  e s/li in  e s 
Social services 
Regional development 
Other
Total development:
Total non-development:
Total expenditure:
Source: The Economist In te llig en ce  Unit nIRAUn .Annual Supplement
1970, P .5. •
18.9 21.7^ 17.4
50.4 54.8
6.7 7.7 7.0
11.7 15.4 9.5
12.2 14.0 8.6
1.2. 1.4 0.4
81.1 95.0 70.0
6.1 7.0 15.2
87.2 100.0 85.2
In terms of u t i l iz in g  the availab le  funds, the Second Plan was more
successful th a t the F ir s t .  While the ac tual expenditure of the F ir s t
/
Plan was 20 percent of the planned expenditure, -this ra t io  rose to 95 per­
cent in  the Second Plan. However, the Second Plan, l ik e  i t s  predecessor, 
was beset by some lingering  adm inistrative d i f f ic u l t ie s .  According to  
Dr. Amuzegar:
"The u n certa in tie s  regarding the magnitude of av a il­
able f in an c ia l resources (p a rtic u la rly  foreign loans),
- the comparative inexperience in  large  scale  planning, 
lack of co-ordination among various government agencies, 
and other operating hurdles were instrum ental in  causing 
•some delays and f ru s tra tio n s . Thus many programmes did 
not hold closely  to th e ir  o rig in a l a lloca tions; p ro jec ts  
th a t were s ta r te d  early  n a tu ra lly  estab lished  themselves 
as p referred  claimants fo r  the funds” (7 )
Although the re la tiv e  success or fa ilu re  of the Second Plan i s  not the
subject of th is  chapter, i t  must be emphasized th a t without the o i l  reve­
nues, accounting fo r over 75 percent of the to ta l  expenditure, the imp7e~
mentation of the Second Plan would not have been possib le  a t  a l l .
7. J .  Amu.zegar, ”Iran: Economic Development Under D u a lls tic  Condit io n s” 
o p .c it  P .44 See also: J .  Amuzegar."Iran*s Economic Planning Once Again” nn 
,fAdministrative B arriers to Economic Development in  Iran ” Kiddle Bast 
Economic Parers 1957 and 1958v
The Third Five-Year Plan
The Third Five Year Plan ran from mid-1962 to the end of 1967* ~‘k
was the most comprehensive and sophistica ted  development plan yet in  Iran., 
For the f i r s t  time a l l  major ta rg e ts  fo r  the economy were s ta ted  in  the 
Plan* A ta rg e t of 6 percent GUP growth was se t, and eventually tran s la te d  
in to  sec to ra l a llo ca tio n s . O riginally , the Plan proposed expenditure of 
Rls. 190 "billion, la te r  th is  was reduced to R ls. 140 "billion, and then 
varied  again to R ls. 230 b i l l io n . Tables 7.7 and 7.8 provide a summary 
of sources and uses of funds in  the development plan.
Projected and Actu a l Revenues Under the Third Plan---------- -— —      ,    —------------------ ,-------------   -j----  w i hi " - . i  r">  1*1 m u r i n m m w i " v  win mrni iiw iw ciT iiM rm f
1962-1967 (B illions of R ials)
Source 1964 Revision 7° 1965
Revision
f t Actual
Revenue from Oil 154 61 154 62 155 67
Treasury Bonds 10 5 15 5 14 6
Foreign Loans 17 8 61 24 21 9
Domestic Loans 48 22 19 8 56 16
Other: 11 5 5 -1 5 2
Total Revenues: 220 100 250 100 229 100
Less: Adm inistration 
Expense - 4 4 5
Loan Repayments 16 16 19
Total Revenue fo r
Development: 200 230 205
Source: Central Bank of Iran , Annual Report and Balance Sheet, Tehran
1968, p p .226-7.
An in te re s tin g  fea tu re  of the above tab le  i s  the wide discrepancy 
between the expected and actual loans from domestic and foreign  sources. 
Nevertheless, the ro le  of o i l  in  the to ta l  revenues remained su b s ta n tia l. 
Over 74 percent of the to ta l  development revenue was provided by o i l  reve-
nues, compared with 37 percent in  the F ir s t  Plan and 73 percent in  the 
Second Plan. C learly, without these o il  revenues £he implementation of 
th is  Plan, l ik e  the o ther two Plans, would not have "been p o ss ib le . The 
uses to which these funds were put were as follows:
Table 7*8ni«mu m m nlita,aiiw
Planned and Actual Expenditure of The Third Plan 
(B illions of Rials)
Uses Planned fo of Total Actual *
A gricu ltu re/
I r r ig a tio n 49.0 21.3 47.3 23.1
M ines/industry 28.6 12.4 17.1 8 .4
Fuel and Power 36.5 15.9 3 2 .0 15.6
T ransport/
Communications 59.5 25.9 53.8 26.3
Education 18.1 7.9 17.5 8.5
Health 13.3 5.9 1 3 .2 6.5
Kanpow er/T raining 3.2 1.4 2 .8 1.4
Urban Development 7.5 3.2 7.2 3.5
S ta tis t ic s 1.7 0 .7 . 1.5 0.7
Housing 12.4 5.4 1 2 .2 6 . 0 -
Total: 230.0 10($ - 204.6 1OC0»
Source: Economist In te llig en ce  Unit o p .c it  P .5
The la rg e s t share of the development expenditure in  the Third Plan went 
to  transport and communications, followed by ag ricu ltu re , and fu e l and power 
Industry  and mines also constitu ted  a major share of the planned and ac tua l 
expenditure. The early  years of the Third Plan were a ffec ted  by severe 
draught, an extremely cold w inter f a ta l  to  livestock , and the absence of 
necessary p rivate  investment (owing to  i n i t i a l  u n c e rta in tie s  created  by the 
Land Reform Programme). Also the general recession which had s ta r te d  in  
early  1960, continued throughout the 19 6 3 -6 4  period. The Iran ian  White 
1Revolution’ , a programme of rad ica l soc ia l and economic reform was in tro d ­
uced by the Shah, (s) By fa r  the most s ig n if ic an t of these measures was the
1 11 in i f  Mu iiXmni luliwojiHih i i l i n n i n m r i  m n i n r r  i « >■ —  u w < i~ w r r w m n n r m r u  i m j  n m miniwmniiB  ..... . H fiin iM iiir im rirr m r m m   "*'* 1
8 . Mohammed Resa Pahlavi (The Shah) "The White Revolution" Tehran 1966w .  * »iw.tfwiiifc««i»>i>»»n iiiiia n ii>u  niniiiiriiw n « w » » ii i u m i i: m
( in  Persian)
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land reform s The reforms included workers * participation in p ro fit  
sharing, the Education Corps and the nationalisation of forest and water 
resources© ' '
Growth was rapid towards the end of the Third Plan, which not only 
compensated for the in i t ia l  slow growth, but set noY? records for industrial 
output© Total investment for the period amounted to $5 ©7 b il l io n  or an 
annual average increase of 18 percent G-HP (a t 19® prices) with the high­
est rate of 20 percent in  1967© Of th is  to ta l gross investment, some j$2©5 
b ill io n  (43/0 was public and b illio n  (37t9 private© This large  
investment raised the gross national product and per capita, income at cons* 
tant p rices, by 8©8 percent and 6 percent per annum respectively© (9) 
During the Third Plan a basis was la id  for many of the Foutth Plan® s heavy 
industrial projects, such as the s te e l rail!, machine to o l factories and • 
petrochem ical plants© (10)
9© J© Amusegar and A© Fekrat op© cit©  P50©
10© !!The fourth National Development Plan of Iran 19^8^73n Plan Organias- 
ation 19^8, pp© 26-31c . .
i s  a
■ The Fourth Five Year Plan
t»aaacra«wafc«*%i<«3»»te<5a>wia  jrjwnffrwgJ i^rwt- *ao «*-•■> JMJOM>ffiBsr«w<»«TiigtcEfiaa>
The Fourth National Plan covers the period from 21st© March 1968 to  
20th© March 1973® I t  is 'th e  most comprehensive and ambitious Plan yet- 
formulated in  Iran® I t  c a lls  for an investment of R lsc 810 b ill io n  ($10©8 
b illio n ), about 55 percent (Els© 433 b illio n ) of th is  to ta l w ill  be public 
and the remaining 45 percent (Rls© 367 b illio n ) w ill bo private investment© 
GNP i s  expected to  r ise  by 9©3 percent per year, from$6©9 b il l io n  in  1967* 
to  410®9 b il l io n , (a t 1965 prices) in  March 1973© GNP per capita i s  proj­
ected to  r ise  by over $100, from 257 in 1967* to  $359 at the end of the 
Plan© B r ie fly , the aims of the Fourth Plan are:-
a) Extensive industrialization  in  many sectors, including s t e e l ,  aluminium 
copper, zinc, petro-chemicals and engineering©
b) S c ien tific  water preservation and water resources development;
, c) Rapid expansion of power supply for both industry and agriculture, and 
the construction of a national grid system;
d) U tiliza tion  of natural gas for domestic consumption as  w ell as export;
o) Rural rehabilitation  and urban development;
f )  Decreasing dependence on foreign markets for food and raw materials;
g) Modernization of production and management techniques, particu larly  in  
agricultures ( 11)
The planned receipts of the development budget have been put at Rls©
610 b ill io n  ($8*1 billion)© Oil revenues were to  constitute over 63 per­
cent of the to ta l revenues, while the share of the Plan Organization from 
a l l  o i l  receipts was to  be around 80 percent© Tables 7©9 &&& 7 d 0  indicate 
the revenues and expenditure of the Plan Organisation as w ell as sectoral ‘ 
allocations during the Fourth Plan© The v ita l  role of o i l  income in  the ■ 
implementation of the Fourth Plan i s  apparent from the data contained in  
the above mentioned tables© But there was in i t ia l ly  some scepticism  over 
the anticipated o i l  revenues© Iran expected to  receive R ls0 487 b il l io n ,  
($6©5 b illio n ) from the o i l  sector, of th is ,  the development budget was to  
bo given 80 percent, or Rls© 385 billion© Under the then existin g  arrange-
g >M®n i'«»rniin<j Hi,t»©<i f r v .s v ra»m n 'r i*tii»i,f ■Him* .whm-ih  ? ' n w^ i f i r r i l:/~nii»i|m r . lrtnmOnin® n.~v.■ 11 *<r iiian'ip'i mni r wr w . m f f h T g a i n f f m y m i f t '  wiwm ■ r t . )» im r w r r r r t  i*rj~na~M,Trrirwrnr>-fr‘Ti~~i
11© J© Amuzegar and A© Pekrat opcc it  Pc51* see also: ’’Fourth National!. 
DGve3.opment Plan of Iran” Plan Organization pp©39~48o . .,
T ab le  7©9
Revenues and Expenditure of The Plan Qi'gan lsatiqn  
During the  Fourth Plan (B illio n s of R ials)
■ < a lll^lll^| l ■l^l■lrll■^r^lnTT1f^r•^lmwlT^ '^ T ^ * ^ w 'l M■OT!^ f,1^ ^ O T r T f^T r,t !^!•'^^-^:!r>,^ ^M^Mr r* l" l,,p,  ^ »<""■•■—■- ■■ -»■ »—* 1 ■ »— t ■■tM'.m f i w w w w M  m m i nrim*i !* ■ »  ■ m  m m i ' u n i  ---aj a ^ ^ g s ^ a r / a a y K g n g
Revenue % Expenditure fa
1© Oil revenue 385 63©1 i« Development projects and 4*80 78© 7
(80fa of to ta l o i l  current expenditiire©
income)
2® Foreign loans 150 24.©6 2© Completion, of the Third 4-5 7c4
3© Revenues from Plan projects©
petro-chemicals & 3© Gas transmission 5 0©8
gas©
Petr o-chemicals 11 ) 4*0 Foreign debt repayment 4-7 7*7
Gas 10 5 Joty 5© ggggpent of Treasury 15 j
Ac Treasury Bonds & 6© Repayment of domestic 4-©6
other govex'nment sec bank ci'ediis 1 3 )
u r iiie s 50 8*2 7© Administrative and
5© Miscellaneous 4- 0©7 other 5 6©8
Totals 610 100 % Totals 610 100^
niiitni-nriiniiinnn-irnmninfjn Tinntn'ii.- m rrTffwiirnnwi»n~m^i-iiT»itnKi|ylT.<»ni'<wt m ~i i i ^ f mMiwriniirnriT^ gBr1 n n t r T o  m ipiwwm ' mmii'iininiw im iiiiii nr w « M ' hi m i nm iu ij w i 1 rrm Tm 1 m r piia i~ h~ wminrr iim n  ~i <i m i)wuWiw~ m n r f r r ^ i  T - r r mfli r rr~ i
Source; ’’Fourth National Development Plan of Iran” op©cit P©62
tiwct.wm'^ gwcagfctflBw r u wiitoMBa^  a  artghijfrwHrffcCiBtmaT * a^ iwtfn ■im«hw»ig<?’ax-nGe« —*
ments (posted prices and production rate) i t  was d if f ic u lt  to  envisage 
hoY? th is  vr&s to be attained© In 19&9 and 19705 Iran was involved in  
negotiations with the Consortium, and at one time threatened to  shut down 
the o i l  installations© Iran presented an argument based on the needs of 
the Plan Organisation for o i l  revenues, and asked the Consortium to  comply 
Y&th these demands© The government did not aslc for a revision  of posted 
price or royalty payments, but rather for an increase in  the rate of prod­
uction so that o i l  revenues would reach the lev e ls  required by the Plan 
Organisation© After long negotiations, a compromise was reac&ed** The 
Consortium increased i t s  production, though not to  the le v e l Iran had ask­
ed for , but agreed to  make advance payments so that the Plan Organization 
could obtain the required revenues© la te r , the 1971 revision  of the OPEC
Oil Agreements provided for a largo increase in  tho Iranian o i l  revenues© 
( 12)0
hooking at the sectoral a llocation  of  the development budget} (Table 
7..10) i t  w ill be seen that for the f ir s t  time in  the development plans, 
industries and mines were given top p r iority , followed by communications, 
transport and agriculture© Education, housing and telecommunications also
12© Fox' d eta ils see Chapter 6©
T ab le  7 q10
A llocation of Plan Organization’s Development
> ii i n©m ii» r  a n i i  mi >imu im <i h i ■  n m n  i w i f n  i m «  i m i w m i  n i u r n wiiiT n  i r  m r i u © i  i - r - r r n i n r— i i mt n ~ n n iii w  n iir - m — - Tv t r r r - i r r —
During the  Fourth Plan (B illio n s  of R ials)muri] miiiiiHhiw iruniiMirnr n imimn iirm  iwi»»nwmnniii m m  > n w i  irwintTmnnii^iiiimi mm ©iii«)»«©innriri»inm —  «Miiiiii©i«Mi»iniiininfi[i
Plan Organization Fixed Current
Development Invest- Expend-
Budgeto ment by iture with
the public items in
sector© column 2„
1© Agriculture and 
Animal Husbandry
2# Industry and 
Mining
65e0
99*0
26«3
48*5
38.0
3® Gas end Oil
4® Water
5* Pov.rer
6. Communications and 
Transport 80© 0
7o Telecoramunications ? 
Television and Radio 20©3
8© Rural Development 9o1
9© Urban Development 7©0
10© Construction and 
Housing 23 ©0
11© Education 35*0
12© Arts and Culture 1 ©8
1 3 © Tourism 3*8
14* Health and 
Medical Service 13*75
4.8515© Social Welfare
I 60 S ta t is t ic s , Research 
and Regional Devel­
opment 4© 6
wurjtf1 h ji .
Total: 480*0
24 c. 0
84-. 7 
26.3 
47o4 
36*3
78.0
19*1
8©1
7*0
20©1
14*7
1o8
3*6
4.85
3*25
1o0
380o2
JL
20© 0 
6©0
1e1
1o7.
2e 0 
1 ©2
20 o 3
0©2
7*3
1*5
3*6 
64® 9
»n im m 1 iiimii'iii m in im iin i n i i . '1'iiiiiiiiwi—i 111m1 wii inimi 1 1 «jm w ir 1 «n in in in 1 i m»u ■wirw ui i m in n i !■ 1 r  1 nw «~Tnrrn©fnn 11 ■lnnini ppih i m iirinm  n r  1 him mi unimnn® ur n i r  ~
Fixed invest­
ment by the 
private sector 
out of develop 
ment contribut 
ion©
21 ©0
8©3
1o0
2© 9
1 c-6 
0©1
34*9
Source; Plan Organization ,sTho Fourth National Development Plan of Iran”
1968 -  1972,; P063.
i Of<if»«iCTsiin' ’ttmmm »i it* nr. ji'irnngaww©
i n t s
accounted fo r  a large  po rtio n  of the to ta l  expenditures* ( 1 3 )
Having discussed the. objectives of the Fourth Plan and the  high ex­
pectations of the  government, l e t  us now consider what re a l ly  happened and 
how closely  events followed the  Plan* The period under study here covers 
the f i r s t  four years of the  Plan; I 96&-I97 I © (14) The revenues and expend­
itu re s  of the  Plan Organization are ind icated  in  Table 7© 110 I t  w ill  be 
seen th a t the  o i l  revenues of the Plan Organization provided between 9 5  to  
98 percent of tho to ta l  revenues in  the  f i r s t  th ree  years* In  I 97I the  
ra t io  f e l l  to  94 percent* These figures do not need any elaboration: 
Without the o i l  revenues th e re  would have been no Fourth Plan in  i t s  e x is t­
ing fo ra  I Tho Plan had required 80 percent of the to ta l  o i l  revenues to  
be allocfeted to  the  Plan Organization (Table 7 q 9 ) o  But in  foo t * the  a llo c ­
a tions ranged from 75 to  79 percent of the  o i l  revenues (Table 7©3) * ind ic­
ating  tho determ ination of the  government to  adhere as c lo se ly  as possib le  
to  i t s  o rig in a l objectives® The revenues of the  Plan Organization were not 
su ff ic ie n t to  pay fo r  a l l  the  expenditure and as a r e s u l t ,  d e f ic i ts  of be t­
ween 20 to  50 b i l l io n  r i a l s  appeared® Table 7©11 shows the  sources of def«* 
i c i t  financing* Although the  o i l  revenues co n stitu ted  over 94  percent of 
the  t o ta l  Plan Organisation revenues, th e i r  share in  the t o ta l  expenditure 
was le s s  significant®  In  the  f i r s t  th ree  years of the  P lan , o i l  revenues 
co n stitu ted  between 54  to  56  percent of the  t o ta l  expenditure, but in  1971 
th is  r a t io  rose to  nearly  80 percent® This re f le c ts  the impact' of the  1971 
Tehran Agreement and the large increase  in  production and domestic consump­
tion* While tho o i l  revenues rose by 7 6  percent in  1971 s to ta l  Plan 
expenditure rose by only 22 percent in  th e  same year* In  general, 1971 was 
a year of great a c t iv i ty  on th e  p a rt of the Plan Organization* The in ­
creases of nearly  a l l  items in  1971 over 1970, were su b s ta n tia lly  above the  
average fo r  the whole period* (Table 7 d l)«
13© I t  i s  argued by some economists th a t a g ric u ltu ra l development was 
not given i t s  f a i r  share of the expenditure in  the  Fourth Plan®
14* In  terms of tho Iran ian  Calendar, 1347~1350 which corresponds to  
21st, Marsh 1968  to  20th* March 1971o
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Tabl6_7.11iiirn m i.nn fgi •
Revenue* Expenditure and D efic it of the  Plan
m n n :n if m i - i f i f T tn r f * ^ * * * T - i r n T T —- f ""V T" ** - r 1" ~ «--■- r —r —1—' .■■——■ |- - r —-^- - i  —^  -ri r '" t 1 n —
Organisation (B illio n s  of R ials)
ui iriii p M.niiu—iiu.riw-f.^ Hi*. Cijjiiwin>wmffi.m>ixini*»nr.«iaw^a&<3
1968 1969 1970 1971 Growth Rate 
1971
Average
G-rovrth
1968-71
1© Revenue 49*1 56*7 68.3 123©8 81©3 36.1
Oil ■‘46.8(1) 55*4 66©2 116.3 73*7’ 35.4
Other 2©3 1*3 2.1 (2)7.5 257.1 48.3
2© Expenditure 86,3 101 ©4 118«3 144.1 21 ©8 18.6
Development 70e1 83o0 96.1 118.7 23.5 19.2
Recurrent
Development 10.1 11.4 13©4 15.2 1 j)©4 14.6
N on- development * .6 .1 7e0 808 10.2 15.9 18.7
3 . D efic it 37*2 44.7 '50.0 20.3- -39*4 -18.3
D efic it
financing:
U tiliza tion  of • 
banking system 
credit (net) 11 ©3 17.3 31*1 2.  8 - 91© 0 -3 ©^6
Sales of treasury 
b i l l s  and bonds 
( net) 3c2 1.0 •»2©0 - 2.0 0 0
U tiliza tion  of 
foreign loans 
( not) 22©5 21 ©2 19*5 15.3 -2 f .5 ««12©1
Advances by the 
o i l  Consortium 0 5*0 1 .4 4o2 200.0 0
1) The figure  was ac tu a lly  Rls© 48©8 b i l l io n  from which R ls0 2 b i l l io n  v/as 
tran sfe rred  to  the Treasury General fo r  implementation of the  New Gin’l l  
Serv5.ce Code©
2) Includes Rls© 0©4 b i l l io n  tra n s fe r  from the Plan Organisation in  implan­
ta t io n  of su b -a rtic le  16 of 1971 Complementary Budget Law©
* Average Growth ra te s  are re -ca lcu la ted  by the author and d if fe r  from the  
o rig in a l data©
Source: Plan Organization, quoted .in Annual Reports and Balance Sheet. 
Central Bank of Iran  1 9 7 1 , P©116©
The following table compares the planned and the actual flow of resources 
for the Fourth Plan:
Table 7.12
Sources of the Plan Organization* s Income in  theinrfMi I« r  wnwifin. ■ I i ihi ©• I ■! m  — ------------------ r- ^ r T , r f T —TI^ T IIIT 'I ♦  n i II TurHTTTfc l»Tmi M
Fourth Plan (B illion s of Rials$
Source 
1 © Oil
2© Foreign Loans 
3© Gas and Petrochemicals 
4© Domestic Borrowing 
5© Other
TOTAL:
Expected Income
150*0
Actual Income in  f ir s t  4 .yrs
284© 0 
78©5 
no a©
62.9
23.8*
tiwiHiHn r i» ~iii>Miiiw i» .©WTi^ nirrj>niiri»iii . iWi«nihiiTiiFin'i>p©ni'iniB aTriiiTiiTrr.vrErTT—i~rrr»
449©2
Source: Estimated from the data in  Tables 7©9 to 7o11©
* Includes advances of the Consortium©
I t  seems that the projected estimate c lo se ly  approximated the actual 
situation© I f  we assume an average growth rale of 30 percent for the o i l  
revenues, the 1972 o i l  income would amount to  over 150 b il l io n  r ia ls  and 
the original target of Rls© 385 b ill io n , w ill be surpassed© Total revenues 
are also  expGcted to reach Rls© 610 b ill io n  without much d if f ic u lty g (based 
on Rls© 144 b illio n  revenue of 1971)q Income from foreign loans had 
reached roughly half of the target figure by the end of the f i r s t  four years 
of the Fourth Plan, so that unless Hie remaining year made up for tho re­
maining half there would be a shortfall® With regard to the expenditures, 
tho targets seem close enougho The expenditure on new development projects 
was Rlso 364 b ill io n  in  the f ir s t  four years, compared with the estimated 
target of Rls© 480 b ill io n  for  the f iv e  year period© However,( the recurrent 
development expenditure seems to bo s lig h tly  under-estimated® In the f ir s t  
f  our years Rls© 50 b ill io n  had already been spent on recurrent development
projects, compared to  tho target of Rls© 45 b il l io n  for the f iv e  year perioc
/
Appendix tables A-7.2 and A~7o3 provide a breakdown of the disbursement 
of tho Plan Organization expenditure for development and recurrent develop­
ment projects and the non—development disbursements for the f i r s t  four year
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of the  Plan® These expenditures can he compared v/ith the  planned sec to ra l 
a lloca tions to  see whether the estim ates have been adhered to  by the  Plan­
ning Authorities® I t  i s  worth noting th a t while the  expenditure on indust­
r ie s  and mines seems lik e ly  to  exceed the ta rg e ts , (Rls® 91 ©3 b i l l io n  fo r  
the f i r s t  four years, compared with a planned expenditure of Rls© 99 b i l l ­
ion fo r  the f i r s t  f iv e  year period) the expenditure on the a g ric u ltu ra l 
sec to r w ill probably f a l l  considerably short of the  estim ate, (Rls*. 35°20 
b i l l io n  fo r  the  f i r s t  four years compared with th e  planned expenditure of 
Rls® 63c0 b i l l io n  fo r  the whole of the Plan period®)
E xternal Balance and the  Composition of Imports •
Another way of looking a t the  in d ire c t e ffe c ts  of the  o i l  revenues i s  
to  consider the  to ta l  fo reign  exchange received from o i l  and the composit­
ion of imports th is  fo reign  ©xchango paid for© In  the  fo u rth  P lan, o i l  
revenues have co n sis ten tly  constitu ted  over 50 percent of the  fo reign  ex­
change earned by Iran  (Table 7°2). The foreign exchange was used by Iran  
to  import machinery and equipment required fo r the development of th e  
economy® Table 7 d 3  shows the  composition of imports in  the  f i r s t  four 
years of the Plan period® The la rg e s t share of the imports went to in te r ­
mediate goods, followed by c a p ita l goods and consumer goods® In d u stries  
and mines had a t o t a l  share of over 69 percent of the  to ta l  im ports, v irile  
a g ric u ltu ra l imports con stitu ted  only 3 percent of the  t o t a l  value of goods 
imported in  1971° I t  i s  important to  note th a t desp ite  the  large  value of 
consumer goods imported, th e i r  t o t a l  share was only 1107 percent® The 
data shown in  Table 7*13 shows th a t the  income received from o i l  was 69 per 
cent of tho to ta l  import b i l l  in  1968© In  19^9 and 1970 th is  p roportion  
rose to  71 and 7 6  percent© A fter the Tehran Agreement of 1971 and th e  sub­
sequent o i l  p rice  increase , the  o i l  revenues rose by nearly  7 6 percent© In  
the same year tho o i l  revenues exceeded the  le v e l o f - to ta l  imports fo r  the 
f i r s t  time®
Unlike many other o i l  producing countrfS.es of the  Middle E as t, I ran  has 
a balance of trade  and payment d e f ic i t ,  because the  o i l  income i s  not 
su ff ic ie n t fo r  the ambitious development p ro jec ts  launched in  th e  country® 
Table 7 ©11*. gives a summary of the  relevan t data© The ava ilab le  data, indie** 
a tes th a t during the past decade Iran  has continuously had a balance of paj 
ment deficit©  In  1971, although the  balance of trade  was s t i l l  in  the  red ,
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Table 7.131 liwiKMi. T~~Tl~rg*in
Composition of Inports ($ Trillions) 1960-71*
j i  f  i m  w iia  i i  * i* f  w w i w i ^ iiwiiwim u n>M itiw m ^ M w w ii* i» m a o < w
1963 1969 1970 1971 1970/71 .
Gro'frth Rate $
1971 
of-Total
Intermediate Goods 856*5 987,3 10=8.5 1336.3 25.1 ^ &r»9$
Industries and 
Hines 6^ .1 <>7 737,4 645.0 1110.9 31.5 53i?
Construction 1if7o0 152,7 145,8 138.5 - 5 .0 608 .
Services 52*1 64,8 52,7 57.8 9.7 2o8
Agriculture and 
Livestock
15o7 32,4 25,0 29.1 16 .4 1cA
Capital G-oods 376*3 387.2 391.0 482.9 23.5?J 23oA$
Industries and 
Hines 239.1 316,2 263.3 31606 20.1 15.4-
Services 103,8 30,9 SU2 132^7 45.5 6o4
Agriculture 33,4 40,1 36.1 33.6 -6*9 1 .6
C onsumsr Goods 156.4 168,2 217.1 241,7 11.3$ 11*7$
Total: 1389. 2154,2,7 1676, 52060 ,9 22*9$ 100o0$
Receipts from o i l  
sector 958,5 10=9,0 1268.4 2114.1 66.0$
> iT ti» r ^ i c n  fiiwn iitm >i i mi i n ii ■ i> p >■!! mi »i> ■>»■» .an 11 n  i h i i m  mri * i g i n i m i w  i m r 'i iii m v n h u t  h i  i  i i h  n n i w  iii  <rniiiPin« r« h i i x i t h itii i i h t r  n m irn n im  n n n »   .........   im r  •  *■-■ '■ -
O il receip ts as $
of imports (>% 71$ 76$ 103$
Source: Foreign Trade S ta t is t ic s  of Iran 1971<>
— m i n j i . .  m iwiii I in  ii m f m rm r iw n iT im  biim h i  ■f f r t T n n w wif
Balance o f  Payments o f  Iran  1 9 68-71  
($ M illions)
1968 1969 1970 1971 Growth Rate 
1970 1 971
1o Current 
Receipts
20 Current 
Payments
3c Net Current 
Account(1 * 2) -  479 06
4c Net Capital 
Account 38V1
5 c Figures not
Regis t  ere d *~4c 2
6e Incidental 
Receipts and 
Payments
7o Balance of 
Payments ( 3 to 6 ) - 99©7
.1325*1 1518*7 1690.1
■1804*7 -2072.2 -2365.1 
-553*6 -675.0  
398.8 413o4
83.8 21«8
•70.9. -239.8
2733*5 
•275606 
-25.1 
409 06 
—24*4
116*7
478*8
11 ©3$ 
14.1 
22e0 
3.-7
-74&0
238*2
61*7$
1606 
*9606 
—0o9
435*3
i i i  r ~itiv 1 rirnT iT i <n©~iim nunnur h hi.hhttim  i im iir  i*'*ti««rn »ii»un 1 iw itj iitnwaTiwMH-MTimff i«7m~r iim > n u T iiT -n n in —in r i in
Source; Central Bank of Iran “Annual Report and Balance Sheet” 1350 (1971) 
Chapter V* P*32«
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the-February 1971 o i l  agreement re su lted  in  a to ta l  payment, surplus* How­
ever, i f  one looks in to  the breakdown of the balance of payment statem ents, 
ono sees th a t  the Iran ian  net c a p ita l account i s  g rea tly  dependent on fo r­
eign loans and credits*  These loans and c red its  ranged from around $500 
m illion  in  1968  to  nearly  $750MJin  1971* In  I 97I Iran  disbursed $326*5 m ill­
ion on the repayment of fo reign  loans and credits,, which represen ts around 
70 percent of Iran* s payment surplus in  the  same year* However* the balance 
of payment and trade  d e f ic i t  i s  an in te g ra l p a rt of a growth o rien ta ted , 
developing economy, p a r t ic u la r ly  when there i s  a general in f la tio n  in  the 
in te rn a tio n a l markets in  tho p rices  of manufactured goods0
T he O v e r a l l  Im p act o f  t h e  F i s c a l  P o l i c i e s
D u r in g  t h e  1960*8 ,  I r a n  e x p e r ie n c e d  a  rem a rk a b ly  h ig h  r a t e  o f  econom ic  
g ro w th  i n  a c t u a l  p r i c e s ,  c o n s ta n t  p r i c e s  and p e r  c a p i t a  income© B etw een  
1959 1 9 7 0 , o u tp u t grew  a t  an a n n u a l r a t e  o f  9*5 p e r c e n t  a t  c u r r e n t  p r ic e
A p p en d ix  t a b l e s  A~7*5 and A -7 o 6  show t h e  r a t e  o f  gro w th  o f  th e  GBP and  i t s  ■ 
com ponents i n  t h i s  p e r io d ,  b o th  i n  c o n s ta n t  and c u r r e n t  p r ic e s ©  Tho T h ir d  
P la n  t a r g e t  o f  6 p e r c e n t  grow th  i n  GDP was s u r p a s se d  b y  o v e r  3  p e r c e n t t T he  
F o u r th  P la n  t a r g e t  o f  10 p e r c e n t  grow th  i n  GDP was r e a c h e d  i n  1970* I n  1 97‘ 
th o  G ro ss  N a t io n a l  P ro d u c t r o s e  b y  14*3 p e r c e n t  a t  c o n s ta n t  p r i c e s  and by 
20©5 p e r c e n t  a t  c u r r e n t  p r i c e s ,  s u r p a s s in g  th e  F o u r th  P la n  t a r g e t  o f  9*4 V01 
c e n t  grow th  a t  c o n s ta n t  p r i c e s e (15) T a b le  7«15 show s t h e  s e c t o r a l  c o n t r ib ­
u t io n  t o  t h e  GDP r a t e  o f  grow th  i n  p e r c e n ta g e  te r m s0
Table 7*15 Secto ra l C ontribution to  GDP Pate of Growth (50
Current Fourth Plan Target
•M^»3gliaNi*r.-Hai.rtc©aWfla
1 9 0 » 6 7 1969 1970 1 9 7 0 a t  C o n s ta n t  P r i c e s
U N il>M i'HU it\ ■ IIWWuMlI 1 1 III 1 II1II1I ii©'HI "Mil wall'll liVT*l > 'Ki rT T tfin T im n
A g r ic u l t u r e 1d 0 * 4 0*6 1 * 4 0o9
I n d u s t r i e s  & M in es 1o5 1 *4 © CO 2*0 1*8
O i l 3 o1 3©5 3 c3 3 o 4 3 o 8
C o n s t r u c t io n 0*5 - 0 * 2 0*2 0*5 0*6
W ater cl Pow er 0*5 0 * 4 0*9 0*6 0*2
S e r v ic e s 2*8 4 c0 _ 3 o1 3*8 2*7»r n w n fw iiw i - iim iM n in iif iiiH 'ixwrnnrim inpi ~rinm n  n ru n  m n ' r  m rm I ' n r ' i —
GDP a t  F a c to r  C o st 9*5 9o5 9*9 1 1 * 7 10o0
GMP 8*5 10* 3 10*3 12*0 9 c 4
S o u r ce : "Annual R ep o r t and B a la n ce . S h e e t"  C e n tr a l  Bank o f  I r a n  1970 P©17
15* ib id ©  1971 P©15
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The largest contributor to  the growth of GDP has been the o i l  sector’ 
Tho impact of the o i l  sector on the growth of GDP i s  twofold: d irectly «, as 
shown in  Table 7©15* 2nd ind irectly , through the m ultiplier e ffect on othen 
sector's© The indirect e ffect i s  clearly brought about by the investment^ 
of the Plan Organisation in  the other" key economic sectors©
Gross, domestic capital formation rose by an average of 10 percent in  
1959~70, (see Appendix tables A-7o7 sndA-7©8) 0 In 1971 the GDFCF was Rls 
165 b il l io n  and had grown by I808 percent at constant prices (21 ©5 percent 
at current p r ices), thereby surpassing the Fourth Plan target of 13o6 per­
cent a y e e r j'it  constituted 21 percent of GNP in  1971© Another in terestin  
economic indicator i s  the percentage share of the major sectors in  Gross 
National Product© The share of the o i l  revenues has stead ily  increased in  
the GNP from 1608 percent in  1959 to 28©9 percent in  1970® Industries and 
mines have shown a fa st rate of growth, while the share of the agrioultura 
sector has consistently fallen© After services, the o i l  sector constitute  
the largest component of the GNP, both at current and constant prices (see  
Appendix tables A-7©9 and A-7©10) o Table 7©16 provides us with an indie at 
ion of the lev e l of a c tiv ity  in  the major economic sectors© Wo.can see 
that the o i l  sector was the most active sector in  1959- 70, followed by 
industries end mines, with the agricultural 'sector at tho bottom of the 
scale©
C learly  Iran  has achieved a high ra te  of growth, perhaps on© of the  
highest ra te s  of growth in  the  world© Y/hen we consider the fa c t th a t in  
most developing economies, a f iv e  percent ra te  of growth of the  GNP has 
been d i f f ic u l t  to  achieve, then we can re a l ly  appreciate the  growth p e rf  or 
mane© of the  Iran ian  economy© Moreover, th is  growth has been, p a in less  « 
no b e lt- tig h ten in g , no cut in  consumer goods and no sharp increases in  ta s  
a tion  have been necessary© Th© ro le  of the o i l  revenues in  providing the 
means of achieving th is  ra te  of growth i s  apparent from the data contained 
in  Table 7d5©
T ab le  7 q1 6 J
Index of Mador Economic A c tiv ity  G-rouns
*^-*■•^*’ "1 ■ 1 ■■ 11 n  1 r,J— nM'MX’urii >f t|- him nTn «nm i* inn i i  r»ii mmchh i* ‘m«r>iiMW»m»« wiiTh
at Constant P rices fo r  Selected  Years
Year Agriculture Indust- O il Ser- Gross Not Net C-ross
r i« s and vices Domestic Indirect factor Nation-
11 ines Product(at Taxes or in - a l
(1) (2) (3) factor cost) come Product
( 4) from
abroad
1959 100 100 100 100 100 100 >100 100
1960 102 111 112 104 • 105 107 121 104
1961 102 120 123 105 110 103 123 109
1962 104 131 143 110 118 105 133 115
1963 106 147 157 115 125 115 178 121
1964 , 108 157 177 124 135 117 176 131
1965 116 182 199 140 152 147 219 146
1966 121 209 230 152 164 170 228 • 139
1967 130 247 270 164 182 196 264 177
1968 141 276 311 182 200 234 329 193
1969 143 300 • 353 208 223' 246 . .368 214
1970 148 351 395 224 242 276 431 231
Notes: 1) Ineludes farming, anima1 husbandry, fort?stry, f i shing and hunt in,
2) Includes manufacturing, raining, construction, water and power®
3) V&lu© added in  domestic production of the oil.sector®  '
4) Includes transport, communications, banking, insurance, trade, 
house rent, government and private serviceso
Sources S ta t is t ic a l Yearbook of Iran 1970c P«3®
Be D irect Role of the O il Industry; Backward and Forward Linkages
wwin WIIIIM I<r wmiTiHJi.irfii t hi— mr n—«‘i' im ■ ttiar wmmnimn   hihiiii' m »■ u fipOTWMiJi — - - iim>w~nmirii iii« i m , ■!> ii S nHHM
The o i l  industry  has a tv/of old e ffec t on the  Iran ian  economy;
a) F isc a l influences through the  medium of the government, and
b) D irect influences through the  in te r-re la tio n sh ip  between the o i l  
industry  and the  economy© These d irec t influences can take e ffe c t through 
backward and forward linkages: th a t i s  to  say, the flow of resources to  and 
from the  indigenous sectors©
•*» V A  \JU  V k /  «
tfcww..iy i ir^ fT wt^ b rr > n » i-nmuiw
Forward linkages represent the flow of low cost fu e l from the o i l  
industry  to  the na tional economy© The cheap source of fu e l  i s  expected to  
provide an inducement fo r  the economy to  su b s titu te  o i l  fo r  other energy 
resources and to  create  petroleum-based industries© This p red ic tio n  has . 
turned out to  be tru e  in  the  case of I ra n , where in  i 9^9 74 percent of the  
domestic energy requirements were supplied by the o i l  industry© I f  we add 
n a tu ra l gas and IPG, the r a t io  r is e s  to  around 90 percent fo r  most of i 960-  
19£>9 ® ^be demand fo r  petroleum products has r ise n  nearly  f iv e  times in  
1939~1 9 7 1 , while fu e l o i l  and gas o i l ,  as the  two most important in d u s tr ia l  
fu e ls , have shown very high ra te s  of growth in  th is  period© (16)
The demand fo r  petroleum products depends on various fa c to rs , such 
as the ra te  of growth of GRP and income per head, income e la s t ic i ty  of 
demand, p ric e s , etc© Since these subjects are discussed l a t e r ,  (17) i t  
i s  su ff ic ie n t to  note th a t  there  i s  a very close c o rre la tio n  between the  
demand fo r  o i l  products and the  ra td  of economic growth© There i s  what one 
may c a l l  a ’’cause and effec t"  re la tio n sh ip  between the  consumption of o i l  
products and the  ra te  of economic growth, th a t  i s  to  say, th a t  while econ­
omic p rosperity  i s  brought about by tho growth of the  o i l  industsy , economi 
progress w ill  in  tu rn  increase the  demand fo r  the products of the  o i l  ind­
u s try , which Yrill lead to  fu rth e r  growth of the  o i l  se c to r0
The a v a ila b ili ty  of e a s ily  accessib le  quan tities of gas, induced 
the government to  b u ild  the 1,100 kilom etre p ipeline  to  the  U«S#S©R© This 
p ipe line  was completed in  1971 and serves two purposes: f i r s t l y ,  i t  i s
used to  export gas to  Russia, which in  exchange w ill  pay fo r  the  Russian
16© For a d e ta iled  analysis of the various o i l  markets and th e i r  ra te s  of 
growth see'Chapter 10  ^p a rt III©
170 ibid©
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construction  of the  Esfahan s te e l  m ill , and secondly, i t  w ill  provide 
n a tu ra l ge.s fo r  the main centres oj& consumption® The p ip e lin e  route has 
"been drawn so as to  serve the l a t t e r  objective© Furthermore, the  N ational 
Iran ian  Petrochemical Company (a  subsidiary  of NIOC), has undertaken sev­
e ra l p ro jec ts  fo r  the  construction of petrochemical p la n ts , some iirparb** 
nership with foreign companies© Some of these p lan ts  are completed and 
others are under construction® Although no important linkage in  the  pe tro ­
chemical industry  has yet m ateria lised , i t  i s  f a i r  to  an tic ip a te  th a t in  
the  next decade petrochemicals w iH become an important export activity©  . 
At the  same time they w ill  supply the domestic market with cheap f e r t i l i s ­
e rs , p la s t ic s ,  e tc0
. I t  i s  important a t th is  stage to  emphasize th a t in  a ty p ic a l dual 
economy, one would expect, the forward linkages to  be weaker than the  back­
ward linkages® For instance, i f  the leading dynamic sector’ i s  producing 
f in a l  goods, ( e Gg© autom obiles), the backward linkages, or demand induced . 
influences may become predominant® In  ex trac tive  and m ineral in d u s tr ie s , 
the  leading secto r may provide i t s  'dominant influence through supply^-that' 
i s ,  forward linkages® In  tho case of Iran , i t  i s  f a i r  to  say th a t forward 
linkages have in  the  p o st-n a tio n a liza tio n  period , led  to  ’’some'5 in te g ra tio n  
between the na tional economy and the  o i l  sector©
Backward Linkages! . ■
Backward linkages c o n stitu te  the  leading industry ’s demand fo r  goods 
?ahd services provided by the national economy© The leading se c to r’s demand 
can be divided in to!
a) demand fo r  fixed  asse ts  required  fo r  expansion of in d u stry , : and
b) demand fo r  current resources to  meet the  routine requirements of industry 
These two sub-divisions of demand are not of course mutually exclusive0 
Indeed, both components of demand have been achieved during the  post-na tion ­
a liz a tio n  period©
Backward linkages, with regard to  c a p ita l expenditure, have been 
p a r tic u la r ly  weak® The o i l  industry  i s  a very c a p ita l in tensive  industry,, 
and the degree of c a p ita l in te n s ity  i s  r is in g  over time by the  in s ta l la t io n  
of sophistica ted  end automatic machinery in  re f in e r ie s  and o i l  terminals© 
The na tional economy has, thus f a r ,  been unable to  provide such c a p ita l
equipment fo r  the  industry© There a re , moreover, sp illo v e r e ffe c ts  from 
the import of th is  machinery from abroad in so fa r as the in s ta l la t io n  of 
th is  machinery would require  the build ing of new p lan ts  (from domestic 
resources) and employment of domestic labour© But such sp illo v e rs  are 
generally  sh o rt-liv ed  and re a lly  irre le v a n t to  the issue of c a p ita l  expend­
itures© The in a b i l i ty  of the  domestic economy to  supply the c a p ita l goods 
required  by the industry  may not continue in d e fin ite ly , although the  d iver­
sion of economic resources towards th e  production of such sp ec ia lised  fac­
i l i t i e s ,  in  competition with large and experienced western companies, may 
be i r r a t io n a l  a t t h i s  stage of economic development in  Iran©
The only major p a rt played by the  domestic economy in  supplying the 
needs of the  o i l  industry  fo r  c a p ita l  goods, has been th e  construction  of 
the  Ahw&z pipe m ill in  1968© This p lan t i s  a subsid iary  of HIOC, and i s  
producing p ipelines fo r  products and crude o i l  in  various p a r ts  of the  
country© Although th is  p lan t has been recognised by the American Petroleum 
I n s t i tu te  and i s  authorized to  use the standard mark of API, I  am informed 
th a t the pipes made in  th is  p lan t w ill  be more c o s tly  than  tho  p rice s  of 
p ipes made in  in te rn a tio n a l markets® (18)
The most important aspect of backward linkages i s  the  current expend­
itu re  of the o i l  industry  on the  goods and services of the n a tiona l economy, 
These expenditures include wage payments fo r  labour, purchases of suppli.es, 
o ffice  equipment, fu rn itu re  and f ix tu re s , payments fo r  some in d u s tr ia l  parts 
availab le  in  the domestic economy, and so on© Y/ith regard to  the  l a t t e r s 
the  In te rn a l Resources D ivision of KIOG was estab lished  in  1959 with the  
objective of;
a) Investiga ting  and keeping under constant review, the  p o s s ib i l i t i e s  of 
using Iran ian  co n trac to r’s services and Iran ian  m ateria ls in  o i l  ojjorationsj
b) In i t ia t in g  and adm inistrating the  procurement of Iran ian  serv ices and 
m ateria ls as are found su itab le ; and
c) S tim ulating, by means of advice, guaranteed orders, and sometimes by 
advance payments, the  availab le  range of Iran ian  m ateria ls and serv ices 
relevent to  o i l  operations©
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18© This camo up in  a p riv a te  conversation with hr© Ameli, a c iv i l  engineer 
working on the Tehran-Tabriz pipeline© Apparently1-, IBRD agreed to  lend 
money to  Iran  fo r  th is  p ro je c t, end although tho IBRD f e a s ib i l i ty  study was 
unfavourable, the loan was granted© For a good summary of a c t iv i t ie s  (Contd
g o o
In 1969, d iv ision  compiled a five-volume industry directory, containing 
the names of large firms in  various branches of manufacturing ranging from 
refrigerators and related components to  automobiles, pipes, chemicals and 
paints, furniture and o ffice  equipment® I t  i s  herd to  say how successful 
the a c tiv it ie s  of the Internal Resource Division have been, but i t  Is  imp- 
orfcant to note that th is  has been a valuable step in  channeling the o i l  
industry1s demand for domestic goods and services to the industria l sectors 
of the national economy e Table 7«17 provides a comparison of the purchases 
of loca l and foreign products, both by the Consortium and NIOC®
Table 7o17
Value of Purchases by Oil Companies (1961'
lwmit« inm iirTi )iriTTrr-T «rrr w  i rn m  m— nrrf—Tiri-Tfc-irt iv ium - ji— t - ir u r t —T-rr *-“T °rr—— m~ -n- i "".I 'i,rfTv~-rf—*T
(M illions of Rials)
Internal Purchases Foreign Purchases Total .
Domestic Products Imported Products 10!00 Consortium NIOC Oonsortii
NIOC Consortium NIOC Consortium
nwn»i»Mauij> ui' inn!.......... . ii'i.'n  um  >Twiiifirri®niM«wi.fci»iirnc~nw«n®g«irT»»in.flri«i«iiiafi»i«iniiiii r»> t
1961 57 535 35 72 439 3640 > 531 4247
1962 92 485 36 37 361 3558 489 4080
1963 95 438 60 102 357 2450 512 2990
1964 106 420 48 2051 412 3029 566 5500
1965 148 493 57 . 1411 464 7527 . 669 943'i
1966 107 507 61 1378 736 1883 : 904 3768
1967 153 538 69 2344 998 1983 1220 4865
1968 188 693 108 1785 877 1860 —j 4311
Source: National Iranian Oil Company, Commercial Section Annual Report
1968® PPo
Although the Consortium5s foreign purchases appear to  have been re« 
duced by half in  th is  period, the purchases of foreign goods by the Con­
sortium through domestic suppliers have risen  nearly 25 times® Tho 
Consortium purchases of domestic products have not shown a large increase 
over the seven year period® Although purchases of imported goods through 
domestic suppliers provide certain'additions.to the GNP*s service sectors,
18o of the Ahwaz Pipe M ill, see T*Mossadeghi "Ahwaz, Pipe H il l  P lants1 
NIOC Public Relations Office, Tehran® Undated ( in  Persian)® .
th e i r  t o ta l  con tribu tion  seems to  be neg lig ib le  from the po in t of view of 
th e i r  m u ltip lie r  impact on the domestic economy, because of th e i r  high 
leakage rate® NXOCfs purchases r e f le c t  to  some ex ten t, th e  a c t iv i t ie s  of 
the In te rn a l Resource Division® This ind icates the  importance of Iran ian  
ownership and p a r t ic u la r ly  management in  influencing the p a tte rn s  of econ­
omic development w ithin Iran® Although the purchases of NIOC are to  a 
grea t ex ten t, pei'ipheral to  o i l  operations, they involve the so -c a lle d ’hon- 
basic  operations” financed by the  Consortium but ca rried  out by NIOCe The 
”non«basic operations” include; housing (3 0  p e rcen t), medical serv ices 
(about 20 percent) and adm inistration (15 percent) etc® The range of the 
non-basic a c t iv i t ie s  are very diverse® They are mainly d irec ted  towards 
improving th e  liv in g  standards of the  o i l  industry  employees® In  some case 
they  include swimming pools, c lubs, holiday camps by the Caspian Sea and 
school and road construction©
The o i l  industry1 s demand fo r  labour i s  another backward linkage® 
Because of the c a p ita l in tensive nature of the oi3, industry , the  lev o l of 
employment has ac tu a lly  fa llen^  while the production has increased® Table 
7© 18 shows employment and p roductiv ity  in  the Iran ian  o i l  in d u stry , 1556 -  
1971o Tho p roductiv ity  in  thousands of cubic metres p er employee has r ise n  
from 0*50 to  Gckf an increase of around 13 times® Two other in te re s t in g  
po in ts  emerge from Table 7©18, f i r s t l y ,  desp ite  the  reduction in  tho labour 
* fo rce  of the  o i l  industry , the  number of Iran ian  s ta f f  has nearly  doubled 
in  th is  period , ind ica ting  the expansion of KICK) and tho su b s titu tio n  of I 
Iran ians fo r  foreign  s ta f f  e Secondly, the  d ra s tic  reduction in  th e  manual 
labour force during th is  period i l lu s t r a te s  tho e f fo r ts  of the  o i l  industry  
to  ra is e  p roductiv ity  and introduce automation in  the production and re f in ­
ing activ ities®
Tables 7*19 and 7©20 show the  employment s itu a tio n  in  the  Consortium 
and in  the non-basic operations, while Table 7©21 provides a breakdown of 
the  Iran ian  labour force among various domestic and foreign companies© The 
data  in  Table 7 ©21 c le a rly  shows th a t NICK) i s  by f a r  the la rg e s t employer, 
followed by tho Consortium© The number of peoplo employed by tho p a rtn e r­
ship agreements i s  small© The la rg e s t employers among tho jo in t ventures 
arc 1APC0 and IPAO, each employing 244 workers, amounting to  ju s t over 0©5/^
Q IP &
of tho to ta l  labour force in  the o i l  sector© The companies which have not 
yet discovered commercially viable o i l  have a labour force ranging from 
only 2 (IROFCO) to 57 (S0PJRMi)o
Table 7©18
Employment and productiv ity  in  the O il Industry  
1956 ** 1971 - - '
wsTirg^ «giiniii iv ipmthi triii iii'i*iii* ihi m  n nim if im f m  1 in n  minm rwrfciiiT^ r n rm w urr «r rrr«rmT-ii»mTiii>T iiinnnT-rn n ra »i>n~»Mi «iiiiiirfirinn rwrwr »«nii-irrMrrm»rTf^:-i>',rw7Tri-i,-<
Year S ta ff  Manual Contractor T o ta l Production Productiv-
Labour (c) in  000* s i t y  in  000*;
Iran ian  Overseas . Cubic Cubic metre
Metros(d) /Employe lie
"r<»TfiiTi[iiniHi<aiwi>wflir iin n » p*''"nifrf iT i >wr iin ri'nw < Twr   iinr» i^iiiiTi<ri irTBnr‘rt>iirii» Tiiiiinirinffin«Ti',W'>niiiirniTiiriliiiri-n‘-iir'riitiirrm-nirn.i>nrTiinrrii
1956 7166 480 47568 7913 63147 31,359 0©50
1957 7722 585 47940 7056 63303 41,763 0© 66
1958 8139 693 48477 4724 62033 47,767 0©77
1959 BZltO 781 . 47984 4305 61310 53,856 O088
i 960 85*4 838 45646 3206 . 58234 61,343 1 © 00
1961 10183 a ? 39638 1619 52292 68,581 1o30
1962 9787 711. 33764 1554 45816 76,570 1 ©70
1963 9623 . 583 32135 662 43003 ' 85,527 2o00
196k 9888 474 31564 727 42653 98,343 2c,30
1965 10349 501 30732 2137 43719 109,412 2© 50
1966 10740 506 30213 1663 43132 123,235 2©90
1967 11659 t t * 29426 . 1385 42470 150,681 3o50
1968 11995(a) « * 27449 2006 41450 159,701 3*80
1969 12295(a) *es 26498 m i 41750 .-195,846 4© 70
1970 12547(a) w 26952 1917 41416 222,180 5 ©40
1971 12350(8) «3» 26324 2008 41166 263,838 6 ©40
© M w om j x w  ««jresBgc^33*ris«ifl«w8M»6S»i*t«aM»g»eg*CT»pi»tt^c3^^^igai««««wa > ^iga>»g^t«otw3«wtfwsa6«a*^**«ft«gwBgAj« w:qr«»<'»«»u**i«<>H»-a»aig^&
a) Including overseas
b) Mid-June 1971
0 ) Excluding fo reign  employees of the  contractors©
d) Prom Table 8C1 Chapter 8©
Source: For the  employment figu res up to  196 7 : M© Nezaa-Mafi ’Hole of Oil 
in  Ironical Economy” A booklet published by NIOC Public R elations Office© 
1967© For other data -  The S ta t i s t ic a l  Yearbook of Iran  1970* P©195a
Tab le  7*19
BnrolcxTment in  the Iran ian  Consortium
ctieaneeBWieKasgwein*::**
Year Producing A c tiv itie s  Refining A c.tiv ities Head O ffice T otal
♦’■*sw<a»e$H3R*'tifc6aS8B5i*»aff*BeMrcah«froti»tittaie*aerwf»ft«»*at#6ieie r min>r-im n ~  ~>TirT~iriimiinmi'<iw»»wfniiirr»"i>g r~i~rrjni'ir nrtfcrn>~inm nn>««[»»Trff»ii~i i | nmi~i,inTri'~Ti>TTfL**,^ *‘>*,m*i~r Tr"»
Iran ian  Overseas Iran ian  Overseas Iran ian  Overseas
1958 18977 223 24661 258 181 110 4441.0
1959 19050 240 19894 304 200 151 39839
i 960 17278 246 17678 310' 241 171 35924
1961 IL962 263 22634 346 428 186 38918
1962 12749 217 19302 261 590 163 33282
1963 12086 183 18191 176 611 140 31369
1964 11744 181 18016 112 554 101 30708
1965 11388 cv VO 17353 112 544 91 29657
1966 10947 152 16293 97 659 98 28246
1967 9983 145 14979 88 628 97 25918
1968 8896 144 13319 73 680 . 104 23216
1963
voCOCOIs*- 130 11857 60 • 840 105 20878
1970 7114 163 10818 45 7 6 6 118 im\ VO O rv> *r”
1971 6 6  20 141 10037 31 840 119 i 7 7 8 8
•oar«c»'*»«Mv.ei
Note:«syt ■«onnaai Lga at Bata fo r 1958**1960 eacludes personnel in  non-basic operationso
Source: Annuel Report of Iran ian  Oil Operating Companies. 1963* 1967, 1971.
Table 7*20
T otal Personnel in  Basic and Non-Basic A c tiv it ie s  
of the  Consortium^, 1967 — 1971
*RO»e<5Saee«Sw»»*iriS*<w»/.'^iw.»4itiieyatM6a5aefci«,erS»'i0H«u»$sie«H5A3Ctiie
Year Basic Operations NoruBasic Operations T o ta l
mmi >»?i nci m a i n  r im  m i ihmup iin-Tr ntmirmrrn m  i n u in ft uTm irw nTnrm rq n t n n — i—rnnntrm in iiiiTirrT  rTmrTrTr-rr-nrn— rm-urrrrrniTrrT  r r r — nm-trn* r r ^ -  t  —*•*-•
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
15763
14204
12635
11539
10878
10155
9012
8243
7485
6910
25918 
23216 
20878 
19024 
17788
Source: Annual Report, Iran ian  Oil Operating Companies 1971 o Po39<>
rrti» trxrw Cm iim ra .-„ g*w> •  • J . *
£U4
T ab le  7© 21
Employment In  the Iran ian  Oil Industry  by 
Companies (At 31sto December* 197Q)■w>^iTTTir i<Ln*»«u_'i "in'H' i igti'tf ''Tii I'lym-ytnan' , wai trn*irriiiriiMinii'ili'-iajTii'H»rtrftnimnn'ii*nifiigl|.~p»»i.*<rnHD *rc—■'git
Employer
S ta ff
gsofT>gaw H»igr»lm| i
Iran ian  Overseas
—fai'BWMM wrTiOf «i«30»i*fi l*i»' igi <nt-»»Tajcg»re5jKOTf^m(a^w(SflP
D aily vate 
Emplyees
T o ta l
N ational Iran ian  O il Coo 47/4 32 10379 15183
National Iran ian  Petrochemical 
Company e 704 3 495 1202
N ational Iran ian  G-as Co0 830 31 739 cr-% 0 0
N ational Iran ian  Tanker Co* 4 «K9 4
Ahwaz Pipe R olling M ill 73 3 211 2 87
Ron-Basic. Operations 2199 21 5172 7392
Sub-4? o ta l: 8582 90 16996 25668
The Consortium (1) 2908 301 8241 11450
snap 109 1 4 102' 225
IPAC 209 7 28 ■ 244
IMIKCO 108 52 38 198
IR0PC0 1 1 M 2
LAPCO 116 28 •100 244
PEGUPCO 2 2 »■* 4
SOFIRAN 38 12 7 57
Continental O il Co© 12 7 4 23
Contractors 1323 618 1352 3293
T otal; mA» 0 CO 1132 26868 414 0 8
Note; 1) Excluding non-b&sic operations ©
Source;. 'N ational Iran ian  Oil Company* quoted in  ’’Petroleum Press Service” 
JuOy, 1971 o
The to ta l  active labour fo rce in  Iran  in  1968* was 7o8 m illion* of 
which 7o2 m illion  were employed* ( 19 ) Ju s t over 0*5 percent of the  t o t a l  
employed Iran ian  labour force was working in  the  o i l  industry©
19© "The S ta t i s t ic a l  Yearbook of I ra n ” 1970* P*31
20b
One f in a l point which may be mentioned i s  th at, although no accurate . 
data i s  available on the outflow of trained manpower from the o i l  industry 
to  the domestic economy, the author® s enquiries point to some transfer of 
technical and managerial s k i l ls  from the o i l  industry to  the national econ­
omy o The outflow of qualified manpower from the o i l  industry has in  many 
cases been due to  re la tiv e ly  low pay0 As can he seen from the f  ollowing 
tab le , salaries of Iranian graduates are particularly low in the o i l  sector 
compared to  those of other government departments, U niversities or private 
enterprises
Average Salaries of Iranian Graduates 1971
Employer B«A* (B«Sc©) 
Rls/month £ ©p © a©
UeAe (MoSCo)
Rlq/month £op0ac
PhoD
His/month £ *p « a*
NIOC (1) 20,000 1,333- 28,000 1,866 43,000 2,866
Plan Organis­
ation 23,000 1,666 33,000 2,333 55,000 3,666
University 
teaching (2) 35,000 2,333 55.000 -  2,333 -
75.000 5,000
Private enterprise 35,000 2,333 A3,000 3,000 60,000 4,000
Note: A ll the salaries are basic starting sa laries in  Tehran0
1) The graduate vdth an engineering degree receives a bonus of £130 p©ae 
The Consortium salaries are s lig h tly  above those of h i000
2) University teaching includes a l l  the establishments which award degree-;;
Source: Personal enquiry by the author©•"nijuws. v v
The author was to ld  by some III00 employees that the low I gvcI  of grad­
uate salaries was part of a deliberate p olicy  to encourage the outflow of 
sk illed  and qualified employees to  the economy, while at the same time wipe 
out the imago of .NIOC being a haven for  underworked, overpaid employees©
The backward linkages have so far had the least e ffec tiv e  impact on tt  
Iranian economy, mainly because the domestic economy is  not capable of 
supplying the sophisticated machinery required by tho o i l  industry© At the 
same time tho capital -in tensive nature of the o i l  industry lias led to  the 
reduction of the already small labour force in  that sector©
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Co Summary and Conclusion
i1ffii»Tr» wnwrin Tnur- MTi H'lipi ■ » *an iiiiUiiiij ©i.l'Hl
In th is  chapter we have looked at the direct and indirect e ffe c ts  of 
tho o i l  industry on the Iranian economy© I t  was shown that the f i s c a l  imp- 
acts of the o i l  industry in  terras of revenues received by the government* 
had the most important e ffect on the Iranian economy through the various 
development plans0 The direct impact of the o i l  industry* v ia  forward and 
backward linkages was small « with the exception of the flow of cheap fu e l  
to the domestic economy©
The conclusions reached in  Chapter 3* for 1901-51 followed c lo se ly  
Rollin* s predictions that neither direct nor indirect influences had any 
impact on the Iranian economy© The payments to the government were often  
misused by the rulers* while the size  of the payments were r e la tiv e ly  small 
compared to  the other sources of government revenue© In 1937 only 13 per­
cent of tho government revenues came from the o i l  receipts© This ratio  
was 11 ©5 percent in  1-949*' There was no comprehensive development planning* 
except for certain 15 imp act1* projects* such as the construction of the trans 
Iranian railway system0 In 1949 only 14. percent of the to ta l government 
expenditure was spent on development projects© Unlike tho 1901-31 period* 
the 1951-7^ period saw a complete change in  the Iranian o i l  industry© 
Development planning started on a moderate scale in  1949 and reached comp4 
rohensive and sophisticated lev e ls  in  the fourth Development Plan© Product­
ion and revenues rose greatly© The o i l  revenues reached a le v e l of $2©1 
b ill io n  in  1971 compared to  /?34«4 m illion in  1954* an increase of over 61 
times© These large amounts of revenue did not go to  make any private  
fortunes* nor 7/ere they invested in  foreign banks for speculative or other 
purposes© The Iranian government u t il is e d  these revenues to  the full®  
Indeed* in many years Iran had a balance of payment d e f ic it  and had to  
resort to large scale borrowing* because the o i l  revenues were not su ffic ­
ien t for the ambitious development plans of the country©
The d iv ision  of the  o i l  revenues by the  government* between the 
Treasury General and the  Plan O rganisation, shows the a tt i tu d e  of the gov­
ernment towards development planning© In tho 1950* s , more than h a lf  of the 
o i l  rece ip ts  \7ent to  the ordinary budget* while in  the la te  1960*s* over 
th ree -quarters  of the o i l  rece ip ts  were a llo ca ted  to  the  development budget
z i r t
The conclusion of our analysis in  the 1951-71 period , po in ts t o -a  fast 
r a te  of groY/th in  the  GUP (9 percent fo r  1963 -70  end 14o3 percent fo r  1971 
a t constant p r ic e s ) , caused by the o i l  industry© These re s u lts  th e re fo re , 
re fu te  Rollins* theory th a t an ex tractive  industry  cannot lead  to  high 
ra te s  of growth in  developing countries©
But do these conclusions substan tia te  Hirchman* s theory of unbalanced 
growth ? On the surface i t  seems th a t the leading sec to r has had a great 
impact on the economy, ju s t as Hirschman had predicted© But i f  we look 
c lose ly  at the p a tte rn  of economic development in  Iran , v/e see th a t th is  
kind','of economic development is  b a s ic a lly  d iffe re n t from th a t of H irsch­
man* s theory© According to  Hirschman, demand-induced influences, or back­
ward linkages ( th e  leading industry* s demand fo r  goods and serv ices from tl: 
n a tional economy) are the most important f a r t  or in  the  development of an 
economy, re su ltin g  in  forward linkages in  terms of employment, p ro f i t  re in ­
vestment and the c rea tion  of complementary industries© In  th e  case of Irar 
however, the  most important fa c to r  in  the  development of the  economy has 
been the ro le  of the o i l  rece ip ts  in  financing the development plans© More­
over, the supply-induced influences, or foreward linkages have been much 
more important then th e  demand-induced influences because of the  nature of 
the leading industry© Indeed the demand-induced influences have been the 
le a s t  important fa c to r  in  the development of the Iran ian  economy* There he 
also been a cause and e ffec t re la tionsh ip  between the national economy and. 
the o i l  sector© The development of the na tional economy caused by the u til  
i s a t i  n of o i l  payments 7/as followed by the c rea tion  of petroleum-based inc 
u s tr ie s  and the  re su ltin g  in teg ra tio n  of the  na tiona l economy with the o i l  
secto r has led  to  a la rg e r  demand fo r  petroleum products©
The p a tte rn  of development of the Iran ian  economy, as in  many 
other developing coun tries , does not match any p a r tic u la r  development theo: 
I t  i s  but one more "specia l case" and i t  i s  7/rong to  generalize from th is  
p a tte rn , even fo r  other Middle Eastern o i l  economies© But why did the o i l  
industry  not have a g rea ter impact on the p re -n a tio n a liza tio n  Iran ian  econ­
omy ? And was the  n a tio n a liza tio n  i t s e l f  a s ig n if ic an t fa c to r  in  paving tb  
v/ay fo r the o i l  industry  to  influence the economy in  such a way? One cann 
claim th a t n a tio n a liza tio n  on i t s  ovai changed the  situation© One may even 
argue th a t the n a tio n a liza tio n  a c tu a lly  hampered development p lann ing ,
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by cu tting  o ff the  o i l  revenues to  the F ir s t  Plan© C learly  th ere  were 
other fac to rs  a t work, both economic end non-economic© A massive inflow  of 
cash cannot by i t s e l f  transform  an under-developed economy in to  a developed 
one© In the p o s t-n a tio n a lisa tio n  ixeriod large  quan titie s  of fo reign  exch­
ange became available© These resources were used w isely and under p rec ise  
and comprehensive economic planning© Large investments in  the e s tab lish ­
ment of an in fra -s tru c tu re , capable of absorbing such vast quan tities of 
cash, were undertaken© Transport, communications, hea lth  and education, 
were among the  top p r io r i t ie s  of the government©
In the  f i r s t  th ree  Plans a su b s ta n tia l portion  -  tw o-thirds of the 
t o t a l  in  the F i r s t ,  end over tw o -fifth s  in  the  Second and Third Plans — 
was devoted to  tra n sp o rt, communications, health  and education© In  the 
Fourth Plan however, the  proportion devoted to  the economic and so c ia l inftt 
s tru c tu re  f e l l  to  25 percent© An important non-economic fa c to r  has been 
the  enlightened p o l i t ic a l  leadership which Iran  has received from the  Shah, 
who has been ca lled  ‘’the moderate leader of the Middle E as t11 e The Consort­
ium negotiated with him whenever there  was a dispute and foreign  c a p ita l 
found a safe and secure place fo r  investment in  Iran© The p o l i t ic a l  stab­
i l i t y  enjoyed by Iran  provided a great incentive fo r  entrepreneurs to  se t 
up in d u strie s  in  the country, and there  was a general mood of confidence in 
business cirelos© The ro le  of the government in  channeling the  funds in to  
appropriate development expenditure must not be underestimated© The p a tte r  
of economic development in  Iran , unlike the Schumputerian theo ry  which draw 
i t s  m otivating power from the sphere of en trepreneuria l decisions, i s  based 
not so much on innovation and management in i t i a t iv e s ,  but mainly on the 
a b i l i ty  of the government to  u t i l i s e  tho borrowed technology and the  av a il­
able funds in  a correct and productive manner©
Iran  has obviously been able to  achieve a high ra te  of growth by 
properly  u t i l is in g  i t s  o i l  revenues© • But th is  progress did not come over- 
rlght© I t  took twenty years fo r  Iran  to  bu ild  an in fra -s tru c tu re  capable 
of absorbing tho o i l  revenues, end i t  took as long fo r  the  government to  
improve i t s  methods of employing those revenues© The Iran ian  economy has 
developed a p a tte rn  pecu lia r to  itself©  Perhaps the  future* development 
th e o r is t  w ill present a theory which-will incorporate the p a tte rn  of econ­
omic development in  Iran©
PART III: Domestic Activities of NIOC 1951-71
Int r oduct ory Note to Pari: III
Part I I I  i s  b a s ic a lly  concerned with the a c t iv i t ie s  of the R ational 
Iran ian  O il Company (RIOC) in  the domestic o i l  market* I t  w ill  discuss 
the  production, d is tr ib u tio n , sa les and p ric in g  of o i l  products through­
out the  country, and thus th e .C onstitu tion  and struc tu re  of RIOC are 
c le a rly  relevant in  th is  connection* Although the th e s is  i s  concerned 
with economic ra th e r  than leg a l and organizational aspects of NIOC, they 
are of sign ificance and form the background to  the investiga tions in  the 
following chapterso.
A fter the Iran ian  n a tio n a liza tio n , NIOC was created, to run the doraesti 
o i l  industry  * The f i r s t  NIOC C onstitu tion  was approved by parliam ent in  
1955  and the second in  19680 Although these two versions are not fundomerr 
a lly  d if fe re n t, the l a t t e r  i s  more soph istica ted , ind icating  the Company*s 
need to  face the modern complex problems of a booming o i l  market'd
The Nature of the Company
Contrary to  what might be implied by the name of the Company, RIOC i s  
not a public co rp o ra tio n  I t  i s ,  according to  i t s  C onstitu tion , a commerc 
i a l  company, paying ta x  on i t s  net p ro f i t  a t the ra te  of 50 p ercen t« The 
Company has 10,000 shares of 1,000,000 r i a l s  each,representing a share 
c a p ita l  of around £ > 5 6  m illion* The paid-up c a p ita l  c o n s titu te s  50 percent 
of the nominal share p rice  and the unpaid c a p ita l  could be c a lle d  upon a t 
any tim e, subject to the  approval of the  Cabinet* (1) A ll the  shares are 
held by the Iran ian  Government and are not transferable*  An increase in  
the issue of shares would have to  be requested by the Board of D irectors 
and approved by the Cabinet*
The a sse ts  of the  Company include the ownership of a l l  petroleum and 
n a tu ra l gas resources of the  country, as well as p ip e lin e s , bulk depots,
1* The M inisters of Rconomy, Finance, Labour and Social Services, Power an 
Mater, and the Attorney General, Tho Managing D irector of the  Plan Organiz 
a t ion, and the Governor of the C entral Bank of Iran , a ttend  the General 
Meetings of the Company as the rep resen ta tives of the shareholders*
road tankers* f i l l i n g  stations*  etc* , necessary fo r  the d is tr ib u tio n  of 
petroleum products© The asse ts .also comprise a l l  the bu ild ings, in s t a l l ­
a tions and fixed  equipment operated by the Consortium in  the Agreement 
Area© ( 2) •
Duties and Legal Powers of ICE PC ■'
The 1955 C onstitu tion  vested the ownership of a l l  equipment c la s s if ie d  
as fixed  asse ts  and operated by the Consortium, in  NIOC© I t  granted the 
Company general adm inistration of a l l  o i l  and n a tu ra l gas resources and th< 
u n re s tric te d  r ig h t to  search fo r  o i l ,  produce, re f in e  and d is tr ib u te  petro! 
eum products throughout the country© The Company was given a s ta tu to ry  
monopoly of domestic sales© Moreover, the  Company was charged with the 
re sp o n s ib ility  of operating the non~basic a c t iv i t ie s  in  the  Consortium 
Agreement Area® (3)
The C onstitu tion  does not lim it NI0Css a c t iv i t ie s  exclusively  to  o i l  
operations© Thus, the Company may bu ild  p ip e lin e s , own tankers, operate a 
d is tr ib u tio n  network both a t home and abroad, e tc 0 ( 4 )
The 1937 Petroleum Act provided MOO with leg a l powers to  grant permis­
sion to  any Iran ian  and/or fo reign  company to  take part, in  the exploration 
and production of crude o i l ,  e ith e r  in  partnership  with NIOC or on th e i r  
own ( 5 ) <• I t  also  empowered the Company to form su b sid ia ries  in  Iran  and 
abroad, but a l l  the shores of the Company are to  be held by NIOC©(6) More­
over, NIOC is  exempted from import licensing  fo r  a l l  i t s  fo re ign  equipment 
and pays no duty on such imports (A rtic le  8) ©
20 For d e ta ils  see NIOC C onstitu tion: A rtic le s  1, 2, 3® 19&8 (in -P ers ian ) 
3o Non-basic operations include h ea lth , education, redres/tion, housing and 
the general 'welfare of the Consortium employees©
4® NIOC C onstitu tion , A rtic le  4®
3® In  p ra c tic e , NIOC has always taken a 30 percent stake in  partnersh ip  
w ith foreign o i l  companies©
6© NIOC ha,s, a t p resen t, four su b s id ia rie s , these are:
The National Iran ian  G-as Company, (NIGC)
The National Iran ian  Petrochemical Company (NPC)
The National Iran ian  Tanker (NITO) end the Ahwaz Pipe M ill (ARJ)
The Board of Directors .
NIOC’s Board of D irectors in  e ffec t runs the Iran ian  o i l  industry , 
and i t s  Chairman, who is  also the Managing D irector of the  Company, un~ 
o f f ic ia l ly  holds the s ta tu s  of a super m in iste r. U n til 1962, Mr© A® 
Entezan was the Chairman, and Managing D irector of the Company, but since 
.19^2, Dr© Eqbal, a former Prime M in ister, has been occupying th is  p o s it­
ion© Dr© Eqbal was appointed by the Shah and reports d ire c tly  to  him, 
which ind icates the importance attached to  the leadership of NIOC by the 
Government ©
According to  the 1968  C onstitu tion , the Board of D irectors i s  composed 
of f iv e  members, one being the managing d irec to r and another the deputy 
managing director® A ll members of the Board must have a t le a s t  20 years 
of government serv ice , f iv e  years of which must have been spent in ,  or in  
association  with the o i l  industry© Almost a l l  m atters regarding the admir 
i s t r a t io n  and po licy  of NIOC are decided by the Board of Directors© The 
only re s tr ic tio n . ■ placed on NIOC decision making is  with regard to  the 
p ric ing  of the  four main o i l  .products: m o to r-sp irit, kerosene, gas o i l  anc 
fu e l  oil© According to  A rtic le  35 (b):
“Any change in  the p rice  of the four main products must be 
.recommended by the Board of D irectors to  the Cabinet fo r  approval 
Only a f te r  such approval can p rices  be altered©”
The effects of th is  important r e s t r ic t io n  are far-reach ing  and require  det­
a iled  analysis (see Chapter 12)©
The management of the  Company and i t s  organisation has undergone 
a considerable change in  the past decade© Charts I  and I I  in  the  Appendis 
r e f le c t  the organizational s tru c tu re  of NIOC in  November 1962  and in  Augy 
u s t 197^® By comparing these two charts one can c le a r ly  see the increas—■ 
ing degree of so p h istica tio n  of the  Company in  th is  period© The organiz-- 
a tion  has expanded as the scope of NIOC operations have reached in te rn a t­
ional standards©. This obviously c a lle d  fo r  an increasing  number of depart 
ments responsible fo r  various new activ ities©  There has certainly been a 
noticeable tendency towards d e -cen tra liza tio n , by assigning responsible 
positions to the Board members and the heads of departments© The Managing
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D irector s i t s  on a large number of committees dealing with service oper­
ations of the  Company, but the operating departments of the  Company are 
run by other Board members0
The Board of D irectors
of ITIOC -  1971
Dr. Eqbal 
Chairman & Managing D irec to r
;Ir. Foroghi Deputy LAD© D irector 
of Non-Basic Operations in  the 
agreement Area.©
Dr*. A© Falah, D irector 
of Technical & In te r ­
n a tiona l A ffa irs
lire A glia Khun Bakhtiar 
|i D irector of Aclministr- 
|  a tion , F inancial Cz 
;j Trading Affairs©
=LMr© Ho Farkhan, D irector 
of Production, lie fin ing  
8z D istribu tion  A ffa irs
Dr. P© Mina Dr® Mussadechi Mre Ramazan Nia
A lternate  D irec to r A lternate  D irec to r A lternate  D irector
I t  must be noted th a t the D irector of Production, Refining and 
D istrib u tio n  A ffa irs  has the most important p o s itio n  because he deals vritl 
the  domestic d is tr ib u tio n  of o i l  products in  Irano
NIOC i s ,  contrary to  i t s  C onstitu tion , in  a l l  respects a public corp­
oration© I t  has no p ro f i t  maximum! z at ion motive and i t s  operations .comply 
with the overa ll government po licy  ra th e r re tfn e r  than maiding of profits©  
The organisational s tru c tu re  of the  Company has undergone some change, i f  
only in  te rn s of. increasing the complexity of the Compan3r. There has cer-
ta in ly  been a tendency to de-cen tra lise  th e  decision making of the Company 
but th is  d e -cen tra liza tio n  has not gene f a r  enougho The Company i s  under 
close scru tiny  by the government and the presence of Cabinet M inisters en­
sures th a t i t s  wishes are carried  out* Indeed, the con tro l of p rices  of 
the four main products by the government has e ffe c tiv e ly  placed the contrc 
of the most important source of NIOC revenue in  the hands of the  governmer 
In other f ie ld s ,  such as production and re fin in g , NIOC has been obliged 
to  ask fo r  the  government's approval before i t  could put i t s  p ro jec ts  in tc 
operation©
CHAPTER EIGHT
-j t t /if-j» w m i n r .*  rr* m~. ti—w n n g
Product3.on.. Ref in ing and Exports
Iran  has fo r  long been a leading o i l  producer in  the  world© In  i 95'* 
she was the  la rg e s t producer outside the Soviet bloc and the  United States© 
(See Tablec8©1) In  th a t year she supplied 2©9 poi'cent of th e  t o t a l  world 
production, and 18*9 percent of the Middle East oil© A fter the  Iran ian  
n a tio n a liza tio n , the  major o i l  companies expanded th e i r  a c t iv i t ie s  in  the 
other o i l  producing countrios and th u s, the  Iran ian  lead was lost© In  19&G 
Iran  was the fou rth  la rg e s t producer out of the  f iv e  OPEC members, but i t s  
shore of the to ta l  world production rose to  9 percent © In  19 6 8  $ Iran  becam< 
the th ird  la rg e s t s h o r t e r  a f te r  Venezuela and Saudi A rabiac In  1970 i t  
x'egained i t s  p o sitio n  as the  la rg e s t exporter in  the  world, but th is  lead  
was lo s t  to  Saudi Arabia in. 1971© Iran  supplied 2S02 percent of the  Middle 
East o i l  and 9*3 percent of the  to ta l  world production in  1971®
Appendix tab les  A~8©1 and A~8©2 compare tho Iran ian  o i l  production 
with th a t of the  other o i l  producers in  a world s e t tin g , while Appendix 
Table A-8.3 ind ica tes the  production of various Iran ian  o i lf ie ld s  in  1971® 
The contents of these tab le s  may be b r ie f ly  summarized as folloTfs:
a) OPEC's production as a percentage of tho to t a l  world production 
rose from 32e6 percent in  19&0 to 51*3 percent in  1971o During
. the  same period Iran* s share of the 0PS0 production increased 
from 13©3 percent to  18*1 percent©
b) In  terms of crude o i l  exports, the  OPEC members provided 6 9®A/a of 
the world exports in  1962© I ra n 's  share of the  world exports was 
9©1 fo in  the same year© In  1971 OPEC's exports accounted fo r  94©3/£ 
of the in te rn a tio n a l crude exports, while I r a n 's  share* was 17c5$«
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Iran ian  Crude Production in  C can a risen  w ith OPEC 
The Middle East and World Production in  Selected  Years
^~%«U>£^4£V3‘'4r«jSKMSC£K3lUMEa»'>tt£«K9
• M illions of Cubic Metres R elative  Importance of Iran
as a Percentage*
■<«mwTiiiiiiiiiiirniinn r . 1 u;infT w*nn*D fT h io  mrw-^ niiTTiTfii*iTTi»ni ii r ii ii im irM iinnvwrtr irn ip m ir r n i i Ri 1 im>i 1 ’ -rmrrrmr* n r  • «r71 wwimr 1 Binn .n w ii  i, u  r1 urn1 ir rr r i iin arrt - n  m  n 1
Year World Middle East* OHSG Iran  World Middle Bast OPEO
1951 713 111 m 21 2*9 18t»9
1955 939 187 19 2©Q 10© 2 -
1960 1221 306 457 61 5*0 1$o9 13o3
1964 1645 431 700 98 6©0 22© 7 i  4*0
1968 2252 6(3 1024 160 7*1 24*7 15 c 6
1970 2679 796 1226 222 8©3 27o9 18*1
1971 2823 932 1455 263 9o3 28© 2 ■18o1
® Excludes 'o i l  production in  Turkey* I s r a e l  and Syria< 
Source:
. e*a*nL»-»s$»fiCfsc*a
Based on data from the  RIOC S ta t i s t i c a l  Cent re  o
■grp<«ffiMM^ o * g » c aws!»g»xfty«Sfcga«g^»a«as—t e w
The Irani,an Crude Production
  - m i~ rrr-ntnmTinTinnr iirTHirrr imiiiium T rr^ -rr -* * --^ tn r^ T -  t
The search fo r  o i l  in  Iran  i s  undertaken by various operators: a) The
National Iran ian  O il Company; b) The Iran ian  Oil Operating Companies*
(The Consortium); o) Eleven groups of companies involved in  the  jo in t 
venture agreements: SXEIP* IPAC, DOPGO* IROFOO* BUNCO* LAPCO, EPC.-, FEUKJO, 
INEFCO* BUSHCO end HQFECO©; d) There are a lso  fo reign  companies d r i l l in g  
fo r  o i l  under serv ice con tracts: SOFIR&N* CONOCO and EGOOO© (1)
In  terms of production* the Iran ian  scene i s  dominated by the  Consort­
ium* The National Iran ian  O il Company produces o i l  from one o i l  f i e ld  in  
- Nafte-Shah and the  size  of i t s  production i s  small© The serv ice co n trac ts  
have not yet produced any o i l  in  commercial quantities*  but four of the  
jo in t .ventures are producing crudes Table 8©2 shows the  production of 
crude by various groups of operators since 1956© In  a l l  years the- Consort- 
iura production has accounted fo r  over 90 percent of the  Iran ian  production 
NIOC production has increased 2©7 times dining th is  period* but in  1971 d t 
only accounted fo r  0©3 percent of the to ta l*  STRIP* th e  f i r s t  Iran ian  
jo in t venture* has boon re la t iv e ly  unsuccessful© I t  took four y e a r s  to  
s t a r t  production and i t  produces the  sm allest quantity  of o i l  compared to  
the  other partners© L&PGO has been the  most successful non-concessionary 
venture* w ithin the  span of fou r years i t  became the  la rg e s t producer afte: 
the  Consortium©
Iran* s O il Exports
I r a n 's  o i l  exports are dominated by th e  Consortium© The percentag© 
share of the Consortium out of the t o ta l  exports was 100 percent in  1956* 
98 percent in  19&4* and over 90 percent in  1971 (see  Table 8©3)© The 
share of NIOC out of to ta l  exports has been le s s  than 1 percent through?* 
out th is  period© The ra te  of growth of exports has been spectacu lar in  
the  1967-71  period© The-Consortium exports grew by 18©3 percent* while
dt r r TVT  ~<n iTrT^ «^r*nrrT rfnrw i7>~rT<rrniTr~fnir.Jt<rV‘irTT~i
1® For d e ta ils  see Chapter 5? and the  map showing the lo ca tio n  of these  
activ ities©
T ab le  8o2
Net Grade Pro6uction bv NIOC and Other Operators 
1956 « 71 (000fs cubic metres)ns3»gSiite.«rcaa;gT>« b ita»»BK twywa ■■e*w mttstnsj*wnr.T
National Oil 
Company Concessionaire Partnership Contracts
§•<■»■•  * w w r m «in** OTTn*aii f ini»r o wiii iiiiiw»<ii'i»in»iiHTiJr b1^ —itof l7i.tttTc rc cTiwffri,ft,vwM»r M«i Wiima
Year HX03 Consortium sn a p IPAC LA.P0Q BUNCO Total
1956 259 31,100 OS t o 31 *359
1957 263 41 ,500 c a t 16 w*m E C 41,763
■1958 267 47,600 csa *0 * * 47,867
1959 256 53}600 • s a » u - 53,856
1960 343 61S 000 «■* •S3 mm - 61,343
1961 380 68}000 175 26 - 68,581
1962 704. 75}500 351 15 * * «n» 76,570
1963 848 83,600 862 17 e tc 85,527
19A 40V 96}300 1454 185 cc3 t « 93,343
19S5 433 104.911 1389 . 2679 cs» t * 109,412
1966 500 117,654 1382 3699 • 9 M 123,235
1967 517 143,136 1198 5830 es, « » 150,681
1968 544- 151,345 1048 5962 802. CJC 159,701
1969 5-41 179,923 1347 6023 6924 8 8 8 195,846
1970 594 202,884 1 8 5 4 5372 8267 3210 222,181
1971 700 240,500 3335 7246 7801 3856 263,838
Source:
•raTSfcwaceatsesfctfCcaa
NIOCfa S ta t is t ic a l Centre for figures of 1963-670 The remaining data 
has been collected  from NIOC Annual Reports©
•kisssesx >ajai^ a *«gv <>»<qf t g ^ im^arfag!»twc*«8s>j5«>gfii  ^< -"vstsra
Tho Iranian Crude Exo-orbs by Various Odorators 
1956 -  71 (000*5 cubio metres)
<M»»»<ttia»^Ptta^»JUMiktiMaj'ijiiMCTTi*i<a ir»r,fci<>roiBa BW>te^»e^»«aasx» w « M^egaBaatf^iwi*^CT^M aM «lft»a>^ i^ jr> »<,rFiiiw|ii»«i.Ti.i:u  iii« m ^ in<uwiHiiw<«i«i/li<i>i»giainsB3a M^ 5B^ M w u u u iia iu :'«!.»jiffrrgr..ig'iAj'aB| Er.>*mnMTC3aiKa
Concessionaire National Oil Joint Ventures Total,
Year Company
Consortium ■NXOS SKIP IPAC IAFQO MIKS0
1956 28,413 •S3 *B9 *«S 43E c a t 28,413
1957 38,601 ■ 34 ms> «4» ■ » 38,635
1958 43,818 48 m *33 «8» t o 43,866
1959 4-9,881 33 tsm am * • 4-9,914
1960 56,4-69 45 - t a « 99 56,514.
1961 63,212 78 175 26 ma M 63,491
1962 71,226 102 363 15 mm r » 71,706
•19 63 79,470 118 812 7 09 c a t 80,40?
1964 90,635 105 1456 89 w » « 92,285
1965 96,344- t s * 1395 2751 mm r e 100,490
19 66 HO,582 mat - 1390 3606 « « 115,568
1967 135,067 Ci9 1235 5687 141,989
1968 147,556 385 1058 6150 383 « • 155,532
1969 167,415 1799 1527 5897 6872 723 184,233
1970 190,005 2857 1824 5417 8382 3232 211 ,717
1971 224,835 2481 3228 7288 7960 3843 249,635
^a«iiTirtg iwi7rftfpnff fiTiHr^pmrrpu1 1ri n~ tim n im6iim w ^ iwwM,i>i»|vtfifcw n it ni m I'r^rfTTtrrrrtrTirMiiTnri ir f nrTi' nhiTrrir r^TiirtrrTaBrfrrrTi~in^ i?rirrrr-a~riTTi< -11. 'i
Note: a) A ll figures are net crude exports
b) NIOC figures for 1957’"61 are for  bunkering onlyc Prom 1961 
onwards tho export figures include exports of aviation fu e l to  
Afghanistaru Data for 1965*»67 i s  not availableo NIOC export 
figures for 1968-7/< do not represent NIOC produced cx*nrle « they 
consist of the crude handed over to  NIOC by the Consortium for  
export to Eastern Europec The prices charged for th is  crude are 
not shown* but are thought to  be belovr market p r ice0
c) A ll the Consortium data includes crude delivered to the Abadan 
refinery for th eir  own account©
d) The joint venture exports include NIOC * s 30 percent share of the 
eru&eo
Source: S ta t is t ic a l and Information Office of the A ffilia te d  Companies©
the  jo in t ventures increased th e i r  exports by. 16*5 percent in  the  period
1970-71 o
The mechanism of Iran ian  crude exports i s  somewhat complex* and is
not the same fo r  each operator©
a) Exports by jo in t venture partners: NIOC i s  th e o re tic a lly  able to  ask 
fo r  50 percent of i t s  share out of the  crude production of the  p a r t­
ners to  be handed over fo r  i t s  own exports* But in  practice*  NIOC ha,e 
always required i t s  partners to  export i t s  share on i t s  behalf to  the  
world markets* In  most cases* the. partnership  crude i s  e ith e r  sold  or 
the open market or supplied to  various re f in e rie s  on a long-term con­
t r a c t  basis© The only d irec t use of partnersh ip  o i l  by NIOC i s  th ro ­
ugh the  supply of crude to  the Madras re fin e ry  in  India* which i s  own­
ed in  the ra t io  of 14 : 14 s 72 by NIOC, American In ternational. Oil 
Company and the Indian Government*
b) Exports by the Consortium: tho production of crude, by the Consortium 
is  always higher than i t s  exports of crude* This i s  so because some 
crude i s  exported as refined  products from the  Abadan refinery* and 
some delivered to  the Abadan and Tehran re fin e rie s  fo r  the  account of 
NIOC fo r  in te rn a l consumption* Also, under the 19 6 6 -6 7  Supplemental 
Agreement, the Consortium has agreed to put a t the  d i s p o s a l  of NIOC, 
twenty m illion  tons of crude over f iv e  years, so th a t  NIOC may export 
th is  crude to  the markets where the Consortium p a r tic ip a n ts  are not 
operating* Table 8©4 provides d e ta iled  information w ith regard to  
crude produced and exported by the Consortium©
c) Exports by NIOC: NIOC exports d ire c tly  very l i t t l e  of i t s  own prod­
uction* Indeed, NX00£s main exporting a c tiv ity  in  the  p ast has been 
through tho supply of av ia tion  fu e l to  the Kabul and Kandhar A irports 
in  Afghanistan* The quantity  of th is  export has been very small: 8,7< 
cubic metres in  1969  and 10,000 cubic metres in  1971o N100*s o ther
exporting a c tiv ity  is  the supply of crude to  tho Sasolburg re fin e ry  
in  South A frica , and the Madras re fin e ry  in  India* (2)
»««tOTgjc*wcar>»gacaia*.‘*'k* <Baewii»M#jrB«.v«ac*ifl*$snw<fc.tOii6«E|t  M’OwMe<ear»*«s«*2#5
2* The Madras re fin e ry  was operational in  1969 and has a capacity  of 50,000 
b /dc NIOC and the  American In te rn a tio n a l O il Company arc committed to  supply 
1.50-180 m illion  b a rre ls  to  th is  re fin e ry  over a 10 year period* Tho Sasolbia 
re fin e ry  became operational in  1971® I t  has a capacity  of 50,000 b /d  and th< 
balance i s  held by TOTAL and the  South A frican Coal and Gas Corporation©
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1964 71 (M illions of Tons)
trnssg»<su3B«»Eygy5re3rg»bt fiu ^ is w u ^ O «sa^ q^ ffljras^ .3««g j r ^ .w i i iL ^ y-ty^.gsaaysa»tt3aeg^
19&4 1965 1966 1967 1963 1969 1970 1971
» s s c « 3 ^ * g w 3aar > » ^ g »«ssagi«fc»g5gc>w«.
Gross crude oa.1 production 82©7 90©2 100©8 122©? 134© 5 13441 174©4 207© <
Returned to  re se rv o irs  
Net crude production 
D eliveries:
For* in te rn a l consumption 
Abadan refinery .' ; 
Mas jicU»e~S oleiman 
Tehran re fin e ry
Totc,l NIOC fo r  domestic 
consumption
Bzport
To trad ing  companies
Light crude 
Heavy crude 
Abadan re fin e ry  
LhG-cLo re f in e ry  ^
To NIOO
Light crude
O08 0*9 1 ©0 0*6 0o3 0g4 0©3 0*<
r rTnrrm-imntnii-rin'r m i inn r r r —'*,—"t ~ ir ““ifrr .^yTrirrr ^ ^ ‘~T^n^-alrT J rT ^ ^ jT n i^ lrin''ir ^ ri^ .^ —i-i r ^ ^ ^ ~ n f i^ r rT iT rT n r fn ^ ^ ,TfrTrijn,f,',,~rrri-'
81 ©9 B9o3 99o8 122oi 134*2 133©7 1?4©1 206ei
3©2 3o3 3©8 4©5
1 ©2 1 ©4 1 e6 1©7
4©1 3©9
O08 0©6
3© 8 4©
0©? 0©,'
2© 8  3 ©7 4© 4 4©’
g ^ » a « t f lyg»a*si^ »»sta s«9w anT3WLi^«WErai ,ig «r o »Ottgffi'j i r ^ i |t?tr*3nr-g,s***iBKGa«^Bsga^^.^
4*4 4*9 5*4 6»2  7o7 8*2 Si 9
40*3 42*1 43*2 55*4 
22o1 2S08 3606  45*0  
15*0 15*0  15*0 15*1
6’jc8 Cjc.7 78*1 106;
45 ol 57*4 67*7 ■-■'/O,
,0 
)*6
16*2  1 6 * 2  17* 16,
0*3 1»5 2*5 ?„■
&S9&&**c7v^&^ii&ss&e&a&i * te ja«cffoear»g*a&»M6SW>£-aBgaagw» gjuaumj. a i  w 6ib^v g g a g ^ g a g a ,r a ^ ffiT.*«ft»«?^Ba*»*r&!35>«aigs^
T ota l Exports: 77*4 85*9 94*8 115*5 1 26*4 1 43*8 1 65*9 1 95*.
Use in  production* stock
"change, 0*1 0©5 «Q©4 0o4 0©1 0©7 «-0o7 0©
■ocaca*«*su&!/a5G^»«^A.*!r<7rfcto<«*rjtu^3ur»/g<rto«MC«©*i*a*S3s6B®taaMt^jK*a^«»W3^3*ys^^
0 Tixe Bandar Hahshar KGL re fin e ry  s ta r te d  operation in  1970©
Source: Annual Reports of the  Iran ian  O il Operating Companies 1964**71 ©
' 9 9 9ft! Q f«)
Another important destin a tion  fo r  NX 00* s crude i s  the  Eastern.
European market© This opportunity arose because of the  two t i e r  p rice  
system operated by the  Soviet Union® whereby the p ric e  of o i l  sold to  
Eastern  Europe i s  50^80 percent above the p rice  of crude sold  by Russia to  
tie  ’Western "European Countries*( 3 ) In  October MI00 signed an agreement
w ith Rumania, under which Iran  was to  eaqaort about fh  00 m illio n  worth of 
o i l  over a ten  year period in  exchange fo r  machinary and goods required  fo r 
l r a n ss development programmes o Sine© then , fu r th e r  agreements have been 
negotiated  fo r  b a r te r  exchanges with other East cam European countries© The 
source of NI00es crude fo r  these exports i s  e n tire ly  from the crude provid­
ed by the Consortium©
Three main po in ts emerge from the  analysis of NI005s ©sport a c t iv i t ie s  
f i r s t l y ,  NIOO has been attem pting to  get in to  in te r n a t io n a l  markets in  
competition with o ther in te rn a tio n a l o i l  companies by p a r tic ip a tin g  in  
various re fin in g  ventures© For 12103 to  become com petitive, crude o i l  must 
•be supplied a t lower prices® For in stance, HIOO has been obliged to  s e l l  
i t s  crude to  the  Madras re f in e ry  a t a discount of 20 percent© ( 4 ) Although 
th is  may havo a d c -s tab liz in g  e ffe c t on World p r ic e s , i f  12100* s  d irec t 
©sports became la rg e r,-i* 1 the  short-term  i t s  impact on the. in te rn a tio n a l 
p rice s  i s  neg lig ib le  and does not represent much more p r ic e  c u ttin g  than 
i s  already p rac tised  by independent o i l  companies* G enerally spooking, 
th is  must be viewed as a  s tra te g ic  a c t iv i ty  by HIOO to  p en e tra te  the  World 
markets®
Secondly, 12100*8 b a r te r  agreements with E astern Europe represen t an 
attempt a t capturing a new and large  market, which cannot be f u l ly  supplied 
by the  Soviet Union fo r  much longer© I t  i s  impossible to  estim ate the 
d o lla r  per b a rre l prdc© of these exports, as the M inistry  of Economy does 
not re lease  d e ta iled  figu res of the machinery imported# Moreover, tho 
machinery specifica tions in  E astern  Europe d if fe r  from those in  th e  West® 
Howeverf i t  i s  f a i f  to  speculate th a t HI03 p rice s  havo been much lower ilia? 
those p reva iling  in  in te rn a tio n a l markets0 12103 i s  obviously su ffe rin g  a 
lo ss  of revenue with regard to  tho opportunity cost of oil. sold to  East err 
Europe© But th is  economic lo ss  may be ju s t if ia b le  in  terms of long-term 
economic and p o l i t ic a l  b en efits  to  Iran©
3c Voprosy Economikl, A pril 19o6 ; p p .88-94 'c ited  in  G-.YT® S tocking 'opecit 
Po195c
4o G#W*. Stocking, cp<>eit P©198#
Finally* NIOC's-marketing a b i l i ty  must not be ex&ggeratedo Indeed*
NIOC has not been; able to  u t i l i s e  fu l ly  the twenty m illion  tons of crude 
which the  Consortium agreed to  hand over fo r  d irec t exportso In  fact*  in  
tho f i r s t  fo u r years* NIOC marketed le s s  than one-th ird  of the twenty m ill­
ion  tons i t  had hoped to  export0
D estination  of Iran ian  Oil Exports
Since the  Consortium i s  by f a r  the la rg e s t ^exporter of Iran ian  crude* 
fo r  which the  data i s  rea d ily  available* the following analysis w ill  be 
confined to  the destina tion  of i t s  exporbse P a rtic u la rs  are shown in  
Table 8c5
Japan was one of the  sm allest importers of Iran ian  o i l  in  1$>62* but 
by 1971 she had become the la rg e s t importer* having overtaken Yfestern 
Europe in  1968® Other important changes in  the p a tte rn  of demand include 
the  development of a sizeable a frican  market* which increased  i t s  import 
th ree  times in  the period 19^2 -  71 * The switch by North America from 
North A frican o i l  to  the  Middle E astern o i l  in  1971* presumably because of 
d i f f ic u l t ie s  with Libya* re f le c t  another major change0 The North American 
imports of Iran ian  o i l  increased by 400 percent in  the  1970-71 periodo 
The product markets have been much smaller* in  1962  Asia was the  la rg e s t 
importer of refined  products* but th is  p o sitio n  was lo s t  to  A frica  and 
Japan in  1971®
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Domestic Supply of O il Products
. »m ■■rm f T  nr-tT-ftr-r^'-Tr  i t  i i M m irrvi i i ' n ~ r ^ r — «ierg’Tvp,i‘
The crude o i l  used fo r  supplying the  domestic market comes from two 
sources? The Naffc-e-Sheh o i l f ie ld ,  which i s  run by NIOC, and the crude 
delivered  to  Abadan, Tehran and Mas jid-i-Soleim an re f in e r ie s  by the  Cons- 
o rtiu a  fo r  the account of NI0Q© The jo in t venture companies p lay  no ro ls  i x 
the domestic supply of crude o i l  or products, although NIOC i s  e n ti t le d  to  
ask fo r  50 percent of th e i r  crude©
At present there  are th ree  re f in e r ie s  and one topping p lan t in  oper­
a tio n  in  I ra n , these are? ' th e  Abadan re f in e ry  and the  Mas jid-i-Soloim an 
topping p la n t, both operated by the Consortium, and the Tehran and Kerman- 
Bhah re f in e r ie s , operated by NIOC® Table 8© 6 shows th e  operation of the 
Iran ian  o i l  re f in e rie s  in  Iran  since 1956© >
The Abadan Refinery
The Abadan re fin e ry  i s  p rim arily  exp o rb -o rien ta ted , but i t  a lso  serve 
as a balancing re fin e ry  fo r  I r a n 's  domestic product requirements© I t  i s  op- 
orated by the Consortium's Iran ian  O il Refining Company, but under the  oper­
ating  agreements, NIOC has p r io r i ty  fo r  i t s  domestic product needs© The re f  
inery  i s  supplied with crude o i l  from the Consortium's 'Agreement Ai'ea, yihioh 
has an average g rav ity  of almost 34° API© N atural gas from the  Marun area 
i s  piped to  the re fin e ry  as fu e l through a 16 inch p ip e lin e , w ith a capacity  
of 115 m illion  cubic fe e t per day0 Plans are under study to  increase  the  
capacity  to  140 m illion  cubic fe e t  per day, possib ly  by using some id le  
crude lines©
The Abadan re f in e ry  i s  a mod era  complex re f in e ry , w ith ' a high degree 
of flex ib ility©  I t  i s  one of the la rg e s t in  tho world with a capacity  of 
450,000 bbl/day© The re fin e ry  can produce 150,000 bb l/day  of middle d i s t i l ­
la te s  T&th a great f l e x ib i l i ty  between gas o i l  and kerosene, ranging from 
67 percent gas o il/35  percent kerosene to  40 percent gas o il / 6 0  percent 
kerosene© For the purposes of th is  study, the  Abadan re fin e ry  i s  analysed 
only fo r  i t s  function as a domestic "balancing” ro fin e ry 0 NIOC i s  e n ti t le d  
to  l i f t  100,000 b a rre ls  per day of o i l  products from the  Abadan re f in e ry , 
but the  ra tio s  of these l i f t in g s  * are subject to  negotiations©
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T a b le  806
The Opera t i on of the Iran ian  Oil R efineries
s cubic metres)
Year Abadan Md0S0 Kennanshah^ Tehran, Alb or z T otal
■ wiih imiHfi 11 r n niTfwnrrTu i* n w w riium  n.y M W Riw f i,ifm~i ,wyHii~'^ ,i|i|ffi'imirti«wwimiiHFW ,‘r.i>r  ^t i"nr»'ni.MTM»nrtfani»rNW%Tiiiir:»wtfiii .imrr ^ n j n 1 r  m vtm me n~Hi 171 nr w«THT'v ■ w minn mrnf u r rK art.urr ~r rr] ,i>g~rtVj
1956 12578 tat 158 « * Ho&o 12736
1957 17134 2730 152 TLq&q 20016
1958 16941 1851 138 ' O ft no a© 18930
1959 17349 1579 125 co» UeSo 19931
1960 18992 1727 152 <a» HqZIo 20871
1961 16793 2386 466 » » n&a8 19645
1962 19460 1545 470 * • 805 22280
1963 19522 2270 485 O ft 267 22574
1964 19936 2124 505 999 420 22985
1965 20312 2009 21 & €ve «. 21 22342
1966 20959 2089 22 0-0 t** 'OW 23048
1967 21592 2398 505 fc? 24495
1968 ■ 22089 1526 532 2685 fto» 26832
1969 22772 1133 56s 39 ^ 3 CK 28438
1970 22952 1097 615 4903 fSft 29567
i 971 23194 1830 701 4929 0 4 30654
n n ’ r i i i in i .  » i i «   'i« g .n n  »rrrw»T. ■m »'i-<'T8»«aa^.m^a-wv.tf?yL, ..i.f l.aT'«nr
® Figures fo r  the Kermanshah re fin e ry  include the  operation of th e  adjacent 
Naft«~e~Shah topping p lan t from 19610
Source; S ta t i s t ic a l  and Information O ffice of the  A ff i l ia te d  Companies of 
MIOCo - -
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The pricing of products for internal consumption i s  "by an agreement 
between the Consortium and NIOQ© The price structure i s  understood by 
tho author to be equal to:
1) The exploration and producing co sts , and the producing fee  for  
the crude used in making the products0
2) The refining cost and the refining fee  of the products lifted©
Over the past decade these costs have developed as shown in  Table 8o7 
below: -
Table 8«7
Eroloration. Production and Refining Costs, of NIOC*3 
l i f t in g s  at the Abadan Refinery*34
Year Crude cost including fee  General refining costincluding fee ** Total
His© per 
cuomotre
Dollars per 
barrol
Rls© per 
cu$metre
Dollars per 
barrel
RlSo per" 
oubmetre
Dollars p 
barrel
1960 118.8 0©25 283©6 Oe66 402© 6 0©83
1961 128© 9 0©27 ' 394a 2 0oS3 523.1 1.10
1962 123© 6 0©26 318*4 O067 442*0 0©93
1963 107o3 0©22 293.7 0©62 lj 01 ©0 0.84
19 64 88 ©1 0©19 285.9 O06O 374© 0 0.79
1965 77.4 Ool 6 240 ©6 0©51 318.0 Go 67
1966 76©8 0oi6 253o2 0©33 330© 0 0.69
1967 69© 2 0o15 233©8 0©53 323©0 Qe 68
1968 58.1 Ool 2 20*1 o9 0*43 260©0 0©35
19 69 58©1 Oc-12 104© 9 0.41 233.0 0.53
 ^ On product basis©
General refining cost excluding special 
rately  id entified  in  NICOc s records© 
Source: NIOC's unpublished records©•/«C-mh>n<SACbc/0!tfa*’U A
w costs which are not sopa-
There has boon a considerable reduction in  tho unit costs of the products 
since i 960© The eo3t of crude o i l  dropped to le s s  than h a lf , while the 
general refining cost declined from a high of 83 cents in  1961 to  41 cents 
per barrel in  1969, a 31 percent reduction© factors contributing to  th is
z z s
very favourable development are: increased o i lf ie ld  efficiency* economies 
of scale  a t the  Abadan re fin e ry  and the  devaluation of s te r lin g  in  19^7s< 
which lowered the  one sh il lin g  per cubic metre producing and re fin in g  fees  
from 1 0 c5 r i a l s  to  9©0 r i a l s  per cubic metro©
Under the  1954 agreement* the  Consortium i s  obliged to  export a t 
le a s t  266*000 b a rre ls  p e r day of re fined  products from Abadan; in  p rac tic e  
the Consortium has been exporting 500*000 b a rre ls  p e r day0 Table 8©8 shows 
tho output of the Abadan re fin e ry  and i t s  d is tr ib u tio n  in  the  period  19^4 « 
1971 ©
One fu r th e r  po in t deserves mention a t  th is  stage© The Iran ian  
supply p a tte rn  has not been in  balance with the  demand p a tte rn  since the  
raid~l960*s* consequently* NIOC has used i t s  l i f t in g s  from Abadan to  balance 
i t s  supply with the  demand© The excessive l i f t in g s  of middle d is t i l la te s *  
with generally  higher World prices* have caused KEC0 a lo ss  in  terms of 
th e  opportunity cost of foregone ta x  revenues© This subject i s  discussed 
in  d e ta il  in  Chapter 11 * but su ffice  i t  to  say th a t  our estim ates show th a t 
th is  .loss ranged from between $ 1 4  to  />17 m illion  in  the  period  1964-71o
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M*!eS= Topping Plant
The topping p lan t a t Mas jid-i«Soleim an i s  40 years o ld , and i s  
operated by the  Consortium to  supply fu e l o i l  to  NIOC fo r  the  domestic 
market® The th re e .u n its  of th e  p lan t are designed only to  separate the 
l ig h t  ends® Some fu e l o i l  i s  returned to  the  w ells , while d i s t i l l a t e s  
are sent to  the  Abadan refinery®
The fu e l  o i l  fo r  NIOC mores 93 kilom etres through a 10 inch pipe­
l in e  of 34*500 bb3/day capacity  to  the Ahwas term inals From th ere  i t  i s  
d is tr ib u te d  by r a i l  tank cars and trucks© H is to r ic a lly , the  cost of fu e l 
o i l  to  NIOC has followed the  p a tte rn  shown in  Table 8©9 below©
Table 8©9
Crude and R efining:C ost_ of JPuel O il 
to  'NIOG ‘
Year Crude cost including fee  MIS toppSuig p lan t cost T o ta l
His© per D ollars per His© pe r D ollars per His© per D ollars :
cu©motre b a r re l cuomotro b a rre l cuometre per barrel
1960 118*8 0*25 30o6 O0O64 147*9 0*31
1961 128*9 0©27 23o9 0o051 164*7 0*35
1962 123 ©6 0*26 43 o4 0©Q91 166©9 0*35
1963 107*3 0o22 25©9 0o035 131.8 Q©28
1964 88©1 0d 9 30©0 0.063 117.9 0*23
1965 77*4 0©16 24©1 0*051 101.9 0.21
1966 76*8 0©i 6 38©9 0*082 115.7 0e 24
1967 69© 2 Ool 5 2 0©054 94© 9 0*20 .
1968 58d 0 d 2 34*7 0*073 92*8 0©20
1969 58©1 Ool 2 45 o0 0.094 103.1 0*21
Source; NIOO1 s unpublished recordso
The decline in  the  to ta l  c o s t, from $0«31- to  /S0.21 per b a rre l  i s  p rim arily  
due to  the  sharp reduction in  crude c o s ts , which characterized  th e  Consort­
iu m s production in  the past decade© Tho MIS topping p la n t 's  costs seem tc 
have r ise n  noticeab ly  a f te r  the reduction in  th e  volume of o fftake  by h i CO c
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As Table 8&10 shows, sine© the operation of the  Tehran re fin e ry , the  fu e l 
o i l  l i f t in g s  from the MIS p lan t have dropped markedly, and fo r  th is  reason 
the  crude runs declined "by h a lf  between i 967-1 9&So
Kermanshah Refinery
The Kermanshah refinery i s  supplied from the Na£t-e-Shah o i lf ie ld  
s itu a ted  on the Iran -Ira q  border, with roughly h a lf  of i t  ly ing  on each 
side0 The f ie ld  has been in  production since 1935 and i t  supplied the old 
Kermanshah re fin e ry  which had a capacity  of 5*000 b /d e (The Kermanshah ref-* 
inery and the  Naft-e-Shah o i l f ie ld  were taken over by ICE00 a f te r  the nation­
alization)®  The new Kermanshah re fin e ry  replaced the  old in s ta l la t io n  in  
1971 the capacity of the re f in e ry  i s  15*000  b /d  a t present® . ■
Tehran Refin ery;
The Tehran re fin e ry  i s  the  only large NIOC refinery* i t  s ta r te d  in  
1968® The crude supply fo r  the re fin e iy  comes from tho Ahv/az area and i s  
mowed to  Tehran through the Ahwaz-Rey crude pipeline®
The Tehran re fin e ry  has an in take capacity  of 85*000 b /d  of Ahwas
crude o i l  or a mixture of 70,000 b /d  of Ahwaz crude and 15,000 b /d  of
Masjid-i-SoIeiman topped crude to  produce the  maximum possib le  proportion
of middle d is tilla te s©  Ahwaz crude has 32° to  33° API g rav ity  and prod-
Puces a r e la tiv e ly  high percentage of middle d is tilla te s®  The capacity  of 
the  Tehran re fin e ry  has recen tly  been increased to  nearly  100,000 b a rre ls  
per day®
\
The operation of the Tehran re fin e ry  has caused a decline in  the 
fu e l o i l  l i f t in g s  of NIOC from the  11 i s  j i ’d~:b»Soleiman topping plant® The 
re fin e ry  i s  p a r tic u la r ly  important as i t  i s  placed in  the  cen tre  of tho 
la rg e s t consuming area of the country0 Appendix Table A-8®5 shows the  
operation of the Tehran re fin a ry 0
The Changing S tructure  of the Various Sources of Supply
The r is in g  demand fo r  o i l  products in  the  industriaH set. areas of 
the  country has c a lle d  fo r  la rg e r and more complex refinerie-&» Because of 
the  largo scale and e ff ic ie n t  operation of the Consortium and the  devaluat­
ion of s te r lin g j the cost of crude fo r  the Consortium-run re f in e r ie s  has 
declinedo The re fin in g  costs of the four main p lan ts  are shown in  the 
following table©
Tablo 8*11
Cost of Finished Products from Domestic
»srgfiK?ttwa * w » w  '■ u t i sw»w«at raa*c*gaii>*.rTJCwt s.» rfc«ca»mtr»*
Sources of Supply 1957 — 69 
(R ia ls  per cubic metro)
^ati>^»T»wg^vi»jg«^fr.;<QUKg!ra»>SMwc«e*»:;aw«ei«awy«ai»r»'«S3gr?aM ?^-><aiS
Year 1957 1953 1959 19^0 1961 19^2 I 965 I 968 1969
Abadan 572 374 370 402 523 442 318 2o0 2 53
Kcrmanshah. 608 727 639 588 664 553 498 508 ne&o
120 142 142 148 165' 167 101 93 103
Tehran .« «*• « cc» n© a©
^ For fu e l o i l  only® Other figu res are fo r  the four main products©
25 percent of the cost i s  due to  the  tran spo rt of crude from Ahwas to  
Tehran® The costs are however, e je c te d  to  f a l l  with the  economies of 
scale©
Source: NIOC1s S ta t i s t ic a l  Centre©
C learly the Consortium operated re f in e rie s  have been low cost sources 
of supply compared with the Kcrmanshah re fin e ry . The Tehran re fin e ry  i s  
not s t r i c t l y  comparable with the  other re f in e rie s  , as the  costs include a 
large element of transport cost© However, in  terms of closeness to  consuiap 
tio n  cen tres , the l a t t e r  re fin e ry  i s  most important* Fuel o i l  i s  no longer 
transported  by r a i l  and road tankers from southern Iran  to  c en tra l and nor­
thern  reg ions, where the  la rg e s t demand fo r  fu e l o i l  i s  concentrated.
There soems, a lso , to  be an important s tru c tu ra l change in  the  supply 
system a f te r  the construction .of tho Tehran refinery© As wo can seo from
Appendix Tables A-8©4 and A~8®5<> The Abadan re fin e ry  has been losing  i t s  . 
p o sitio n  as the  main supplier of the  domestic product market0 The Abadan 
share of the  to ta l  supply m s steady at around 67-70 percent from 1961 to  
19680 With the  operation of the Tehran re f in e ry  in  I 96S, Abadan®£ share 
dropped to  54 percent© In  1970, the  Tehran refinery*s output overtook th a t 
of Abadan®s domestic supply, but in  1971 Abadan5 s output was s l ig h tly  high­
e r  than Tehran® s©
While Kermanshah* s share of the to ta l  supply has been re la t iv e ly  
steady from 1961-71, MasyLd-i~Soleimenfs topping p lan t has suffered  sevex;ly 
from the  Tehran refinery®s competition© MISfs share of the  t o ta l  market 
was more than halved in  1968 and now accounts fo r  around 8 percent©
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Summary  and Conclusion*
We have examined in  th is  chapter, the  importance of Iran ian  o i l  prod­
uction  and export. I t  became c le a r  th a t  NIGC*s own production has been 
neg lig ib le  and i t s ' exports have orig inated  from the Consortium Agreement 
Area© $100*8 attempt to  penetra te  the  in te rn a tio n a l market has been comm­
endable, but the  progress was slow as one might have expected© NIOC has 
been prepared to  su ffe r losses of revenue by se llin g  a t lower p r ic e s , but 
th is  must be viewed as a m arket-penetration s tra teg y , with possib le  long­
term economic and p o l i t ic a l  b en efits  fo r  Iran®
With regard to  the domestic supply of o i l  products: NIOC has been
using i t s  own crude from the Haft-e-Shah o i lf ie ld  and the Consortium crude 
delivered  to  the various re f in e rie s  fo r  the  account of NIOC® Unfortunately 
because of tho p ecu lia r p a tte rn  of demand and the re su ltin g  imbalance bet­
ween the supply and demand, NIOC lias been forced to  l i f t  more and more 
middle d i s t i l l a te s  from the Abadan re fin e ry 0 These middle d i s t i l l a t e s  have 
a higher export value than the other products and consequently NIOO has 
been foregoing p o te n tia l ta x  revenues (see  Chapter 11) 0
With the  construction of the Tehran re fin e ry , the  Abadan re fin e ry  has 
become a balancing re fin e ry , correcting  the  imbalance between demand and 
supply© The Shiraz re f in e ry , due fo r  completion in  1971* was completed in  
November, i973« There are also  pl.ans fo r  th ree  more re f in e r ie s ,  in  T abriz, 
Esfahan and Meshed.© German and Japanese companies have agreed to  bu ild  
export re f in e rie s  by the  Persian Gulf in  the near fu tu re 0
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Cl&ETER NINE
■istribution of Oil Productsag»T3r.E-aK.*»*ail«j3wa8>«aeatasaO««fe*aWga»ia>Be<gfctt3vw«>f.*g<»
in  Iran  1951 -  1971 ( l )«uWsaa«€*aaifflM5^w^gBP*S^t£rasig* n'm.w *>, .Iim1totec^ngfe«itta4»fe»
The purpose of th is  chapter i s  to  tra c e  the  h is to r ic a l  devel- 
’ opment of ,}Sasman-*e<-Pa3dish’f o r the D istrib u tio n  Department of NIOC, (DD)©
I t  w ill  p a r tic u la r ly  concentrate on the 1951 -■ 71 period , and w ill  focus 
a tten tio n  on the problems faced by the Departmentc Moreover, th is  chapter 
w ill  consider the  co n stra in ts  placed on the D istrib u tio n  Department, e ith e r  
by the  government, or by geographical and f in a n c ia l d ifficu lties©  This 
chapter w ill  a lso  attempt to  ind ica te  the  changing s tru c tu re  of the  DD 
during th is  twenty year period  and the  extent to  which i t  has achieved i t s  
goalso
H istorical. Develorne n t
AI03 never considered the  domestic Iran ian  market a very p ro f i t ­
ab le  one® I t  d irec ted  i t s  e ffo r ts  towards exporting tho Iran ian  o i l  to  
Western Surope, and the largo South Asian markets, where i t  could s e l l  o i l  
at p rices 'agreed with the other majors© In  a l l  fa irn e s s , one must admit 
th a t  the  lack  of roads and railways re s t r ic te d  AIOC1 s chances of e s ta b lish -  
ing a la rge  d is tr ib u tio n  network in  the  country® This would have involved 
la rge  in fra -s tru c tu re  investments in  roads and railw ays, which would net 
have been economically ju s t if ia b le  to  a profit-m aking commercial en tity*  
Thus, the  d is tr ib u tio n  network was small and only ju s t met the Iran ian  
government*s oimnum requirements©
1© Most of the data presented in  th is  chapter has been co llec ted  from the 
S ta t i s t i c a l  Office of tho DD* DD i s  unw illing, or unable, to  p resen t the  
data, fo r  the 1951-57 periodj when the operation of the Department wan d is ­
rupted  by the n a tio n a lisa tio n  and i t s  aftermath. ® Continued o v erleaf•««« •
After the nationalization of Iranian o i l  in  195% and the subsequ­
ent establishment of NIOO, the Iranian government placed the scan sion  of 
the distribution network at the top of i t s  l i s t  of priorities®  I t  was the 
government* s b e lie f  that the development of the Iranian economy would not 
be possible unless accompanied by the growing use of energy* and to  achieve 
this* energy was to be made available to  "anyone who needed it*  anywhere in  
the country* and at reasonable prices©" (2)
With the nationalization of Iranian oil* the D istribution Depart­
ment Tfas taken over by NIOC and was charged with the exclusive responsib­
i l i t y  of o i l  product distribution in  Iran© The DD8 s declared policy* with 
regard to  o i l  product distribution was as follow s
1) Oil products must be delivered and available to  the marketing 
outlets©
2) The customer*s requirements must be fu lly  supplied©
3) Tho customer* s requirements must be delivered when required©
4) Oil products must be of standard weight and quality when 
delivered©
5) Oil. products must reach customers at standard p rices, and the 
prices must be reasonable©
6) Oil product prices must be as cheap as possib le to provide cheap 
energy for the expansion of a l l  industries© (3)
The Importance of the D istribution Department
The D istribution Department of NIOC, i s  perhaps, the most import­
ant organisation within the Company© In 1970 the DD employed 8,740 people
of tho to ta l 15*183 employed by NIOC » representing nearly 58 percent of 
tho NIOC workforce© In terms of tho to ta l o i l  industry* s labour force,
the DD*s share was over 21 percent©
1© I am particularly grateful to  Nr* Delfanian and Mr© Asad-Panah for their  
co-operation©,
2o inOG*s Constitution (Policy Section)
3© Policy Declaration of the Distribution Department, quoted in  F© Saadat 
"An Economic G-eosrahky of Iranian 'Oil*5 Vol© II  1968© Tehran ( in  Persian)1 "T • — " -    t  r-~~~-tT-nT^~fiiirtrriTTT* ~-~~ir'tirn>©tnir'—©'i— • • ■—m r n —-!— ©ff— ri i t  » *
In  197^# the D istrib u tio n  D epartm ents sa3.es in  the  domestic mar­
ket exceeded $400 m illion  end i t s  payments to  the government in  the  form of 
sa les ta x  and p ro f i t  ta x  were la rg e r than some of the  partnership  agreement 
providing around 6 to  10 percent of the  t o t a l  o i l  revenues in  the 1968-71  
period© (See 6 hap t e r  7)
The D istrib u tio n  Department had to  expand i t s  d is tr ib u tio n  f a c i l ­
i t i e s  w ithin a shoft period to  comply with the NIOC C onstitu tion  and.gov­
ernment wishes© Because of th is ,  i t  i s  the Department most concerned w ith 
the  overa ll planning of the  economy, but i t s  freedom to  pursue autonomous 
d is tr ib u tio n , sa les and p ric ing  p o lic ie s  i s  severely  restricted©  I t  has 
to  adapt i t s  decisions to  four fac to rs ;
a) Physical p o s s ib i l i t ie s
b) F inancial p o s s ib i l i t ie s
c) NIOO1s overa ll po licy
d) The. governments general-planning-strategy©
Because of the somewhat co n flic tin g  p o lic ie s  of NIOO and the  
"Plan Organization" (th e  Organization responsible fo r  the o v e ra ll "economic 
planning of I ra n ) , the DD has had d if f ic u lt ie s  in  complying with tho wishes 
of both NIOO and the  Plan Organization© Since 1969- 7 0 * th e  Plan Organis­
ation  has moved towards exercising a t ig h te r  con tro l over NIOC in  general, 
and the DD in  particular©  Because of th is ,  there  have been rep o rts  th a t 
the DD would become an autonomous organization by 1975* c a lle d  the  "National 
Iran ian  O il D istribu tion  Company", w hilst remaining an a f f i l i a t e  of NIOC© 
This would allow the DD to work in  close co-operation w ith the  Plan Organ™ 
ization© Such close co-operation i s  c le a rly  e sse n tia l in  so fa?? as the  
construction  of roads and railways i s  concerned© Also, to  achieve the  Plan 
O rgan izations po licy  of d ispersing in d u s trie s  from Tehran and th e  main 
c i t i e s ,  end to  encourage fa c to rie s  to  move to  under-developed reg ions, the  
co-operation of the DD i s  essential© One of the  g rea tes t problems facing 
tho DD has been the p o sitio n  of the storage f a c i l i t i e s  in  d if fe re n t areas© 
With the Plan O rganizations co-operation, the  DD w ill be able to  assess 
o r p red ic t the population movements and the concentration of in d u s tr ie s  in  
p a r tic u la r  a reas , fo r  which i t  could increase or decrease i t s  s to ring
Because of the importance of the DD i t s  Head i s  so le ly  respons­
ib le  to  the Board of D irectors of NIOC0 At present the  Head of the 
D istribu tion  Department i s  Mr* M irsa ii, and he i s  responsible to  Mr© 
Farkhan , a member of the  Board of Directors© Mr0 Farkhsn i s ,  of course, 
responsible to  Dr© Bqbal, Chairman and Managing D irector of NIOO, who i s  
personally  appointed by the  Shah©
Immediate Problems Facing the D istrib u tio n  Denartment
Apart from the tec h n ic a l, managerial and f in a n c ia l problems 
which the  D istrib u tio n  Department was fac ing , there  were s ix  important 
problems which the  DD would have to  solve to  achieve i t s  objectives:
1) The lo ca tio n  of consumption centres: the northern  and c en tra l 
areas of Iran  have tra d i t io n a lly  been the most prosperous regions 
with the la rg e s t consumption of o i l  products, while the  less- 
prosperous southern regions have been the  producers of oil© In  
many oases the d istance between the production and the  consumpt­
ion centres i s  over 1,000 kilom etres (see  Chapters 2 and 10)©
In 19^8, 73 percent of the four main o i l  products (raotor*»spix’i t ,  
kerosene, gas o i l  and fu e l o il)  were consumed in  the northern 
p a rt of the country© (2*.) To tran sp o rt o i l  from these areas to  
the centres of consumption, many new roads had to  be b u i l t ,  r a i l ­
way lin e s  la id ,  p ip e lin es constructed and road tankers purchased, 
by MOD© As we sh a ll  see in  the course of th is  chap ter, many of 
these problems have been solved in  the span of twenty years, but 
some unpredictable fa c to rs , such as the  closure of roads by ava­
lanche (which i s  very usual in  northern areas) w il l  s t i l l  p resent 
d if f ic u l t ie s  in  the future©
2) Lack of d is tr ib u tio n  centres: in  1930 th ere  were only 691 po in ts
fo r  the  d is tr ib u tio n  of o i l  products in  I ra n , and these  could not 
s a t is fy  the domestic energy requirements of the  country© I t  was 
the  task  of the D isbribution Department to  finance , organize and
A© Ho Barkan "A Forecast of the Sale of Oil Products in  the  Next Decade” 
in  l5Seyri Dar Sanaat Naft-o Iran" (A Look a t  tin  Iran ian  O il Industry) 
NIOO Public .Relations O ffice, 1970© p p .130-161 ( in  Persian) See also Map I.
contro l the  d is tr ib u tio n  centres* In  1971 the  number of d is t r ib ­
u tion  po in ts had reached 11 *469 -  a six teenfo ld  increase in  21 
years (see  Table 9®,^0
3 ) Large flu c tu a tio n s in  seasonal consumption: seasonal f lu c tu a te
> ions in  the  consumption of o i l  products, p a rticu la rly  kerosene,
are so g rea t, as to  cause a major storage problem© Kerosene, ' 
which was previously  used fo r  lig h tin g , i s  now used fo r  cooldLng 
and heating , and as such, i t s  d is tr ib u tio n  i s  e sse n tia l fo r  the  ■ 
w ell-being of the  people© Not only must adequate q u an titie s  of 
kerosene be resew ed  fo r  th e  cold season, but also  the storage 
tankers must be located in  the  centres of consumption themselves5 
since tran sp o rt i s  always d if f ic u lt  in  the  winter© A usual 
phenomenon in  I ra n , with regard to  kerosene consumption, i s  th a t 
in  w inter people do not only buy kerosene fo r  th e i r  cu tren t cons­
umption, but also hoard i t  in  the expectation of colder weather* 
The exbent of the seasonal flu c tu a tio n s in  kerosene consumption 
i s  shown in  Table 9 01 *
Table 9 d
Monthly flu c tu a tio n s  of 051 Products in  1©a a u . a ©— WTB' V T I - f n ^ t T V f r *
igures 5u 0 0 0 ss of cubic metres)
Month Jan Feb March A pril May June Ju ly  Aug Sept Oct Nov Deo
Kerosene 228 205 169  145 H I 97 95 94 104 155 174 257
Gas o i l  
Gasoline
158
72
142
56
61 166 189 
67 71
187 209 209 196
75 80 80 76
Fuel o i l  177 16? I 6 4  165  184 1 6 4  181 179 195
Not©i. 1967  i s  chosen because i t  was a Mty p ic a l year”© 
Source: D istribu tion  Department Annual Report, I 967  Po10
205 184  179  
77 75 59
215 215 256
be can see th a t while tho th ree  main products of gas o i l ,  m o to r-sp irit and 
fu e l o i l  had a ra th e r regu lar p a tte rn  of sa le s , the consumption of kerosene 
has been erratic©
The D is trib u tio n  Department i s  not reported to  have even once
1i JL
fa i le d  to  d e liv e r kerosene requ ired  by i t s  customers*. This has been made p os £ 
ib le  by build ing  large  storage tanks in  the main cen tres of consumption©
The provision of storage i s  co stly , but th is  i s  a cost which 131 GO has been
forced to  accept under i t s  Constitution© Unlike the  United Kingdom * s 
National Coal Board, which s e l ls  coal more cheaply in  the summer than in  
the w in ter, and thereby tra n s fe rs  some of i t s  storage costs to  the coal 
u se rs , NIOC is  obliged to  absorb the f u l l  storage cost and i s  not perm itted  
to  pass any cost over to  the  consumers© (5)
4) Importance of kerosene? th is  i s  by f a r  the  most important domestic 
fu e l and th is  fa c t d istingu ishes the large  Iran ian  c i t ie s  from 
those of Western Europe and America, where the major domestic fu e l  
i s  usually  tow q/natural gas© G-as i s  d is tr ib u te d  to  homes by means 
of p ip e lin es , while tho d is tr ib u tio n  of kerosene requires tankers 
and numerous sa les o u tle ts  in  the town -  th is  n a tu ra lly  c rea tes 
many more complex: problems from th e  po in t of view of planning©
5) Imbalance between supply’- and demand: the ex is tin g  re fin e ry  pa ttern
of production of tho four main products i s  not in  harmony with the 
demand pattern© That i s  to  say, there  i s  a shortage of re fird n g  
capacity  fo r  some products, while there  i s  an excess of other prod­
ucts which cannot bo exported due to  lack of markets abroad (This 
Ydll be discussed in  d e ta il  in  Chapter 11)©
6) Keeping up with the large annual increase in  consumption: the pace
of expansion in  the development of o i l  based in d u s tr ie s  has been 
very rap id  indeed in  the la s t  dec ado© With an economic growth ra te  
of arcnmd 11 percent in  the Fourth Plan period  (1968-1972) and a 
r a te  of growth in  consumption of o i l  products of 12©4 percent p e r 
annum, keeping up . with the supply and tran sp o rt of o i l  products has 
proved a d i f f ic u l t  ta sk  fo r  the  D is tr ib u tio n  Department© NIOO pre­
d ic ts  a growth ra te  of 11 percent fo r  the 1970--79 period , which 
fu rth e r  complicates i t s  problems (D eta ils  in  Chapter 10)«
animation of D istribu tion
In 1957, tho DD decided to  divide tho country in to  7 geographical 
consumption centres* These centres were;' 1© Tehran area , 2© Kuzistan a rea ,
eMSSmane*wwwcor**<S7«?«<s<'*6^«X:5F.TifS'»e*ig«tf*w«*>l^
5© The DD curren tly  holds on average, about 37 days supply of o il  product: 
based on 1970/i9?1 f ig u res . '  For kerosene, 52 days supply is  held©-
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3o Esfahan a rea , 4® Khurasan area, 5© Azarbayejan area, 6® Kermanshah area 
and 7« Kerman area® (6) In  1$)66 the  geographical d iv is ion  was changed, 
and tho country was divided in to  f iv e  area3 (See Map I)* This continued 
u n t i l  1970, when i t  was rea liz ed  th a t thero was too much cen tra lised  dec­
is io n  malting and subsequently the DD divided the country in to  nine areas 
(see Map I l ) e F in a lly  the  Stanford Research I n s t i tu te ,  fo r  i t s  own purp­
oses, mad© a new nine area sub-division of consumption and d is tr ib u tio n  
centres (See Map I I I  and Table 9e2)©
I t  must be emphasised th a t th ere  has never been an y  p a r t ic u la r  
programming reason fo r  the  se lec tio n  of an area  or a number of areas© The 
DD has followed, to  some ex ten t, the government®s p rov inc ia l d iv is io n s , 
and to  some extent i t s  own experience in  a llo ca tin g  p a r t ic u la r  areas® ( 7 ) 
Moreover, these d iv isions do not follow the p o l i t ic a l  d iv isions of Ostan 
(Province) and therefo re  i t  i s  hard to  a sce rta in  the  population d en sitie s  
accurately  in  any area® However4, tho  author has attempted to  estim ate the 
population in  various areas on the  b asis  of the  National Census fig u res  
fo r  1966® Table 9<>3 provides us with, the population fig u res fo r  the  recent 
geographical d iv ision  of the  and the volume of sa les  in  these  areas®
Every area  i s  a stmrL«&utGnomons organisation in  te rn s  of fo recastin g  
i t s  requirem ents, but in so fa r as f in an c ia l and p ric in g  p o lic ie s  arc con­
cerned i t  follows MOO directives® In  1950 there  were 691 d is tr ib u tio n  out­
l e t s ,  in  1971 th is  fig u re  reached 11,469© The pace of tho expansion i s  
shown in  Table 9*4*-
60 F o r  d e t a i l s  o f  t h e  1 9 5 7 -6 5  g e o g r a p h ic a l  d i v i s i o n s  s e e  F© SaacLai opecit® 
ppc 403-409«
7© I  have been to ld  by Mr0 Delf amari th a t  in  the  next few years the  DD i s  
going to  adjust the areas by using mathematical programming©
G-eoaraphical D ivision of Oil Product C onsumptlo n  
end D«D Areas
« Ag-?<»tS^wteaaE-*<taafet^*i*T«rvifcj ■:■ni»rn >i,i
Tabriz 
0
pzaehe 
"12,9/s G-organ
©
T ehr an
Ileshed
1 U 5 fKermanshah i
18 * 9/°
0 SsfahanAhvra 
Abadan I I I
iraz  Kern an
o t^ahedan 
\
of Oniiian°*>KlBE!W£!KS33!^33!S!D*S3«SMS»is»
Note: a) Percentage figu res represent the consumption of each area in  19^8
b) The nap ind ica tes  th a t 73 percent of the  consumption i s  concentrated in  
the  northern in d u s tr ia liz e d  p a rts  of the country, which occupies onlyv one- 
th ird  of the area -of I ra n , but have a much la rg e r  population«than the  areas
below the line* c) The map' also shows the f iv e  o i l  areas which ex isted  in
Iran  from 1966-1970® Main towns and provinces of these areas were:
1® Northern Area: Tehran, Ghazvin, G ilan, llazanderan#
2c North-Western Area: Azarbaye jan, Khuzestan, Kermanshaho 
3o C entral Area : Esfahan, G-hom, Shiraz, Kerman®
Ap Southern Area: Ahwaz, B ushir, Khoramabad, Bandar Abbas®
5c E astern -Area : ' G-organ, Khor&san, Zahe&an*
Source: H0 Far than qp«cit Pc4^
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Notes; a) Area VI i s  the main o i l  producing region of Iran
b) Percentage figures represent the  consumption of each region,
c) The new areas, d is t r ic t s  and branches are;
Area
I
II
III
IV
V
VI
VII
VIII
IX
T otals
S o u t c j
D istr ic t
• a^e  ^J'M’i'-'-.Ts:
T abriz , Rezaehe (2)
Branch
A rdebil. Miano. Maraghe, Khey, 
Miandoab ( 5 )
Shahi, Rasht, G-organ, 
Shahroud ( A )
Chalo os 2 Babol, Behshahr, Pahlavi 
Lahidjan, G-onebade Kavios, Semnan
( 7)
Meshed, Torbate, IIeydarie(2) G-hoochan, Neishabour, Sabzavar,, ■
Bo^nord, 3 i r  jand ( 5 )
Kerraany Bandar Abbas, Zahedan
( 3 )
Ssfahan, Shiraz (2)
Lange ( l )
Shahresa, Ynzd, Bar, Abado ( 4 }
Ahwaz  ^ Abadan, Bushir (3) Mas jid-e-'Soleiaan, Andimesh ^2
Keraanshah, Sannandaje 
Koromabad (3)
Khoramshahr5Ivhark Island  {/■■■)
U )Shahabad, Saghez, 3 or odd.
Ramadan, G-horn, Ghazvin ( 3 ) K alayer, Arak, Kashar., ( 4)
Tehran, Tehran Stores (2) Ray, Naziebad, Kara;b Mas a (4/ 
Areas,:, 9 D is t r ic t s : 24 Branches: 37
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Table 9.3
Regional Demand and Per Capita Consumption 
of O il Froducts 
(SfrlLI Regional Cr-oupin.gs)
Population ' O il Consumption Market Consumption per
Region 0 ^ ^ ^ ons) (000*s cudaetres) Share (/£) Head in  l i t re s *
1969 1969 '1969 1969
Azarbayejan 4 o 0 7 1 3 7 o 5 CO
Kermanshah 3*5 7 3 1 7 c 7 2 0 9
Kuzistan 2 c  0 919 ‘  % 7 4 3 9
C aspian 3  o 4 7 8 9 ' 0
CO 232
Tehran 5 o 3 3 9 3 7 41 * 8 7 1 9
Ilsfahan • 2 0 2 862 9 * 1 3 9 2
Pars 2 & 0 463 4 c  9 232
Khorasan 2 0 7 7  6 5 8 « 1 2 8 3
Kerman 1 c 8 272 2 c  9 1 3 1
T otal
(Regions) 2 7 d 9 4 7 1 1 0 0 * 0 3 5 0
Other 2 o 4  2 3 9
T otal: 2 9 o 5 9 7 1 0
Source: Chapter 10e
D efin ition  of D istrib u tio n  Centres
Every o i l  area i s  divided in to  several d i s t r ic t s © Every d i s t r i c t  
has a number of branches, sa les agencies, f i l l i n g  s ta tio n s  and ru ra l/u rban  
dealerships©
Branch: or fbulk depot* i s  an in te g ra l p a rt of the  D istrib u tio n  Department©
^««mwMOTOaiBSS£9 *  *
I t  i s  the la rg e s t d is tr ib u tio n  centre and has large storage capacity© I t  
i s  usual to  f in d  an El00 run shop se llin g  various o i l  products alongside 
a branch, but the  main purpose of a branch i s  to  supply large  consumers 
and sm aller d is tr ib u tio n  cen tres0
Sales Agene v: sa les agencies are estab lished  in  places where NIOC does not 
f in d  i t  p ro fita b le  to  open a branch© NIOO provides the  a sse ts  (bu ild ing , 
products etc©) and the agent s e l ls  the  o i l  products fo r  HI03 a t p rice s  f ix ­
ed by KIOOo The agent receives a, commission proportional to  the  quantity  
of o i l  he sells© A sa les agency i s  u sua lly  quite small, and. does not have 
large  storage capacity© I  he agent must have a good lo c a l rep u ta tio n , and 
he must p resent cash or property  as surety  against any damage or Id ss to  
NIOC propertieso
F il l in g  .S ta t l onss u n t i l  the early  i  960* s , a l l  the  f i l l i n g  stations belonged 
to  HlOCe In  19® there  were 48 p riv a te ly  run f i l l i n g  s ta tio n s , compared be 
185 HI 00 f i l l i n g  stations© In  1$67, the  Board of D irectors of NIOC dec idee 
to  h a lt any increase in  the NI0C«run f i l l i n g  s ta tio n s  and encourage p rivate  
en terp rise  to  supply the required number of f i l l i n g  stations© This was .in- 
tended to  have two important re su lts :  f i r s t l y ,  i t  was to  have co n stitu ted
a step towards a g rea ter in teg ra tio n  of the economy with the  o i l  in d u stry , 
and secondly, i t  was to  bring  about the  establishm ent of f i l l i n g  s ta tio n s  
on a more economical basis© In  1970 there- wore 185 p r iv a te ly  owned, and 
180 NIOC owned f i l l i n g  stations© The procedure fo r  a llo ca tin g  a lic en se  tc 
a p riv a te  f i l l i n g  s ta tio n  i s  as follows: f i r s t l y ,  the D is tr ib u tio n  Depart­
ment decides on a p a r tic u la r  area and-then on a p a r t ic u la r  road© The DD 
advertises in  the na tional p ress th a t anyone who owns a p iece of land in  
accordance with tho required sp e c ifica tio n s ,  and can presen t reputable guaz 
e n te rs , can apply fo r  a license© A fter one person or group of persons are 
chosen, HI00 builds the  f i l l i n g  s ta tio n  and. supplies a l l  the  machinery and 
pumpso The f i l l i n g  s ta tio n  w ill then buy o i l  from the DD and s e l l  i t  a t 
fixed  prices© No competition i s  allowed between the  f i l l i n g  s ta tio n s , al»
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though there i s  a great deal of non-price competition© I t  i s  in teresting  
to  note that unlike European countries* the private f i l l in g  station  does 
not receive a discount on prices from NIOC* I t  receives a commission on 
the quantity of products i t  sells© The nature of the commission structure 
of the f i l l in g  stations i s  highly unusual compared to  the western concept­
ion of 11 quantity discount”, as w il l  he seen la ter  on©
Rural/Urban Dealers; these are private retailers* who buy o i l  from the DD 
at special discounts for resale at fixed  prices and receive a commission 
depending on th eir  sales volume© Unlike sales agencies, they do not re­
present NIOC, have th e ir  own in sta lla tio n  and maintain no direct lin ks with 
the DD© These dealers represent the largest increase of d istribution cent­
res in  the past twenty years© An important component of rural dealers are 
the co-operativos, which were set up after the implementation of the Iran­
ian land reforms© Rural co-operatives were neglig ib le u n til 19&5«
I 965 to 1970 their  numbers increased from 2119 to  5590, constituting the 
largest growth in  the dealers©
Sale of Oil Products through Various Distribution Centres
Table 9®5 shows us the channels through which the four main products 
were sold in  19&9o
Table 9*5
Balo of the Four Main. Products 
Through Various Distribution Centres in  1969
wsw»iss«7!»awariKz£lei<»*iasifflB»MBiosu66s«9esS45assBS$ss»
Distribution Centre Kerosene Mot or-sp ir it G-as o i l  Fuel o i l
Dealers (urban/rural) 77® 6/* 6©3$ 16©2  ^ 8©9/o
Co-operatives 8©8 0©1 4o3 0©5
Private f i l l in g  stations 2©4 28©2 22o 1 0©5
Sub T ota l { pravate
enterprise) 88© 8^ 44© 6$  42© 6% 9 ©9/S
NIOC f i l l in g  stations 109 4102 10©7 0©1
Direct from depot (in c lu - ~ ~  ^ _
ding agencies) yQj 1 ^ ^  ^ 0
Total; 100f6 100$ 100$ 100$
Considering each product in  turn* we can see th a t:
a) Kerosene sa les were la rg e ly  through p riv a te  e n te rp rise , vrith r e t a i l  
o u tle ts  co n stitu tin g  the p rin c ip a l sa les outlet* F i l l in g  s ta tio n s  
played a minor ro le  in  the  sale  of kerosene0
b) M o to r-sp irit sa les are equally divided between-private en te rp rise  and 
NIOO * s own outlets*  The la rg e s t quantity  of mot o r - s p ir i t  sold has been 
through the f i l l i n g  stations* Dealers and co-operatives have played a 
minor ro le  in  the  sa les of m otor-sp irito  (8)
o) G-aa o i l  sa les are dominated by d irec t sa les from depots, while f i l l i n g  
s ta tio n s  p lay  a secondary ro le e Dealers provide over 16 percent of the 
•to ta l gas o i l  sold in  I ra n 0
d) Fuel o i l  sa les  are made almost exclusively from FIDO branches o r bulk • 
depots* p riva te  en terp rise  dealers have le s s  than one-tenth of the  
marketo
8o Urban and ru ra l r e ta i le r s  s e l l  mot o r - s p ir i t  in  f iv e  l i t r e  containers 
a t higher p r ic e se
C omra.is sions
I 1 I'lH'-llf*—T*TT—f'T T 'Timr-
The ra te  of grouch in  r i a l  payments fo r  commissions "between 19&2
and 19^9 ? outstripped  those of any other sing le  cost element© Xn 1968
*
and 1 9 6 9 $ commission p a r e n t s  accounted fo r  a quarter of th e  to ta l  cost; 
of the  DD* (See Chapter 12 -  the  section  on costs)©
Table 9©6 shows the  commission payments in  r i a l s  p e r cubic metre;
L0.6
Commission in  Hi e ls  per Cubic Metre
wa*^efcc3a^ig»»g8»<Kg^nffl^i»CT(iia»ta’'T>rriTii»»i->r-g*wrriiiMiiinaiiiiotiuairri
Product 1962 1966 1967
■■sastfH i ■itna’i.mt >ji ip i w w  i wi nijjjizm
1968 1969
urajafeajirr e a w rm ii- .f i i* a ^ r rm i riri'jarga<pT.*a©.a»'i|g ilyw ^w l^ »
Kerosene 143 ©5 137o5 144>2 1k5c5 144©1
das oilI 16o5 52*7 6o©4 64o4 70© 8
M otor-sp irit 2>ho9 '52*1 6o©9 70©0 7 % 7
Fuel o i l 4e 2 10©9 11 ©0 11 ©7 13*1
Iran o l 54o8 80 0 4 106© 8 9108 136© 9
Bitumen 1 02 1 o4 1 ©4 1 ©4 1 *4
A ll other 4 d 47 ©9 1©3 1*1 3©4
Average: 47© 0 59©4 62*1 64© 2 68©3
>wurrnT<n-t< am tTiiwri ■'i «■ u 't r ' J ’ny-tT-i'm inrnrw arTH n -ff t g H Triff rrr-ii^ctn-flV-*i-«Tilrrffr->mriiTrrCT.-B»i rTT;-* •.VfcT T f r r n - r a.nTrTr im  ft hnrrrn- r-ntn . vrr iV.^jTrii^-ri w j» r»««ai|ni>r«nr» «~i.~iTH'r.l»i f * wifrm ,-■»!> wp,w>iron , |  i. f . i n in
Note; Figures are based on the t o t 8,1 sa les volume© 
Source: Calculated from tho data supplied by NIOC©
•M taar?«e«iM ewsft «- v
C learly , the  commission payments have increased considerably over 
the  seven-year period© I t  i s  hard, to  explain why th is  has happened, part™ 
ic u la r ly  because the DD does not d if fe re n tia te  between the  commission ree~ 
ieved by various o u tle ts  and i t s  data i s  fo r  to ta l  commission payments and 
volumes© One reason may well be the  expansion of p riv a te  f i l l i n g  s ta tio n s  
which supply' a largo  quantity  of mot o r - s p ir i t  and gas o i l ? (see  Table 9©5)© 
Another reason fo r  tho behaviour of the commission payments i s  th e  ra th e r  
pecu lia r s tru c tu re  of commissio?! ra te s  in  Iran©
There are b a s ica lly  th ree  kinds of commission rece ip t exits in  Iran : 
agencies, dealers and p riv a te  f i l l i n g  stations© The commission s tru c tu re  
fo r  each group i s  shown in  Table 9©?© Unlike the  common p ra c tis e  in  b es t or 
Europe and the United S ta te s , dealers end agencies receive no quantity  d is­
counts© The quan tities sold do not always have a bearing on th e  commassior
they receive© But what i s  even more suprising i s  the commission rate 
paid to private f i l l in g  stations© Private f i l l in g  stations receive a f la t  
commission rate of 150 r ia ls  per cubic metre sold* But the commissions 
received for the sale of motor-spirit and gas o i l  are inversely related 'to  
the sales volume as shown in  Table 9©8e
Product
Emission S'
(R ials psr cubic metre)
Private Urbar/rural dealers Agencies
f i l l in g  stations co-operatives & others
unwmmiirn ni»i»ir;inr  iiin n iu u ii h ~iurn m iiin r n m m  r n —lTrrrnrTrmrr " 7 - r T n i r  i r ' i t  — — -‘— ---------------------
M otor-spirit 
Kerosene 
Gas o i l  
fu e l o i l
150s*
150
160^
100
150
100
100
100
80
70
60
 ^ Averages based on 1969 sample survey e
Source: The S ta tis t ic a l Office of the D istribution Department©
Private P illin g  Stations* Commission 
for M otor-spirit and Gas o i l
Table9c,8
pgafcgg=gtfwgvMwi ,'iw u ,s
Monthly sales in  cubic metres
»nWi"i'f II ( m i  l~l I n fflT'i I Illl j «|||"M
Up to 50 
5 0  -  4 0 0  
4 0 0  «  1 5 0 0  
Above 1 5 0 0
Rate in  r ia ls  per cubic metro
500 
130 
100 
80
Source: As in  Table 9©7■•■•tar- ^  ~  *
Tills arrangement i s  very unusual in  any business p ractise0 Tho W  
claims that th is  IdLnd of arrangement w il l  stop any private f i l l in g  sta t­
ions from capturing the customers of tho neighbouring NICC/private f i l l in g  
station© In general the author was not sa tis fie d  by the explanations 
given by the various N10C? o ff ic ia ls  in  th is  matter©
The Iran ian  Oil Transport Network
Tho Iran ian  o i l  tran spo rt network comprises p ip e lin e s , railw ays, road 
tankers end barges©
a) P ip e lin es: The Abadan-Ahwaz product p ipeline  moves products from the
Abadan re fin e ry  to  the Ahwaz term inal fo r  lo ca l d is tr ib u tio n , and also 
supplies tho product p ip e lin e  to  the north* The 12 inch l in e  extends over 
128 kilom etres and was put in to  operation in  1958© I t  has one pump s ta tio n  
of 3,000 hors e-power located  in  Abadanc The lin e  had a maximum capacity  
of 67,000 b a rre ls  per day in  1971® A new 8 inch p ip e lin e , which p a ra lle le d  
the ex is ting  l in e  i s  cu rren tly  under construction and i s  scheduled fo r  
completion in  the  ea rly  1970’s© Without the addition of new pumping f a c i l ­
i t i e s ,  the  combined capacity  of both lin e s  w ill  be 89OOO b a rre ls  p e r day* 
This capacity  could be increased to  130,000 b /d  by using ad d itio n a l pumping 
p lan t a t Abadan and a new pumping s ta tio n  between Abadan and Ahwaz© The 
cost of these pumping f a c i l i t i e s  i s  estim ated a t 426  m illion  r i a l s  (U«S© 
$5® 6 m illion) ©
The 821 kilom etre long, 10 inch Ahwas-Rey lin e  i s  tho key lin k  with th e  
main consumption centre of Tehran, i t  also serves d is tr ib u tio n  depots alon* 
the route as well as the branch l in e  to  Bsfahan. I t  s ta r te d  operations in  
1957 with f iv e  pumping s ta tio n s , having a to ta l  in s ta l le d  horse-pover of 
8 ,160o In  1961 an expansion programme was completed which added nine more 
pumping s ta tio n s  with 14,130 t o t a l  in s ta l le d  hors e-power © Three pumping 
s ta tio n s  arc e le c tr ic  and nine a rs  d ie se l driven© The p resen t maximum cap­
a c i tie s  of the  various sections are  shown in  Table 9c9® A programme of 
e le c tr ify in g  a l l  the  pumping s ta tio n s  i s  underway, and th is  i s  expected to  
increase  the  p ipeline  capac ities by 10 percent©
The Asna-Ssfahan l in e  has a diameter of 6 inches end moves products 
over a d-istance of 234 kilometres© I t  was put in to  operation in  1958 with 
one pumping s ta tio n  of 1080 hors empower, and has a p resent maximum op or a t i n  
capacity  of 11,700 b/d©
Tho 325 kilom etre Rey-Rasht p ipeline  was operational in  i 9 6 0 , with on© 
e le c tr ic  pumping s ta tio n  of 980 horse~p over, located  in  Key* Tho products 
arc received from Key (on the o u tsk irts  of Tehran) and transported, fo r  d is­
tr ib u tio n  to  G-asvim and Rashto The maximum capacity  of the  Rey-G-asvin
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section  i s  18,800 b /d  (8  inch lin e ) , whereas the 6 inch diameter sec tion  
from G-azvin to  Rasht has a capacity of only 12*200 b/d» A new pumping 
s ta tio n  vdth 700 in s ta l le d  hors e-power i s  under construction  a t  Gazvin, 
and w ill  cost an estim ated 152 m illion  r i a l s  (U©S# /2©0 m illio n )© When 
in  operation, i t  w il l  increase  the capacity  of tho 6 inch l in e  to  Rasht 
to  13^00 b a rre ls  per daye
The 8 inch Rey-Meshod product l in e ,  w ith a length of 819 k ilom etres, 
has been operational since 1962  with two pumping s ta tio n s  having a 2,280 
to ta l  in s ta l le d  horse-power© The maximum operating capacity  of the  f i r s t  
section  from Rey to  Shahrud i s  12,600 b /d , which w ill be increased  to  
16,200 b /d  when a new 1,400 hors empower pumping s ta tio n  a t Seianan, costing  
an estim ated 129 m illion  r i a l s  (thS© fA  0? m illio n ), i s  completed© The 
second section  from Shahrud to  Meshed has a capacity  of 11,700 b/d© The 
throughput of the  p ip e lin e  can be fu r th e r  increased by ad d itio n a l pumping 
stations©
b) Road Tankers: th is  mode of tran spo rt i s  an important l in k  in  the
d is tr ib u tio n  system© Road tankers serve lo c a l r e t a i l  o u tle ts  and whole­
sa le  consumers and also  move products, including fu e l o i l ,  long d istances 
in  areas not served by p ipelines or railways© Due to  th e i r  m obility  and 
speed they are also used as emergency tran sp o rt means i f  shortages develop 
because of bottlenecks or breakdowns in  p ipeline  or r a i l  transport© A 
la rge  portion  of the to ta l  road tanker f l e e t  i s  owned by p riv a te  en terp rise  
In  i 960  there  were 355 NIOC owned tankers, compared to  904 tankers under 
contract© In  1 9 6 9 , the number of NIOC owned tankers was s l ig h tly  reduced 
to  340, while the  number of p r iv a te ly  owned tankers had r is e n  over 2«5 
times to  2,450© The growth in  p riv a te ly  owned tankers i s  c le a r ly  due to
a d e lib era te  NIOC po licy  of encouraging p riv a te  en te rp rise  to  take over 
more re sp o n s ib ility  fo r  distribution©
c) Railways: in  1970, the  Iran ian  S ta te  Railway operated a network of 
3,700 kilometres© The main lin e s  form a *T* with Tehran in  the intersect©  
The most frequent connection is  between Khoramshar and Bandar Shahpur, on 
the  Persian Gulf, via. Tehran to  Bandar Shall on the Caspian Sea, over a 
d istance of 1,440 kilometres© I t  i s  on th is  lin o  th a t the  railw ay moves a 
considerable • amount, on behalf of NIC0, of fu e l o i l  from the  loading point 
in  Ah was to  the north© Another major l in e  connects Tehran with T abriz ,
(7 3 6  kilom etres) and from there  to  Turkey over a d istance of 2 2 4  kilom etres< 
From Tabriz a railw ay connection ex is ts  to  Ju lfa  on the  Soviet .border© The 
th ird  section  of the  fT;t  leads from Tehran to  Meshed over a d istance of 
926 kilometres® A p la n 'e x is ts  to  connect Qom with Zahedan to  form a l in k  
'with the  Pak istan i Railway system® In  tho early  1 9 5 0 * s  and early  1960*s ,  
the Iran ian  Railways played an important ro le  in  the  Iran ian  o i l  tran spo rt 
network© This ro le  however, has now been g rea tly  reduced because they do 
not operate e f f ic ie n tly  and re liab lyo  The u t i l iz a t io n  r a t io  of ex is ting  
tra c tio n  equipment i s  extremely low in  comparison with o ther countries and 
the maintenance of fixed  in s ta l la t io n s  i s  not properly  c a rried  out© ( 9) As 
a r e s u l t  , r a i l  tran spo rt i s  slow, delays are frequent and NIOC has no d irec  
con tro l over tho situation© However, as long as th ere  i s  a major fu e l  
shortage in  the north which must be covered from th e  MIS topping p la n t, or 
the  Abadan re fin e ry , which cannot be moved by p ip e lin e s , the  railways are. 
necessary and could con tribu te  much to  an e ff ic ie n t and low cost product 
d is tr ib u tio n  in  Iran© In  add ition , the railw ay tank cars have a much longer 
l i f e  than road tankers, are cheaper to  run and carry  a much la rg e r  capacity  
-  namely an average of 43 cubic m etros, compared to  16 cubic metres fo r  
road tankers© There are 1 ,0 6 0  railway tank oars in  Iran© Of these , about 
10 percent are usually  out of operation due to  maintenance and impairs© 
Another 1 0 - 1 5  percent are a lloca ted  to  the M ilita ry  or fo r  tho own use 
of the  railwayso This l e a v e s  NIOC with 800 to  850 cars voider normal cond­
i t io n s ,  which i s  equal to  a capacity  of 3 4 ,4 0 0  to  3 6 ,5 0 0  cubic metres© This 
may be compared with a road tardier capacity in  1969  of about,43,000 cubic 
m etres, of which one-eighth aro owned by NIOC*
d) Barges:n a few chartered barges supply petroleum products in  bulk and 
in  drums to  towns along the  Persian  G-ulf, the  most important of which i s  
Bandar Abbas© These barges, vdth a capacity  of 580 to  1,740 cubic metres 
are moving a small but increasing  amount of o i l  products out of Abadan©
Tho distance from Abadan to  Bandar Abbas and Bushehr i s  1 000 kilom etres and 
400 kilom etres respectively©
9*. Quoted from a government report ttA Survey of Iran ian  Economy” 
published by Iran  Trade and Industry , Tehran 196.9, Pe7&o
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The re la tiv e  contribu tion  of each means of tran spo rt i s  shorn in  
tab les  9o10 and 9*11* I t  w ill  be seen from Table 9*10 th a t p ipe lines 
co n stitu te  the most important c a r r ie r  of o i l  products in  Iran* A fter pipe­
l in e s ,  p r iv a te ly  owned tankers and the railways are in  second and th ird  
placeso NIOC has cut domi on i t s  operations of road tankers* In  1971 NIOC 
closed down the Kermanshah road tanker depot serving the western and cen tra l 
d i s t r ic t s  of the  country and tran sfe rred  i t s  re sp o n s ib ilitie s  to  contract 
road t  ankers * The impact of th is  closure can be c le a r ly  seen in  Table 9*10© 
NIOC gave up i t s  operations of barges in  19&3 and tra n s fe rre d  th is  a c tiv i ty  
to  p riva te  en te rp rise  shipping®
Tho use made of the transport system increased from 1,824 to  9*404 
m illion  ion-kilom etres between 1957  and 1971 -  th a t i s  an increase of 400 
percent in  fourteen years® Since the  early  196o*s p ipe lines c a rr ied  the  
la rg e s t volume of o i l  (see  Table 9*11)© This period i s  marked by a largo  
decline in  the  re la tiv e  importance of the railw ays, from 43 percent in  1957  
to  9*0 percent in  1971 and a very rap id  r is e  in  the  use of p ip e lin es; from
27 percent to  72 percent of the  total® The share of road tankers f e l l  from
28 percent in  1957  to  17 percent in  1 9&2 , but from 19^2 onwards th is  r a t io  
seems to  have been re la tiv e ly  steady® Barges have remained a minoi* fe.ctor 
in  the  t o ta l  transport network, not exceeding 2 percent fo r  the  whole perioc
Table 9©11 shows the ra te  of change of each means of transport*  I t  
shows th a t the ra te  of increase in  the p ipeline  use was 29 percent in  19&7 
(over 1966  f ig u re s ) , but i t  gradually f o i l  to  23 percent in  1968  and fin a lly  
to  7*3 percent in  1971* This can be explained by the construction  of the 
Tehran re fin e ry  in  1967* There was a sm aller need fo r  the construction  of 
new p ipe lines or fo r using the ex is ting  p ipelines to  the maximum capacity , 
as Tehran, the la rg est consuming cen tre , and the  nearby a reas , were supp­
lie d  by the lo ca l refinery* The ra te  of growth in  the use of the  railw ay 
was « 20 percent in  19^7 * ” 9 percent in  1970 and — 6*8 percent in  1971 *
This vras due to  the replacement of r a i l  tran spo rt by p ipe lines and the  de­
c lin in g  importance of railways as a c a r r ie r  of o i l  products® P riva te  road, 
tankers show a high ra te  of growth, while NIOC road tankers showed a decline 
In  t o t a l ,  the various transport methods show a growth ra te  of 14 percent in
25
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1967$ 16©7 percent in  1968 and 8*9 percent- in  1971© In general one can 
conclude that the o i l  transport network in  the 1957-71 period has been 
dominated by increased pipeline use and decreased railway uso0 But was 
there any economic advantage in  the increasing use of pipelines over other 
means of transport ? To examine th is  we have to look at the cost structure 
of the transport networko
The Structure of Tra:
Transport costs constitute a major component of the to ta l cost of o i l  
products© Indeed, transport costs account for between 35 to 42 percent of 
to ta l costs as shown in  the following table©
Table 9© 12
m a w  >n«iixtijii j*i nmwifi an waqmgi
Costs in  the Iranian Oil Industry., I962 and 1968 
(R ials per cubic metre)
Cost components 19&2 19^9
Ex-refinery cost of tho product 443 41*1
Container cost 70 3&
Transport cost 399 392
Distribution cost 285 270
Total cost: 1397 1109
Note: The ex-refinery cost of the product includes the cost of transporting 
the product to tho refinery, therefore transport costs are in  fact higher 
than those shown above©
Source: Chapter 120
Since transport costs are such an important part of the to ta l co st, i t  i s  
essentia l to look at the average cost per ton-ldlometrc of each transport 
method in 1$57-71 period (Table 9°13)o Vo can seo that average costs of 
a l l  the means of transport have fa llen , (with the exception of NIOC road 
tankers in 1971 >which have risen fox* reasons explained before)© As expectec 
tho largest decline in average cost i s  attributed to the p ip elin es, which.
V»M
CD
CM
« - 1 vn LT\I ca 
•  i •
iiT-| O 
VO I o  
• I  •
T - l  1 -I
KN T - '
O  r -
IT i 
• f -
O
'd' 
r—
o
o o CO o
CM t—
o r - CM
KN T -
r t  • •
h  - p  
a ) m  > o < o
.  «a s >& a!
(Zf U <5
f e l l  by th ree -quarte rs  in  fourteen years© The la rg e s t drop in  the pipe­
lin e  cost was in  1958* when costs equalled h a lf  the 1957 costs© This was 
due to  tho large p a rt of the f i r s t  tran s-Ira n ia n  p ip e lin e  opening fo r  op­
erations© The p ipeline  cost then remained re la tiv e ly  steady u n t i l  19^7* 
when the second tran s-Ira n ia n  p ipeline  -  th a t  supplying the Tehran re f in ­
e ry ^  requirements -  was ready fo r  operation© I t  led  to  a f a l l  in  the  pipe-" 
l in e  costs to  an average of 0©35 r i a l s  in  1967* and f in a l ly  to  0«23 r i a l s  
in  1971o I t  i s  important to  note th a t even in  1 9 5 7? when heavy investment 
in  p ipe line  construction was talcing place* the average p ipe line  cost was the 
lowest of a l l  a lte rn a tiv e s  -  ind ica ting  th a t the expansion of the p ip e lin e  
network was economically sound© The average railw ay cost also declined* but 
the decline was only fourteen percent in  fourteen years© The f i r s t  drop 
came in  1959$ trut th e re a f te r  the cost was steady u n t i l  19&4 © In  19&4 the 
cost declined to  1©08 r i a l s  and stayed constant fo r  th ree  years© As th© 
railw ay fre ig h t charges increased* the  average cost rose to  1 ©12 r i a l s  in  
19 6 7* and remained re la tiv e ly  steady u n t i l  1971 * The cost of p r iv a te ly  
owned road transport* tankers and barges has s te a d ily  dropped over th is  per® 
iod  and considering th a t they were the second la rg e s t c a r r ie rs  in  the  1957“* 
71 period (Table 9© 10)'their operations seem to  have been sa tisfac to ry*  I t  
i s  also  an ind ica tion  of the  lack of monopolistic power in  the  p riv a te  road 
tran sp o rt and barge in d u s tr ie s , and i t  shows good judgement on the  p a rt of 
NIOC to  leave th is  section  of the tran sp o rt system in  the hands of p riv a te  
enterprise© NIOC’ s road tanker costs declined s te ad ily , but th is  decline 
was not s ig n if ic a n t, p a r t ic u la r ly  in  view of the  small amount of o i l  prod­
ucts they carried , (around 1 percent in  1971© See Table 9©10)o l n t o ta l ,  
average costs  dropped by 60 percent in  th is  period©
Pipeline costs show a continued drop of 12 percent in  19^7* 18© 2 percent 
in  1968  and 8 percent in  1 9 7 1* which i s  by a l l  standards qu ite  significant®  
Hallways show an increase of A percent in  co sts  in  19^7 and 1©8 percent in  
I 9 6 8 , but th ere  was a decline in  costs in  1969  and 1971* The cost perform­
ance of NIOC owned road tankers i s  d isappointing, and ju s t i f ie s  the  closing  
down of the  Kernanshah .Tanker Group in  1971®
Another way of looking a t the change in  cost s tru c tu re  of th e  various 
tran sp o rt methods i s  by making a simple index number © Table 9^14 shows the 
index of changes in  average costs of the  various means of tran sp o rt in  the
1957-71 period, taking 1957 a base year (1957 = 100)© Graph, I shows 
th is  change of trendse. As with pipelines we can see a decline from 100 
in  1957 to 23 in  1971* with the breakthrough in  cost reduction in  the 
years 1953 and 19^7* Railway costs have dropped from 100 to 86 in  the 
span of fourteen years© Privately owned means, of transport have reduced 
their  cost by 27 percent and NIOC tankers have increased their  cost by 35 
percent in the same period© The to ta l decline i s  60 percent© Graph I  i s  
in teresting insofar as i t  indicates the influence of the cost of pipelines  
on the to ta l average cost© We can see that the to ta l average cost lin e  
follows the drop in  pipeline costs closely* a l l  the way to 1971* indicating  
that the decline in  pipeline costs has been the single most important factcr  
in  the reduction of to ta l transport costs©
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Summary, and Conclusion \
YJe have seen in  th is  chapter the d i f f ic u l t ie s  and co n stra in ts  faced by \ 
the  Distribution-Departm ent of NIOC during tho period a f te r  n a tio n a lisa tio n  
Because of i t s  importance, the  DD was subject not only to  geographical, 
techn ica l and f in a n c ia l , but also p o l i t ic a l  constraints©
The expansion of the d is tr ib u tio n  centres and tran spo rt f a c i l i t i e s  must 
appear as a great success sto ry  given the  d i f f ic u l t ie s  i t  had to  face© The 
DD expanded i t s  d is tr ib u tio n  o u tle ts  sixteen?old in  fourteen  years and prov 
ided o i l  products of standard qua lity  a t fixed  prices© I t  managed to  bring 
o i l  products to  any customer who required them, any tim e, and anywhere in  
the  country© I t  bore the  .burden of high storage tanks fo r  kerosene so th a t 
no one would be l e f t  without it©
As f a r  as tran sp o rt po licy  was concerned, i t  was economically sound to  
invest in  p ip e lin e s , with consequent reduction in  p ip e lin e  costs© The over 
a l l  success of the  tran sp o rt po licy  was not carried  over In to  the area, of i t  
operation of the  NIOC owned road tankers and barges© The barges were aban­
doned in  1 9 6 3 * &nd road tankers are cu rren tly  being phased out© NIOG corr­
ec tly  decided th a t i t  would be a sound po licy  to  leave these p a rts  of the 
tran sp o rt network in  the hands of p riv a te  enterprise© The soundness of 
th is  po licy  can be judged from the po in ts l is te d  below:
1) During th is  period , not only were the costs of the  p r iv a te ly  owned 
tanks and barges lower, but also there  were consisten t reductions in  
average costs©
2), I t  brought about a c loser in teg ra tio n  between the  nations,! economy and 
the  o i l  industry©
3) I t  decreased the burden of adm inistrative and c e n tra lised  decision 
making of NIOC©
In  general i t  i s  wrong to  appraise-NIOC's a c t iv i t ie s  on a purely  comm­
e rc ia l  basis© I t  has to  be understood th a t as a p a rt of a public caporation  
the  DD has d iffe re n t objectives from those of a commercial e n ti ty , and thcr> 
efore needs to  bo judged in  a d iffe re n t framework© Given the  co n stra in ts  
re fe rred  to  above, i t  must bo sa id  th a t the DD has been successful in  ach­
ieving i t s  goals©
CHAPTER TEN
s '
The Remand fo r Oil Products in  Iran 1951-71w — ,i ■ niti-»'iMWMM— w » fi n i w i ' n u  hi i —Bg»«f» immrmm n w*w*T>w.Hg<g<*«T»i»iww.^i'M n
Chapters eigh t and nine examined the sources of supply and the 
d is tr ib u tio n  of o il  products in  the domestic market. This chapter i s  
concerned with the demand conditions in  the Country during 1951-71o 
The in troduction  to  the chapter discusses the p a tte rn  of energy consumption# 
This i s  followed by; A) A h is to r ic a l  analysis of demand and the fac to rs  
a ffe c tin g  i t?  B) The development of the o il  markets, and C) the ro le  
of o i l  in  household expenditure.
In troduction: Demand fo r Energy and the Role of Petroleum Products,
In the Yt'estem World, the primary source of energy fo r  fu e llin g  the 
" In d u stria l Revolution" was coal. Early in  the tw entieth  Century, the 
in d u s tr ia liz ed  co u n tries* a tte n tio n  was turned towards o il  and i t s  d e riv a t­
ives due to  the discovery of numerous commercial and in d u s tr ia l  uses of 
petroleum products and hence th e i r  a v a i la b i l i ty  as an a lte rn a tiv e  source of 
energy. Progress in  re fin in g  and the a v a i la b i l i ty  of o i l  in  large  quantities 
f a c i l i ta te d  a switch from coal to  o i l .  Today,in most in d u s tr ia lis e d  Countr­
ie s  of the world petroleum products account fo r  a t le a s t  45 percent of th e ir  
energy requirements.
Table 10,1 shows the p a tte rn  of energy consumption in  the in d u s tr ia l  
Countries of the world.
Generally, in  the developed world, so lid  fuel,  has given way to petroleum 
products. This transform ation i s  p a r tic u la r ly  s tr ik in g  in  the case of 
Japan. However, w ithin th is  general framework, several po in ts need to  be 
emphasized;
1) The process of rep lacing  coal by o il  w ill not continue in d e f in ite ly ;
At some point in  time, the diare .of so lid  fuel w ill become s ta b iliz e d  because 
of the secu rity  of supply, and fo r so c ia l and employment reasons*
2) Natural gas* which has been playing an important ro le  in  the 
American energy consumption, i s  expected to  become increasing ly  used in  
Western Europe,
3) Although h y d ro -e le c tric ity  and m clea r power have been re la tiv e ly  
unimportant in  the p ast, u ltim ate ly  the l a t t e r  i s  expected to  become the 
su b s titu te  fo r o i l .
Table 10,1
P a tte rn  of Energy Consumption in  the In d u stria l 
Countries, (Percent)
Area Year Solid Fuel , Oil Natural Gas Hydro- Nuclear
E le c tr ic i ty
United 1955 31*4 40.1 27,3  1.2
S ta tes 1965 2 3 .7  40.4 34.5 1.4
1970 21.1 44.6  32.8  1 .4  0,1
Western 1955 78*2 18.1 1,0 2.7 -  100
Europe 1965 49*3 44*3 2.7 3*5 0.2 100
1970 29*4 6 1 .1  6.1 3.0 0 .4  100
■ — miiriiwii — iiiiniiwu-mwniii    i iiiiWitiiiiit ih~ iiiimir   a iinwimn miii«~TTinmiTrwr irin immi~iriraiiil nm m « r~ nil m ~i ■■ —n r~» imiu m      i mn ■Trnnnw m.inii.i   >n ■ mi win miiun
1935 70.0 20.6 0.3 9*1 -  100
Japan 1965 3 6 .9  56.5 1.5 3*1 -  100
1970 22.2 74*1 1.0 2.6 0.1 100
Source; S.H. Schurr and P.T. Homan "Middle Eastern Oil and The Western 
World Prospects and Problems*1 New York 1971* S ta t i s t ic a l  appendix, pp. I6.I- 
177 fo r 1955 siid 1965 figures .For 1970 figures see:-"!B.!P. S ta t i s t ic a l  Review-
of the World Oil Industry’8 London 1970, p.16
The Role of Petroleum Products in  Energy Consumption of Iran
As one might expect, the demand fo r  energy in  Iran  i s  dominated by
petroleum products and natu ra l gas. liy d ro -e le e tr ic iiy , coal, charcoal and 
wood, and animal m atter play subordinate ro le s . Table 10.2 shows the 
p a tte rn  of energy demand in  Iran  fo r se lec ted  years. The following 
observations can be made from the ta b le .
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1) Petroleum products have increased th e ir  share from 63 percent in  i 960  
to  74 percent in  19^9 ? "tort i t  i s  expected th a t la rg e r  u t i l iz a t io n  of 
na tu ra l gas and h y d ro -e le c tric ity  w ill  reduce the share of petroleum 
products to 60 percent by 1982*
2) A s tr ik in g  fea tu re  of the tab le  i s  the large  share of the na tu ra l 
gas consumption in  Iran* While the in d u s tr ia l  and re s id e n tia l  uses of . .
n a tu ra l gas are very small indeed, the major portion  of na tu ra l gas i s  
used fo r  cdl production purposes, and as a re fin e ry  fu e l. Although the share
of na tu ra l gas has declined throughout th is  period, i t  i s  expected th a t i t s
use.;w ill reach 34 percent of the market in  1982, when the plans fo r  laying
p ipelines in  the large  c i t ie s  are due to  be completed.
3 ) Coal, wood and animal matter"have declined in  importance, and th is  trenc 
i s  expected to  continue.
/
A word of caution regarding the r e l i a b i l i ty  of the data in  Sable 10.2: 
Y/hile i t  i s  easy enough to  estim ate the demand fo r petroleum products, na tu r­
a l  gas, h y d ro e lec tric ity  and coal, because the sources of supply are few 
and the data well recorded., . i t  i s  much more d i f f ic u l t  to  estim ate the 
consumption of wood, or the use of animal matter* This i s  p a rtly  due to  
the m u ltip lic ity  of supp liers , and p a rtly  due to  the fa c t th a t as these 
products are mainly used in  the v illa g e s , adequate records are not kept.
The Stanford Research In s t i tu te  claims th a t these data were co llec ted  by 
the use of Sample Surveys, but provides no in d ica tio n  of the methods vised in  
estim ating these data . •
The four main products? m o to r-sp ir it , kerosene, gas o i l  and fu e l o i l  
account fo r the major portion  of o il  products used in  Iran . In  19579 these 
products accounted fo r 96 percent of the to ta l  o il  product demand of the 
Country^ th is  r a t io  f e l l  to  9“* percent in  1961 and has not a lte re d  since.
This ind ica tes  the sign ificance  of these products in  the p a tte rn  of energy 
demand in  Iran  and fo r  th is  reason the present chapter i s  confined in  most 
p a rts  to  the study of these four products.
The Relationship between GRP and Remand fo r Energy
The re la tio n sh ip  betv/een the lev e l of economic development and energy 
consumption i s  well estab lished , and numerous publications on the sub ject
are available* I t  is .g e n e ra lly  agreed th a t there  is  a close co rre la tio n  
between the  ra te  of economic growth and the  demand fo r  energy 0 Professor 
Mikdashi has co rre la ted  per cap ita  GNP and per cap ita  energy consumption 
fo r  the United S ta te s , Northern Europe, Southern Europe and Japan, and 
Latin  America fo r 1960-66® He obtained a l in e a r  re la tio n sh ip  of I  = 0*14 
X -  2o5; r  = 0c99^ where X is  per cap ita  GNP and Y per cap ita  energy 
consumption,* (1) The Stanford Research In s t i tu te  has also ca rried  out a 
p ro jec t examining the re la tio n sh ip  between energy demand and GNP, fox- Iran  
Portugal, Greece, Turkey and B ra z il, Japan and U.SoA* In  a l l  these cases 
i t  reported  th a t a d e fin ite  and d ire c t re la tio n sh ip  ex is ts  between the  ra ti 
of growth of GNP and the ra te  of growth of demand fo r  energy® The x’elevan 
data  fo r  Iran  are shown in  Table 10®3e
Table 10c3
Annual Growth Rat es of GN? and Energy D emand ( wi
1960~63 1963-69 1969- 8 ^
n in im iw mm wtiJT rnm  r  ii i -T>inrm in«i« tliii ^nMMiinMifTTTnrca r t n i n l i
Gross N ational Product
Energy Demand
R atio of Energy Growth 
to  GNP Growth
wimwiffmiJT nr»irtwnnimn>»i»i mf m inw m piw m n1 wwT»it «ni«r»n>i wii hi imurniHfn witwitu *■>»— ii* ■**ih t » m w u m i - m m n - ■ c t t-
* Projected  GNP growth ra te  i s  based on the  Plan Organization fo rca s ts  in  
1 9 6 9© Projected energy demand growth ra te  i s  based on S.R.Io fo recas ts  ±1 
1969o
Source: The Plan Organization
■awttii k x  wiuiixn 11 'tmrn w
The above figu res show th ree  d is t in c t  periods:
a) 1960- 6 3 : The Iran ian  recession  of 1960-63  a ffec ted  energy consumption
more than GDP as a whole0 In  the  196 .4-65  period the  economy showed signs 
of recovery and the energy and GDP growth ra te s  began to  converge*, Genera! 
ly  speaking, there  were too many d is to rtio n s  in  th is  period to  allow props] 
analysis , but i t  i s  f a i r  to  say th a t  towards the  end of th is  period , indus- 
I 'ia liz a tio n  got under way a t a f a s t  r a te .
r i r w i-rnf m~rrr trrn «t  rnn i im—TTnfcn -m imntm ni m n » n i > , n  m w n  irwwam Tm iu n m m  n m  —■ n « -  <■ iiiim i1 \* iw» r u  i 1> tr* im *» ^ « pi i i  mr an i ml h t» ■ata^em^nt*«»vss^S5s
1o Zo Mikdashi ’’The Community of 013. Exoortins C ountries” George Allei 
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b) 1965- 6 9 ; The growth of energy demand overtook th a t of the GEP. 
in d ica tin g  rapid economic progress and the g rea te r u t i l iz a t io n  of energy 
resources*
C) 1969-82? The growth of energy demand and GNP run p a ra lle l  to  each - 
other* This i s  a p a tte rn  s im ila r to  th a t of the in d u s tr ia l  countries 
of the world, and may ind icate  th a t Iran  has s ta r te d  a phase of s e lf -s u s ­
tained gro?/th.
In  the case of Iran , one could argue th a t there  i s  a strong and d ire c t 
co rre la tio n  between the ra te  of economic growth and the consumption of the 
four main products which co n stitu te  the bulk of the Iran ian  energy demand.
( 2) .
A -  H isto rica l Movements in  the Demand fo r  Oil Products.
The analysis of the h is to r ic a l  movements in  demand fo r  o il  products 
has a twofold advantage; F ir s t ly ,  we are able to  examine the fac to rs  behind 
the v a ria tio n s in  demand and th is  w ill help to  fo recast the fu tu re  move­
ments of the demand; and secondly, we can obtain an ind ica tion  of the level 
of economic development in  the Country by looking a t  the various trends* 
Table 10*4 shows the demand fo r o il  products in  Iran  since 1958* The 
growth ra te  of demand was 10.3/° in  “1961s and 10y8fo in  1971 in d ica tin g  the 
p e rs is te n t demand fo r  o il  products in  a decade of rap id  in d u stria liz a tio n *
Factors A ffecting the Demand fo r Oil Products in  Iran
Lack of re l ia b le  data has made i t  impossible to  make a d e ta iled  
analysis of a l l  the movements in. demand* Therefore, we confine our analysis 
to  two p a rtic u la r  areas; F ir s t ly  the general fac to rs  a ffe c tin g  the o i l  
product demand in  Iran ; and secondly, the sp ec ific  events th a t have in f lu ­
enced th is  demand.
The general fac to rs  are ;
a) General economic growth and in d u s tr ia liz a tio n ; The government policy  
and the way i t  a ffe c ts  the d irec tio n  of the economic growth has had an 
important influence on the demand fo r  o il  products. The Third Development 
Plan ( 1963- 68 ) an tic ip a ted  in d u s tr ia l is a t io n  on a massive sc a le , Th
2* A regression was run fo r between Iran ian  GDP and the demand fo r  the 
four main products fo r  1957-70. The regression  lin e  was Demand fo r  o il  
products D * -l64*58 + 6*55 GDP! r? 0.99* The high c o rre la tio n  co­
e ff ic ie n t  i s  not suprising  in  view of the close in te rac tio n  between the
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of growth of GHP ^ 3 ,3  8 , 5$ and the ra te  of growth of industry  was 11$, 
w hilst the o il  product demand grew by 13
In the Fourth Development Plan (1968-72) the ra te  of growth of GNP was 
11 .4/6 and th a t of the o i l  product demand 10.3?6 (3) •
b) Expansion of the d is tr ib u tio n  and tra n sp o rt network (Chapter 9)«
c) f. S ta b il i ty  of the p o l i t ic a l  system, a tt ra c t in g  foreign  and domestic 
c ap ita l to  se t up in d u strie s  which were n a tu ra lly  petroleum-based,
d) Population Increases! The population of Iran  was 17*5 m illion  in  
1950* and over 30 m illion  in  1970* (4 ) While the Iran ian  population has 
le s s  than doubled in  20 years, the consumption of o i l  has risen, n inefo ld . 
Indeed, o i l  consumption per head was 120 l i t r e s  in  1957? and 219 l i t r e s  
in  1964* In 1971 th is  figure  rose to 400 l i t r e s ,  ( 5 )
e) Urbanizations Since the urban population consumes the la rg e s t 
quahtity  of petroleum products, the growth in  urbanization  must a f fe c t  the 
demand fo r  o il  products. According to  the 1956 National Census, the to ta l  
number of centres with a population of more than 5*000 was 186, In  the 
1966 Census, th is  figure  reached 235* The Iran ian  Urban population was 
31?o of the to ta l  in  1951* tout ro se ’45/6 in  1970, In the 1956-70 period the 
urban population growth was 5*5°/° per annum, while the ru ra l population grew 
by only 1.7/6 per annum. The average annual growth of population in  th is  
period was 2*9/6 annum. (6)
f)  Per Capita Income! Increases in  per cap ita  income a ffe c t the demand 
fo r  various o il  products d if fe re n tly . In some cases the demand i s  a ffec ted  
d ire c tly  through the expansion of the market. Thus, fo r  example, in  the 
case of m o to r-sp ir it, the increase in  per cap ita  income w ill  induce new 
consumers to  en ter the market, but w ill not s ig n if ic a n tly  a ffe c t the 
consumption leve l of those already in  the market, unless they purchase
additional motor ca rs . In other cases, fo r  example Kerosene, increases in  
per cap ita  income w ill influence the demand in  two ways! On the one hand
2. continued. V ariables.
3. GUP figu res are taken from the Annual Report and Balance Sheet of The 
Central Bank of Iran . Oil product demand growth ra te s  are ca lcu la ted  from 
Table 10 ,4« NOTE: These figures are not s t r i c t l y  comparable to  those of 
Table 10,3* The l a t t e r  considers the demand fo r  a l l  energy resources.
4. J .  B harier: “Economic Development in  Iran  1960-70" op•c i t  p ,2'7 con td /. .  
5 & 6 overleaf.
i t  enables consumers to  purchase add itional space heaters or new 
f a c i l i t i e s  such as water heaters* , On the o ther hand, the increases 
in  per cap ita  income may cause a switch by other consumers from coal and 
wood to  kerosene*
L it t le  work has been done in  Iran  on estim ating the income e la s t ic i ty  of 
demand. The only recorded re s u lt  was published by the Central Bank of 
Iran , on the basis of average data fo r ten  years* These data  are shown, 
in  the following table*
Table 10.5
Income E la s t ic i ty  of Demand fo r Various 
Oil Products in  Iran . 1956-68
. Product Income E la s t ic i ty  of Demand
Motor S p ir it  
Kerosene 
Gas Oil 
Puel
Other Products 
T o ta l:
Source; The Central Bank of Iran  15Annual Report and Balance Sheet,
21st. March 1968“ (in  Persian) -
The data in  the above tab le  seems to  confirm the argument th a t the increase 
in  per cap ita  income has a sm aller e ffe c t on the consumption of the motor­
car fu e ls . The income e la s t ic i ty  of demand fo r  fuel o i l  i s  re la t iv e ly  
high, which i s  not suprising  in  a rap id ly  growing economy.
I t  may be in te re s tin g  to  note th a t a United Nations Study, in  1968 , showed 
th a t the average income e la s t ic i ty  c o e ffic ien t fo r energy consumption was 
1 fo r  developed p rivate  en terp rise  economies; 1*2 fo r c en tra lly  planned 
economies, and 1 .6  fo r  developing countries. (7 )
‘4* continued. No te ; The Iran ian  National Census was taken in  1966* The 
1970 figu res are based on a 2 . 97° population growth.
5. NIOC S ta t is t ic a l  and Information Office.
6. J .  Bharier -op.cit, p .28 .
7. TJ.N* Economic and Social Council: ?l Natural  Resources Devel opmen t "and 
Pol i c i e s ” .New York > 19 71 PP * 5-6.
0.72 
1.40 
0.80 
1.70 
4.57 
1 ^  82
g) P rice  changes: because of the  re la tiv e ly  steady p rices  maintained by
the  National Iran ian  O il Company, no ca lcu la tion  of the p rice  e la s t ic i ty  
of demand has been possible* However, i t  i s  generally  agreed th a t the  
petroleum product demand is  p r ic e - in e la s t ic  in  I ra n 0 The p ric e  e la s t ic i ty  
of demand i s ,  to  a great ex tent, dependent on the  a v a i la b i l i ty  and p rice  
of substitu tes*  In  the ea rly  1960*s Professor Adelman noted th a t th e  p rice  
e la s t ic i ty  of demand fo r  crude o i l  was *'a composite of the moderate gasol- 
ine e la s t ic i ty ,  the very great fu e l o i l  e la s t ic i ty  and the  interm ediate one 
fo r  m id d le -d is tilla te s"*  (8) P rices of fu e l o i l  and coal were then comp­
e t i t iv e ,  thus maiding fo r  a high c ro s s -e la s t ic i ty  of demand. As the p rice  
of fu e l  o i l  dropped and th a t of coal increased, the  p rice  e la s t ic i ty  of 
demand fo r  fu e l o i l  declined* The p rice  e la s t ic i ty  of fu e l o i l  could, in ­
crease once nuclear power or n a tu ra l gas become competitive* In  Iran  how­
ever, coal'was never a serious competitor to  fu e l o i l ,  wood and charcoal 
were in fe r io r  to  kerosene, and not availab le  in  large quantities© Motor- 
s p i r i t  and automotove gas o i l  were n a tu ra lly  competitive as m otor-car fu e ls  
but i t  is  not expected th a t a. change in  th e i r  re la tiv e  p rice s  w ill  cause a 
switch from one product to  the other* The government has d e lib e ra te ly  im­
posed high taxes on m o to r-sp irit, while making i t  i l l e g a l  to  use d ie se l 
driven motor vehicles in side  the c itie s*  In  th is  way th e  government has 
sub-divided the tran sp o rt market in to  two d is t in c t  areas:
a) P riva te  m otor-cars, ta x is ; public  tran spo rt etc* , using m o to r-sp irit 
only, may be used in  the  c itie s*  b) D iesel driven motor v eh ic le s , such as 
lo r r ie s ,  in te r - c i ty  bus serv ices, t r a in s ,  road tankers and t r a c to r s ,  can be 
used outside the  urban areas* This separation  of markets has elim inated 
the  c ro s s -e la s t ic i ty  of demand between automotive gas o i l  and mot o r-sp irit©
Having discussed the  general fac to rs  th a t e ffec t the  demand fo r  o i l ' 
products, l e t  us now consider some spec ific  events in  Iran  which have had 
a profound impact on the demand:
1960-63 Economic Recession: th is  period was marked by a severe economic
C i >ti*>»~ih T i i i> ~ »n if ■ j l i i n i i r m r m . r  m —" »r ~r"r ioiT'"mn~TiiTiT»rTnn~»i m .'tfrrrT i.M jT-w runt ^  **
c r i s i s ,  slow-down in  in d u s tr ia l  a c t iv i ty  as well as a draught in  1 9 6 2 , whicl 
adversley a ffected  a g ric u ltu ra l production* The e ffec t of th is  economic 
recession can be seen from Table 10*2j-* The ra te  of growth o f a l l  products 
dropped from 10*3/3 in  1961 to  4 c6>i and 4o8^ in  1962  and 196 3 © Although
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th e re  was no decline in  the ra te  of growth of the  demand fo r  not or •» s p i r i t  
th is  growth was small* The ra te  of growth of kerosene and gas o i l  f e l l  
sharply* The la rg e s t decline was th a t of fu e l o i l  -  the most important 
in d u s tr ia l  fu e l: i t s  growth in  1962  vras h a lf  th a t of 1961c The ra te  of
growth of G-NP f e l l  to  2 percent in  19&2 -  the lowest annual increase since 
the  nationalisa tion*  '
1 964 -65  P rice  Increase: in  19 6 4 , the Cabinet decided‘.to ra is e  the  p rices
of mot o r - s p ir i t  and kerosene, upon the recommendation of the  Board of 
D irectors of NIOC.... M oto r-sp irit p rices  were increased by 100/:o from 5 r i a- 
pei’ l i t r e  to  10 r ia l s  per l i t r e ,  and kerosene p rices  by 48 ;£ from 2©3 r ia l :  
to  3 »5 r i a l s  per l i t r e *  P rices of fu e l o i l  and gas o i l  remained unchanged 
The government1 s decision to  increase p rices  .was based on two fa c to rs , 
f i r s t l y ,  domestic p rices were very low compared to  ex te rn a l p rice s  ( 9) an< 
secondly, no public reaction  was an tic ip a ted , given the  extent of depend-?
I
ence on these two products -  th a t i s  to  say, th a t the p ric e  e la s t ic i ty  of 
the  demand was thought to  be n e g lig ib le . The government had c le a r ly  mis** 
judged the situation© The public  reaction  was v io len t and spontaneous©
A boycott of m otor-spixit consumption s ta r te d  immediately© Taxi d rivers 
and bus d rivers went on s tr ik e  and the p riv a te  m otorists stopped using 
th e i r  cars© There were large  demonstax^taions by the  workers, students 
and middle classes© The Shah personally  intervened and ordered the  reduc 
ion of not o r - s p ir i t  and kerosene p rices  to  6 r i a l s  and 2 .5  r i a l s  per l i t r  
respectively© Following the  increase in  p r ic e s , there  was a decline in  
the  absolute le v e l of demand fo r  mot o r - s p i r i t ,  while the ra te  of growth 0: 
the  demand fo r  kerosene f e l l  from 14©2/b in  1'9^4 to  2©3/V in  19^5® A fter 
the reduction in  p rices the demand returned to  normal©
The p e c u lia r ity  of the  s i tu a tio n , where we have an a lready low p ric  
•for petroleum products, and a r i s e  in  p rices causes such a pub l i e  re  act for 
can only be explained in  terms of psychological factors© I t  i s  not the  
p rice  e la s t ic i ty  of demand th a t we should look fo r , but the  p o l i t i c a l  
e la s t ic i ty  of demand© This stems from a strange k ind  of emotion and ■< - - 
anger which, i s  associated with o i l  in  Iran* I t  seems reasonable to  as sum 
th a t the emotions over o i l  were an afterm ath, i f  not an extension of, the  
Iran ian  n a tio n a liza tio n  and i t s  subsequent defeat©
9© For d e ta ils  see Chapter 12©
There i s ,  even today, a fee lin g  among many Iran ians th a t they have been 
cheated out of th e ir  r ig h tfu l share of th is  God-given resource and they 
simply are not prepared to  pay more fo r  it*  Indeed, the o il  product 
p rices have been frozen since 1^5e ' . '"'
The examination of various end-use markets fo r Petroleum products 
in  a Country, can lead not only to  a b e tte r  understanding of the sec to ra l 
demand fo r  these products, but also  to  a re a liz a tio n  of the s ta te  of 
development of the economyc I t  w ill ind ica te  th a t the consumption of o il
products has been both the cause and e ffe c t of the increased lev e l of
economic a c tiv ity .
End-Uses of Petroleum Products
I t  i s  possible to d istingu ish  ten  major in te rn a l ..markets and one externa, 
market in  the Iran ian  Oil Industry; these ares 1. R esiden tia l and- 
Commercial9 2. E le c tr ic i ty  Supply, In d u s tr ia l, 4-* Government,
5e A griculture, 6. Read Transport, 7c Railways, 8. Aviation, $. Coastal 
Shipping, 10. Oil Company use. 11. Bunkers (Bunkering fo r  ships i s  an
external demand.) ■
Table 10.6 shows the demand fo r Petroleum products by end-use fo r  1$60-69» 
Table 10.7 shows the percentage share and the growth ra te  of these markets 
in  th is  period. Three secto rs predominates R esidential and Commercial, 
In d u s tr ia l, and Road Transport; together they accounted fo r  78 percent of 
the to ta l  in te rn a l demand in  1969 .
H isto rica lly , the R esidential and Commercial market has declined in  
importance and- th is  trend i s  expected to  continue, mainly because of the 
in troduction  of na tu ra l gas. In d u str ia l market has s l ig h tly  improved i t s  
-position  and Road Transport has declined s lig h tly  in  importance* The l a t t e  
i s ,  however, expected to  become the la rg e s t end-use by 1$82e 
A griculture has su b s ta n tia lly  improved i t s  re la tiv e  p o sitio n , vh.il0 o ther 
end-users have more or le s s  maintained th e ir  re la tiv e  p o sitio n s .
In so fa r  as the growth ra te s  are concerned, one can see th a t in  the period 
i 960- 1965 , the highest growth ra te  occured in  A griculture. The second and 
th ird  highest growth took place in  Government use and Air T ransport. In  
the period 1985- 6 9 , the highest growth ra te  occured in  Coastal shipping, 
because of i t s  neg lig ib le  s ta r tin g  po in t. A griculture and E le c tr ic i ty
supply occupied second and th ird  positions resp ec tiv e ly .
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Table 10.7
Market Share and Growth Rates by End-Use
1
-
1960 - ^ d <•
\
-Market Share (fo) Average Annual Growth 
Rates (fo)
1960 . 1965 ■ 1969 1960-65 1965-69
R esidential and 
Commercial 40 37 34 7*3 11.1,
E le c tr ic i ty  Supply 6 6 8 8.5
In d u s tria l 21 22 23 9*9 14*0
Government 1 2 2 16.5 ■17.4
A griculture 1 5 * 6 40.0 21.0
Road Transport 24 22 21 7*3 ‘ 11.4
Railways 2 1 1 1.7 2*0
Aviation . 2 ■3 3 . 14.3 - 15*8
Coastal Shipping • •*c , ' ~ 0 28.0
Oil Company use 3 2 2 7*3 4*0
Total; 100 100 100 9*0 12.9
Source; Table 10. 6
R esidential and Commercial Market; ;
The primary determining fac to rs in  the size  of the R esiden tial and 
Commercial market, are the growth of households, dwellings and commercial 
establishm ents. The p rincipal app lica tions in  Iran  are space heat5.ng 
( c e n tra l heating run by gas o il  has been an in te g ra l p a rt of new dwellings 
fo r  the a fflu en t c lass in  the main c i t ie s ,  p a rtic u la rly  in  Tehran, since 
1968) , accounting fo r tw o-thirds of demand, and cooking and water heating  
accounting fo r the balance. The current p ra c tic e  of space heating  in  Iran  
i s  th a t only certa in  rooms are heated, and even in  these rooms the 
temperature i s  kept a t a low le v e l. The commercial establishm ents include, 
o ffice  bu ild ings, s to re s , h o te ls , h o sp ita ls , re s tau ran ts , e tc .
Table 10.8 shows the volume and re la tiv e  importance of various o il  products 
consumed by the re s id e n tia l  end commercial users.*
2 8 3
Table 10.8
R esiden tial and Commercial Consumption : 
Analysis by Products, 1960 -  1969
Product Quantity Consumed 
000’s cubic metres
Market Share (fo) 
1960-
1960 61 62  65 64 65 66 67 68 69 i 960  65 69
L.P.G . 4 4 11 .15 21 30 44  67 98 135 0 .3 ' 1 .4  4 . ‘
Kerosene' 878 989 1054 1132 1292 1323 13771627 1789 2102 58.5 62.0 6 4 ^
Gas o i l  277 238 245 247 257 263 278 296 321 366 15.1 12.3 11.;
-Fuel o i l  . 392 405 419 432 411 521 523 554 .620 659 26*1 24.3 20.:
T otal: ' 1501 1636 1729 1824 1981 2137 2222 2544 2828 3260 100 100 100
Sources The D istribu tion  Department of NIOC and d ra f ts  of research  by 
the Stanford Research In s i tu te .
Kerosene io the dominant fue l in  th is  market , and has maintained 
i t s  liad during the whole of the decade. Kerosene i s  used for. space 
heating , water heating and cooking. With the in troduction  of na tu ra l 
gas in  the 1970’s , i t s  re la tiv e  importance i s  expected to  drop. Fuel Oil 
i s  the second most important fu e l, but i t s  share of the to ta l  market has 
fa lle n , due to  the growth of L.P.G. The re la tiv e , importance of
Gas Oil has gradually decreased and th is  trend i s  expected to  continue, 
although more and more p rivate  residences w ill  in s ta l l  cen tra l heating* 
Natural gas w ill , however, compete fo r  these customers in  the futiure*. 
L.P.G. has grown in  importance over the la s t  few years and i s  expected to  
continue i t s  growth. A large number of the urban households are using LFG 
fo r  cooking, but if . the p ipeline  syiem i s  completed in  accordance with 
NIOC plans, by 1978, competition from na tu ra l gas w ill help to  slow clown 
L.P.G’s spectacu lar growth.
In d u s tr ia l Uses
in d u s tr ia l uses, but excludes the e le c t r ic i ty  supply and petro-chem icals*
c to r includes: b rick s , cement, sugar re f in e r ie s  and other
Table 10.9
In d u s tria l Users? Analysis by Products
aux-Mug^i/amu— e«a»afc»«i" « mini mm ■ w fT irn li i.—jm'wiwtw w B ' w * m«—mt— iim iXiw m p—
• 1960 -  1969.M tiiM iiH H M BW iaaiw m w aai—M B 1«
Product - .Quantity Consumed • Market Share
pOO’s cubic metres ♦ (^ o)
1960 61 62 63 64 65  66 67 6 8 69 60 65 69
LPG- -  ; -  1 1 1 2 2 4 - 5  15 -  0.2 0.7
Kerosene'98 110 116 124 144 145 155 .181 199 234 .12.4 11*5 10.9
Gas Oil B4 113 128 137 149 168 185 214 273 279 10.7 15*2 13.4
^ ® 1 608  663  677 664  877 954 1142 1285 1486 1615 76.9 75.1 .75.0
T otal: 790 886 922 926 1171 1269 1482 1684.1?65 2143 100 100 100
Source; As fo r Table 10.8
This group of users i s  g rea tly  -dependent on fuel o i l ,  w ith gas o il  
in  second, p lace. The importance of fue l o i l  r e f le c ts  the growth of 
petroleum-based in d u s tr ia l  a c tiv i ty  and i t s  ro le  in  con tribu ting  to  the 
growth of GNP.
Demand fo r  fuel o i l  i s  expected to  reach 80 percent of the market by 1982, 
taking in to  account the future competetive ro le  of na tu ra l gas. Although 
gas o il  has increased i t s  share in  the past, i t  i s  expected th a t  i t s  
importance w ill decline in  the fu tu re  as a re s u l t  of the reduction  in  
mechanical drive and in d u s tr ia l se lf-g en era tin g  of e le c t r ic i ty .
Kerosene i s  a lso  loosing ground, while LPG i s  m aintaining i t s  minor share. • 
\  .
Road Transport;
This market includes a l l  motor v eh ic le s ' consumption but excludes 
government transport end ag ric u ltu ra l machinery. D etails are shown in  
Table 10.10 .
In  1960 more than tw o-thirds of the market was represented by Motor 
S p ir i t  consumption, but in  the next ten  years d ie se l o i l  gained ground so 
th a t by 1969 , nearly  h a lf  the market was dominated by i t .
Table 10.10
Consumption of M otor-Spirit and 'Diesel Oil 
for. Road Transport. 19o0 -  1969.
Product Quantity Consumed 
000*8 cubic metres
Market Share
i 960 .61 6 2 " 63 64  65 66 67 68 69 60 65 69
Motor-
S p ir it
P iesa l 
Oil
627 643 664  704 739 715 799 854 944 1032 71 56 52
268 3?4 364 375 443 558 645 770 837 940 29 44 48
T otal: 895 967 1028 1079 1182 1273 1444 1624 1781 1963 100 100 100
Source: As fo r Table 10.8
The. change in  the r a t io  of m o to r-sp irit to  d iese l c i l  r e f le c ts  a
de libera te  and e ffec tiv e  government po licy . In the early  1960*s the
government decided to  provide incen tives fo r the expansion of the ru ra l
'transport ‘sec to r, through the reduction of import du ties on d iese l engines
and m aintaining lower taxa tion  on d iese l fu e l. At present one cubic metre
of m o to r-sp irit i s  sold a t  6,000 r i a l s ,  compared to  the d iese l o il  p rice  of
2 ,4 0 0  r i a l s  per cubic metre. ( 10) These p rices have been p rev a ilin g
since 1964? and i f  the e x is tin g  p rice  re la tio n sh ip  i s  allowed to  continue,
gas o il  i s  expected to  capture 58 percent of the to ta l  market by 1982.
The importance of these p rices and the vfisdora of the government po licy  w ill
be examined in  d e ta il  in  Chapter 12 .
✓  „
E le c tr ic i ty  Supply.
Respite the rapid  growth in  e le c t r ic i ty  supply in  the la te  1960*s 
i t s  share of the to ta l  Petroleum market has remained unchanged.
Table 10.11 shows th a t the re la tiv e  importance of gas o i l  has been reduced 
a t the expense of fuel o i l ,  because of the wider use of steam driven turbo­
a lte rn a to rs , and the decreasing dependance on d iese l generating s e ts .
10. The price  of in d u s tr ia l gas o il  in  Iran  i s  equal to  th a t of automative
8 6
Table 10.11
Consumption of Gas Oil and Fuel Oil fo r 
E le c tr ic i ty  Supply 1 9 6 0 -1 9 6 9
Product Quantity Consumed 
000*s cubic metres
Market Share
1960 61 62 63 64  65 66 67  68 69 60 65 69
Gas Oil 112 123 12? 131 145 155 169 201 229 266 47*9 44.0 3 6 ,5
^® 1_ 122 124 127 136 178 197 262 319 394 462  5 2 .1  . 5 6 .0  6 3 .5  
T otal: 234 247 254 267 323 352 431 520 623 728 100 100 100
Sohrce; As fo r Table 10.8
In  fu tu re , a l l  the increased requirements are expected to be fo r  fu e l osi l  
which should achieve.a sevenfold increase between 1969 to  1982, supplying 
’93^ of the demand. ‘
A griculture
The main fuel fo r  ag ricu ltu re  i s  d iese l o i l ,  which i s  used fo r  t ra c to rs ,  
grain  combines, bulldozers, other heavy machinery and ir r ig a t io n  pumps* A 
small volume of m o to r-sp irit i s  used fo r garden tra c to rs  and t i l l e r s ,  while 
fu e l o il  consumption i s  in s ig n if ic a n t.
Over the period, 1960- 6 9 , d iese l o il  consumption dominated $0 to  99 percent 
of the market, and i s  expected to  account fo r $0 percent of the demand by 
ag ricu ltu re  by 1982, followed by motor-spiiuLt, 9 percent,and fu e l o i l  1 per­
cent. (For d e ta ils  see Appendix tab le  A.10.1)
The spectacu lar growth in  fuel consumption by ag ricu ltu re  r e f le c ts  the 
impact of the Land Reform Programme in  1962 , and the subsequent raodernizatio: 
of the ag ricu ltu re  in  Iran* A large number of village co-operatives were se t  
up by the government and many tra c to rs  and bulldozers were purchased by thes 
co-operatives with government loans.
>
All o ther End-uses
These includes Government, railw ays, av ia tion , o i l  company use and 
>■
coasta l shipping. 'The d e ta ils  of the consumption of these markets are 
shown in  Appendix tab le  A-10.1.
fo r Oil Products.
Although the regional demand i s  not the subject under d iscussion, i t  
may be usefu l to  look b r ie f ly  a t  the re la tiv e  importance of demand and 
consumption per head in  various regions.
- In  Iran , regional data fo r per cap ita  income or economic growth are 
scarce and u n re liab le . However, a  comparison of per cap ita  o il  consump­
tio n  in  various regions can provide us with an ind ica tion  of the re la tiv e  
.stages of development in  the regions.
Table 10.12
Regional Demand and Per Capita Consumption»r inn ■■■ imi m iin 'm w ffinm 'i iim ii'fi iii».iim-<iiinnii !■    nm«iw.n mi uan iwnwpni.iniiinii.iim. < i
of Oil Products
Population , % O il Consumption . LIarket Share ($) 
( jiillio n s)   ^ '(Q00!s cm3) (3)
Consumption 
per head in
1966 1:?69 1960 1969 1960 1969 1969
Azarbayejan 3*7 4.0 279 713 ■7.3 7 .5 178
Kermanshah 3.2 3.5 319 .731 8 . 4 7 .7 209
Kuzistan 1.8 2.0 481 919 12.7 9 .7 459
Caspian 3.1 3.4 286 789 7.5 8 .3 232
Tehran 5«o 5.5 1704 3957 4 4 .9 4 1 .8 719
Esfahan 2 .0 2.2 281 862 7.4 9.1 392
• Pars 1 .8 2.0 169 463 4.4. 4.9 232
-Khorasan 2 .5 2.7 209 765 5«5 8 .1 283
Kerman 1 .6 1.8 72 272 1.9 2 .9 151
Total
(Regions) 2 4 .7 27.1 3800 9471 100 100 350
Other (2) 2 .3 2.4 62 . 239
Total 2 7 .0  2 9 .5 3862 9710
Source: 1) Regional Population i s  estim ated by the author on the basis
of 1966 National Census figures and the regional c la s s if ic a tio n  discussed 
in  Chapter 9 , 19&9 population data i s  estim ated by the author on the basis
of a uniform 2.9$ average annual growth in  population.
2) Other population or consumption not accounted fo r in  the reg ional data .
3) Regional consumption data, figures are data, from NIOC S ta t i s t i c a l  and 
Information O ffice.
C learly , the  Tehran region accounted fo r  the  la rg e s t share of the 
to ta l  demand in  although i t s  share i s  e je c te d - to  f a l l  to  36fj by
1982* Other regions ind iv idua lly  accounted fo r  le s s  than 10 % of the  to tal 
demand*, • However, the reg ional demand figu res are meaningless without pop­
u la tio n  data® Average consumption per head was 350 l i t r e s  in  19&9* By-» 
comparing th is  fig u re  with those of the  various regions we can obtain an 
ind ica tion  of the  re la tiv e  s ta te  of economic development in  each region® 
The Tehran region, with 719 l i t r e s  per head i s  the most prosperous region , 
while the Kerman region, with 151 l i t r e s  p e r head i s  the le a s t  prosperous® 
•The re la tiv e ly  large  consumption of 459 l i t r e s  in  Kuzistan must be viewed • 
with caution , i t  includes some o i l  products which are exported to  Iran ian  
and foreign  islands in  the  Persian G -u lfo r  the Gulf of Oman®
• U nfortunately, there  are no end-use breakdowns availab le  fo r  the
Regional- consumption and therefo re  i t  i s  not possib le  to  say which regions 
are more in d u s tr ia lis e d  and which are more agricultural®  However, we can
• l in k  our reg ional analysis to  those of the previous pages in  the  following 
manner:
Table 10*13 E stimates of End-Use Consumption per Head.' 
By Regions fo r
End Use . Average fo r  all. regions Tehran Kerman Pars
(£) . L itre s L itres L itre s L itri
R esiden tia l and
commercial 34 119 244 51 79
In d u s tr ia l 23 81 166 35- 53
Road tran spo rt 21 73 151 32 49
Other 22 77 158 33 51
T otal: iOO/c 350 719 151 232
Source: Table 10®6 and Table 10o12
The above tab le  is  re a lly  a standard isa tion  of the  availab le  dv=V 
I t - t e l l s  us th a t i f  the end-use demand in  each region p ro -ra ted  accord 
to  average fo r  a l l  reg ions, then th e  above figu res would emerge,
"  X
V 8
The Table shows th a t in d u s tr ia l  users of o il  products in  the 
Tehran region consumed twice as many o il  products than the average 
fo r  the country^ w hilst the Kerman re g io n 's  consumption of in d u s tr ia l  
fu e ls  i s  le s s  than h a lf the average of the country.
C learly , the regional demand analysis requ ires d e ta iled  research  
and carefu l study. This inform ation would g rea tly  f a c i l i t a te  NIOC and 
government planning and would provide a basis fo r  regional development 
p o lic ie s  by 'the  government.
C -  The Role of Oil in  Household Expenditure. ’
. >
One way of assesing  the demand fo r  various o il  products in  
Iran  i s  to  consider the expenditure of households on these products.
The o n ly 'se t of data availab le  i s  the Urban Household Budget Survey of 
Iran , prepared by the Central Bank of Iran . (10)
The data used in  th is  section  are fo r 19&7 and 19&9 (11) showing the 
expenditure on the main sources of energy and i t s  comparison w ith other 
major categories of expenditure (See Table 10.14- and 10.15)* /
With regard to  the 1967 fig u res , we can make the following observations;
1) The o il  product consumption i s  d ire c tly  proportional to  the leve l 
of income! unlike many other sources of energy, the absolute 
expenditure on o il  products does not s ta b il is e  or decline a f te r  a 
ce rta in  lev e l"o f income i s  reached. Indeed, th e re .is  a 25 percent
__ increase in  the  expenditure bebYreen the  500,000 -  400,000 r i a l s
income group and the 400,000 -  500,000 r i a l s  income group (The two 
highest income groups.)
2) Generally, the expenditure on coal i s  a minor item a t a l l  le v e ls . 
-'HoTrever, w hilst the expenditure has been declin ing  among higher in ­
come groups (thorough the su b s titu tio n  of o i l  products) there  has been 
a steady r is e  in  the lower income groups.
3) Gas consumption in  Iran  i s  confined to  LPG used fo r  cooking by
the urban mi da le -c l as s . The only large  c ity  in  Iran  which uses
10. The Survey, s ta r te d  in  th e ’mid-1950’s , but was discontinued in  i 9 6 0 , 
the Second se rie s  s ta r te d  in  15&4* The Surveys are fo r the Urban Contd/ 
11 o v e rlea f.
n a tu ra l gas through p ipelines i s  Shiraz* The two lowest income groups 
consume no gas a t  a lly  while th is  expenditure i s  very small in  the 
higher income groups,
4) Wood consumption i s  very much a poor man’s means of cooking and 
heating* The expenditure on wood remains constant fo r  the f i r s t  few
' income groups, "but f a l l s  s te a d ily  as income increases,
5) E le c tr ic i ty  consumption very much follows the p a tte rn  se t by the o il
• products. Expenditure i s  d ire c tly  re la te d  to  the increases in  the level 
of income.
- In terms of average expenditure^ o il  products are. in  the f i r s t  p o sitio n , 
followed.by e le c t r ic i ty  and then coal. Wood and gas consumption occupy . 
fourth  and f i f t h  position  respec tive ly .
The 1969 data are b e tte r  ind ications of -household expenditure, since 
the sample size  i s  la rg e r . The expenditure on o i l  products and e le c tr ic i ty  
i s  s t i l l ' t h e  h ighest. However, the ra t io  of the expenditure on o i l  prod~ 
uc ts  to  th a t of e le c t r ic i ty  a lte red  from 2.5 in  1967 to  1.6 in  1969 , In 
the highest income group, the expenditure on e le c t r ic i ty  overtook th a t of 
the o i l  products fo r  the f i r s t  time, . ,
Gas consumption expanded and i t  was used even in  the lowest income 
groups. I t  i s  expected th a t toT/ards the end of the 1970’s , o i l  product. j 
expenditure w ill  s t i l l  be in  f i r s t  p lace, followed c losely  by gas and 
e le c t r ic i ty  expenditures. Coal w ill be in  fourth  place and wood w ill
occupy the la s t  p osition ,
/  •
.Comparison of the Oil Product Expenditure with other Main Categories
The Central Sank of Iran  has divided the to ta l  household expenditure 
in to  ten  ca tegories. Table 10,15 provides an account of these categories 
fo r the various income groups in  1969 ,
Each category i s  composed of between 10 to 70 item s. For in stance , the 
o il  product expenditure i s  only one of the nineteen items in  catagory 3 -  
the running cost of the household,.
The comp3.rison i s  useful in  so fa r  -as i t  poin ts out th a t in  the lower 
income groups, the expenditure on o il  products i s  often  la rg e r  than the 
expenditure on some main categories. Thus, the following observations
10. Contd. Households of 35 large and small towns, Ho such Survey i s  carrier 
out fo r the ru ra l households.
11. The author has been unable to  obtain Surveys fo r  o ther year’s .
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can be' made ? -
• 1) Oil product 'expenditure, on average, co n stitu tes  25$ of the 
to ta l  expenditure in  category
2) In the f i r s t  income group, the expenditures cn o il  products and 
accommodation are nearly  equal®
3)  Expenditure on household fu rn itu re  i s  lower than those on o il  
products fo r  incomes under 50?000 r i a l s  per annum*
• • 4) Expenditure on health  i s  lower than th a t on o il  products fo r  the 
f i r s t  income group, while in  the second income group, the two are 
very close* .
5) Expenditure on education i s  lower than o il  product expenditure in  
the f i r s t  five  income groups*
. \
F o r 'th e  large m ajority  of Iran ians who are in  the lower income groups, 
o i l  products expenditure co n stitu tes  an important expense* Given the 
dependance on o il''p roducts, a r is e  in  petroleum product prices would 
cause a great deal of hardship fo r the poorer population® Since the lar 
p a rt of the expenditure on o il  products i s  re la ted  to  Kerosene, this ana 
s is  • could provide the government with a strong case fo r  the s t a b i l i z a t i  
of -the o il  product p rices in  general and th a t of Kerosene in particular*
Summary and Conclusion
There i s ,  c lea rly  a close re la tbnsliip  between the le v e l of economic 
development and the demand fo r energy in  a l l  the Countries of the World® 
How close th is  re la tio n sh ip  may be, depends on the stage of the in d u s tr­
i a l  development of th a t Country.
Oil has been playing an increasing ly  important ro le  in  supplying 
the energy requirements of the in d u s tr ia l countries of the free  wcrlci.* 
Indeed these countries draw a t le a s t  45 percent of th e ir  energy demand f r
o i l .  Oil products accounted fo r 74$ of the energy consumption in  Iran  -  
a ra t io  s im ila r to  th a t of Japan. The four main products: m o to r-s p ir i t ,  
kerosene, gas o il  and fuel o il  together supplied over 90 percent of the 
to ta l  Iran ian  o il  consumption,, Therefore, the analysis of the changes i
■ . ■ • ,  2 8 4v ■ ■ • •
demand fo r  them, i s  an important in d ica to r of the  overa ll energy demand 
in  Iran© The genera,! fac to rs  th a t a ffec ted  the demand fo r  o i l  products 
in  Iran  were:
1) Economic'growth and in d u s tr ia lis a tio n : th a t i s  to  s a y -  the develop­
ment s tra teg y  of the government, through i t s  development p lans , ha-d a
profound e ffec t on the o i l  product demando.
2) Expansion of the  d is tr ib u tio n  and tran spo rt networks®
3) S ta b il i ty  of the p o l i t i c a l  syst era, a ttra c tin g  foreign  and domestic
c a p ita l  to  se t up petroleum-based industries®
4 ) Population increases: Iran ian  population rose from 17 m illion  in  195
to  30 m illion  in  1970*
5) . Urbanization: th e re  was a large  growth in. the  urban population comp­
ared to  th a t  of the ru ra l  population®
6) Per cap ita  income: the  income e la s t ic i ty  of demand has been 1*82
fo r  a l l  the o i l  products taken together® However, the e la s t ic i ty  has been 
le s s 1 than unitjr fo r  m o to r-sp irit and gas oil® This led  to  the  conclusion 
th a t an increase in  the per cap ita  income ra ise s  the demand fo r  motor-veh- 
ic le  fue ls  ‘ through the expansion of the mot or-vehicle  market, w hilst the
.’demand fo r  kerosene increases both through the purchase of more space heat­
e rs , water heaters, and because of a switch by new consumers from wood and 
coal to  kerosene®
7) Price e la s t ic i ty  of demand: i t  i s  generally  agreed to  be neg lig ib le
in  Iran® C'cal i s  in  short supply and thus cannot act as a su b s titu te  fo r  
fu e l o i l .o r  kerosene, although n a tu ra l gas w ill  become an important compete 
i t  or in  the long run© Wood and charcoal are also in  short supply and thus 
are not serious contenders to  kerosene® Although automotive gas o i l  and 
m o to r-sp irit are su b s titu te s  fo r  each o ther, the government tax  p o licy  and 
environmental regu la tions, and the  lower t a r i f f s  on d ie se l engines have 
c rea ted ja  s itu a tio n  where the c ro s s -e la s t ic i ty  of demand fo r  these products 
has been eliminated®
There were, a lso , some sp ec ific  events which a ffec ted  th e  demand fo r  
o i l  products in  Iran, in  the- 1960*s © F i r s t ly ,  there  was a severe economic
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recession  in  the period 1960/ 6 3 , which adversly affected  the demand fo r 
o il  products ( the ra te  of growth of demand f e l l  from 10,3^ in  1961 , to  
4.870 in  19^3)« Secondly, the p rices of m o to r-sp irit and kerosene ?/ere 
tem porarily ra ised  in  1964* which resu lted  in  a large reduction in  the 
absolute leve l of demand fo r the former, and a drop in  the growth ra te  of 
the l a t t e r .  This was considered in  terms of a p o l i t ic a l  e la s t ic i ty  of 
demand which demonstrated th a t any response to  price  changes i s  l ik e ly  to  
have an underlying p o l i t ic a l ,  ra th e r  than economic explanation,
. In section  JB of th is  chapter./ 10 d iffe re n t end-use markets were 
d istinguished, these were 2 R esidential and Commercial; In d u s tr ia l;  Road 
Transport; E le c tr ic i ty  Supply; A griculture; Government; Railways; Aviat­
ion; Oil Company Use and Coastal Shipping,
The ‘o il  product demand was dominated by three end-uses£ R esiden tial and 
\
Commercial, Road Transport and In d u s tr ia l;  together they accounted for 
78 percent of the to ta l  demand in  19^9 *
The development of these markets, • must however, be viewed in  the l ig h t  of 
,the development of. the domestic economy and the planning s tra te g y  of the 
government. The emphasis on in d u s tr ia liz a tio n , expansion of road tran sp o rt, 
•Land Reform e tc , ,  were c le a rly  re f le c ted  in  the grov/th of these end-uses. 
Indeed, by looking a t the expansion of o il  markets, one could-closely  
follow the changes in  the Iran ian  economy, and obtain an in d ic a tio n  of the 
growth of end-use consumers themselves.
Such analysis can be of g rea t help in  determining the s ta te  of regional 
development in  various parts ' of the Country where no GDP breakdowns are 
a v a ilab le . By comparing the regional o il  consumption per head one can see 
th a t the Northern and Central provinces are more prosperous than the E astern 
and Southern provinces.
In section  C, the importance of o il product expenditure in  the household 
budget was examined. The conclusions were th a t the expenditure on o il 
products was la rg e r than those on e le c t r ic i ty ,  coal, gas and wood. In the 
lower income groups the expenditure on o il  products exceeded th a t  on main 
.categories such as health , education e tc . The importance of the o il  product 
expenditure in  the household budget has far-reach ing  policy  im plications 
fo r the government in  so f a r  as i t  strengthens the case fo r m aintaining low 
p rices fo r o il  products ra th e r  than allowing economic p rices  to  be charged.
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CHAPTER BITTEN ;
The Imbalance.- between the Surrly end Demand fo r Oil Products
In  Iran
In Chapter 9, ve re fe rred  to  the imbalance "between the 
supply and demand fo r o i l  products as a.m ajor problem facing  NIOC.
This chapter w ill examine th is  problem in  depth, and attem pts to 
o ffe r  remedies fo r i t s  so lu tion .
The imbalance has come.about because of the p ecu lia r way in  which 
the demand fo r o i l  products has been growing in  Iran  during the past 
decade. Indeed, the demand fo r the  middle d i s t i l l a t e s  has c o n stitu ted  
over 50/J of the to ta l  demand fo r  o i l  products since 1965* We know th a t 
the re fin e ry  p a tte rn  d ic ta te s  the. product mix, which i s  re la t iv e ly  in ­
f le x ib le , and any changes in  i t s  p a tte rn  w ill  be small in  the sho rt run. 
Thus, increases in  the lev e l of demand w ill  co n sis ten tly  widen the gap 
between the  supply and demand of some o i l  products.
In  the o i l  consuming coun tries, where the re fin in g  and d is tr ib u tio n  
of o i l  products i s  dominated by the major o i l  companies, the problem of 
imbalance has been ea s ily  overcome. The ° i l  companies simply sw itch 
the excessive q u an titie s  of some o i l  products to  the countries th a t 
su ffe r  a shortage of these products and vice versa . However, the problem 
of imbalance has been p a r t ic u la r ly  acute in  Iran  because c f : -
a) The g rea t dependence of the Iran ian  ■ consumers on .kerosene fo r  
heating , cocking and lig h tin g  (in  v i l la g e s ) ,
b) Government p o licy  which has encouraged the use of d ie se l o i l  
ra th e r than m o to r-sp irit,
c) The v ir tu a l  im p o ssib ility  of exporting o i l  products, ( 0
d) The p o l i t ic a l  inexpediency of importing ce rta in  refined  products ( 2 )
1. Except fo r  a v ia tio n  fuel-which i s  exported to  Afghanistan.
2. The author was informed by NIOC o f i ic ia l s  th a t the Company would 
find  i t  p o l i t ic a l ly  d i f f ic u l t  to explain the need fo r  im porting 
o i l  products to a major o i l  producing country.
coupled with i t s  high co st, meant th a t NIOC was unable to balance 
i t s  supply and demand in  the same way th a t the in te rn a tio n a l o i l  
Companies had been doing fo r  some time.
Ax p resent there  are th ree  re f in e r ie s  and a topping p lan t operating 
in  Iran . These are : Abadan re fin e ry  and 14.1. S. topping p lan t (Consort­
ium operated), and Tehran and Kermanshah re f in e r ie s  (lHOC operated). 
Table 11.1 shows the re fin e ry  p a tte rn  of the NIOC operated re f in e r ie s  in  
comparison with the demand p a tte rn  fo r  1971.
Table 11.1
The Refinery and Demand P a tte rn  fo r  O il Products 
In  Iran  -  1971. (ft)
Product Nofinery Yield ( 1) Demand P a tte rn  ( 2 ) 1-2
K o to r-sp ir it 18 12 + 6
Kerosene 8.5 ) 22 ) )
Gas o i l ) 33 24,5 j ^ 29 } 51
J
)
)
-  18
Fuel o i l 40 29 * + 11
Other products 9 8 + 1
Total: 100 100 0
Source: Chapters 8 and 10
NIOC uses the output c f the Tehran and Kermanshah re f in e r ie s  fo r domestic 
purposes. I t  i s  also empowered to l i f t  up to a maximum of 100,000 b/d  ■ 
(5.0 m illion  cubic metres a year) of o i l  products from the Abadan re fin ery  
and some fu e l o i l  from the M .I.S. topping p lan t, i f  and when requ ired .
W hilst NIOC i s  obliged to l i f t  a proportion of a l l  the o i l  products 
refined  a t  Abadan, i t  i s  able to change the composition of the products 
l i f t e d  a f te r  nego tia tions w ith the Consortium. Based on i t s  in te rn a l  
fo rec as ts , NIOC produces every year a schedule of i t s  proposed l if t in g 3  
from Abadan bo the Consortium. Although the product mix of these l i f t in g s  
may cause the Consortium a lo ss  of export business, i t  almost always 
£ iv£$  *i/C.yto NIOC ■ s aemands. The Consortium has made i t  known th a t i t  Joes 
not wish to involve i t s e l f  in  a quarre l with NIOC o'rqr a r e la t iv e ly  small 
product export fo r fea r  of jeopardizing i t s  la rg e r  dealings in  crude.
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I n d e e d . NIOC h a s  n e v e r  l i f t e d  i t s  f u l l  e n t i t l e m e n t  o f  5*8 m i l l i o n  c u b ic  
m e tr e s ,  s im p ly  b e c a u s e  i t  d id  n o t  n eed  t o  do s o .  T hus, NIOC ha.3 b een  l i f t ­
i n g  o i l  p r o d u c ts  from  Abadan i n  s u c h  a  way a s  t o  b a la n c e  th e  d o m e s t ic  s u p p ly  
w it h  dem and. T a b le  1 1 .2  i l l u s t r a t e s  t h i s  p o in t .  The Abadan r e f i n e r y  
a c c o u n te d  f o r  45  p e r c e n t  o f  th e  d o m e s t ic  r e f i n e r y  o u tp u t  i n  I r a n  i n  197^» 
b u t th e  p r o p o r t io n s  o f  k e r o s e n e  and g a s  o i l  l i f t i n g s  from  Abadan p r o v id e d  
f o r  81 p e r c e n t  and 6 0  p e r c e n t  r e s p e c t i v e l y ,  o f  th e  d o m e s t ic  demand f o r  t h e s e  
p r o d u c t s .
T a b le  1 1 .2
The S u p p ly  P a t t e r n  o f  th e  I r a n ia n  R e f i n e r i e s  
1971 ( OOP’ s  C ubic M e tre s  )
T ehran  K erm anshah  
R e f in e r y  R e f in e r y
M .I .S .  Abadan 
T op p in g  R e f in e r y *  
P la n t
T o ta l Abadan a s  a  c/o o f  
T o ta l
M o t o r - s p i r i t  810 223 510 1543 33
K e r o se n e  374 107 - 2097 2578 .81
Gas o i l  1297 65 - 2071 3433 60
F u e l o i l  1 9 6 7 . 304 976 59 3306 2
O th er  .49*1 2 -
0hr\
CO 1323 62
T o ta l:  4 9 3 9 701 976 5567 12183 45
*  D e l iv e r e d  t o  NIOC,
S o u r c e : C a lc u la te d  from  th e  d a ta  i n  C h ap ter 8 ,
T a b le  1 1 .5  sh ow s th e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  th e  o i l  p r o d u c ts  from  Abadan  
t o  NIOC and  f o r  e x p o r t s .  I t  show s t h a t  th e  c o n so r t iu m  l i f t e d 90  p e r c e n t  
o f  f u e l  o i l ,  78  p e r c e n t  o f  m o t o r - s p i r i t  p r o d u c t io n ,  b u t o n ly  21 p e r c e n t  
o f  th e  k e r o s e n e  o u tp u t  i n  1971* NIOC p e r c e n ta g e  s h a r e  o f  th e  m id d le -  
d i s t i l l a t e 3  h a s  c o n s i s t e n t l y  in c r e a s e d .
The u s e  o f  Abadan r e f i n e r y  a s  a  " b a la n c in g "  r e f i n e r y ,  r a i s e s  an  
im p o r ta n t  q u e s t io n :  how lo n g  can  Abadan c o n t in u e  to  f i l l  th e  gap  b e tw e e n  
th e  s u p p ly  and demand f o r  m i d d l e - d i s t i l l a t e s  i n  I r a n  ? T h is  v d .l l  b e  th e  
s u b j e c t  o f  th e  f o l l o w i n g  d i s c u s s i o n  on  s h o r t  term and lo n g  term  s o l u t i o n s  
t o  th e  p rob lem  o f  p r o d u c t  im b a la n c e  i n  I r a n .
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Short Term Measures and Lon:? Term Solutions*
NIOC has tho following options to  deal with the problem of 
imbalance between the supply and demand fo r  the middle d i s t i l l a t e s :
a) Take over the Abadan re fin e ry  and use a l l  i t s  middle d i s t i l l a t e s  
fo r  the domestic demand, foregoing a l l  export p ro f i ts  on these 
products.
b) Import the required middle d i s t i l l a t e s .
c) Build new re f in e r ie s  with co stly  isom erization u n its  which produce
la rg e r  proportions of middle d i s t i l l a t e s .
d) Speed up the plans fo r n a tu ra l gas d is tr ib u tio n .
e) ite -struc tu re  the p ric ing  system.
Tlie f i r s t  two are short term measures, and the others are long term
a lte rn a tiv e s .
Short Term Ileasures: NIOC has, in  the p a s t, used Abadan as a "balancing"
re fin e ry  and no doubt w ill continue to do so in  the fu tu re . As the d email d 
fo r o i l  products increases i t  w ill become more and more d ifficu lt.fo r-N IO C  
to balance i t s  supply and demand through Abadan. As NIOC cannot under i t s  
agreement, proceed to l i f t  a l l  i t s  100,000 b a rre ls  a day share of the 
Abadan-output from middle d i s t i l l a t e s ,  i t  w ill  have to take ac tio n  fo r  a 
complete take over of the Abadan re fin e ry . Let us assume th a t NIOC ‘takes 
over the Abadan re fin e ry  and uses a l l  i t s  middle d i s t i l l a t e s  fo r  tho 
domestic demand ( 3) .  But how long w ill  th is  help to balance the demand 
with supply ? The re levan t data are shown in  Table 11 .tf". Kerosene demand 
w ill overtake supply in  1974; while gas o i l  produced by the e x is tin g  
capacity , w il l  l a s t  u n t i l  1973. The use of Abadan as a balancing re fin e ry  
w ill be sho rt lived  and o ther measures w ill  have to be introduced to 
a lle v ia te  the s itu a tio n . Import; of middle d i s t i l l a t e s  could bo l;ho 
sim plest sho rt term so lu tion . However, th is  p o s s ib i l i ty  has been ru led  
out fo r two reasons. F ir s t ly ,  the p o l i t ic a l  im plications of such a move, 
and secondly, the high p rice  of middle d i s t i l l a t e s  in  the in te rn a tio n a l 
markets.
3 . In  fa c t NIOC took over the Abadan re fin e ry  in  August, 197b'; under a 
new agreement which replaced the 1934 Consortium Agreement. (Sec P o s tsc rip t
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Table  11
Estim ate of the Middle D is t i l la te  Shortage 
In  Iran  (OOP’s cubic motrod)
Kerosene Gas Oi n-U
i 97 2 1974 1976 1978 1972 1974 1976 .. 
I
CO
Supply:
Abadan 2660 2660 2660 2660 4350 4350 4350 4350
Kermanshah. 
& Tehran 481 481 481 481 1362 1362 1362 1362
T otal: 3141 314-1 3141 3141 5712 5712 5712 5712 .
Demand 2589 3580 4370 5067 3894 4742 5380 6483
Shortage/
Excess +152 -539 -1229 -1926 +1818 +970 +332 -771
Source: Supply estim ates are based on the assumption th a t the Iran ian  
re f in e r ie s  are working a t maximum capacity . Demand fo recas ts  are based 
on the o f f ic ia l  data  provided by the D istrib u tio n  Department J,A Forecast 
of O il Product Consumption in  Iran" 1571 (in  P ersian ).
Long Terra S o lu tions:
hew R efineries: NIOC’s past record, with regard to tho construct­
ion of re f in e r ie s  has been poor. The Shiraz re fin e ry  with a capacity  of 
40,000 b a rre ls  a day was scheduled fo r completion in  1571? hut i t  did not 
become operational u n t i l  November, 1573* A fu r th e r  th ree  re f in e r ie s  are 
planned and w ill  be located in  Tabriz, Heshed and Esfahan (4)* ‘Although 
the f i r s t  of these i s  due 'to  be completed early  in  1975? construction  has 
no t ye t s ta r te d  a t the time of w riting  th is  d is se r ta tio n . In  so f a r  as 
the other two re f in e r ie s  are concerned, no f e a s ib i l i ty  stud ies have yet 
been carried  out. This lack of fo re s ig h t stems from the fa c t th a t tho 
Company has never faced a shortage of domestic re fin in g  capacity  before,, 
and i t  has appeared to underestim ate the seriousness of the problem. The 
construction of new re f in e r ie s  i s  a co stly  venture, p a r t ic u la r ly  because 
NIOC would have to  in s t a l l  expensive isom erization u n its  to increase  the 
proportion o f the middle d i s t i l l a t e  output* I t  must, however, be
4 . According to reports in  ’’Keyhan11 the Iran ian  d a ily  (November 15th. 
1973) two more re f in e r ie s  are to  be b u i l t  in  partnersh ip  with German and 
Japanese concerns.
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empha.si zed, th a t while the construction of new re f in e r ie s  might 
help to “balance the middle d i s t i l l a t e  shortage, i t  w ill, a t  the same 
time, provide excessive q u an titie s  of l ig h t  and heavy d i s t i l l a t e s ,  
which cannot e a s ily  he marketed abroad.
The Role of N atural Gas: Since the discovery of o i l  in Iran ,
the la rg e r  p a rt of the associated  n a tu ra l gas has been f la re d . In -1965 
an Irano-S cv iet agreement was signed fo r tho export of n a tu ra l gas to 
Russia. The’ IGAT P ro jec t (Iran ian  Gas Trunkline) was completed in  1970. 
IGAT was designed to serve th ree  purposes:
a) To earn ex tra  foreign  exchange by exporting gas to the Soviet Union.
b) To bring about c lo se r economic and p o l i t ic a l  co operation between
•Iran and her old enemy Russia. ( 5)
c) To supply the Iran ian  market with n a tu ra l gas along i t s  1100 .
kilom eter route to the Soviet border.
I ro n ic a lly , the supply of n a tu ra l gas fo r domestic consumption, which ■ 
was the le a s t  im portant fa c to r  in  the construction of IGAT, has become 
an in te g ra l p a rt of NIOC’s planning fo r  the fu ture  o i l  product demand in  
Ira n . Indeed, u n t i l  1968 no serious d iscussion of the  ro le  of n a tu ra l 
gas took place in  o f f ic ia l  c irc le s , which ind icated  the absence of an 
o v e ra ll energy po?.icy.
Table 11.5* shows the planned consumption and export of n a tu ra l gas.
Table 11 J§>.
Planned Consumption and Sxnort of IGAT Gas 
(M illion Cubic M etres)
Domestic Consumption Export to U.S.S.R.
1970 * 2,000 6,000
VJ12 ’ 5,500 8,000
1974 * 4,500 10,000
1976 5,400 10,000
1978 • 5,900 10,000
* Actual
Source: M. Proozan- and M. Shiraz-: "The Development of the Gas Industry  
In  Iran" Paper delivered  to the 11th. In te rn a tio n a l Gas Congress-held 
in  Moscow in  June, 1970.
5. The Russians constructed the Esfahan S tee l M ill Complex in  p a r t-  
paym ent fo r  the n a tu ra l gas.
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N atural gas i s  a su b s titu te  for fue l o i l ,  in d u s tr ia l  and heating gr>s 
o i l ,  L.P.G. arid kerosene, but gas consumption w ill not immediately 
ease the middle d i s t i l l a t e  problem. The most immediate and profound 
impact o f n a tu ra l gas w il l  be on fu e l o i l  (see Table 11.£). This i s  
because the in d u s tr ia l  concerns are concentrated along the IGAT route 
and no extensive branch p ipeline  system is  required . L ater, towards 
the end o f the 1970's and early  1930fs when the NIOC plans fo r in t r a -  
c i ty  gas p ipe lines are completed, the supply of n a tu ra l gas w ill  help 
to  ease the middle d i s t i l l a t e  shortage. Table 11.(9 shows the expected 
impact of n a tu ra l gas on the domestic demand fo r o i l ’products.
Table 11. (f
The Expected Impact of N atural Gas on 
Demand fo r Oil Products (OOP's cubic m etres)
1972 1978
L.P.G. S ubstitu ted  by N atural Gas - 95 •
Kerosene tl tl II tl 395
Gas o i l II . It tl It - 315
Fuel o i l 1) tl tl It 1813 4185
Source: J .  Zamanian ” The Role of O il Products in  The Security  of
I ra n ” ' NIOC Public Relations O ffice. 1.971 P .28 (in  Persian)
The above tab le  shows th a t in  the sho rt terra n a tu ra l gas w ill replace 
fu e l  o i l  and w ill thus not; help to reduce the demand fo r  middle d i s t i ­
l l a t e s .  In the long terra, however, n a tu ra l gas w ill rep lace kerosene 
and gas o i l .
A Change in  the S tructure of P rices: This i s  an im portant 
long term measure in  changing the d irec tio n  of the growth in  demand 
fo r various o i l  products. This w ill  be d e a lt with in  Chapter 12.
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Summary and Conclusion
The imbalance between the re fin e ry  p a tte rn  and the demand fo r 
o i l  products in  Iran  has become p a rt ic u la r ly  important since thb.haid^l 96  ^
NIOC has t r a d i t io n a lly  used the Consortium operated Abadan re fin e ry  as ' .
an adjustment mechanism fo r co rrec ting  the supply bo ttlenecks. But as 
the ra te  o f consumption increased, i t  became c le a r  th a t th is  mechanism, 
had ou tlived  i t s  usefu lness. At the same time, unbalanced l i f t in g s  from 
Abadan have cost NIOC a considerable sum o f foreign  exchange in  terms of 
foregone export revenues, due to the high p rices of middle d i s t i l l a t e s .
Five a lte rn a tiv e s  were offereu in  th is  chapter to oasc the middle 
d i s t i l l a t e  problem. These were: a) Take over of the Abadan re fin e ry ,
b) Imports of middle d i s t i l l a t e s ,  c) Construction of new re f in e r ie s , ,
d) The use of n a tu ra l gas and e) A change in  the product p rice s . The 
f i r s t  a lte rn a tiv e  was found to serve as a temporary measure only, while 
the second (and perhaps the sim plest) a lte rn a tiv e  was ru led  out fo r  
p o l i t i c a l ,  as well as economic reasons. lTIOC’s performance with regard 
to the construction of new re f in e r ie s  has proved to be poor. 'The Shiraz 
re f in e ry  i s  long overdue, while o ther re f in e r ie s  have no t jre t passed the 
planning stage. N atural gas could be an important instrum ent in  supplying 
the s h o r tfa l l  of the middle d i s t i l l a t e s ,  bat i t s  impact i s  not l ik e ly  to 
be f e l l  u n t i l  the la te  1970’s or ea rly  1980’s. A change in  the p rice  
s tru c tu re  of o i l  products could serve to reduce the demand fo r  gas o i l  
considerably, although i t  i s  not c e rta in  whether i t  w ill be p o l i t i c a l ly  
possib le  to ra ise  kerosene p rices .
In  general, there seems to have been no coherent and d e ta ile d  
po licy  to deal with th is  important problem. For instance, there  are no 
plans to deal with the excessive q u an titie s  o f m o to r-sp irit nnd fuel o i l ,  
no d e ta ils  of the fu tu re  plans regarding new re f in e r ie s  and no date has 
yet been se t fo r  laying the gas p ipelines in  the c i t i e s .  Unless NIOC 
undertake to implement some of the above a lte rn a tiv e s  immediately, under 
a co- ordinated se t of p o lic ie s , the domestic supply w ill be se rio u sly  
a ffec ted  in  the very near fu tu re .
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CHAPTER TVfBLVE
P rices, Costs and P ro f i ts  of the National I ra n i an
The purpose of th is  chapter i s  ..to in v estig a te  the various f in an c ia l 
aspects of ITIOC and to show by h is to r ic a l  analysis the c o n s tra in ts , * 
d i f f ic u l t ie s ,  p o lic ie s  and achievements of the Iran ian  o i l  industry .
The d i f f ic u l ty  in  such an . analysis i s  to show the compromise between 
the fin an c ia l a sp ira tio n s  of a company on a commercial b asis  and the 
wishes of the c e n tra l government. This chapter t r i e s  to d is tin g u ish  
between such c o n flic ts  of in te r e s t  and an evaluation of the r a t io n a l i ty  
of various p o lic ie s  w ill  be made on a s t r i c t l y  economic b asis .
A -  Pr ic e s  of O il Products in  Iran
The NIOC C onstitu tion  obliges the Company to submit fo r  approval to 
the cabinet any proposed changes in  p rices  of the four main products; 
m o to r-sp irit, kerosene, gas o i l  and fu e l o i l .  ( l )  In e ffe c t, the commer­
c ia l  r ig h t  of the Company to determine the p rices of products which const­
i tu te  over 87 percent of i t s  to ta l  sa les revenues has been taken away by 
the government.
Since the n a tio n a liza tio n  of the Iran ian  o i l  industry , and the c rea t­
ion of NIOC, governments have frequently  pointed cut th a t  they wish the 
o i l  product p rices to be a) uniform in  the whole country, and b) kept 
as low as possib le , to provide a cheap source of energy fo r the in d u s tr ­
ia l i s a t io n  of the country. ■
N ith  regard to petroleum product p rices, th ree  major events have taken 
place since 1957: F ir s t ,  a switch to ’uniform p rices  fo r a l l  products fo r
t he e n tire  country was conuioted in  1964-. ( f) Second, in  the process_____
1. NIOC C onstitu tion , A rtic le  55 (b)
2. Special..price discounts are availab le  fo r huzistan  farmers ( in  the 
southern I'oaicn), the N in istry  of h a te r  and lower, and the Iran ian  
Railways.
of equalizing the fu e l o i l  p rice s , add itiona l fuel, o i l  taxes wore levied 
in  November 1964, while NI0C*s a f te r - ta x  re a liz a tio n  was l e f t  unchanged.( 3) 
'.Third, there was an experiment with taxes on m o to r-sp irit and kerosene in  
December 1964, which re su lted  in  an unprecedented public reaction , and the 
tax  increase  was almost e n tire ly  reminded w ithin a few months.. Prom 1965 
onwards tho p rices of the -four main products remained unchanged.
Although the Iran ian  economy is  la rge ly  dependent on petroleum products 
which co n s titu te  70  percent of the country*s energy requirements, any change 
in  the p rices of these products has proved to be g rea tly  re s is te d  by the 
public. Petroleum has played a dominant ro le  in  the h is to r ic a l  development 
of Iran ian  p o l i t ic s  and economics, and as such, i t  i s  very much under public  
sc ru tiny . There seems to  be a fee lin g  among the people th a t a t  a time when 
•Iran  has e stab lished  her .sovereigntyover o i l  resources, the government 
.should ensure th a t these products are availab le  to Iran ians a t  the lowest 
p rice . Indeed, the p rice  increases of, 1964 re su lted  in  a f a l l  in  the abs­
o lu te  lev e l of demand fo r  m o to r-sp irit and a decline  in  the growth ra te  of 
demand fo r kerosene. While i t  i s  generally  agreed th a t the p rice  e la s t ic ­
i ty  of demand i s  very weak with respect to petroleum products, due to tho 
absence of su b s ti tu te s , i t  i s  c le a r  th a t there  i s  a p o l i t ic a l  e la s t ic i ty  
of demand with respec t to petroleum product p ric e s . ( 4 ) Table 12.1 shows 
the changes in  the p rices o f the main products since 1957.
Table 12.1
Prices of Petroleum Products in  Iren  (d ia ls  r e r  pubi c m etres)
Product 1957-59 1960-62 1963 December 1964 1965 1971
I'lo to r-sp irit 4500 5000 5000 10000 6000 6000
lie ro scne 2500 2300 2500 3500 2500 2500
Cas b i l 1750 2250 2400 2400 2400 2400
Fuel o i l 820 820 900 1200 1200 1200
Note: a) Tho above prices include taxes, b) the demand fo r m o to r-sp irit 
increased by over 5)6 in  1964, but declined by 3.4/^ in  1965. The 
demand fo r kerosene increased by 14.2,4 in  1964 and by only 2.34> in  
1965. c) The above prices do not r e f le c t  the p rices of "packed prod­
u c ts11.
5. Fuel c-il p rices  were fixed a t 0.75 r l s .  per l i t r e  fo r  ICuzistan and 1.2 
r l s  per l i t r e  fo r the r e s t  of the country*
4 . For d e ta ils  see Chapter 10.
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Petroleum product p rices are not only important because of the way 
they a ffe c t the revenues of NIOC, but also oecauso they play an important 
ro le  in  shaping the p a tte rn  of demand fo r  various products.- Iran  su ffe rs  
from an acute imbalance between the p a tte rn  of supply and the s tru c tu re  of 
demand. This problem was discussed in  d e ta il  in  Chapter 11, but b r ie f ly  
we can say th a t the ex is tin g  re fin e ry  capacity  of the Iran ian  o i l  industry  
has been s trugg ling  to keep up with the large annual increase in  the demand 
fo r  middle d i s t i l l a t e s .  To cope with the so called  "middle d i s t i l l a t e  
problem" NIOC Has been, and i s ,  bu ild ing  complex re f in e r ie s  ( 5) which 
maximize the y ie ld  of the middle d i s t i l l a t e  output, and has l i f t e d  higher 
and h igher proportions of kerosene and gas o i l  from the Consortium operated 
Abadan re fin e ry . These l i f t in g s  from the Abadan re fin e ry  have resu lted  in  
a lo ss  of p o te n tia l exports of middle d i s t i l l a t e s  w ith re la t iv e ly  h igher 
export p rice s .
Thus, the r e la tiv e  p r ic e io f  petroleum products in  Iran  are important in  
so f a r  as they a ffe c t the p a tte rn  of demand fo r  these products. A change 
in  the s tru c tu re  of p rices may help to balance the supply and demand and, 
th ere fo re , save the cost of build ing more complex re f in e r ie s  and the un­
balanced l i f t in g s  from Abadan.
In  th is  section- I  w ill  attempt to determine whether Iran  has had an o i l  
p rice  policy  a t a l l ,  and i f  so, on what b asis  i t  was form ulated. Three 
possib le  p o lic ie s  w ill  be considered: i )  P ric ing  on the b asis  of export
p rices, i i )  Cost-plus p ric in g , i i i )  P ric ing  along the European p a tte rn .
i ) P ric ing  Based on Export P rices
An im portant approach to the problem of p ric in g  would bo to consider 
the economic opportunity cost of add itional volumes of products demanded by 
the domestic economy. The present re fin e ry  capacity  i s  given and fo r  a l l
5. The term ‘ complex’ i s  applied to p lan ts with isom erization and o ther 
equipment, so th a t the y ie ld  of middle d i s t i l l a t e s  i s  increased .
In  teclin ical language:
-  A simple re fin e ry  consists of crude topping, c a ta ly tic  reforming and 
kerosene undfining (s im ila r to Kermenshoh design)
-  A complex re fin e ry  consists of crude topping, vacuum d i s t i l l a t io n ,  
middle d i s t i l l a t e  hydrocracking, c a ta ly tic  reforming and visbreaking , 
(s im ila r to Tehran and Shiraz design).
practical purposes there i s  no choice but to use the NIOC owned f a c i l i t i e s  
to the utmost. This w ill sa t is fy  a certain demand which we could ca ll base 
demand. Nor volumes exceeding the base demand there are two alternatives:  
l i f t in g s  from Abadan, or the building of a new domestic refinery capacity. 
The la tte r  can range from topping units a l l  the way to the most complex 
refin er ie s .
For the Abadan refinery l i f t in g s , the rela tive  values of products 
are determined by their export prices, which are reflected  fairly accurately 
in  the posted export prices for bulk cargo at bandar Mashahr. Table 12.2 
compares the posted prices o f Iranian exports with the domestic product 
prices.
Table 12;2
Domestic and Export Prices of Iranian Oil 
Products. 1971 fDollars"per Barrel)
Product Export Prices 
(1)
Domestic Prices 
(2)
Export Prices as a °/o. 
of Domestic Prices.
M otor-spirit 3.83 12.70 30
Kerosene 3.95 5.25 75
Gas o i l 2.90 5.09 57
Fuel o i l 1.62 2.40 67
Note: a l l  prices include taxes.
Source: ( l )  derived from the posted prices for B.P. ex Bandar Mashahr, 
published in  the Petroleum Pres3 Service, January 1971.
(2) derived from Table 12,1.
V/e can see from the above table that m otor-spirit export prices are 
30 percent of the domestic prices, while export kerosene prices are 75 
percent of the corresponding domestic prices.
The above domestic and export prices arc not s tr ic t ly  comparable, 
because the former include transport e rd marketing costs as well as loca l 
taxes, while the la tte r  i s  a posted price and does not f e f le c t  the Iranian 
receip ts . • Nevertheless, one important point emerges: there seems to be no 
relationship between domestic prices and export prices -  that i s  to say 
there i s  no o i l  price policy in Iran based on the opportunity cost o f exports.
309
i i )  Pricing Along the European Pattern
A study o f the rela tive  prices of petroleum products in  Wo3tem 
Europe, where o i l  companies compete to some extent with each other, may 
y ie ld  some lesson s'for  the Iranian o i l  industry. The most immediate 
problem in such a price comparison would be that o f crude cost d ifferen tia ls  
In 1968 crude cost in  Iran was around $0*12 per barrel, while the corres­
ponding1 ccst o f imported crude in Europe was around 02.20 per barrel. To 
avoid th is d iffe re n tia l, 1.3 cents per l i t r e  of crude, and 1.4 cents per 
l i t r e  o f product i s  added to Iranian cost3. (6)
The s ix  European countries under study are: the United Kingdom,
Prance, Holland, I ta ly , West Germany and Sweden, The products imder study 
are; m otor-spirit, kerosene, automotive gas o i l ,  gas o i l  for heating purp­
oses and fuel oil*  Value added tax and excise tax are included whore 
appropriate.
Table 12.3
Average Prices. Average Tax and Average Sx-Tax Prices
of Oil Products in Western Europe Compared to Iran 1968.
( Cents ner l i t r e
Selling£ Price Tax & Duties iik-Tax Prices
Europe Iran Europe Iran Europe Iran
M otor-spirit 16.8 9. 4(8, 0) 11.9 5.2 4.9 4 .2 (2 .8 )
Kerosene 7-8 4. 7( 3. 3) 1.7 1,1 6.1 3 .6 (2 .2 )
Automotive gas o i l 11.0 4 .6 (3 .2 ) 7.9 0.9 3.1 3 .7 (2 .3)
Heating gas o i l 3.7 4 .6 (3 .2) 0.8 0.9 2.9 3 .7 (2 .3 )
Fuel o i l 2,2 1.91(1.51 ) 0.5 0,26 1.7 1.65(1.25)
Note: a) Figures in brackets indicate the prices excluding crude cost
d iffe re n tia l.
■ b) Fuel o i l  of 275 v isco sity  for Iran and 800-1500 v isc o s ity  for  
Europe.
Source: Product Prices Abroad. Unpublished report by NIOC and SHI. 1970*
6. M.A. Adelman: 11 The World Petroleum 0utlocVM The John Kopkins Press, 
Baltimore 1971* P.190. According to Adelman, a barrel of refined o i l
products in Rotterdam in 1968 was valued at 2.53 dollars, while the 
refin ing cost was 0.33 dollars, giving a crude price of 02.20 per barrel.
Continued o v e r lea f..•
Table 12.&V
Iran ian  Price S tructu re  fo r  the Four Main- Products 
Compared with Average of S ir  Si^opoan Countries 
(Iran  as a Percentage of European. Average)
Products S ellin g  Price Taxes & Duties Ex-Tax Priceq
Includixig crude d ifferen tia l:
Koto2>-spirit (regular) 56/° 4 ^
Kerosene 60 65 59
Gas o i l  (automotive) 42 11 119
Gas o i l  (heating e tc .) 124 120 128
Fuel o i l  (medium) 87 52 97
Fuel o i l  (lig h t) 56 ■ «. -
Excluding crude d if fe re n t ia l :
K otor-spirit (regular) 4Sp$ 571°
Kerosene 42 65 56
Gas o i l  (automotive) 29 11 71
Gas o i l  (heating e tc .) 86 120 79
Fuel o i l  (medium) 69 52 71
Fuel o i l  (lig h t) 44 - —
Source: ib id .
0- J-MTables 1 2 0  end -12*$ are  p a r t ic u la r ly  inform ative, as they  provide a b asis  
fo r  comparison between the Iran ian  and European p rice  s tru c tu re . With 
regard to "regular" m o to r-sp irit, we can see th a t the Iran ian  p rice s  are 
about h a lf  the average pump p rice  in  the six  European countries. This i s  
almost e n tire ly  due to lower taxes in  Iran , (5*2 cents per l i t r e  versus
11.9 cents per l i t r e  European average). EIOCMs u n it sa les  revenue, ex- 
tax , compare to the revenue of the  o i l  companies in  the  U.K., Netherlands 
and I ta ly , and amounts to  about 86 percent of the European average. This 
i s  in te re s tin g  as i t  shows th a t the o51 companies in  Europe are  not charg­
ing excessively high p rice s , a3 many would assume. Kerosene shows a
„ The 1.5 cents d i f f e re n t ia l  i s  calcu lated  in  the follow ing manner:
220/ -  12$ = 212'/ 212/ 158.93 '=  1 . 5 /  Assuming th a t  tho re f in ­
ing costs in  Iran  are 0 .1 / per l i t r e  h igher than those in  Europe, then 
a product d if f e re n t ia l  of 1*4/ p~r l i t r e  would b ring  up the Iran ian  
prociuct p rices to those of the European le v e ls . Continued o v e r le a f .4
different pattern*, Including crude d iffe re n tia ls , NIOC salc3 revenue, 
ex-tax, i s  59 percent of the European average, while tho 4tUt»c, price  
i s  60 percent, with taxe3 at a comparative lev e l of 65 perdont0 However, 
th is  comparison may not be very usefux because kerosene plays a minor role  
in  Europe and therefore prices may not have much significance*
The analysis of gas o i l  prices shows a marked price difference in  
Europe according to  end use, whereas in  Iran, tho product i s  marketed 
at a uniform price* Automotive gas o i l  i s  sold at a comparatively low 
consular price in  Iran, oven including crude d ifferen tia l (42^ of the 
European average)* On the other hand, NIOC !s sa les revenues, ex-tax, are 
higher than the European average by almost 20 percent*. The reason for  th is  
i s  the comparatively very low tax , which in  th is  case i s  a f u l l  7 cents 
per l i t r e  below the European average* In th is  European sample, only the 
Netherlands has a tax  burden more comparable with the cne in  Iran* But 
i f  gas o i l  for  space heating i s  considered, the picture i s  en tire ly  rever­
sed* Including crude d iffe re n tia l, the Iranian se llin g  price i s  higher 
than in  any of the European countries (124$ of the European average)*
The taxes too , are higher in  Iran than in  the U*K«, France, West Germany 
and Sweden, and amount to  a startlin g  120 percent of tho European average* 
As a r e su lt , the se llin g  p rice , ex-tax, in  Iran i s  quite high (128^ of the 
European average)o (^ 5) A comparison for fu e l o i l  i s  more d if f ic u lt ,  be­
cause of the unusually low v isco sity  of fu e l o i l  sold in  Iran, In general 
Table 12.Vv can be interpreted as fo llow s:-
Not surprisingly* the Iranian consumer actually  pays considerably lo ss  
for  petroleum products than h is European counterpart, with a low of 29 
percent fo r  automotive gas o i l  and a high of 86 percent for gas oil- U3ed 
for heating purpose5* Intorostingly enough, kerosene, v/hioh i s  tho heat­
ing and cooking fu e l of the vast majority of tho Iranian population, i s  
comparatively more expensive than automotive gas o il  (vdth 42Jo of the 
European average), and much cheaper than gas o i l  used for hoatingo
grrf~T ~r— iktti>i i ~t i~|i i  nir n  T irr—r —: — -• —v .Mivir—nnr** i « ^ f»» »**.<'» tfi nri r t i n m *'! m  n i i i i n M iiii iii i h m  inm urm  in n ir iiiiw iiii 'm m i x w iw i n r l i  w n * n » i  n • i n n  u r  ..■>»
6* c o n t in u e d .M o s t  of the data used in  th is  section  has boon taken from 
a joint NICC-SRI report on the Europe-«n and Iranian prices in  1968;
"Product Prices Abroad"0 1970 (Unpublished)
Note that iii  1969 the resid en tia l and commercial markets in  Iran con­
sumed 366,000 cubic metros of gas o i l  for heating purposes, while tho tram  
port, market consumed 940,000 cubic metres of automotive gas o i l  (D iosnl 
Oil) * Ga3 o i l  sold to b^th markets v/as at uniform prices while the trans­
port market used 2o5 times more gas than tho resid en tia l & commercial mark- 
e t0 For d e ta ils  see Chapter 80
0 1 9t i i  w
The Iranian government c o llec ts  considerably le s s  tares and duties 
than the European governments, on average, except on gas o i l  for heating 
purposes. I t  i s  in teresting  to note that the government lev ies  on kerosene 
are comparatively higher than on other products. Also, thanks to the crude 
cost d iffe re n tia l, NIOC rea lizes fa ir ly  high sa les revenues ex-taxes ranging 
from 59 percent for kerosene to 119-128 percent for gas o i l ,
Erom these observations, one can conclude that, compared with our 
European model, the Iranian government is ,  in  e ffe c t , subsidizing automotive 
gas c i l ,  while th is  business i s  very profitable for NIOC. Conversely, NIOC 
has a low rea lization  on kerosene, while the government ra ises comparatively 
high taxes on th is fu e l. On balance, looking at the consumer prices, we 
can conclude that automotive gas o i l  i3  cheaper compared with other products. 
The prices for m otor-spirit, kerosene and lig h t fuel o i l  f a l l  within a 
suprisingiy narrow range (42 percent to 4S percent of the European average). 
In order to increase the price of automotive ga3 o i l  to the lower end of 
th is range, that i s  42 percent, i t s  price should be increased from 3*2 cents 
to 4*6 cents per l i t r e .
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i i i )  Cost - Plus P ric ing
Cost-plus pricing i s  one of the most commonly used techniques of 
pricing* The basic idea behind cost-plus pricing i3 that the firm add3 
an increment to i t s  average cost when deciding i t s  sa les prices. In th is  
v/ay the firm ia expected to have p rofits proportional to tho volume sold . 
We do not intend to discuss the advantages and disadvantages o f such a 
system, but merely to determine whether a price policy based on costs has 
been in  operation in  the Iranian o i l  industry.
In such type of analysis the to ta l cost of a barrel o f refined o i l  
must be considered and the incremental p ro fit required must be added to 
th is  to ta l cost figure. Table 12.5 provides the relevant data.
Table 12.5
Average Costs and P ric e s .o f  Oil Products in  Iran  
1957 -  71 (R ials per Cubic Metres)
1957 1959 1961 1963 1965 1967 1969 1971
Average P rice 1315 1570 1582 1696 1725 1722 1716 1750
Average Cost 1627 1456 1559 1328 1280 1149 1109 1070
P ro f i t  Margin -312 134 23 363 445 573 6 07 680
Note: A verage'price excludes taxes but includes the p rice  of ’’packed
products".
Source: NIOC D istrib u tio n  Department. Annual Heport 1966-71.
By p lo ttin g  the data on graph I vre can get a p ic tu re  of the movements 
o f costs and p rice s . The p ro f i t  margin has been increasing  in  most of the 
years but nnt v/ithin a regu lar p a tte rn . There i s ,  however, no in d ica tio n  
o f a cost-p lus p ric in g  policy  in  .Iran*
The above data e la te  to a l l  the products taken together. There i s
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no in d ica tion  o f the rela tionsh ip  between individual costs and p r ices.
But can there be any measurement o f individual costs 7/here jo in t products
are concerned ? In the -following the problem o f jo in t costs w il l  be 
discussed .
/
The Problem o f Joint Cost
In the petroleum industry, jo in t costs enter in to  most o f the 
down-3troam operations. Y/e w i l l ,  however, confine our d iscussion  to the 
r e fin in g  stage.
Bor a su ccessfu l re fin in g  and marketing operation, to ta l sa le s  
revenue must exceed to ta l co s ts . Therefore, to a ssess  the p r o f ita b il i ty  
o f an o i l  company i t  i s  not necessary to know the individual co sts  o f  
each product. So why i s  there an in te r e st  in  apportioning re fin in g  costs'*. ■ 
to various products ? The reasons may include the accountants* wish to 
keep a tid y  book o f in ven tories, or-the wi3h to decide the le v e l  o f  ind­
iv id u a l product p rices by using the corresponding individual c o s ts . Indeed, 
NIOC accountants, with the help o f the Stanford Research I n s t itu te , have 
a llo ca ted  the jo in t re fin in g  costs to various products. Such apportioning  
o f costs may .be done by a llo ca tin g  costs  on the basis o f demand or s a le s .
In the case o f  NIOC, arbitary ra tio s  which were claimed to be based on 
"experience" were used for such a llo ca tio n s and the author was not informed 
o f the way these ra tio s  were arrived a t , (See Appendix Table 12.1)
The danger with such cost a llo ca tio n  i s  that one may be led  to draw 
conclusions from such data, forgettin g  the fa c t that such a d iv is io n  o f costs  
i s  economically meaningless in  the f i r s t  p lace. Average costs can simply 
not be apportioned where jo in t  products are concerned, The fa lla c y  o f  
a llo c a tin g  jo in t  costs i s  pointed out in  general economic tex t books, as 
w ell as more s p e c ia l is t  w ritings. Professor G tigler w rites:
"Such an a llo ca tio n  must be arbitary, for there i s  no one 
b asis o f a llo ca tio n  that i s  more persuasive than others. 
Indeed, any a llo ca tio n  o f common costs to one product i s  
ir ra tio n a l, i f  i t  a f fe c ts  the amount o f ‘product produced, 
for the firm should produce the product i f  i t s  p rice i s  
a t le a s t  equal to i t s  minimum marginal co st. (*8)
3, overleaf.
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In  so fa r  as o i l  i 3 concerned, P o rte r w rites :
"Accounting fo r  re f in in g  operations "begins with the rec e ip t 
o f crude o i l  and ends with the delivery  of the fin ished  
products* Between these two po in ts there is  a complex a rray  
of co sts , including  investment in  m ateria ls and supp lies, 
investment in  p lan t and equipment and operating  co sts . I t  
i s  u su a lly  not d i f f ic u l t  to determine which of these cost3 • 
should remain in  investment and which should be charged to  
operations fo r a p a r t ic u la r  period. But i t  i s  v i r tu a lly  
im possible to a t t r ib u te  p a r t ic u la r  operating costs to  
p a r t ic u la r  products in  anything more than an a rb ita ry  fash ion ,r( 9 )*
A very im portant d is t in c tio n  has to be made a t  th is  s tage .
While i t  has become c le a r th a t to ta l  costs cannot be a llo ca ted  to  jo in t  
products on an average cost b a s is . I t  i s  economically co rrec t to  decide 
p rices  on the basis  of marginal cost, even where jo in t  products a re  
concerned. But before we consider such a p o s s ib i l i ty  in  the case o f 
the petroleum industry , l e t  us look a t  two p ra c tic a l attem pts to solve the 
problem o f jo in t  co sts . .
A.A. W alters. (10) deals with the problem o f jo in t  costs in  the 
tran sp o rt in dustry . He considers the theory th a t marginal costs o f each 
product can be calcu lated  by holding o thers constant while we increase  
the production o f one. product by one u n i t .  To find the most p ro f ita b le  
product mix we need to equate marginal cost and marginal revenue fo r  each 
product. There i 3 no "a llo ca tio n  of jo in t  costs" as such, involved 
d i r e c t ly  .in th is  procedure; i t  has a l l  been taken in to  account in  ca lcu l­
a tin g  the marginal cost3 . Walters introduces the concept o f "marginal 
expected costs" and se ts  up a mathematical model fo r h is  problem. Although 
W alters argues th a t under c e rta in  conditions "the a llo c a tio n  of accountants 
and t r a f f i c  costing  o ff ic e rs  may often have a ra tio n a l basis"  he observes 
th a t the round t r ip  vehicle  costs determined by hi3 model vary g re a tly  from
8 . G .J. S tig le r :  "The Theory of Price" Macmillan and Co. Mew York
1966, PP.162-165.
9• M. P o rte r :"Petroleum Accounting P ra c tice s" New York 1966• P«418•
10. A.A. W alters: " Tne A llocation of Jo in t Costs With Demand a3 P ro b a b ility  
D istribu tion" in  The American Economic Review Vol. 50. 19&0
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those o f the accountants * allocations*
R. Y/eil J r .  (11) begins' h is  a r t i c le  w ith an a ttack  on " tra d itio n a l 
economists". He w rites :
"I suggest th a t management s c ie n t is ts  ought not to be led  
a s tra y  by the economists' t ra d itio n a l arguments on a llo c a tin g  
jo in t  costs and th a t meaningful answers to reasonable questions 
can be provided."
3
However, Weils second paragraph goes on to say;
"I show the manager who v/ants an opportunity cost or an accountant 
who wants a cost fo r inventory a llo ca tio n  how to determine these 
numbers, but I  wish to emphasize th a t c a llin g  these numbers costs 
does not change the fa c t th a t they are marginal revenues."
Both of the above a r t i c le s  provide p ra c tic a l methods of dealing  
w ith the jo in t  costs problem. 'But i t  must be remembered th a t both approaches 
use the marginal concept.
But how c lo se ly  do a l l  these arguments re la te  to jo in t  re f in in g  
costs ? The basic  idea i s  the same. All the products are produced 
jo in t ly ,  whether some' o f these are  wanted or no t. At the same time, i t  i s  
not possib le  to increase the output of one product and hold the next 
constant fo r a given re fin e ry  p a tte rn . Let us assume th a t furnace o i l  i s  
considered undesirable  by the re fin in g  company, but the production o f a 
c e r ta in  amount o f th is  product i s  unavoidable. In th is  case no cost has 
been incurred to produce furnace o i l ,  since i t  was not desired  by the 
re f in in g  company, and to a t t r ib u te  a p a rt o f the to ta l  costs of re f in in g  
-  equal to i t s  proportion in  the to ta l  volume of o i l  production, o r to i t s  
proportion in  to ta l  sa les  -  would be economically meaningless.
R. Weil J r . :  "A llocating .Jo in t Costs", -in The American Economic
Review Vol. 58* 1968, - >
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But how can we calculate the marginal cost of any one product o f a 
refinery ? This is  possible because- there are certain in sta lla tio n s  
and equipment which may be added to a refinery to increase the y ie ld  of 
certain products (see Table 12,6),
As we can see from Table 12,6, any addition of a unit to a refinery  
ean a ffe c t  the output pattern. Thus, i f  v/e intend to increase the output 
of lig h t d is t i l la te s  by in s ta llin g  a ca ta ly tic  cracking u n it, then the 
marginal cost o f the increased output o f lig h t d is t i l la te s  would be 
roughly equal to a) the cost of in sta lla tio n  (including the future 
discounted cost o f maintenance and operation) of the cracking u n it, and
b) the discounted present value of the lo ss in earnings over the whole 
l i f e  o f the cracking un it, beacuse of the fa l l  in the proportion o f the 
other o i l  products. The marginal cost estimated in th is way w ill have an 
important e ffe c t  on the decision making process. Unless the additional . 
earnings over the whole l i f e  of the cracking un it, resu lting  from the 
increase in the proportion of m otor-spirit, net of item d), and discounted 
at le a s t  equals item a ), i t  would not be economically worthwhile*to in s ta ll  
the cracking u n it.
Let us consider the special case of the Tehran refinery. Because 
of the need to increase the y ield  of the middle d is t i l la te s ,  an Isomax 
unit has been in sta lled  there. I t  i s  estimated that a complex refinery, 
(which includes special purpose un its) costs 49 m illion dollars more than 
a refinery of the same s iz e . I t  produces 18,600 barrels per day of addit­
ional d is t i l la te  products at the expense of 22,100 barrels per day of 
fuel o i l .  AI30, operation cost in  a complex refinery i s  around 22,5 cents 
per barrel higher than those in a simple refinery. On the basis o f these 
figures, the Stanford Research In stitu te  concluded that .the marginal benefits 
were le s s  than the marginal cost, and that NIOC may well be making a net 
lo ss  on i t s  sa les of middle d is t i l la te s ,  (12)
12. The Stanford Research In stitu te  "Long Term Future Energy Policy in Iran*1 
A report to the Imperial Government of Iran 19^9* Note: Source and methods
of estimates were not disclosed to the author.
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Table 12,6
Percentage Yield of Various Oil Products 
Prom the Same Kuwait Crude by Applying 
D ifferent Refining Techniques.
Light
Methods D is t il la te s
Middle
D is t illa te s
Heavy
Ehd3
Pie finery  
Loss
D is t illa t io n  and 
Platforming
11 28 56 5
Plus Visbreaking 13 38 42 7
Plus Catalytic 
Cracking 21 n
> i O
N 35 8
Plus Propane 
Deasphaltihg 39 27 28 10
Plus Hydro­
cracking, 15 53 21 11
Source:
Shell International Oil Company, "International Oil Prices” 19&4*.
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Despite the importance of marginal costs in  the decision making process 
o f an o i l  company, i t  appears th a t NIOC has not based i t s  p ric in g  po licy  
on such a b a s is . The marginal cost of the specia l in s ta l la t io n s  added to 
the Tehran re fin e ry  to increase the y ie ld  o f middle d i s t i l l a t e s  was in  no 
way re f le c te d  in  the p rices charged fo r these products -  indeed, there  v/as 
no change in  the p rices  a t  a l l .  I t  i s ,  however, important to note th a t 
NIOC has been I'.nable to change i t s  p rices without the consent of the Cabinet. 
At the same time the company was obliged to produce middle d i s t i l l a t e s  in  
accordance with J ,■ demand. Thus, regard less of the marginal costs involved, 
the company was forced to  i n s ta l l  the necessary equipment when requ ired .
A lte rna tive  C rite r ia  fo r  P ric ing  Policy
In the follow ing, four a lte rn a tiv e  c r i t e r i a  fo r p ric in g  po licy  w ill 
be discussed:
a) Maximising net revenues from a b a rre l of refined  o i l  may w ell 
be the ob jec tive  of a p rice  po licy  fo r an o i l  company. P rices may be 
determined by using  the e la s t ic i ty  o f demand ( and the c ro s s -e la s t ic i ty  
o f demand fo r su b s titu te s )  fo r  various products. In th is  way a c e r ta in  
leve l o f p rice  may be (mathematically) decided fo r each product which w ill 
maximize net revenues from a b a rre l of refined  o i l .  One im portant po in t 
however,.has to be made a t  th is  s tage . I t  i s  not necessary fo r the p rice  
o f every b a rre l o f a c e rta in  product to exceed the cost of crude o i l .  The 
p rice  of heavy fuel o i l  (HR)) provides an example, HR) i s  a simple combust­
ib le , which i s  worth no more than any o ther source of heat, allowance being 
made fo r handling costs a l i t t l e  lower than coal and a l i t t l e  h igher than 
gas. A ll o ther refined  products have high value uses with no near s u b s t i t ­
u te s , Thus the Hi?0 p rice  cannot go much higher than crude, fo r i f  i t  d id , 
consumers would burn the e n tire  crude. But UK) p rices can go below crude,
o r even to zero and below (when i t  involves a d isposal c o s t) .
In the words of Professor Adelman:
u.................. the p rices of o ther products (o ther than IIFO)
cannot go below the p rice  of crude, fo r then i t  v/ould not pay
to re fin e  them out. They would only have fuel value. Therefore,
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the "basic ru le  i s :  the mere are  the p rices  of o ther products
above crude o i l ,  ihe more i s  heavy fuel o i l  below i t .  Conversely, 
the nearer the p rices o f o ther products are to th e ir  lower l im it  
(the  p rice  of crude o i l )  the c lo ser i s  the heavy fuel o i l  to i t s  
upper l im it,  which i s  a lso  the p rice  of crude o i l .  At th is  
po in t there  i s  no longer any re f in in g . " ( 1 3 )
Adelman goes on to say th a t the competitive opportunity cost of 
a b a rre l o f crude o i l  must exceed th a t of HI*), because crude can p ro f ita b ly  
be made in to  more valuable products, while fuel o i l  cannot. To charge an 
equal o r h igher p rice  fo r fuel o i l  than fo r crude ic  to d iscrim inate  in  
p rice  ag a in st fue l o i l  buyers. ( 1 4 )
b) Encouraging in d u s tr ia l  use: may be a c r i te r io n  fo r p ric in g  po licy . 
The government may wish to encourage the expansion o f petroleum based ind­
u s tr ie s  and thus, by keeping in d u s tr ia l  product p rices steady in  the face
of domestic and ex ternal in f la tio n , or by d iscrim inating  between the
domestic and in d u s tr ia l  p rice s ,-  .the government w ill  in  e ffe c t subsid ize 
the in d u s tr ia l  u se rs . In the case of import su b s titu tio n , the su b sid iza tio n  
o f an e s se n tia l  in d u s tr ia l  input, e .g . petroleum products, v d ll  have the 
e f fe c t  o f a high ra te  o f e ffe c tiv e  t a r i f f  p ro tec tio n . Such p ro tec tio n  of 
domestic in d u s tr ie s  may be considered in  the case of in fan t in d u s tr ie s .
In Iran , the steady p rices o f fuel o i l  and gas o il  during the 1960*3  led  to
an increasing  lev e l o f in d u s tr ia l  a c t iv i ty  (see Chapter 10).
c) Subsidizing low income budgets: the government may wish to use
the p rices  o f o i l  ‘products to subsidize lower income groups. This subsid­
iz a tio n  may take place through lower p rices o f kerosene, and possib ly
13. M.A. Adelman, o p .c i t .  P .177.
14. Although .Adelman' was concerned with wholesale p rice  in  a com petitive 
market, h is  analy sis  shows th a t NIOC accountants* fig u res , showing lo sse s  
on sa le s  of fuel o i l  (Appendix Table A-12.1) are  economically m eaningless.
m o to r-sp ir it . Our analysis  o f the Urban Household Budget Survey o f Iran  
showed the importance of the o i l  product expenditure in  the lower income 
groups (see Chapter.10),
d) To co rrec t the product imbalance: a p ric in g  policy  may be
devised in  such a way th a t r e la tiv e  p rices w ill e ffe c t the demand pattern, 
and thus reduce the imbalance between supply of and demand fo r o i l  products 
(see PP.341-343)* '
One may use the follow ing approach to  discuss the above a lte rn a tiv e  
p rice  p o lic ie s . The maximization of the net revenue from a b a rro l o f 
products may be tre a te d  as the ob jective  function  of the company. The 
firm w ill  attem pt to  maximize i t s  ob jective  function in  the face o f the 
p rev a ilin g  co n stra in ts  such as*, demand c o n stra in t, techn ical co n s tra in t and 
cost c o n s tra in t. In th is  way o ther ob jec tives, such as encouraging in d u str­
i a l  use , subsid iza tion  of low income budget, co rrec ting  the product imbalance, 
may a l l  be trea te d  as sub-sets of the o rig in a l objective  functions. That 
i s  to say th a t these o ther ob jec tives may be trea ted  as c o n s tra in ts  in  
maximization of the ob jective  functions.
In  the case o f Iran , various c r i t e r i a  have been used to see whether 
NIOC has followed a c e rta in  p rice  po licy . I t  appears th a t none o f these 
c r i t e r i a  conform to the Iran ian  p rice s . Moreover, the a u th o r 's  d iscussion  
w ith NIOC o f f ic ia ls  confirmed tho point th a t NIOC has not followed a 
p a r t ic u la r  p rice  po licy  based on any economic c r i te r io n . However, the 
government freeze on the p rices of the four main products since 19^5 
has re su lte d  in  subsid iza tion , p a r tic u la r ly  in  the case of kerosene.
Although any kind of subsid iza tion  can be trea te d  as a p rice  po licy , i t  
i s  f a i r  to say th a t such subsid ization  was a s id e -e ffe c t o f the government 
freeze , ra th e r  than the re s u lt  o f a ra t io n a l  economic po licy .
B -  Cost3 in  The Iranian Oil Industry
Costs constitute the largest element in the prices of petroleum 
products in. Iran, although i t  i s  true to say that prices are independent 
of costs'. U ntil 1962, costs constituted more than h a lf of price, hut 
since 1962, have ranged "between 40 to  49 percent. Table .12.7 shows the 
elements constituting the prices of an average cubic metre o f petroleum 
products
Table 12.7
Components of the Average Price (Price = 100)
lear Taxes and Duties Costs P rofit Contribution
1962 34*2 57.2 8.6
1 £63 33*3 52.2 14.5
1964 34.0 49.7 16.3
1965 39.0 45.3 15.7
1966 . 35.1 46.4 18.5 "
1967 34*6 4‘3-7 21.7
1968 34.5 42.5 23.0
1969 34*5 42.3 23.2
1970 34.6 41.1 24.3
1971 34.7 • 40*0 25.3
Source: Computed from Appendix Table A-12.1 and the Annual Report of
the Distribution Department. 1962-71.
Costs are obviously the most important element and are divided  
into three major catagories: i )  Transport costs, which include; the
delivery of petroleum products from refin eries by p ipelines, trucks, 
railways .and barges, i i )  Product costs include; the cost o f crude, the 
cost of transporting the crude to refin eries and the actual refin ing  
costs, and i i i )  The costs of distribution include; sa les, expenses, 
marketing overheads, commissions and the cost of containers.
i )  Transnort Costs:. \
Transport costs, h istorica lly , constitute the largest sin g le  controll­
able element for the Distribution Department of NIOC. In 1969, fo**
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example, i t  amounted to 3*76 b ill io n  r ia ls , or almost $50 m illion . 
Tabic 12,8 shows the trends in  r ia l values and unit costs for 1962-69.
Table 12,8
The Trend of Transport Costs 1962-69 (R ials yer  cubic metre)
1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969
M illion r ia ls 2677 2604 3163 3557 3849 4048 3473 3757
M illion
dollars 35.5 34.5 41.9 47*1 51.0 53.6 46.3 49.3
Rials per
cubic metre 599 557 • 564 603 576 529 405 392
Note: There has been a percentage annual increase of 5 percent in
transport costs, while in  r ia ls  per cubic metre the costs show an 
average annual decrease o f 5*9 percent.
Source: Appendix Table A-12,1.
The sign ifican t transport cost reduction in  T968~69> ^-e open­
ing of the Tehran refinery. However, th is saving was o ffse t by the incr­
ease in  product costs due to the operation of the Ahwaz-Tehran crude pipe* 
l in e  in  1967.
Another aspect of transport cost i s  the cost attributable to each 
method o f transport. This i s  discussed in  d e ta il in  Chapter 9, end rep­
eated in  summary below:
Average Cost of Each Method of Transport and Their Uses
1957.. m i
CoDt in  Rls./ton-km. $  use Cost in  Rls/ton-km , cjo use
P ipelines
Railway
Commercial Transport 
NIOC lload Tankers
Total:
0.99
1.30
1.67
2,36
1 *31
27
43
: »
100
0.23  
1 . 1 2  
1.19 ' 
1.80*
0.56
72
9
19
100
* This figure rela tes to 1970 
Source: Chapter 9
Pipeline transport was the cheapest throughout the period, while NIOC*3 
road transport was the most expensive* The use of pipeline transport 
has increased from 27 percent in  1957 to 72 percent in  1971. At the 
same time the. use of railways for transporting o i l  products has declined 
from 43 percent in  1957 to 9 percent in  1971*
Prior to 1962, the KIOC accounting system did not allow for the prop­
ortioning o f the aggregate booked to ta l transport cost to each individ­
ual product. Since 1962, such allowance i s  made for in  NIOC accounts. 
Table 12.10 shows the disaggregation of the transport cost for each of 
the main products.
Table 12.10
Percentage D istrib u tio n  of Transport Cost 
By Product Group.
Year Fuel o i l Kerosene Gas o i l M otor-spirit Sub-total
1962 30.30* 26.7?o 21.15*' ■12.75*. 90.^*
1963 30.0 24.4 22.0 12.8 89.2
1964 36.6 24.0 20.6 10.7 '91.9
1965 37.5 22.7 21.9 9.5 91.6
1966 37.5 21.5 23.2 9.8 92.0
1967 32.0* 24.0. , 26,2 9.8 92.0
1968 ' 25.9* 26.8 29.7 8.9 91.3
1969 25.6* 29.5 28.0 8o3 91.4 .
* Savings in  fu el o i l  transport cost were due to the construction of 
the Tehran refinery in  1967.
Source: Appendix Table A-12.1
Table 12.10 shows that over 90 percent of the transport costs were a ttr ­
ibutable to the four main products during 1962-69. Further, we can see 
that m otor-spirit transport costs constitute the sm allest proportion of 
the to ta l transport cost,' while fu e l o i l  costs have been the largest for  
most of the period. Since no disaggregation of data by product per ton- 
kilometer i s  available we are not in  a position  to judge which products 
have the lowest or highest transport costs.
•a*
i i )  Product Costs
Product costs constitute another important item in  the to ta l cost 
of petroleum products. Product costs include the prime cost of a prod- 
uct plus the cost of transporting the crude to refin eries and the cost
of refining, i . e .  the cost of petroleum leaving the refinery gate. 
Table 12.11 shows the product cost of various products.
JTaklsJLikll
Distribution of Costs Anon,? Various Products at 
Refinery Gate (Rials nor cubic mebre)
Year Fuel o i l Kerosene Gas o i l M otor-spirit
1962 192 467 457 508
1963 186 : 412 404 416
1964 144 383 379 399 .
1965 124 341 335 346
1966 • 118 361 356 361
1967 111 340 330 344 .
1968 390 383 379 414
1969 404 345 334 467
Source: Appendix Table A-12,1
The increases in  product costs after 1967* shown above, are due 
to the need to transport crude from the southern o i lf ie ld s  to the Tehran 
refinery. This increase in  costs o ffse t  the savings in  transport costs 
mentioned earlier  on.
i i i )  Distribution Costs
The margin for distribution , i . e .  the residual money value l e f t  
a fter  deducting product costs, transport costs, taxes and duties from • 
to ta l sa les, has consistently  increased. This i s  because a large prop-* 
ortion of product costs and transport costs are fixed and do not increase 
in  direct proportion to the volume of sa les . Moreover, the reductions 
in  transport, product and other costs have contributed to the largo in ­
crease in the margin as shown in  Table 12.12* Distribution expenses 
constitute the third category of to ta l costs, these expenses amounted to • 
20 percent of to ta l costs in  1962 and 24 percent in  1969. Table 12.15 
provides us with the ratio  of each cost item as a percentage of to ta l  
costs. Me can see that transport costs were the largest in  1962, but 
slowly lo s t  ground to product costs, particu larly after the construction 
of the Tehran refinery. Distribution costs have risen slowly over th is
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period, while the container cost3 have fa llen  slowly. I f  *we consider 
container costs as a part of the distribution costs, we can see that in  
the percentage term, the 1968 figure i s  almost the same as the 1962 f ig ­
ure for d istribution expenses. In general the ratio of cost has been 
r e la tiv e ly  stable over most of the period. The rather drastic change in  
the post 1967 period for transport and product costs i s  due to the oper­
ation of the Tehran refinery.
Table 12.12
Margin Available to the Distribution Department
1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967
M illions o f
Rials 2520 3449 4162 4669 5457
Rials/cubic metre 564 '738 '769 792 817
1968 1969 Aver- 
——~*age AnnuaL. 
Increase: 
6742 7604 8761 1 9 .$
8S1 88 7  9 1 3  1 4 .£ $  .
Source: Appendix Table A-12.1 
Table 12.13
Ratio of Various Cost Items in Percentage Terms
Year Transport Cost Product Cost Distribution
Cost
Container
Cost
Total
1962 42. 31.7/S 2 0 .$ 5»Of° 10C$
1963 42.6 30.3 23.4 4.3 100
1964 45.0 28.4 23.3 3.3 100
1965 47.1 25.8 24.0 3.1 100
1966 46*6 27.0 22.3 4.1 100
1967 46.0 27.0 23.8 3.2 100
1968 36.5 37.7 23.1 2.7 100
1969 35.3 37.1 24.3 3.3 100
Mote: The in i t ia l  drop in product cost i s  6x\e to the f a l l  in  crude costs
resu lting from the more e ff ic ie n t  operation of the Consortium (See Chapi­
ter 10)
Source: Calculated from the data in  Appendix Table A-12.1
The main items of distribution costs are:
* Sales Division expenses * Commissions
* D ivisional expenses Containers
* Management and Organization expenses * Depreciation
Sales Division Expenses
Sales d iv is io n  expenses represent abound h a lf the to ta l distribution
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co s ts . They may be b e tte r  described as f ie ld  o r lin e  d is tr ib u tio n  ex­
penses, covering such elements as wages and s a la r ie s ,  in land depot ex- ■
penses, communications, u t i l i t i e s  and supplies. Operations of NIOC owned 
f i l l i n g  s ta tio n s  are  included as w ell as the expenses of av ia tion  re fu e l­
lin g  f a c i l i t i e s .  At p resen t, sa le s  d iv ision  costs are  grouped by elem­
ents such as s a la r ie s ,  u t i l i t i e s ,  h ired  tran sp o rt e tc . The various 
serv ices performed in  re tu rn  e .g . delivery , accounting and packing are 
not sp e ra te ly  id e n tif ie d  and a functional cost a llo ca tio n  i s ,  th ere fo re , 
no t poss ib le . I f  NIOC intends to  continue to analyze p r o f i ta b i l i ty  by 
product, such a functional cost a llo ca tio n  w ill have to be considered.
The p resen t system merely a llo ca te s  cost to products more or le s s  in  r e l ­
a tio n  to  e ith e r  the quantity  of each product so ld , or the money con trib ­
uted  by each product group. Appendix'Table A-12.2 provides a d e ta ile d  „ 
breakdown of sa les  d iv is ion  expenses, while Table 12.14 shows the r e l a t i -  : 
onship of volume sold to  sa les  d iv is ion  expenses:
Table 12.14 '
Expense/Volume R elationship 1962 -  69
Year 000 ' s  m3 Sales Division Tearly Dials per cubic m e tre
Expense(10^r ia l s ) Increase Fixed Variable Total:
1962 4 4 6 8 629 4 4 . 8 9 5 . 9 1 4 0 .7
1963 4675 6 8 3
c—CO 42.8 1 0 3 .3 146 ,1
1964 5411 • 7 6 8 1 2 .5 3 7 . 0 105.0 142.0
1965  ' 5895 876 14 .1 3 3 . 9 1 1 4 .8 1 4 8 .7
1966 6 6 8 0 943 7 . 9 2 9 . 9 1 1 1 . 3 1 4 1 . 2
1967 7 6 5 0 1032 9 . 4 26.2 1 0 8 ,7 1 3 4 .9
1968 8 5 7 0 1093 6,0 2 3 . 3 1 0 4 .3 127.6
1969 9591 1267 1 7 .7 2 0 . 3 1 1 3 . 3 1 3 4 .1
Percentage:
Average change per
Tear. 1 1 .$  1 0 .$ 1 0 .$ 2 . 4 $ -  0 . 7 $
Source: Appendix Table A-12.2, and NIQC*s accounts.
On the basis  of p a tte rn s developed during th is  period , i t  i s  
estim ated th a t around 200 m illion  r i a l s  of the sa le s .d iv is io n  expense i s  
f ix e d ,, i . e .  bears nc re la tio n sh ip  to the volume. The fixed  expenses in  
1962 were nearky 32 percent of the to ta l  sa les d iv is ion  expense, but
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th e i r  importance f e l l  to  15.5 percent in  1969* In  any case the 
fixed  e2pense3 have co n stitu ted  an important item of the sa le s  
d iv is ion  expense, and as such have had a s ig n if ic a n t e ffe c t on p ro f i ts .
D ivisional Expenses
D ivisional expenses include the support departments o f the D ist­
r ib u tio n  Department, such a3 Supply, A dm inistration, Inspection , Product 
Engineering, linance , Legal, Engineering, Planning and Methods, and 
Domestic Sales. Such costs under p resen t methods were a llo ca ted  to  • 
products la rg e ly  on a ne t revenue b a s is , i . e .  costs a re  a llo ca ted  on 
the b as is  of ex-tax sale  re a l is a t io n . Table 12.15 chows the breakdown 
o f d iv is io n a l expenses by various departments. In th is  case there  i s  
a lso  a fixed  cost element of around 100 m illion  r i a l s ,  which accounted 
fo r  37*7 percen t o f the to ta l  d iv is io n a l expense in  1963, and 22*5 per­
cent of the costs in  1969. The four main items of tran sp o rt se rv ices , 
finance, general se rv ices and maintenance cerv ices, c o n s titu te  the l a r ­
g est groups of expenditure in  th is  category. The u n it  expense in  r i a l s  
per cubic metre f e l l  from 56.7 r i a l s  per cubic metre to  46.4 r i a l s ,p e r  
cubic metre, in  th is  period .
Management and Organization Expenses
Management and organization  overhead costs fo r the period  under 
study, are shorn in  Table 12 .16. These costs include the s a la r ie s  of 
the employees a t the  m anagerial le v e ls , expenditure on expansion.- of 
th e  organ izational base of the Company, management consultancy fees 
and research  in to  various aspects of the fu tu re  o rgan iza tional s t ru c t­
ure of the Company.
Table 12.16
Management and Organization Expenses
Year M illions o f R ials $ of D is tr ib u tio n  Cose
1963 81
1965 1 70  • 4
1967 55 3
1969 48 2
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As we can see from Table 12.16, these costs have decreased over the 
period, both in  absolute terms and as a percentage of to ta l d istr ib ­
ution expenses. This decline can be attributed to two factors. F irstly  
the gradual transfer of managerial decision-malcing from the Distribut­
ion Department to iJIOC’s Central Department, arid secondly, increasing  
effic ien cy  at nianageri.al lev e l of the Distribution Department, brought 
about by two decades of experience in  domestic d istribution  a c t iv it ie s .
Depreciation
Depreciation costs chargeable to the D istribution Department are 
modest, since pipeline depreciation i s  nqt i t s  resp on sib ility . Appendix 
Table A-12.3 shows the depreciation cost trends. Depreciation i s  spread 
over product groups depending on volume sold rather than functions per­
formed. The main items of depreciation are; f i l l in g  sta tion s, garages, 
employees houses, depots, transport vehicles and o ffice  equipment. By 
leaving out the pipeline depreciation, the D istribution Department’ s 
to ta l costs are reduced and i t s  p rofits increased. In e ffe c t  the pipe­
lin e  depreciation i s  passed over to the Central Department of NIOC and 
i s  embodied in  to ta l depreciation costs in  the balance sh eets. (iS)
Indeed, in  1969, depreciation expenses represented only of the to ta l  
distribution expenses.
CosMigsio^
The rate of growth in r ia l payments for commissions between 1962 
-  1969 far outstripped that of any other single element. In many cases 
the reductions in  costs per unit sold for other a c t iv it ie s , were partia­
l ly  o ffse t by the increase in commission payments. Commissions consti­
tuted around 25 percent of the to ta l distribution expenses in  196O-69. 
The relevant data i s  shown in Appendix Table A-12.4. Although the s tr ­
ucture of commission rates i s  discussed in fu l l  in  Chapter 9, i t  i s  
in teresting to contrast the payments for various o i l  products. Two 
points emerge from Table 12.17 overleaf. F irstly , the r e la tiv e ly  high 
commission payments for kerosene compared to other products. Second,
l£ . See Appendix Table A-12.6
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a general increase in  the rates fo r  a l l  products with the exception of 
kerosene, which did not change throughout the period. The dependence 
of the Iranian demand on middle d i s t i l la t e s  i s  c lea r ly  responsible for  
the increase in  to ta l  commlsd-on payments in  Iran. Iiowever? the commi­
ssion  rates are not uniform for a l l  the sa le s  o u tle ts  and these rates  
are h ighest fo r  the private f i l l i n g  s ta tio n s . The expansion o f these  
private f i l l i n g  sta tio n s in  the past decade h a s.g rea tly  contributed to  
the increase in  commission payments.
Table 12.17
Commission By Product in  R ials per Cubic Metre
1962 1969
M otor^spirit 24.9 79.7
Kerosene 143.5 144.1
Cas o i l 16.5 70.8
Fuel o i l 4 .2 13.1
Average fo r  a l l  
products: 47.0 68 .3
.Note:
Figures are based on to ta l  volume so ld .
Source: Chapter 9
Container Costs
The f in a l  element o f the d istr ib u tion  expenses concerns packing 
or container co sts , e .g . raw m aterials, labour, storage, loading and un­
loading.’ Container costs  are only s ig n if ic a n t for two products; keros­
ene and lu b ricatin g  o i l  ( ir a n o l) . However, the figu res arc not meaning-* 
fu l  because they include unspecified  product cost adjustments.
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C -  P ro fit? b ility  o f Dome.gt.ic Sales
P rofit3 in  the-Iranian o i l  industry are a function of various costs ■ 
(transport, d istribution ant refin ing), taxes and duties, and a3 such they 
are governed by the changes in these variables. P rofits on product sa les  
have risen from a low of 8.6 percent in 1p62 to 25.3 percent in  19^9 of 
the average price (see Table 12.7). The reason behind th is sharp increase 
nas been the large scale of NIOC’s domestic operations and the resultant 
decline in  various cost items.
To assign profits to individual products w ill , o f course, involve 
the arbitary a llocation  of the tota l refin ing costs to individual products,
and as such the profit figure for each product w ill-b e  arbitary. Therefore
the only economically meaningful figure i s  that of to ta l p ro fits . Table 
12.18 shows the profit margin per cubic metre of domestic sa le s .
Table 12.18
P ro fita b ility  of Domestic Sales 1957 -  71
(Rials per Cubic Metre). •
Year P rofit Margin
1957 -312
1959- 134
1961 23
1963 *
COvo
1965 445
1967 573
1969 607
1971 680
Source: Table 12.5 •
I t  would have been interesting at th is stage to discuss the balance 
sheets and the p rofit and lo ss  accounts o f NIOC. Unfortunately. NIOC is  
. n o t ,’contrary to i t s  constitution, w illin g  to d isclose i t s  financial s ta te ­
ments even to people in senior positions within the company. The author 
. has however, been able to obtain these statements for the period 1967-^9•
Because o f the short period of time, no meaningful study of trends i s  possib le . 
These tables and their highlights are shown in Appendix Tables A-12.5* A-12.6 
and A-12.7* There are however two important points which emerge from these
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tab les. F irs t, plant, property and equipment (net of depreciation) 
increased by 0  346.5 m illion to 0  575.6 m illion (for de ta ils  see Appendix 
A 12.5). This large amount indicates the scale of the investment in the 
Tehran refinery, increases in  the carrying capacity of the pipelines and 
other additions to the company's buildings, machinery and vehicles. (The 
possib ility  of a revulation of assets cannot be excluded, but the 
information made available to the w riter sheds no ligh t on th a t.)  
Secondly, the income from NIOC's domestic operations -  essen tia lly  sales 
of refined products -  was not su ffic ien t to finance the concern's 
expansion. In the three years i t s  cash flow, i . e .  depreciation plus 
net income a fte r  tax, aggregated 0 125 million (see Appendix A 12.6). 
Thus,in round figures, 0  221 m illion had to be found elsewhere. The 
accounts show a small increase in  loans and a running down of cash 
balances, but both, taken together, provide only a p a rtia l explanation. 
Given the absence of information, the outside observer can only surmise : 
i t  would appear, though th is  cannot be demonstrated on the available 
evidence, that revenues from export sales of crude o il and perhaps 
also advances from the Treasury provided the bulk of the finance fo r 
NIOC's growth in  the la te  1960s.
-D -  Cross-Subsidization in  The Iranian  Oil Industry*
Cross-subsidisation has, in  the la s t  few decades, been an integral 
part o f policy in  public erfcrprises. I t  i s  a d irect government inte3>- 
vention to provide a service for one group of people, which i s  subsidi­
zed by another group. In the United Kingdom, cross-subsid isation i s  
practiced in  railways and coal production. 0 4 )  In the case of thd Iran­
ian o i l  industry, we have to deal with various types o f cross-subsidizat­
ion, each with quite d ifferen t p o lit ic a l and economic im plications.
In the. B ritish  coal industry, cross-subsidization operates on product­
ion costs, but in the case of the Iranian o i l  industry, i t  operates on 
transport costs and takes various forms.
The Hidden Subsidy Principle
Oil products in  Iran are offered at uniform delivered prices. The 
uniformity of prices a l l  over the country, whether the centres of 
consumption are c lose , or far from the refin eries , creates the problem 
of "hidden subsidy", due to differences in  transport costs* The problem 
can be set out a3 follows:
Components of price (p) = P rofit (Pr) + Transport cost (Tr) + 
Distribution cost (d) + Cost of crude +(c) + Cost of refin ing (it) + 
Taxes ( T).
so: P1 = Pr1 + Tr1 + 3)1 + C1 + E1 + T1 in  Centre 1
and P2 = Pr2 + Tr2 + D2 + C2 + k2 + T2 in Centro 2
Since prices are uniform
Pr1 + Tr1 + D1 + C1 + R1 + T1 = Pr2 + Tr2 + D2 + C2 + R2 +. T2
Por the sake of convenience, we assume D, C and R are equal in  a l l
regions, so: Pr1 + Tr1 + T1 = Pr2 4* l'r2 + T2. This means that in  a 
simple model, p ro fits are a function of transport costs and taxe3.
i4 . Por a survey of various discussions on cross-subsid ization , see 
"Public Tinterorise s" , edited by R» Turvcy. Penguin Ecdern Economics 
1568. see particularly, "Cross-Subsidization in  Coa*1" by U.G. Shepherd, 
pp. 316-351.
Since taxes are uniform a l l  over the country for a l l  products (except for 
fuel! o il)  we can safely  assume that profits are a function of transport 
costs This means-that the regional profits arc dependent on the distance 
from the refin eries and centres of production.
Consider a simple example to demonstrate the extent of these hidden 
subsidies. The following sketch chows roughly the provinces and towns 
supplied by the various refineries:
Tcibrxso
''Raslrb
Caspian
Sea
:iezaieh vv
@= Refinery
Meshed
Hameffan
Kermanshah Isfahan©->- °
. KermHasjid-c-
Solexmar: t  Shiraz
hrtiTfritz Zahedan
JAbadan
Persian
Gulf Gulf of Oman
Let us consider the Tehran refinery supplying products to five  
centres:
Tabriz.; Rasht
Eamedan
§  ___—Id e sh e d
$  rn^ nv.rTehran Refinery
Taking an average transport cost of 0,57 r ia ls  per ton -  kilom etre, 
ue con roughly calculate the transport costs, (ilO
i*^ . This average cost figure i s  taken from Chapter 9.
Transport cost to  Tehran r ia ls  per ton
Talaris 0*5? x 619
Meshed 0©57 x 909
Kamedan 0©57 x 334
= 352o8 «
.« 518.1 «
* 190*4 *
= 184.1 tt
«
« Eashi 0o57 s  323
Wo con now see tho amount of subsidy per ton by considering the trans­
port costs o f each centre of consumption as compared to  Tehran, fo r  exasple, 
Tabriz receives a transport cost d ifferen tia l subsidy of 353 r ia ls  per ton. 
This i s  equal to  a subsidy of 304 r ia ls  per cubic metro or 0©75 penco per 
Imperial gallon© Although th is  amount of subsidy may not seem sign ifican t  
in  B r itish  terms* i t  i s  extremely important in  the Iranian context© On 
average, one cubic metre of o i l  was sold for 1,700 r ia l3  not o f taxes in  
1970 (seo Table i2®3) $ thus Tabriz received a subsidy of 18 percent comp­
ared to  Tehran© As Tabriz consumed over 575$000 cubic metros of o i l  prc&® 
ucts in  1970* th is  means that the subsidy to  Tabriz amounted to  175 m illion  
r ia ls ,  or just under one m illion  pounds sterling* Considering the populat­
ion  of Tabriz of 810,000 (1966 Census of population),' the subsidy i s  equiv­
alent to  £1©20 per person per year©
The measurement of tho transport subsidy based on distance, i s  a r e la t­
ive  concept© Tabriz receives-a  largo subsidy compared to  Tehran, i t  would 
roceivo a smaller subsidy compared to  Rasht, which i s  c loser to  Tehrano
Transport cost subsidies become even more sign ifican t when we consider 
tho transport cost d ifferen tia l from Abadan compared with, say Tabriz* Tho 
cost of fin ish ed  products in  Abadan was 260 r ia ls  per cubic metre in  1968, 
compared with 648 r ia ls  at the Tehran refinery© This was because crude o i l  
had to be transported to  the Tehran refinery from tho southern o i lf ie ld s  © 
When wo compare Tabriz to  Abaden, wo must enter into our ca lcu lation s, tho 
product cost d iffe r e n tia ls , which would magnify the amount of the subsidy© 
Tho above analysis shows th a t some centres are. on joying ■ & considerable sub­
sidy at the expense of those who liv e  near tho centres of production and 
refining© That i s  to  say that pricos charged are not based on cost consid­
eration©
Given tho relevant data, one could construct a comprehensive econometric 
model, showing transport and product cost subsidies received by each centre^ 
and hence the economic pricos chargeable to  every region© Such data, 
however^ was not available to  the author, bat even without i t  one can
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roughly come to .some broad, conclusions* The most immediate conclusion 
would be that pre-tax prices of the centres of consumption near a refinery  
would have to be reduced by around on e-fifth , since transport costs const­
itu ted  23 percent of the average pre-tax prices in  1969*
I f  Tehran i s  not to pay any transport costs and other regions have to 
pay in  f u l l  for th eirs, then we may w ell find ourselves in  a situation  where 
some regions w ill  have to pay up to three times more for their  products*
But w ill  people be able to afford these* so called, economic prices ? And 
i s  the elimination o f the transport cost subsidy a practical proposal ?
In answering these questions we would have to deal with three basic points* 
F irstly , the p o lit ic a l im plications of price increases referred to earlier* 
Secondly, the uniformity of prices with i t s  *non~economic* bania has one 
great virtue: i t  i s  adm inistratively easy to operate and enforce. Thirdly, 
one cannot even be sure that such a proposal i s  economically ju s t if ia b le . 
There i s  no reason why the inhabitants of Tehran, who enjoy the highest 
standard of liv in g  in the country, should benefit from the lower cost o f  
petroleum products ju st because they happen to l iv e  near a refinery. Tradit­
ionally , the northern part of Iran has been the most prosperous region, 
followed by the central region of Iran, while the southern regions have been 
the lea s t  prosperous areas of the country. Zahodan and Kerman in  the ■ 
south-east, being among the poorest, accounted for only 2*9 percent of 
the to ta l consumption of o i l  products in  1969* There may be a case for mak­
ing available to the underdeveloped regions, some of the o i l  products such 
as kerosene and fu e l o i l ,  at lower prices. I f  one were to adept a purely 
economic approach, the poor inhabitants of Zahedan, who * happen* to liv e  
around 1,500 kilometers away.from the Abadan refineiy , would suffer greatly* 
There i s  also a great deal of economic dualism within every region, for  
instance, Esfahan i s  a re la tiv e ly  prosperous c ity , but the v illa g e s  and small 
tom s around i t  are poor. The Esfahanis .may be able to afford high o i l  p r i­
ces which w ill be too high for the other towns and v illa g e s  in  the Esfahan 
region, and i t  i s  impossible to have d ifferent prices for every torn and 
v illa g e  in  the countryc
I f  the government i s  to avoid lopsided development (which i s ,  incident- 
ly , a characteristic of capita],ism in the developing regions), 51 w il l  have
1
to base i t s  prices on* d ifferent grounds than the transport cost d ifferent­
ia ls .  I t  w ill  have tc be based at a macro-level on the broad object­
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ive of balanced growth fo r a l l  reg ions. The power o f government taxation  
can play a g rea t p a rt in  these "balances", but th is  power has not been used 
so fa r , with regard to o i l  products.
Fuel Oil Ihxes and P rices: unlike o ther o il  products, which are sold  a t
uniform p re-tax  p rice s , NIOC s e l ls  fuel o i l  a t  d iffe re n t pre-tax  p rice s .
NIOC o ffe rs  four d iffe re n t p rice s ; one fo r the c ity  of Tehran, one 
fo r the Kermanshah region, one fo r the Kuzistan region, and one fo r a l l  
o ther reg ions. Except fo r  the Kuzistan region, which i s  allowed to  have 
cheap fuel o i l ,  the government seems to have ind iscrim ina te ly  imposed taxes 
on NIOC’s p rices to bring  a l l  the p rices  to 1,200 r i a l s  per cubic m etre. 
This po licy  places the g rea te s t burden on Kermanshah, one of the regions 
le a s t  a b le 'to  affo rd  the standardized p rice . And given th a t  Kermanshah's 
re f in e ry  makes the region s e lf - s u f f ic ie n t ,  i t  i s  hard to envisage a sound 
ju s t i f ic a t io n  fo r the present tax  ra te  o f 110 percent. U nfortunatelyf i t  
seems th a t not only has the government not used i t s  taxa tion  powers to help 
the underdeveloped regions (except fo r K uzistan), but, in  some caee3, ha3 
helped to aggravate the s itu a tio n .
Table 12.20
Fuel Oil Taxes & Prices (R ials ner cubic metro)
Region Pre-Tax Price Taxes Sales Price Tax as fo o f NIOC Price
City of Tehran 8 6 6 . 1 3 3 3 . 9 1 2 0 0 . 0 3 8 . 5 ^
Kuzistan 5 9 8 . 2 1 5 1 . 8 7 5 0 .0 2 5 - 4 $
Kermanshah 5 7 5 . 0 6 2 5 . 0 1 2 0 0 . 0 108.7$
All o ther 
regions 1 1 5 3 . 9 6 6 . 1 1 2 0 0 . 0 5 . 8 $
In  general, a g rea t deal o f subsid iza tion  and c ro ss-su b sid iza tio n  
has taken place in  the Iran ian  o i l  industry . However, there  i s  no ind­
ica tio n  th a t subsid iza tion  has taken place as a re s u lt  of a c le a r govern­
ment po licy . Indeed, i t  a l l  seem3 to be the by~produc£ o f the government’s 
r ig id  a t t i tu d e  to the uniform ity of p rices throughout the country.
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Summary and Conclusion
This chapter brought together the e ffec ts  of the various decisions 
taken NIOC and the government, on prices, cost3 and p ro fits .
Prices: the prices of the four main petroleum products nave been frozen 
'since 1965, and a l l  the o i l  products are sold at uniform prices throughout 
the country. Any proposed changes in the prices of the four main products, 
which accounted for 87 percent o f the to ta l NIOC sa les revenues in 19&9> 
are subject to ra tif ica tio n  by the Cabinet. In th is  way the government has 
e ffe c tiv e ly  removed NIOC*s price determining powers.
The governments case for price sta b iliza tio n  rests  on three arguments:
a) The infant industry argument: the Iranian industries are at an early
stage o f development and must be subsidized through lower input prices, 
The lov/er price of inputs would amount to a high rate o f e ffec tiv e  
ta r if f  protection for the domestic industry. *
b) The importance of petroleum expenditure in  the average household
budget: our analysis of the role o f o i l  product expenditure in  the
Household Budget Surveys in 19^7 aud 19o9# showed that in  the lower 
income groups the expenditure 011 health, housing, education and cloth -
.. ing was often exceeded by expenditure on petroleum products. (Chapter
Ten)
c) The p o ss ib ility  of strong reaction to changes in prices, sim ilar to
the large demonstrations in 19&4*
In the f ir s t  place, the infant industry argument i s  not applicable  
to Iran, because i t  i s  already an extremely protectionist country and there 
are a variety of ta r if f  and quota too ls which the government can use to 
protect domestic industry. Also, too much protection may lead to in e f f ic ­
ien cies in  the long run, Secondly, in  a typical household budget, kerosene 
and m otor-spirit constitute the principle expenditures on petroleum products 
and thus there i s  no case for s ta b iliz in g  other product pricos. F inally, 
the public disorder in  19&4 was caused by increases of 100 percent in  
m otor-spirit, and 40 percent in kerosene prices.
* For d e ta ils  of the 'Theory of E ffective Tariff Protection, see: L it t le ,  
Scitovsky and Scott, 11 Industry and Trade in Some Developing Countries", 
O.E.C.P. Development Centre, Oxford 'University Press 1970.
<3 4 1
I f  the p rice  r is e s  are gradual and spread over a longer period, i t  i s  
.doubtfu l whether there  would be any strong public  reac tio n . On the othc 
hand tho public  s e n s i t iv i ty  i s  d irec ted  towards m o to r-sp ir it and herosei 
p rice s , and no t towards in d u s tr ia l  fu e ls .
Given the s tru c tu re  of p rice s , th is  chapter attem pted to in v e s ti­
ga te  Y7h.eth.er there  has been any form of p rice  po licy  in  existence in  Ir«* 
l'hree c r i t e r i a  were, used to  e s ta b lish  whether tho product p rices bear a* 
re la tio n sh ip  to  o ther economic v a ria b le s . These wore: Export p rice s , 
■costs and in te rn a tio n a l p rice s . The conclusion was th a t there  has neve:- 
. been a p rice  po licy  in  Iran  w ith regard to  o i l  product p rice s . The onlj 
gu ideline fo r  p rice s  seems to have been the governm ents pressure on EIC. 
. to  m aintain s ta b le  p rice s .
P r i ce Policy and Energy Policy Iran  has no declared energy po licy , 
Whether there  i s  an energy po licy  in  the minds of the Cabinet M inisters 
i s  another issu e . In  the past two decades, no energy po licy  was requi­
red because of the a b i l i ty  of the domestic re f in in g  capacity  to  supply ' 
domestic demand. In  the early  19701s, the need fo r  a long .term energy 
po licy  became a p p a ren t,^ p a rticu la rly  in  view of the f a i lu re  to take app: 
o p ria te  actions in  the p a s t. I t  i s  the au thor’s b e l ie f  th a t no energy 
po licy  in  Iran  could succeed w ithout a corresponding p rice  po licy . A 
change in  the r e la tiv e  p osition  of p rice s  i s  required  to  change the pat 
of demand for"middle d i s t i l l a t e s .  Based on the authorh extensive discu 
" sions with- the 1-TIGC experts, a number of proposals are subm itted in  the 
folloY7.ing; those proposals are based on the sp e c ific  o b jec tiv e  of using 
product p rices  as a lev e r  in  reso lv ing  tho middle d i s t i l l a t e  problem:
a) There seems to be no ju s t i f ic a t io n  fo r  increasing  the p rice  of 
m o to r-sp ir it . On the other hand, i f  s u f f ic ie n t  ad d itio n a l revenues can. 
co llec ted  from p rice  increases on o ther products, a p rice  reduction may 
be ju s t i f ie d ,  because of i t s  b e n e fic ia l e ffe c t on the demand fo r  d ie se l 
o i l .  In  the past the government tax po licy  has helped to  aggravate the 
middle d i s t i l l a t e  shortage, fo r  in stance , the p rice  o f m o to r-sp ir it  is  
8 cen ts a l i t r e ,  of \rhich- tax  rep resen ts 65 percen t, w hile d ie s e l o i l  h 
a p rice  of 5.2 cents per l i t r e ,  of-which tax  rep resen ts 28 percen t -  11
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difference encourages the use of d iese l o i l .  Therefore, e ith e r  the p rice  
of d ie se l o i l  has to be ra ised  or the tax element in  m o to r-sp irit ought 
to be reduced, or both. . The area of competition between these two products 
i s  mainly tru ck s . The government i s  able to r e s t r i c t  the import or usage 
of d ie se l trucks and to encourage the use of p e tro l trucks. A lte rn a tiv e ly , 
a two t i e r  p rice  system fo r m o to r-sp irit may be considered, v;ith a discount 
o r refund fo r  users o f p e tro l trucks.
b) Although kerosene p rices are  low compared to the European average and 
o ther product p rices in  Iran , an increase i s  probably not considered feas­
ib le  from a so c ia l and p o l i t ic a l  point of view . In  the next decade, with 
the general increase in  income per head, kerosene p rices may be ra ised  
gradually ;
c) For gas o i l ,  a two t i e r  system of p rices may be Introduced, w ith a 
view to m aintaining tho present p rice  lev e l of gas o i l  fo r heating  and 
ra is in g  the p rice  o f automotive gas o i l  by as much as 50 percent to 3i5QO 
r i a l s  per cubic metre. This two t i e r  system has worked in  Europe and there  
i s  no reason to believe th a t i t  w ill not work in  Iran . To avoid a sudden 
shock to the tran sp o rt sec to r, and a sudden d ra s tic  e f fe c t  on the p rices  of 
a g r ic u ltu ra l  and o ther goods which requ ire  long hauls' to market, any such 
increase  should be made gradually and be spread over several years. I f  
combined w ith o ther measures, such as lower m o to r-sp irit p r ic e s , or subsid­
iz in g  the purchase of p e tro l trucks, a d iese l o i l  p rice  increase  should 
con tribu te  su b s ta n tia lly  towards the a lle v ia tio n  of the middle d i s t i l l a t e  
shortage, w ithout d isrup tive  economic side e ffe c ts .
d) The p rice  of the present q u a lity  of fuel o i l  i s  low compared to o ther 
products,, and i t  could be ra ised  to 1500-2000 r i a l s .  However, the fu e l o i l  
p rice  policy must be co-ordinated with tho one on gas o i l ,  to avoid a switch 
from fuel o i l  to  ga3 o i l .  A3 an a lte rn a tiv e  or supplement to  a general 
p rice  r i s e ,  an increase in  v isc o s ity , from the present average o f 275  
Redwood 1 a t  10G°F could be pursued to re lease  "c u tte r  stock". The increase 
in  v isc o s ity  w ill  be possib le  by inclusion  of residues with h igher hydro­
carbons, such a3 asphalt c r  t a r  ., in  the fuel o i l .
t
e) A medium v isc o s ity  fuel o i l  of 600 -  000 seconds fo r  in d u s tr ia l  use,
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should be .Introduced. I t  should be priced to encourage industry to make
the necessary changes in their  equipment, to switch from the lig h t  fuel
o i l  to th is medium grade. The price of th is product may be determined by
*
a market research study.* Heavy fuel o i l  should continue to be used for 
power plants and other industrial operations where technically end econom­
ic a l ly  fea s ib le .
Of course, d irect measures to counteract the growing middle d is t i l la te  
problem may be considered to supplement a pricing policy. These acts may 
range from loca l production of petrol trucks, to import restr ic tio n s , or 
. ra ising  ta r if fs  on d iese l trucks.
Costs: costs are divided into three major groups: transport, refin ing
and d istribution . The major d iff ic u lty  in cost analysis concerns the 
problem o f jo in t costs at the refinery le v e l. NIOC has, however, adopted 
various accounting practices to a llo c a te .cost3 arb itarily  to individual 
products. This cost a llocation  has in  the past been mainly based on net 
sa les realization  or the volume sold, but NIOC i s  not w illin g  to' d isclose  
the ratios used in such a llocation s.
The Distribution Department has trad ition ally  omitted the pipeline  
depreciation and overhead costs o f the associated departments of NIOC from 
i t s  cost analysis. This has, to some extent, distorted our estimate of the 
movements in  co3t trends.
Commissions have shown the highest growth rate -  tr ip lin g  in  les3  than 
eight years. Lack of data on the type of commission payment has hindered 
the analysis o f  the factors behind- th is  co3t increase.
I t  i s  clear that costs bear no relationship to prices, although costs 
account for h a lf o f the fin a l price.
P ro f i ts  and C ro ss-su ts id iza ticn : p ro f i ts  a re  a function of costs and
revenues and as such they are  governed by changes in  co^t le v e ls . Our
* The production of the medium viscosity  fuel o i l  was recommended by 
S.H.I. to NIOC in 1970.
analysis shows th a t as fa r  as to ta l  p ro f i ts  a re  concerned, a su b s ta n tia l 
improvement has taken p la c e . ' In 19^2, p ro f i ts  co n stitu ted  8.6 percent 
of to ta l  sa le s  re a liz a tio n , in  1971 over percen t. An o v e ra ll p r o f i t ­
a b i l i ty  ana ly sis  of NIOC was not possib le  because of the absence of income 
statem ents and balance sheets . However, our an a ly sis  show th a t the growth 
in  domestic a sse ts  was mainly financed by non-domestic a c t iv i t i e s . -
C ross-subsid ization  i s  an in te g ra l p a rt of many public  e n te rp rise s  
a l l  over the world. This i s  so because the government-owned en te rp rise s  
are not concerned with business ob jec tives, but need to take in to  account 
the whole range of so c ia l, p o l i t ic a l  and economic considera tions. The 
compromise which determines the order of p r io r i t ie s  of these o b jec tiv es , 
co n s titu te s  the basis  o f the public policy  fo r  a government ven ture . In  
Iran , the p o l i t ic a l  consideration of uniform ity o f p rice s , has fo r  long 
overruled o ther ob jectives in  the domestic o i l  industry . The uniform ity  
of p rices has led to  a major type o f c ro ss-subsid iza tion : hidden subsidy
due to tran sp o rt costr d i f f e r e n t ia l .  I t  would be unreasonable to  suggest 
th a t tran sp o rt costs should become chargeable in  f u l l  to the consumers, aa 
th is  would mean th a t some consumers, l iv in g  in  centres o f consumption fa r  
away from re f in e r ie s , w ill  have to pay several times more fo r  th e i r  products 
and many of these cen tres o f consumption are  economically underdeveloped.
I f  the government of Iran  i s  concerned w ith a po licy  of balanced 
regional development, i t  can use the p rices of petroleum products, p a r t­
ic u la r ly  those o f in d u s tr ia l  fu e ls , to achieve; i t s  goal3„ The p rices  o f 
these products w ill have to be lowered in  the underdeveloped reg ions, 
re la tiv e  to the prices, o f petroleum products in  the more prosperous reg ions. 
Hut NIOC cannot be expected to do th is  on i t s  own. • Any changes in  p rice  
w ill have to be co-ordinated with the M inistry  of Finance and w ill  require re ­
shaping of the tax structure of the petroleum products. Up to now, 
these taxes have been used solclly to equalize prices throughout the 
country.
P o stsc rip t -  _ Chronology of Events Since 197*1
■ in r i~>i iriw iw im u m  iruTn mi m mnm mi u »w i«i ^  h i  jiiw i n n r nnm j rwtiV m ^'ir<'«»ii<i>T rti m m >n 1 hm w rw n m rnr i  iin«  uh ■inT»ii>wr w» irmn
The purpose of th is  p o s tsc rip t is  to present a short and fa c tu a l 
d iscussion of the  Iran ian  o i l ' industry  from 1971 to  the end of January I 974
•The year 1971 was the  year of change in  the s ta te  of the  in te rn a tio n a l 
o i l  industry® On February 15th . 1971, the Tehran Agreement on ra is in g  the 
posted p rices of crude o i l  by the s ix  Persian Gulf members of OPEC was 
signed® L ater in  the year other producers followed suit® (See Chapter 6)
The Tehran Agreement signa lled  a major change in  the re la tio n sh ip  between 
the consumers and the producers, the buyers’market was transformed in to  a 
se lle r’s 1 market and the so lid a r i ty  of the producers was paying off®
In  Ju ly  197*1 some OPEC members led  by Sheik Ahmad Yamard, the Saudi Arab 
ian  O il B ih is te r  demanded equity  p a rtic ip a tio n  in  the o i l  companies operat­
ing in  th e i r  countries® On December, 20tho 1972, the ’’model” p a rtic ip a tio n  
agreement was signed by Saudi Arabia and Abu Dhabi providing fo r  an inmed-^. 
ia te  25 percent p a rtic ip a tio n , and 51 percent con tro l by 1st® January ,(1982,
Iran  v/as not a p a rty  to  the p a rtic ip a tio n  agreement, opposing i t  from 
the  outset® This opposition was based on the b e lie f  th a t  the programme was 
unworkableo But the success of the  p a r tic ip a tio n  programme l e f t  I ra n  in  a 
d i f f ic u l t  position® The buy-back arrangement of the  p a rtic ip a tio n  crude 
meant th a t the signa to ries to  the agreement would have a la rg e r  disposable 
per b a rre l revenue than Iran , with a g rea ter p o l i t ic a l  con tro l over the 
companies® 1.1 ore over, the producers had, in  th e i r  possession, la rg e r  quant- 
t i t l e s  of crude, th a t they themselves could e:xport i f  they so wished® The 
Shah^ and KIOC had to  do something to  provide Iran  with a t le a s t  as good a
1 o For the te x t of the agreement see; “Petroleum..In te llig e n ce  Vfeekly’’ -  
Special Supplement. December 25th0 1972
deal as the other producers had received© This opened the talks on a comp 
le te  • take-over of the Iranian o i l  industry by NIOC o ( 2) The negotiations 
■with the Consortium started in  July, 1972 and an agreement was signed In 
July, 1973e (3 ) .
Under the new agreement NIOC w ill  take-over the entire operation of the 
Iranian o i l  industry© This was the goal of the 1951 nationalisation attempt 
which was realized only after two decades© This take-over i s  by no means a 
nationalization insofar as expropriation of the foreign operator*s assets 
are concerned© Although, no terms of compensation in  cash terms were d is­
cussed, NIOC i s  obliged to s e l l  crude to the Consortium members under a 20 
year supply agreement©
The sale of crude w ill  be governed by the 0K2C posted prices and in  this" 
sense the 45 percent p ro fits  share of the foreign operator, after the.deduct-
i
ion of various costs and royalties i s  essen tia lly  preserved© The main change 
which took place was that Iran agreed to  do the Consortium's job by exploit­
ing the crude and transporting i t  to the export terminals for delivery to 
the Consortium tankers© Moreover, NIOC's production policy  has become indep­
endent of the majors and i t  w ill  in  future produce and export o i l  in  accord­
ance with national heeds and not in  conjunction Ydth the international. ..supply 
and demand conditions (.as the majors had done for years)© The Abadan ref in -  
eryery is  taken-over by NIOC, but the foreign operator reserves the right to 
i t s  previous 300,000 b/d a fter  the products for  internal demand are l i f t e d  
by NIOC© • ' ..
An important part of the agreement i s  A rticle  6, which describes the new- 
finan cia l arrangements on prices which w ill ensure that NIOC w ill  not receive 
le s s  revenue in terms of dollars per barrel than i t s  Arab neighbours involved 
in  participation programmes© There are four elements included in  the prices 
which the Consortium members w ill pay for crude delivered by NIOC, either
20 7/hether the Shah had th is  arrangement at the back of his mind when he ref­
used to enter into the participation negotiations, or whether th is  idea was 
motivated by the successsof the participation programme and the subsequent 
blow to Iran's prestige, cannot be factually  determined©
3o For details see: "Petroleum Intelligence vTeelcly’1-  Specia l Supplement  July 
23ra© 1973°
on board ship or for processing at Abadan: these are
■ a) An operating cost of 10— 11 cents per barrel© This may r ise  when
• NIOC undertakes secondary recovery methods<>
b) A fu lly  expensed royalty of 12©5 percent of posted prices*
c) The balancing margin princip le, which' takes into account the benefits
Iran would have received under participation, but allowing' for the 
Consortium companies * depreciation charges on the remaining unamort­
ized net book value of th eir  assets in  Iran® The margin i s  estimated 
at 6©5 cents per barrel u n til the end of 1975* but subject to revision  
thereafter© ■
d); Interest on 60 percent of the capital expenditure provided by NIOC to 
increase the production capacity of the Iranian o i l f ie ld s « . This w ill  
la st-on ly  for fiv e  years, which entails the period of major capacity
: .expansion* The in terest payable i s  estimated to be 0*418 cents per 
barrel in  1973* hut th is  vd.ll increase in  future years* The remaining’
v
■ /forty  percent of capital requirements necessary to  expand production 
v /ill be advanced by the Consortium companies as payment for crude o i l  
purchasese
I t  i s  estimated that for the nine month period from 21st, March 1973* 
(the agreement was retroactive to 21st* March 1973) to 31st December, 1973s 
the Consortium ¥/ould pay 55 cents per barrel for the crude purchased from . 
NIOC o In addition they w ill  pay income tax to Iran on the difference bet­
ween that figure and the posted p rices, which w ill enable them to retain a 
tax: credit against home-based income tax* (4)
- Another important aspect of the new agreement i s  the production p olicy  
of NIOC* MI00 i s  to  produce 42*5 b il l io n  barrels of o i l  in  the 1973-93 
period* Of th is  figure, 29*3 b il l io n  barrels are to be sold to the Consort 
ium members, s ix  b ill io n  barrels l e f t  for domestic consumption and 7*2 
b ill io n  barrels for direct exports© Production would r ise  from 4*5 m illion  
b/d in  1971 to 7©6 (or even 8,0) m illion barrels per day in  1977* Together 
with production from other joint ventures^ Iran’s in sta lled  capacity i s  ex­
pected to reach 8*5 to 9*0 m illion b/d by then© Thereafter the production
4© According to Petroleum Press Service (Sept* 1973), the new agreement was 
to bring NICC an additional.. sum o f /1 2 0  m illion compared to the former 
Consortium Agreement©
w ill  remain steady fo r  seven years, u n t i l  1984© From then onwards product­
ion w ould-fall so th a t i t  reaches 1 *5 m illion  b /d  (o n e-th ird  of production 
in  1971) in  1993° The in te rn a l consumption is  expected to  be around 1 o5 
m illion  b /d  in  1 9 7 3 , implying th a t the 1993 production 'le v e l would be in  
lin e  with -domestic. consumption* (b) ■
Recent Price In c reases ' '
The Tehran and T rip o li Agreements of 1971* provided fo r  automatic • 
increases in  posted p rices  every year© Also, there  were o th er upward rev­
is io n s  of p r ic e s .to  compensate against currency f lu c tu a tio n s  in  the West© 
In  the  la s t  quarter of 1973 however, the posted p rice s  were d ra s t ic a l ly  
increased an shown below:
Date
1960-1970
February 15th© 1971
1972
1973 (before Cct* 15th) 
October 15th© 1973 
December 23rd© 1973
Posted Prj.cc/'
■I—.«««p
#1.80
2© 28 
2©48 
2© 90 
5<>18 
11 ©65
Net Receipts of Producers
/0©80 -  # 0©85 
1.32  
.1 .44  
1©70 
7. 1 nJ  © 1 v-
7 ©oo \
* Light Arabian crude of 34° API (Persian  Gulf only)
' The increases in  p rices were the  re s u lt  of th ree  fa c to rs ;  f i r s t l y ,  
some increases would have taken place in  any case as a n a tu ra l outcome of • 
.the 0P2C a ttitu d e  © Secondly, the  Arab o i l  embargo and a 30 percent cut in  
production lev e ls  created  an a r t i f i c i a l  shortage of o i l  supply, I ra n ’ s 
auction of 12 m illion  tons of o i l  on December 14th© and December, 20tli© 
1 9 7 3 * fetched p rices of up to  / 1 7*34 p er b a r re l ,  which convinced the  0K3C ' 
members th a t the tin e  was r ig h t fo r  a sharp increase* F in a lly , the
e  ■ntMrecnb.-*
5© For an estim ate of the length of time the Iran ian  crude reserves w ill  
la s t  under the new agreement see: Appendix.
350
American (and to some ex ten t, European) backing of I s r a e l  persuaded the 
Arabs to  take punitive action  against the West by ra is in g  the o i l  p rice s  
to. such high levels®
The Shah of Iran  was a major advocate of the December p rice  increase*
I t  i s  reported  th a t  he had asked fo r  posted p rices  of $14 -  $15 per b a rre l , 
while Saudi Arabia wished the p rices to be no more than $8 -  $9 per barrel*  
The Shah took th is  extreme a ttitu d e  fo r  two reasons® F ir s t ly ,  he 'knew th a t 
the  export horizon of Iran ian  o i l  i s  sho rt, and he wished to maximize Iran* 
short-term  o i l  revenues® Secondly, i t  had become c lae r th a t December 1973 
was the most opportune moment to  ra ise  the p r ic e s , given the  very exception 
a l  circumstances then prevailing®
The F if th  Development Plan
The F if th  Plan i s  to run from IIarch 1973 to  March i 978j i t  i s  by f a r  
th e ’ mo'st comprehensive and ambitious planning a c tiv ity  which .has ever 
taken place in  Iran* ' T otal investments envisaged by the Plan O rganisation 
are to  be around $ 3 2  b i l l io n  and are expected to  lead  to a doubling of 
income per head and a G-KP growth ra te  of 13*4 percent in  curren t prices* 
The Plan Y/as to be mainly financed by o i l  revenues® Indeed, of the 0 2 2  
b i l l io n  o i l  revenues expected during the  Plan period , 75 per-cent was to  go, 
■fc0 the  Plan Organization® (6) •
The Iran ian  take-over of the Consortium’s a c t iv i t ie s  resu lted  in  the  
scrapping of the o rig in a l F if th  Plan because of the increased revenues® 
Before a revised  F if th  Plan 7/as published in  Autumn 1973* the two p rice  
-increases became e ffec tiv e  and the government’ s o i l  revenues-were expected 
.to quadruple to $14 -  $17 b i l l io n  in  1974  alone -  equivalent to  around 70 
percent of the t o ta l  o i l  revenue expected in  the  old plan fo r  the  f u l l  
f iv e  years*.
The Iran ian  Government has declared th a t a new enlarged F if th  Plan w ill 
be published in  March 1974, but i t  i s  doubtful whether the Plan ta rg e ts  can
f th  Develooment r la n  of ira n6 C For d e ta ils  and analysis see: a,) ’’The F i______________________________
Organisation Tehran, 1973 ( in  Persian) b) Keyhan In te r -  
nationa l ,  January 8th® 1973 c) The F inancial Times nA Survey of the ...Iran­
ian  Economy'1 August 20th® 1973°
be su b s ta n tia lly  increased® The absorbtive capacity  of th e  Iran ian  econ­
omy i s  fixed  a t le a s t ,  in  the short-run , and the large q u an titie s  of
N
o i l  revenue availab le  to  Iran  under the'new p r ise  r i s e ,  cannot be absorbed 
by the domestic economy, (7)
Iran* s Investment Plans Abroad
Ira h fs investment abroad maybe in  two forms: d irec t loans and in ­
vestment in  other countries and downstream operations on the  o i l  fronto 
In so fa r as the former is  concerned, nothing concrete has been undertaken 
. in  the past and there  are no plans fo r  such a c tiv ity  on a la rge  sca le  in  
the futureo In  1973* a token budget of $5«1 m illion  was announced fo r  in ­
vestment and a id  to  Pak istan , Senegal, Jordan and Tunisia,, The budget is  
 ^expected to. r is e  to  $10 m illion  i n '1974* (8) . Aid' on th is- scale  would
serve a. p o l i t ic a l  purpose only, i t  w ill  n e ith e r lea d  to  an accelera tion  of 
economic development in  these coun tries, nor w ill i t  re lie v e  Iran  of i t s  
fo reign  exchange surp lus«
On the o i l  fro n t however, the foreign  investment has been more subsianr 
ia lo  Iran  has p a rtic ip a te d  in  the lladras re f in e ry  in  Ind ia  and the  Sasol*-' 
burg re fin e ry  in  South Africa,, NIOC has agreed in  p r in c ip le  to  p a r t ic ip ­
ate. in  re f in e r ie s  in  Greece, Belgium and i s  also considering a ^oint-ventus 
re f in e ry  in  South Vietnam.,
In  June 1973} following a v i s i t  by the Shah to the U*S«A®, HI00 starts* 
negotiations with the Ashland O il Company fo r  a 50 percent equity  p a r t ic ­
ip a tio n  in  the companyc Ashland O il Company has a 60,000 b /d  re fin e ry  and 
a petrochemical p lan t a t  Buffalo and about 180 serv ice s ta tio n s  in  Hew 
York S ta te c Ashland would o rig in a lly  purchase 60,000 b /d  of Iran ia n  crude 
r is in g  to  100,000 b /d  by 1 9 7 5 ? in  l in e  with i t s  planned re fin e ry  expansion
A l e t t e r  of understanding has been signed by the two p a r t ie s  and the  two
'  .  (< sides had u n t i l  the end of 1973  to  make a f in a l  decision fo r  the  venture*
According to  p ress reports Iran  has also agreed in  p r in c ip le  w ith tfest 
G-ermany to  p a rtic ip a te  in  th ree  re f in e r ie s , two in  G-ermany and one in  
Bushehr ( Iran) c The Iran ian  re fin e ry  is  to  have a capacity  of 580,000 b/d*
7c For a comparison of the Plan targets & the fu tu re  o i l  income see Appends 
8© Keyhan In te rn a tio n a l, November 17th0 1973
F urther, Iran  would have an equity  shareholding in  1,300 serv ice  s ta tio n s  
in  'G-ermany* ( 10)
I t  i s  however, the au thor1 s b e lie f  th a t NIOC and the Iran ian  G-overnmont
are becoming increasing ly  inward-looking ?dth regard to  investments abroad*
The Ashland-NIOC deadline has passed without any p o sitiv e  response from the
Iran ian  side* Y/hat i s  even more in te re s tin g  i s  the Iran ian  re fu sa l to
carry  on vdth the $200 m illion  jo in t-ven tu re  re fin e ry  in  Liege© Although
• *
the Belgians took th e i r  time in  providing the f in a l  approval to  the deal, 
NI0C*s re fu sa l on the ground th a t " the  conditions fo r  the  deal are  no 
longer valid" came as a great sunrise to many o i l  experts© ( 1 1 ) Although 
the Belgian Prime M inister and s ix  other Cabinet M inisters were prepared 
to  f l y  immediately to  Tehran to  salvage the deal, the  Iran ians washed theiz 
hands of i to  Subsequently the  Belgium Government was forced  to resign©
Iran  has declared i t s  in ten tio n  th a t i t  would only agree to  invest 
abroad in  cases of b i la te r a l  and very favourable tre.de agreements, p a r t ic ­
u la r ly  with Japan and the E*E0G© One reason fo r the lack of in te r e s t  of 
NIOC to  pursue i t s  jo in t-ven ture  p o lic ie s  abroad, may well be th a t  id  CO 
has so ld  i n ’advance,'through auction , i t s  entitlem ent fo r1 crude in  the 
next year and i s  an tic ip a tin g  fu r th e r  auctions in  the  fixture©- This would 
leave Iran  vdth l i t t l e  o i l  to  supply to  i t s  an tic ip a ted  jo in t-ven tu re  r e f -  
in e r ie s  and serv ice  stations©
The recent demand of the Arabian producers fo r an increas ing  degree of 
p a rtic ip a tio n  in  the  foreign  o i l  companies may w ell lead to  demands fo r  the 
rev is ion  of the la te s t  o il. agreement, which was f in a l is e d  only l a s t  July* 
I ra n ia n ' opinion i s  influenced p a rticu la rly ’ by the Kuwait Agreement in  
December 1973* fo r  a 60 percent p a r tic ip a tio n  in  KPC © There w i l l  no doubt 
be s im ila r agreements made by the other Arab Gulf producers© These agree­
ments would provide fo r  a higher revenue in  cents per b a r re l  in  cases of
10© Kevhan in te rn a tio n a l December, 8th© 1973 (Persian  E dition)
11* See the F inancial Times, January 17th© 1974- and the  Sun da’/  T ines 
January 20th© 1974-©
buy-back arrangements, but more important i s  the fa c t th a t these countries 
v /ill have su b s ta n tia lly  more crude to  dispose of d ire c tly  then. w ill  Iran* 
According to  Hr0 Housego:
!r!7ithin the' government, and p a r t ic u la r ly  NIOC, there  are 
strong fee lings th a t Iran  could market f a r  la rg e r volumes of o i l ,  
p a r t ic u la r ly  since the p rice  increases have so g rea tly  added to 
her wealth. At the same t in e  there  is  a g rea ter desire  fo r  contro 
over the d is tr ib u tio n  of the Iran ian  o i l  so th a t i t  can be used as 
a bargaining counter in  negotiation  with o ther nations fo r  the  
exchange of scarce commodities and raw m ateria lsoM (i2 )
120 The f in a n c ia l l in e s  January'8tho 1974■ r if r r m im f r -T  --ii-n-rnnut Ti hi   r w m  mi a n  f
In  the proceeding chapters, the development of the Iran ian  o i l  
industry  in  the period i 901 ~7 i has been examined0 The period  under study 
was divided in to  two p a rts :  developments before the n a tio n a lisa tio n  (1901 -  
195*0 and a f te r  n a tio n a lisa tio n  (1951  -  1971)®
The f i r s t  f i f t y  ye era of the Iran ian  o i l  industry  was marked by the 
Anglo-Persian O il Company* s (APGG, la te r  AIOC) domination of the o i l  ind­
u s try  as weld, as the p o l i t i c a l  and economic l i f e  of the  country. The 
circumstances which led  up to  the award of the  h*Arcy concession and i t s  
rev is io n  in  1921 showed the weakness of the leaders of the country, who 
were vulnerable to  p o l i t i c a l  pressures end b rib ery  by the B r i t i s h . author­
i t i e s  c A fter the end of the Second World War when n a tio n a lisa tio n  elements 
became powerful in  the  parliam ent, demands fo r  the n a tio n a lisa tio n  of the 
o i l  industry  gained momentum,, These demands were motivated not only by the 
wish to  r id  Iran* s o i l  industry  of fo re igners , but c l so to  stop B r i t is h  
in te rfe rence  in  economic and p o l i t i c a l  matterso The demands fo r  n a tio n a l-  
ic a tio n  were n e ith e r based on ra t io n a l  economic judgements nor on consider­
ation  of the s ta te  of the  in te rn a tio n a l o i l  in d u s try ,.b u t on emotional 
sentiments of M ajlis Deputies led  by Dra llussadeq® I t  turned out to  he an 
ill- ju d g e d  venture, damaging the Iran ians more than the British© T he'stop­
ping of the  o i l  flow from Iran  had l i t t l e  e ffec t on the in te rn a tio n a l supply 
s itu a tio n , the majors simply stepped up th e ir  production in  o ther o i l  prod­
ucing coun tries« Iran  suffered  th ree  years of economic and p o l i t i c a l .c r i s i s  
and lo s t  i t s  leadership as the la rg e s t Middle E astern  producer, a p o s itio n  
i t  has not yet been able to re-capture©
The domestic o il ' industry  was an export o rien ta ted  one. P ip e lin es , 
road and railways were b u i l t  t.o connect the Abadan re f in e ry  and the southern 
o i lf ie ld s  to  the  export term inals ra th e r  than the domestic market® Because 
of the lack of tran sp o rt f a n i l i t i e s  o i l  was imported from R ussia, Europe anc 
North America. U n til 1930? more than th ree -q u arte rs  of the  Iran ian  demand 
f o r 'o i l  products was imported -  the la rg e s t supp lier being the Soviet Union* 
In  1927 out of the to ta l  consumption of 52,500 tons, imports accounted fo r  
40,000 tons, while exports amounted to  4o7 m illion  tonso AIOC1s lack of
in te re s t  in  the domestic market was not suprising  in  vie?/ of the  d i f f ic u l t ­
ie s  of tran spo rt and th e  small sine of the domestic market. AIOC did not 
have any ob ligation  to  the Iran ian  economy, except fo r  paying small sums 
in  ro y a lty . _
The domestic economy was a subsisiene economy based on a feudal, ag ric­
u l tu ra l  system with l i t t l e  or no in fra -s tru c tu re . The th eo ries  of balancei 
and unbalanced growth were considered* ALso a comp o ris  on of Itollin* s obser­
vations of the  impact of the ex trac tive  in d u s trie s  on the  B olivian economy 
and- of o i l  on the Iran ian  economy was made0 The conditions fo r  a balanced 
growth when a l l  sectors are expected to  grow sim ultaniously did not ex is t 
in  Iran© Such a development p a tte rn  would only be possib le  when some kind
of in fra -s tru c tu re  , managerial a b i l i ty  and tech n ica l know-how are p res-
• /  ’   -
ent in  the economy© Hirsohman1 s theory  of unbalanced growth was found wo
be ir re le v e n t to  the Iran ian  situation^  The major growth industry* o i l  wa
an export o rien ta ted , c a p ita l- in ten s iv e  industry  which did not r e ly  on
p a rtic ip a tio n  from the domestic economy© - The backward linkages -  th a t i s
the 'flow of resources from the domestic secto r to  the o il. industry  were
very weak© The only important flow was th a t of unsk illed  labour to  the
industry , which accounted fo r  le ss  than 1 percent of the t o t a l  work force©
The forward linkages -  th a t i s  the  flow of resources from the o i l  industry
to  the domestic secto r took two forms: the sa le  of o i l  products to  the
domestic economy and the  ro le  of o i l  revenues on economic development©
The domestic consumption of o i l  products .was la rg e ly  provided by imports'
and thus the  impact was minimal© The impact of the o i l  revenues on the
economy v/as small because there  was no planning machinery to  u t i l i z e  these
revenues© Moreover, these revenues v/ere small in  re la tio n  to  o ther source
of income© In  1950, the peals year before n a tio n a liza tio n , o i l  revenues
accounted fo r  12 percent of the t o t a l  government income and 4 percent of
the  na tional Income©
R o llin fs observations of the impact of ex tractive  in d u s tr ie s  in  B o liv i 
mticked c losely  the Iran ian  situation© The o i l  industry  v/as se t apart 
from the economic and so c ia l l i f e  of the country and had l i t t l e  o r no 
impact on i t s  development©
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Part I I  of the d issertation  “was concerned with the changes in  the company/ 
country relationship and i t s  impact on the domestic economy in  the period 
1951-7*1 o At the time of the nationalization , the government decided to creat 
the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) to  take over the a c t iv it ie s  of AIOC* 
In the face of the international boycott of Iranian o i l ,  NIOC was unable to  
export o i l ,  i t s  role being confined to the domestic d istribution  of o i l  
products*
The 1954 Consortium Agreement was a face-saving device for-Iran. Although 
AIOC lo s t  60io o f i t s  share; o f  the Iranian o i l ,  * i t  remained' the largest . 
concession holder in  the Consortium, The agreement accepted the princ­
ip le  of nationalization , i 0e* th a t a l l  the Iranian o i l  reserves and the 
assets of the Cohsorfcium belonged to NIOC, but gave the foreign  operator the 
right to decide on production le v e ls , prices and investment, independently 
and without any interference from the Iranian side* The Consortium Agreement 
was in  fact no different from those already awarded in  the neighbouring 
countries. The only difference was the technical question of ownership of 
reserves and the foreign operators1 assets -  th is  issue did not at any time 
provide an advantage for  Iran* The Consortium Agreement however, marked a 
turning point in  the method of payment of o i l  revenues. In the orig inal 
P!Arcy concession, the payments were based on a p ro fit d iv ision  method - 1 6  
percent of net p ro fits  of AFX was to  be paid to  the Iranian Covemmenb. 
During the early years of the Creat Depression, the low le v e l of APX*s 
p rofits adversly affected the payment of o i l  revenues to  Iran. Thus the 
Iranian Covemment sought a policy  which related the revenue payments to  pro­
duction le v e ls . This led  to the 1933 Agreement, which embodied the "tonnage— 
royalty^ princip le. Later in  1947 and 1949, when the Venezuelan and Saudi 
Arabian governments succeeded in  obtaining agreements based on the equal shar* 
ing of p r o fits , th is  method became widely accepted by both producers and 
companies. The companies were quite happy with the arrangement, since what 
they fo re fs ited  in  additional payments, was more than compensated by the in­
creased tax allowances in their  home countries as w ell as gaining the good . 
w ill of the host countries. These agreements also provided for  a further 
royalty of 12.5 percent of posted prices payable to  the producers, repres­
enting a compensation for  depletion of th e ir  reserves. The 12.5 
royalty provision was interpreted by the - o i l  companies to  foim
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a portion  of the  producer’s 50 percent share of n e t 'p ro f i t s .  In  th is  way' 
no royalty  was ac tu a lly  paid u n t i l  1964.0 •
: The formation of NIOC and the increasing  awareness of the  producer 
governments of the  importance of th e i r  o i l ,  led  to  attempts on their- p a rt 
to  enforce th e ir  sovereignty over th e i r  o i l  resources. These attempts 
took two forms: by awarding non-concessionary jo in t-ven turo  and serv ice
co n trac ts , and by creating  a producers’ c a r te l ,  to  impose th e i r  wishes on 
the  major concessionaires. . . '
The award of non-concessionary jo in t-ven tu re  con tracts was led  by NT00© 
Under the 1957 Petroleum Act, NIOC awarded a jo in t-ven tu re  con tract to  ENI«
'IIany more of these contracts'w ere l a t e r  awarded in  Iran  and in  o ther count-
.  v/ r i e s .  , A ll these con tracts provided fo r 50 percent ownership of the  discov­
ered o i l  by NIOC and a 50 percent income tax  on the not p ro f i ts  of the 
foreign  operator© These contracts were generally  h a iled  as 75-25 contracts 
and were regarded as a considerable improvement on the concessionary agree­
ments© The most important im plication of these con tracts was an erosion 
in  the power of the in te rn a tio n a l majors and a turn ing  poin t in  the r e l a t ­
ionship between producers and the  o i l  companies© In  i 960 , NIOC introduced 
another so -ca lled  ’’revolu tionary” agreement© This was the serv ice contract 
awarded to ERAP©* This contract was based on the p r in c ip le  th a t  the  foreag 
operator i s  simply a con tractor working 011 commission fo r  Iran  and that- 
Iran  would only pay fo r  i t s  expenses when commercially v iable  o i l  has been 
discovered© • -
The major conclusion drawn from the award of- the non-concessionary agrc 
ments re la te d  to  the p ro f i ta b i l i ty  comparisons between these agreements anc 
the concessionary agreements© The 75-25 p ro f i t  d iv is ion  of the  joint-vent* 
.ure .was a misnomer© Indeed, i t  would not be possib le  to  compare the p ro fii 
d iv ision  method of these types of contract with eaxsh other© There are no 
ro y a lty  provisions in  the jo in t-ven tu re  agreements and the producing count­
r i e s  share cf crude is  marketed by the p a rtn e r a t market p rice s  and not a t 
posted prices© Our ca lcu lations showed th a t in  a th e o re tic a l sense, assum 
ing equal production c o sts , the p ro f i ta b i l i ty  of both types of con tract i s  
almost identical© In  p ra c tic e , however,, p ro f i ts  in  terms of cents per 
b a r re l  received by NIOC have been much higher in  the case of the CcnsortiiE 
than in  the  case of the jo in t-venture agreements© Although many Iran ians
have argued that the joint-ventures have given a sense of participation to 
the Iranians,' it is hard to. quantify these'socio-political benefits in econ­
omic termso At the same time, it is hard to prove that the joint-ventures 
have brought about the integration of the oil industry with the economy, 
’which the Consortium had not achieved© Surely, what must be important to 
the welfare of the Iranians, is the cash received and not who exploits the 
oil. The joint-ventures were motivated by Iranian political aspirations an 
by Enrico Uattei*s desire'for revenge and not by purely economic factors. 
This raises the question: should Iran have ceased to proceed with its joint 
ventures because they did not prove to be as profitable as the Consortium ? 
The answer'must be no© 5Given Iran*s ambitious development plans and its 
need for large quantities of foreign exchange, and given the fact that the 
Consortium was not prepared to step-up production, a policy of short-term 
maximisation .of revenue by NIOC may well be justified© No profitability 
comparisons were carried out for the service contracts because no oil has 
.yet been discovered, by ERAP© ' . . ' 1
The growing importance of the independent non-integrated oil companies 
after the Second V/orld war eroded the power of the international majors, 
.which had, owing to.their integrated nature, been able to maintain stable 
prices© Moreover, the U*S© quota policy after the mid-1950!s barred the 
U*So 'independents from shipping their oil to America and they were event­
ually forced to sell in the open markets of Europe© . At the same time the 
Russians started a new phase of oil policy which provided a large quantity 
of crude in the European markets© As a result of these developments, the- 
posted prices which vrere tax-reference prices, weakened and after three 
drastic reductions in the late 1950’s, the idea of a producers organizatior 
was put forwarde.,'' In 1 960, 0H5C was founded by Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, 
Kuwait and Venezuela. The' original aim cf the organization was to stop 
further declines of posted prices and attempt to restore pre-1 posted 
prices. The latter objective did not succeed and posted prices remained 
unchanged for a decade. The most notable achievement of OPEC in the • late 
1960 fs concerned .royalty : .expensing - that is, the differentiation between 
royalties and the 50 percent income tax© As. a result the revenues of OPEC 
members were increased substantially and collective action was shown to pa;- 
But the OPEC members had differences of political ideology,, culture and 
economic development etc. The proration idea, based on limiting the prod-
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Motion le v e l  to  force up the p r ices , created the f i r s t  disagreement between 
Iran and the other members®. Iran wanted to carry through i t s  ambitious
Fourth Development Plan and felt that the present 'scale of oil reveiiues was
* /
insufficiente Consequently, it pressed the Consortium to increase the 
Iranian production so as to provide sufficient'revenues for the Fourth Plan 
_ Given the excess supply situation of the international petroleum market, 
this could not be*achieved without some cut-back in the growth rate of 
production of the others® This attitude naturally caused resentment amongs' 
other OFEC memberso II ore over, Iran stepped-up its. production during the 
Arab oil embargo of i 9^7 t° replace the Arab oil lost through, the stoppage© 
The'issue of higher posted prices of oil in 1970, reunited the OFEC members 
The initial moves were made by the Libyan Government which chose the most 
.opportune moment'to exert pressure on the'oil companies* '
After a great deal of negotiation, the Tehran and Tripoli Agreements y/er 
signed in 1971° These agreements'provided for a general increase in posted 
prices, an incremental- increase in prices to reflect.the rising demand for 
oil, and a further increase to protect oil revenues against inflation© The 
1971 Agreements were not only important because they provided for a very 
substantial increase, in oil revenues, but also because they signalled the 
transformation of the international petroleum market from a buyer's market 
into .a seller* s. jjaxicet©
Chapter 7 deals with the impact of the oil industry on the Iranian 
economy in the light of the new agreements and the substantially 3.arger 
oil revenues® The fiscal impact of the oil revenues was much greater in 
the 1951 ”71 period than it was in the earlier period® The receipts from 
the oil sector rose from $34 million in 1954 to' $2114 million in .1971* 
providing* for 60 'percent of the foreign exchange receipts of Iran® The rol 
of domestic sales of HI GO. in providing revenues for the government was sign 
ifioantc In t.tn 1968-71 period, NI0G‘s activities constituted 10 percent 
of the total oil income received by the government © In many cases the 
revenues provided by domestic activities were larger than those received 
from individual joint-venture agreements©
The o i l  revenues were channelled into two separate budgets: the ‘ordin­
ary* budget for the current government expenditures and the ‘development*
d U l i
budget investments through the Plan Organization®• The division of oil
revenues -between the' ordinary and development budgets reflects the govern-
\
' * ^ ment,s attitude towards development planning in Iran® In the early 19o05 s
around 60 percent 'of the total oil revenues were allocated to the develop­
ment budget, but during the first four years of the Fourth Plan (1968-71) 
this allocation did not fall below 75 percent© The role of oil revenues 
in the four development plans of Iran was considered in detail and the most 
important conclusion drawn was that none of the development plans could hav 
survived without these revenues® Oil revenues accounted for 37 percent, 70 
percent, 67 percent end 63 percent of the total revenues of the four devel­
opment plans respectively©
Insofar as the direct effects of the oil industry ore concerned, the 
forward and backward linkages became stronger© The flew of cheap oil to 
the domestic sector, where industrl.es were oil-based, provided an important 
boost to the domestic economy© In 1 969* around 74 percent of the domestic 
energy-requirements were supplied by oil© If we add natural gas and L.P.Cr© 
this ratio rises to around 90 percent© The demand for petroleum products 
rose nearly 3 times in the 1959-71. period; fuel oil and gas oil, the two 
.most important industrial fuels, grew yery rapidly©
There is an important ’cause and effect” relationship between the con­
sumption of oil products and the rate of economic growth© The latter is 
stimulated by the growth of the oil industry and its progress in turn in** 
creases the demand for the products of the oil industry© Thus, there was < 
virtuous circle of growth which led to a very high rate in G-NP growth in 
the Third, and Fourth plans©
. The capital-intensive nature of the oil industry meant that most of the 
equipment had to be imported, although important steps were taken to allow 
'more participation by the indigenous economy© Employment fell from 6 3 * 0 0 0 .  
in 1 9 5 6  to 4 1 *000  in 1971* but the ratio of Iranian ’’staff" to foreign” 
“staff” rose substantially© NIOC and the Consortium, were the largest 
.employers of the oil industry®
- Thevspectacular growth of the Iranian economy cannot be explained by 
any current .development theory© Hollins’ predictions referred only to one 
stage of the economic development of Iran, and ignored the critical role 
of the government in utilizing the oil reserves© Nor is the unbalanced
growth theory appropriate© The backward linkages (which axe so important 
in the theory)'were the weakest, in Iran© Also, there was little re-invest­
ment of profits and no chain reaction throughout the economy©' The Iranian 
economic development is in fact, one more “special case11©
Fart III of this dissertation is concerned with a detailed analysis of 
NIOC since 1951° The Company’s chief purpose was to take-over the domestic 
activities of AIOC and enlarge them© NIOC was to sell its oil products 
at uniform prices throughout the country© However, any changes in the 
price of the four main products: motor-spirit, kerosene, gas oil and fuel 
oil, were subject to approval by the Cabinet© Although HOG has always bee: 
run on the basis of a public corporation, it constitution refers to it as 
a' commercial company, with ordinary shares, all of which are held by the 
government© The Company pays tax at the rate of 30 percent on its net 
income* Another, more recent objective, was to export oil direc-tly to the 
consuming countries© Our examination of NIOC’s direct dealings revealed 
that this objective was not fully achieved© .The Company’s own production 
of crude was not sufficient for exports and the crude oil from partnership 
agreements was already, tied by long-term supply contracts © The 1966/67 
Consortium Supplemental Agreement, provided for the Consortium to hand over 
20 million tons of oil to NIOC over a five-year period, with the provision 
that the Company should not market this oil in countries where the. Consort­
ium members.v^ ere operating© In the first four years of this agreement, n
NIOC’s exports to Eastern Europe accounted for only one-third of the 20 
/
million tons of crude at' its disposal*
■ Generally speaking, the production and exports of NIOC and its partners 
were minute compared to the scale of the Consortium’s operation of over 
90 percent of production and exports® Also, the revenues received from the 
Consortium in cents per barrel were JjjOQ percent higher than those
received from its partners©
HOC inherited a poor distribution network from AIOC, and many diffic­
ulties; the principal problems being: a) Geographical: more than two-third
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' . of the products were consumed in.the northern parts of Iran* while 
all the oilfields and refineries v/ere located in the southo
' t
b) Lack of retail outletso
c) Large seasonal fluctuations in demando
d) Excessive dependence on kerosene„
e) Keeping up with the high rate of growth of the domestic demand.
f) The imbalance between' the demand pattern and the supply pattern.
• Initially, the Company expanded its transport network by laying two 
trans-Iranian pipelines® It started its own road tanker fleet and also 
hired a large fleet of contract tankers® Special, arrangements were made 
with the government-owned Iranian Railways for transporting oil products© 
The pipelines accounted for 27 percent of total transport in ton-kilometres 
in 1957, but for no less than 72 percent in 1971»
The number of retail outlets increased from-just under 700 in 1957 to 
ovor 11000 in 1971 and to cox^ e with the seasonal fluctuations, bulk depots 
were established in the large centres of consumption® The excessive depend­
ence on kerosene created a particularly difficult problem for ITICC, because 
the refineries were unable to provide sufficient middle-distillates for 
domestic consumption®
In i960, oil x^ roducts accounted for 63 percent of total energy demand 
and for 74 percent of demand in 19&9® This was due to many causes, but
chiefly: the rapid growth of the population (especially in the towns) and
the rising incomes, they provided for exceptionally favourable conditions, 
for the sustained expansion of oil consumption. There were only temporary 
setbacks, such as the 1960-63 recession and the short-lived price increases 
of 1964 (for details see Chapter 10)®
The three largest end-users of petroleum products were: residential and 
commercial,1 industrial and road transport; together they accounted for 78 
percent of the total internal demand in 19 9^° Each market was analysed 
individually and reasons for the movements in end-use demand of each sector
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were discussed in  Chapter 10. Moreover, the end-use an a lysis  was used as 
a method o f d istin gu ish in g  between the developed and under-developed regions 
o f the country, in  view o f the c lose relationsh ip  between the rate o f  econ­
omic growth and the increase in  petroleum consumption. The fin a l part o f  
the demand an a lysis  related  to the in v estig a tio n  o f the ro le  o f o i l  product 
expenditures through the household budget surveys o f Iran for 19&7 a-nd 19&9* 
The conclusions drawn were that: f ir s t ly ,  the o i l  product expenditures
constitu ted  the la rg est energy expenditure in  a l l  income groups. Secondly, 
the o i l  product expenditure increased in  d irect proportion to increases in  
income and f in a lly ,  these expenditures were higher than those on education, 
health  and accomodation in  the lower income groups,
Chap'ter 11 examines the imbalance between the supply and demand for  
o i l  products in  Iran. The demand for m id d le -d is t illa te s  has con stitu ted  over 
50 percent o f  the to ta l demand since 19^5* w h ilst the m id d le -d is t illa te s  have 
accounted for only 30 percent o f the refinery  output in  Iran. NIOC lacks  
the f le x ib i l i t y  o f the large o i l  companies and i s  unable to import o i l  
products for p o l i t ic a l  and economic reasons. Moreover, the dependence o f  
the Iranian consumers and the encouragement provided for the use o f  d iese l, 
o i l  mea.ns that the r is in g  trend o f demand for m id d le -d is t illa te s  i s  l ik e ly  to 
continue in  the forseeable future.
In the 1 9 6 0 ’ s , NIOC re lied  on the Consortium-operated, Abadan refin ery  
to f i l l  the gap between supply and demand. I t  l i f t e d  a d isproportionately  
large quantity o f m id d le -d ist illa te s  out o f i t s  100,000 barrels per day 
entitlem ent o f  the Abadan refinery  output. Moreover, the an a ly sis  
pointed to the fact that the use o f Abadan as a "balancing" refin ery  
w ill  be sh o r t-liv ed , p articu larly  in  view o f the high rate o f growth o f  
demand for m id d le -d is t illa te s . To resolve the m id d le -d is t illa te  problem 
the follow ing so lu tion s were examined:
a) A complete take-over o f the Abadan refin ery .
b) Importation o f  the required m id d le -d is t illa te s ,
c) The build ing o f new, complex r e f in e r ie s .
d) Speeding up the natural gas distribution.
e) Changing the structure of prices.
The analysis suggests that there is no single- optimal solution* hut 
that a combination of all five - with the‘main emphasis on changes in the 
price structure - provides a way out.
The final chapter reviews prices, costs and profits, and cross-subs- 
idizaticn. Since 19&5» the prices of products have been stabilized and there 
are no current plans to change them. In this way the government has effect­
ively taken away NIOC’s power over its internal finances. This is a 
particularly serious issue because in 87 percent of total NIOC sales
revenues were derived from the sale of these products. Given the present
situation, an attempt-was made to examine whether there has been a rational
price policy for oil products. Three methods were considered:
a) Pricing on the basis of export prices,
b) Pricing on the basis of costs,
c) Pricing along the.European pattern.
In all cases the conclusions drawn pointed to,the absence of any price 
policy in the Iranian oil industry. The only guideline available was the 
government’s insistence on maintaining the status-quo on oil prices.
The author’s investigation of NIOC costs showed that the company uses 
arbitary ratios for the allocation of joint costs. These ratios were found 
to be economically meaningless. However, all the costs have fallen as a 
percentage of the selling price, particularly the cost of pipeline transport.
Profits are a function of costs and because the costs of refining and 
transportation arepartially fixed, the profits on domestic sales have in­
creased in proportion to the value sold. In 1$62 profits constituted 8 .6  
percent of the total-sales realization; in 1971 this ratio: was over 25 per­
cent. Our calculations show that motor-spirit has been the most profitable 
product, followed by middle-di's tillates and fuel oil. The above analysis 
refers to the domestic sales activity only and a general evaluation of NIOC's 
financial perfozmance has not been possible because of NIOC's unwillingness 
to disclose its balance sheets and profit/loss accounts.
3G5
The governments r ig id  a ttitu d e towards maintaining stab le  p rices in  the 
o i l  industry has led  to important s id e -e f fe c t s ,  notably cross-su b sid ization  
due to transport cost and product cost d if fe r e n t ia ls .  As a r e su lt , the 
inhabitants o f  an area near to an -o ilf ie ld  have to pay the same price for  
th e ir  products as those who l iv e  far away from the centres o f production.
The p o s s ib i l ity  o f  using transport cost d if fe r e n t ia ls  as a lev er  in  a l le v ­
ia t in g  the d isp a r it ie s  in  the regional development o f the country ha3 been 
discussed in  th is  context. Although a great deal o f sub sid ization  has taken 
place, i t  has become clear that th is  wa3 not the re su lt  o f  a c lear  government 
p o licy , but rather the by-product o f the uniform ity o f p rices throughout the 
country.
* * * * * *
The a c t iv i t i e s  o f NIOC in  the past twenty years have been influenced  
by two s e ts  o f  factors: NIOC’s ob jectives as a company, and the government’s
d ecision  to use NIOC as an instrument for implementing i t s  overa ll economic 
stra tegy . In some cases the wishes o f both p arties  coincided, in  other 
cases they co n flic te d .
NIOC’s main ob jectives o f expanding the d istr ib u tio n  and transport 
network, promoting a large demand for o i l  products in  the home market and 
penetrating foreign markets through unconventional agreements, were grea tly  
encouraged by the government. N evertheless, NIOC remains subordinate to the 
government and so has to ta ilo r  i t s  p o lic ie s  to governmental, p o l i t ic a l  and 
economic o b jec tiv es . Below are some o f the more important instances where 
the government induced NIOC to follow  a p articu lar course o f  action  v/hich 
the la t t e r  'might not have followed o f i t s  own accord.
a) The most important area in  v/hich the government p o licy  determined NIOC 
action s concerns the p ricing  o f the four major products. This has had not only 
• . unfavourable economic and so c ia l consequence?^,but a lso  removed NIOC’s
power to adopt a coherent price policy. In my opinion no energy policy can 
he successfully implemented without such a price policy.
b) The 1969 Consortium Settlement was an instance where NIOC had to press 
for higher revenues on the-basis of the'requirements of the Plan Orgsnisatics
c) Although entry into foreign markets has been an NIOC objective, the part­
icular counties selected for trading with were those chosen by the govern­
ment, within the current political frameworko Thus, the government having 
taken the political decision to enter into barter agreements with the Sastei 
European countries, it was the Ministry of Economy’s requirements of plant 
and machinery, which determined the total volume of oil exports to these 
countrieso 'The refinery projects in India and South Africa,, and the NIOC 
stake in the North Sea oil must also be viewed in the same context-®
(A strong case can be made out for the view that a major national-‘-enter-
{
prise such as NIOC, should co-ordinate its policies with those of the gover 
nmentc But'.;what is open to debate.is the degree and the extent of govern­
ment controlo In many cases the government instructed NIOC to carry out 
certain activities, but NIOC was left unsupported to take the consequences® 
NIOC has ■ developed a great deal of expertise and technical-know-how in the 
past twenty years and one may argue on behalf? of the company,,' that as long 
•it remains within the. framework of the government’s overall economic and po 
itical strategy, it should be given more autonomy than it has"had to deal 
with its affairso On the other hand, the government’s interventionist atti 
ude may be determined.by the longer-term views, based on the eventual exhau 
stion of indigenous oil resources. Given this prospect, the government may 
wish to secure the maximum political and social advantages from oil, if nec 
essary at the expense of economic considerations0
So far NIOC has not followed a path similar to those of‘the profit-moti 
ated companies in the West. Tims, in considering its past activities, ono mus 
bear in mind, that its achievements cannot be judged on a purely commercial 
basis o
: A major difficulty in the preparation of this dissertation has been the 
lack of information® In some cases the data was not disclosed because of 
its confidential nature; in other cases no reliable data was available* I 
was particularly fortunate in obtaining the advice of a number of leading
Iranian economists and oil experts and a great deal of material which 
would not normally be accessible to a student was made available to me®
The data, though inadequate and insufficient in some cases, nevertheless 
hblped me to achieve ray original objectives:to examine.the development of 
the Iranian oil industry - specifically NIOC - in the domestic market end 
abroad, and to make an economic and political evaluation of the various 
policies adopted® -
In my opinion* there is much scope for further research on. the Iranian 
oil industry® The most important lines of study are as detailed:
a) Although there is no dearth of literature on the accounting methods of 
apportioning joint costs to different products, what is lacking is a, full 
study of the various results achieved by each method and ho?/ such results 
(wou3.d affect the Iranian oil consumption patterns once a price and profit 
policy as adopted®
b) An econometric model of cross-subsidisation due to product and trans­
port cost differentials with a view to determining the economic costs charg­
eable to ,each region® This could form the basis for a government policy 
based' on using oil product prices as an incentive in regional development 
planning. • -
c) An analysis of NIOC’s balance sheets and profit and loss accounts (whie 
were not ne.de available to me) since 1955* Ratio analysis may be applied 
to examine the financial activities of the company. This analysis could 
lead to an investigation of the rate of return on capital emplyed in the 
domestic market and abroakL
d) An evaluation of economic and political imp lie at ions of NIOC5 s projects 
.abroad^  for example, the Madras and Sasolburg refineries, North Sea explor­
ation and barter deals with '£astern European countries®
The execution of these research projects depend of course on the willir 
ness of NIOC to make the necessary statistical and financial mate rial avauj 
able® On that assumption, the projects could increase our knowledge of the 
Iranian oil industry® This in turn ?/ould help in the formulation of an ene 
rgy policy, which is essential if the best use is to be made of the country 
principal natural resource®
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Appendix to Chapter 1
A Brief Note on the Iranian Oil Concessions
FIRST REUTER CONCESSION: in 1872 Baron Julius de Reuter, a British subject
■ni» a iiw d  ill iwinrrri i» n i f  mi n* m ihuitiii n n  mTrnin ■" i—m  n m u n i r ^ a n  * ■ v
was granted, a concession which gave him, among other far-reaching privileg­
es “the exclusive right to exploit all mines with the exception of gold, 
silver and other precious metals*”. This concession was nullified fifteen 
months later on the grounds of non-performanceQ
HOTZ CONCESSION: in 1884-Ho Hots obtained an oil concession for a limited
area, around Dal eld. 0 He drilled one shallow well without results«
SECOND REUTER CONCESSION: in January 1889, de Reuter obtained a second .
trr  -inn-r Tmittr inTrnT rT rrti i f t - ;t  irttni rr'm» rBitffiimrrrrmr-tiinTf'>1ti Tffi—n r r f<  v  '  /
'concession-in connection with the creation of the Imperial Bank of Persia® 
Article 11 of the concession states! “The Imperial Bank being ready to moke 
the necessary sacrifices of the natural wealth of the country, the Govern­
ment of Persia grants the said Bank, during the period of the concession, 
the exclusive right in all parts of the Empire to exploit iron, copper, 
lead, manganese, coal, petroleum, borax and asbestos*” Two wells were.drill 
ed along Daleki without success and in 1899 the concession was renounced*
THE D’ARCY CONCESSION: 1901 As explained in the text. •wnur-** oi t ■ . . . ' W«e . r>
THE I3iOS:D?ARlA CONCESSION: in 1916, Khoshtaria, a Russian subject, obtain-
ed andagreement from an official of the Persian G-overnment regarding a 
concession to explore for, and exploit oil, in three northern provinces: 
Gillan, Masanderan and'Asterbad* After the overthrow of the Tsarist regime 
and the nullification of the Anglo-Russian agreement, APOC, fearing that 
the concession night fall into American'hands* bought the concession in 
Hay, 1920 at a price of .€100,00 and established the North Persia Oil Conpsn 
In 1921 the Soviet Government signed a treaty with Persia, which abrogated 
all previous treaties and concessions* In November, 1921 the Persian Gov­
ernment declared the above concession null and void0
* Quoted from the statement of American Ambassador to Persia (Feb c. 1920) in 
A0 Ye2elson: ’United States - Persian Government Relations 188^-1921” (New
York) 1255) P«199 =
THE? STANDARD OIL CONCESSION: in 1921, a concession'was granted to the
■ Standard Oil Company of Key/- Jersey, to operate the five northern provinces* 
As Jersey could not build pipelines across Carcasia in the Soviet Union, 
the only alternative was* therefore, to agree to a joint venture with APOO, 
and thus make it possible to build pipelines to the south of Persia over 
which'APOG had a complete monopoly* The concession was nullified in 1922 
because Jersey Standard was not prepared to pay gratuities to Persian off­
icials o
THE SINCLAIR CONCESSION: in 1922, the government proposed a law to award
a concession to the Sinclair Oil Company for four of the five northern 
provinceso The law was passed, but after a period of negotiation with 
Sinclair* it was cancelled*
KAVIR KHURIAN CONCESSION: in 1878, Hadji Ali Akbar Amin Maaden, had 
been granted the Ownership of mines in Semnan and Damghan* These included 
the possible ”oil mines1’ of Kavir Khurian, south of Semnan, where an oil 
seepage exists* For forty years no work was done on these mines* In 1924 
the heirs went into partnership with the Russian Government, Legal diffic­
ulties ensued and the status of the concession remained unsettled until the 
nationalisation of oil when the properties were taken over by NIOC*
TIIS FRENCH CONCESSION: in 1927, under the inititative of the French Govern-
m -*i>in—iw««n'a-»r»Ciri»-»»p'itT)« W'nwwiWP'T fCTrwai >71 .r  na TCi-'rTraiam ^  *
ment, a French company named Syndicat d!Etudes France Iraniannes, was form­
ed with the view of arranging tripartite agreement between France, Persia 
and Russia to work the Kavir Khurian concession, These negotiations cont­
inued until 1930 with no result* In 1930 a concession was granted to ano­
ther French company for a joint Franco-Persian venture, and although some 
exploitation was carried out in the northern provinces the concession was 
cancelled*
THE 1933 CONCESSION: after the cancellation of the MArcy concession a new
Tin«mrr i —null -th  t  jl" j f ^ r —— ,.i - i - ., —m
concession was awarded to AFOC in 1933°
370
G-overnmcnt awarded a concession to an American Oil Company of Delay/are*
The area concerned was in the «orth and. norfch-east of Iran, including 
G-organ, Khorasan. Sistan and north-eastern Baluchistan® The concession was 
for sisty years and gave the company nthe exclusive light to search, explore 
prospect, drill for oil'and extract petroleum”® in 1937 and 1938* extens­
ive reconnaisance surveys were carried out and showed promising results®
In June 1938, however^ despite the preparation, already made for test drill­
ing, the company relinquished its concession® The reason publicly given 
was that ”oil of good quality had been discovered nearer to seaports, thus 
creating a difficult and dangerous situation for the capital engaged in the 
exploitation of oilfields far from the ocean®” Presumably it referred to 
the discovery, about this time, of large oilfields in Saudi Arabia, nearer 
to the Persian Gulf*
> 1 j  ‘
THE DUTCH CONCESSION: in March, 1939* the Majlis (Parliament) granted a
» r® w -w m -ir  - 1—v- -^r rT-~~r— n ir r f - t*— * *  *
mining concession to Allgemeene Exploratie Maatschappij, covering an area ii: 
the central plateau® A clause in the concession stipulated that if the 
concessionaire in the course of its 'explorations discovered petroleum, it 
could enter into negotiation with the government concerning its development« 
This concession was nullified by the government in 1944 on the ground of 
non-p erformanc e0
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Table A-7.1
• Financial Pacts 
1967-1971
Revenues Payable to Iran 1967 
in £ Million.
1968 1969 1970 1971
Trading Companies: Stated
Payment 67.4 82.6 93.1 105.9 159.0
Income Tax 196.4 246.3 282.1 324.4 578.0
Operating^  Companies:Income Tax 4 .7 ■'5.1 5.6 6.5 8.1
Totals 268.5 334.0 380.8 436.8 745.1
Ret deduction for oil in kind - 0.5 2.1 3.4 3.0
Net payments to Iran 268.5 333.5 378.7 433.4 742.1
Foreign Currency Yield 
(£ Million)
Rials purchased to pay costs 
incurred in Rials. * 32.5 34.1 40.7 37.1 42.0
Main Expenditure in Rials 
(Equivalent in £ Million)
Payments to and on behalf of 
Employees. 32.2 34.7 36.2 34.6 CO
Payments to Contractors/local 
purchases 9-9 14.7 36.7 16.0 21.8
Capital Expenditure (£ Million)
Producing Company: Exploration
& Drilling 6.2 9.4 10.4 7.2 9.6
Other 9.1 14.5 24.1 10.8 33.8
Refining Company 5.6 4 .2 6 .3 1.4 1.0
Total: 20.9 28.1 40.8 19.4 44.4
* In addition, contractors paid by the Operating Companies in foreign 
currencies, purchased substantial amounts of rials on their own account.
Source: "Iranian Oil Operating Companies Annual Report"1971•
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Table A-7.2 - .
'■Development Disbursement of the Plan Organization 
(.'Billions of Rials)
' • .1968 - 1969 \
Development Recurrent Total Development Recurrent Total
Develop­
ment.
Develop­
ment.
Productive Sectors 
0 ) 46.7 1-7 48.4 53.5 2 .0 55-5
Infra-Structure 
Sectors (2) 19.0 -1.1 20.1 . 23.5 1.0 24.5
Social Services 
and Social Welfare(3). 4 • 4 7.3 11.7 6.0 8 .4 14.4
Totalj 70.1 10.1 . 80.2 .83.0 11.4-,: 94.4
Continued....
1970 1971.
Productive Sectors
(1) 58.5 2.7 61.2 61 .8 2 .9 64.7
Infra-Structure 
Sectors (2) 30.5 1.2 31.7 45-3 1*4 46.7
Social Services 
and Social ¥elfare(3) 7.1 9.5 16.6 11.6 10.9 22.5
Total: 96.1 13.4 109.5 . 118.7 15.2 133.9
Continued.......
Growth Rate 1971 Averac*e Growth 1968--71
Development Recurrent Total 
Develop­
ment.
Development Re current 
Develop- • 
ment.
Total
Productive Sectors (1) 5,6 7.4 5.7 9.8 19*5 10.2
In f ra.-S t ru c tur e 
Sectors (2) 48.5 16.7 47.3 33*6 8.4 32.4
Social Services and 
Social Welfare (3) 63.4 14.7 35'. 5 39.0 14.3 24.4
Total: 23.5 13.4 22.3 19.2 14.6 18.6
1) Includes .griculture and livestock breeding, industries and mines, oil 
as, water and power.
Continued,..........
TableA7»2 continued
2) Includes, transportation, communication, telecomnmnication, rural
and urban development, construction, housing and regional development,
5) Includes education and training, art and culture, tourism, health ' *
and sanitation, social welfare, research and statistics.
NOTE:
In all the Tables of this Appendix, the Average Growth rates are calculated 
on thet basis of the year immediately preceeding the period under study.
This practice is followed both by the Plan Organization and the Central 
Bank of Iran. -
Source t
Plan Organization - cited in nAnnual Report and Balance Sheet" Central 
Bank of Iran 1971# P*117
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\ ITon-Development Disbursements of The Plan
Organization 1968-71* (Billions of Rials)
1968 1969 1970 1971 Growth Hate
19 7 1
1. Repayment of Foreign
Loans 5.1 8,1 12.2 17.7 45. ¥
A. Principal 3*3
\
5.2 8 .6 13.6 58.1
B. Interest 1.8 2.9 3.6 . 4.1 13.9
2. Repayment of 
Domestic Loans 9.6 5.4 21.7 27.O 24.4.
A. Principal to the 
Banks 6,6 0 .8 16.4 21.0 28.0
Be Principal of 
Treasury Bills 6.7 2.0 2.0 2.0 0
6. Interest 2.3* 2.6 3.3- 4.0 21.2
3. Miscellaneous 2.0 1.5 •1.9 2.1 10.5
4. Total non-develop­
ment Expenditure: 16.7 15.0 35.8 46 .8 30.7
5. Total Development, 
non-development and 
recurrent expendit­
ure. 96.9 1Q9.4 145.3 180.7 24.4
Source: Centra,! Sank of Iran "Annual Report and Balance Sheet" 1971 • ?* 1<
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APPENDIX III 
Apoendix to the Introductory Note to Part III■ i -rL       •" .............. ■*!»©»■—i.im.mnw inrrMiHHi^ 'BWinii.l
Chart I
Chairman and 
Managing Director
Advisor to the Managing 
Director
2 Deputy Managing Directors
Operating Departments
Non~B asic 
Operations
Oil
Operations’ 
L- 1 1
Distribution
k
Housing? 
.Welfare etc,
Exploration Domestic Distribution 
Drilling, of Petroleum 
Production Products 
& Refining
Service Deoartaents
1« Legal
2C Managing Director’s 
Representative in the 
Agreement Area©
3© Secretariat
A© Organization Methods 
and Systems.
5c Pensions and Savings
6© Finance and Account.’ 
ancy*
10C. Technical Develop­
ment and P»esearch 
11© Transactions 
Committee
7c Personnel and Public 
Relations 6
8© Internal Reboui’ces 
Development©
9c Engineering & Techni* 
services©
382
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! ix  to  Chapter 8
T a b le  A«801
Crude Production of OPSC Countries 1960 -» 71
■ ii t  "in if i* n  11" nr" > r i " i riyi r-Ti*i itt'ii'iW in i r~mi m'(i n ■ n i i "iinmiri iniin"ti-mmriiirniiw~Mgrr<Tf»~ninim—
|fs bbi/cJ.ai
Country i960 1962 1964 1966 1968 1970 1971
Iran 1052*9 1314*2 1690*1 2113*3 2847.6 - 382806 4539.6
Indonesia 453 ©4 45606 464*6 600.7 853*6 892.1
Abu Dhabi — •* . 49606 693 08 934.4
Algeria «S» r o es» eaft 1029.1 785.4
S® Arabia 1313.5 1642.9 1 897.0 2602*9 30ii4o2 3799*3 4769.1
Iraq 972.2 1009.2 1255.2 1392©2 1503*3 1548o6 1694.1
Kuwait 1691.8 1957.8 2301.0 2484*1 2613*5 2989*6 3196o7
Qatar 186.2 215.3 291 ©3 339*5 362*4 430.7
Libya 182.3 862.4 1501 *1 2602o1 3318© 0 2760.8
Nigeria «39 «*» «*» - •d 1531.2
Venezuela 2846d 3159*8 3392*8 3371.1 3604*8 3708.0 3549.1
Total 
0PESO 7876o5, 9945©8 1 2070©4 14220®6 17652<>3 22131*0 25083.2
Percentage 
of World 32o6^ 37*7^ 42o5^ 42.95s 45*5# 47.952 '51.5^
Production
Note: a) The founder members of OPEC wares Iran, Iraq, Venezuela,
Saudi Arabia and Kuwait* Others joined as follows:- 
late i960, Qatar, 1962, Libya and Indonesia, i9^7 Abu Dhabi, 
1969 Algeria and 1971 Nigeria®
b) Indonesia, Algeria and Nigeria produced oil on a substantial 
scale before joining OPEC*
Source: ’'Management Statistics” NIOG paste hi ei fof interna], circulation
— i ta * m  wni 1. juiCb *1 /  \
(in Persian)
Table A«8®2
m wpww ira*  ■o.-em.m.Ta'acfc*'t> «*» <■»
OPEC Crude Exports in Comparison vriLth World Crude 
Exports I962 and 1971 (000s s bbl/day)
Country 1962 1971 -
Indonesia
Abu Dhabi
Algeria
So Arabia
Iraq
Kuwait
Qatar
Libya
Iran
Nigeria
Venezuela
251 ©0 ,
13789.9
950.8  
* «
184.9
179.5
933.6
Ca»
1476.8
655.1
927.6
687.6 
4186.7 
1573.4  
.2775.2
428.6
2W 7.4
3979.0
1470.1 
1635.0
Total 0EBC
Percentage of 
World exports;
5335*5
.69 ©4$
21065*7
i;gf&iS2ir!2fiaQ-»X4S2s:
Source: As in Table 13«!3ki»AdU»r<»
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Appendix'.to Chapter 10
T ableA~10»1
Petroleum Product Demand by End-lTse 
Total for Iran (1960-69)
End Use and Product
H is t o r i c a l—Thousands o f  Cubic Motors
R e s id e n t ia l  and comm ercial
LPG 4 4 11 13 21 . 30 44 67
K erosene 878 989 1 ,0 5 4 1 ,1 3 2 1 ,2 9 2 1 ,3 2 3 1,377 1 ,6 2 7
Gas o i l 227 238 245 247 257 263 278 296
F u e l o i l 392 405 419 432 411 521 523 554
S u b to ta l 1 ,5 0 1 1 ,6 3 6 1 ,7 2 9 1,824 1,981 2 ,1 3 7 2 ,2 2 2 2 ,5 4 4
E le c t r i c  g e n e r a tin g  p la n t
Gas o i l 112 123 127 131 145 155 169
F u el o i l 122 124 127 136 178 197 262
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A v ia t io n
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Motor g a s o lin e t t t t t
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A ll o i lie r 9 10 11 - 11 13 12 23
S u b to ta l 100 108 117 125 134 142 151
T o ta l d o m estic  demand 3 ,7 9 7 4 ,1 7 3 4 ,4 3 8 4 ,6 6 4 5 ,3 4 5 5 ,8 3 0 6 ,5 7 8
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T a b le  A-1 2 .7
K lfdilights of inCOC1 s .f in an c ia l S ta tements
» ,
1 o D om esticsa les re a lis a t io n  (n e t of d isco u n ts). increased  by 1 1 a1/c in  
19^8 and 12*6£o in  19^9 (compared with the  previous. y e a r)0
2£ T o ta l revenues have remained remarkably, s tab le  a t about GQyl of sa les 
re a lisa tio n s
3© The net p ro f i t  margin increased from 4o5/o in  19^7 to  5*3/-  in  19&S,  then 
dropped to  4*3/* in  1 9&9 ? •
L* Net-income-'after taxes increased 3^- in  19 6 8 'but i t  dropped by 8;4 in
1969©
5o In te re s t  payments more than t r ip le d  in  th ree  years*
60 T o ta l as set s..nearly doubled between the end, of *i 9^7 end the end of
1 9 6 9 * On the asse ts side , on a percentage b asis  almost a l l  the growth
occurred in  property , p lan t and equipment o This growth in  e ffe c t r e f l ­
ects to  a large  extent the a sse ts  employed in  the domestic operations®
7© I f  we compare net worth (n e t'.a sse ts) fo r  1 9 0  ° f  $705©4 m illion  with 
the net income from domestic operations of 0>£M>l. ■ m illio n , then i t  
becomes c l e a r ’th a t the  domestic-'operating-..assets-were mainly financed 
by non-domestic revenueso
8» The physical a sse ts  increased 2o5 tim es, to  over h a lf  a b i l l io n  d o lla rs  
■Taftsiriii i ,»b illy- jyfu
Appendix to  the P o s tsc rip tm m » i» i — mim w h i i FMi'fci 9n»»o»i»m  H i in ww w ’t i w i
Iranian Reserves and Production Policy
The purpose of . th is  appendix is  to  appraise the  Iran ian  reserves and 
production p o licy  in  the l ig h t  o f 'th e  1973 NIOC take-over of the"Consort­
ium1 s operations® *
The Iran ian  reserves are not as a n a tte r  of po licy ,published  by NIOC*
There are .u n o ff ic ia l  estim ates of 45 b i l l io n  b a rre ls  (1) and 55 b i l l io n  
b a rre ls  p lus 14 b i l l io n  b a rre ls  i f  the nethods of secondary recovery are 
applied® (2) Recently, Dr® R* P a lish , NIOC’s ch ief a rc h ite c t of the  new' 
agreement , has siad  th a t the Iran ian  p o te n tia l  reserves in  th e ’Agreement 
Area1 amount to  60^78'b i l l io n  b a r re ls ,  and in 'th e  whole of the  country the 
reserves could be 90 -100  b i l l io n  barrels® ( 3 )
I t  i s  c le a r  th a t any estim ation of the  length of time the Iran ian  o i l  
reserves would l a s t ,  depends e n tire ly  on the r a te  of ex p lo ita tio n  dnd the 
success in  discovering new o i l  reserves® One can however, make a rough 
c a lcu la tio n , based on the  most opstim istic  and p essim istic  fo recast'-to  see 
how long the  Ix'anian o i l . reserves w il l  last®
Let us f i r s t  take-the.-most pessim istic  estim ate  of 45 b i l l io n  b a r re ls ,  
p lus 1 4  b i l l io n  b a rre ls  fo r  secondary recovery in  1 9^9<> Prom 1969 to  1973  
Iran  produced over 11 b i l l io n  barrels-, leaving 48 b i l l io n  b a rre ls  of o i l  
reserves in  1973® I f  NIOC produces 42®5 b i l l io n  b a rre ls  in  the 1973 to 1993 
period , under 6 b i l l io n  b a rre ls  would be l e f t  fo r  the  domestic consumption
1 o"Iran  Almanac and The Book of P ac ts” 19^9 > Tehran Published by Soho of Iran 
2® In te rn a tio n a l Petroleum Ihicyc loo c o la , 1970 
3® ileyhan In te rn a tio n a l, Ju ly  21st® 1973
from 1993 onwards«, As domestic consumption is  expected to  be around 550 
m illio n  b a rre ls  in  1993? thus the Iran ian  re  serve would l a s t  an ex tra  8 to 
*10 years depending on the ra te  of growth of the- domestic demand and the ra te  
cxf su b s titu tio n  of n a tu ra l gas fo r  oil<> This means th a t I ra n  would exhaust 
i t s  o i l  resources by th e .y ear 2,003°
To take the most op tim istic  fo recas t of 90-100 b i l l io n  b a rre ls , Iran  would 
have around 50 b i l l io n  .barrels l e f t  a t the end of 1993  and th is  would. suppD.y 
the  domestic demand fo r  a fu r th e r  80-100 yearse Thus the o i l  reserves w ill 
be exhausted by the year 2,-1 9 3©
In  both cases the ind iea tiohs are th a t Iran  i s  un like ly  to export o i l  in .
large  qu an titie s  a f te r  1993© 'W hether or not i t  is  a rationed po licy  to
deplete th e .o i l  resources as f a s t  i s  a debateable po in t and must r e a l ly  be
considered in  the l ig h t  of the overa3.1 economic p o licy 0 Since Iran  has
embarked on -ambitious development programmes fo r  th e  implemenation of which
*■
la rg e  o i l  revenues are e s se n tia l, such a production p o licy  may, be ju s tif ia b L  
bu t i t  i s  e sse n tia l th a t domestic demand be s a t is f ie d  fo r  a considerable 
period  a f te r  the stoppage of exports, Iran  w ill be hard pressed  to  invest ir  
such c a p ita l  in tensive  technologies such as - nuclear power and should ensure 
th a t i t s  o i l  po licy  vrould allow the im portation of these technologies only 
when they become cheaper and more widely used®
I t  i s  in co rrec t to  compare the Iran ian  production p o licy  w ith those of 
Libya, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, which have c u rta ile d  production fo r  conser­
va tion  and p o l i t ic a l  considerations, because these coun tries do not have an 
o u tle t fo r  such large  amounts of o i l  revenues and as such can a ffo rd  to  keep 
t h e i r  o i l  in  the ground in  a n tic ip a tio n  of higher fu tu re  p r ic e s , or use i t  
as a Y/aapon in  the c o n flic t against Israe lo
T ota l investment 
ONP
Per cap ita  income 
Growth ra te  of GNP 
Number of new jobs
Investment in : 
A gricu lture 
Industry  
O il :■
Education 
Housing 
H ealth
$ 3 2 ,0 0 0  m illion
Up-from $16,000 to. $27,600 m illio n  
Up from $513 to  $9 0 7  
11 o4x p 0a0 a t constant p rice s  
1 o7 mi3-lion
$2350 m illion  
$6700 1 
$4A0O »
$1700  ”
^5390 u 
^ 400 "
Source: Prime M in is te r s  Speech to  the  Parliam ent0 Keyiian In te rn a tio n a l
January 8th c 1973©
The Iranian Balance of Payments in  the F ifth  Plan
Period ( $ I lillio n s )
1 * Current receipts (to ta l)  27,701
a) o i l  revenues 22,050
b) other exports 3,693
c) in v is ib le  exports 1,953
2© Current payments ,30,508
a) imports 25,821
b) non-banking gold if1
c) payment for service 3,439
d) repayment of debt and assured in terest 1,207
3© Balance of current account -2,807
4o Capital account receipts 8,243
a) foreign loans by the government sector 7,793
b) other loans and private foreign capital 450
5© Capital account payments 4,661
a) amortization of foreign debts and credits 3,907
b) investment abroad and repayment of foreign private
debts . ~ 754
6C Balance of cap ita l account 3,582
7o Balance of foreign payments (net) 775
Source: The F ifth  Development Plah of Iran Plan Organization P0 20 ( in  Persist
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